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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a critical analysis of the current human rights protection for 
suspects in the criminal justice system of China, evaluating them from the view of 
international human rights law and practice, in particular, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR). The theme that runs through the paper is whether the right to fair trial is 
practically and adequately available to the suspect in China according to the 
established international standards. The hypothesis is that by addressing the distance 
between the Chinese system and international standards on the issue of human rights 
protection for suspects in the pre-trail criminal procedure, and the causes for this 
distance, the direction of further reform for criminal justice system will become 
clearer and more practical. The ultimate purpose of this paper is to consider how to 
handle the relationship between crime control and human rights protection, when the 
crime rates in China have generally been rising along with the high-speed economic 
development in recent years.  
 
Before outlining the performance of China, this paper considers the current 
understanding and interpretation of the relevant standards in ICCPR and ECHR. 
Extensive consideration is then given to weigh criminal procedure law and its 
practice in China against those international standards in a new detailed part. Taking 
into account the highly influential effects of China’s traditional legal culture and 
special social situation, the paper is devoted to investigate four most pressing issues 
regarding the continuing Chinese criminal justice reform on the pre-trial procedure in 
different chapters: guiding ideologies and basic principles, the pre-trial compulsory 
measures system, prevention of the use of illegal evidence obtained through torture 
and the right to legal counsel before trial. This comprehensive examination shows the 
significant progress regarding fair trial rights for suspects China has made in meeting 
international standards set in ICCPR, in particular the Criminal Procedure Law of 
1996. The barriers and challenges that impair the criminal procedural rights for 
suspects and impede the proper enforcement of the existing criminal justice system 
to come in line with international standards are also highlighted with possible 
suggestions of improvements. These problems root in current social, cultural and 
ii 
 
institutional conditions under which the criminal justice system operates, including 
difficulties in changing the traditional ideology, the deficiencies and failure with the 
law itself for certain issues, the incorrect and ineffective enforcement of the law, and 
a severe shortage of professionally qualified judges, prosecutors, police and lawyers. 
As a result, the practices in human rights violation against suspects that subsequent 
reforms have been trying to eradicate still remain in the Chinese criminal justice 
system. The thesis concludes with the allegation that the introduction of some key 
rights into Chinese criminal justice system to provide greater protection to its 
suspects for preventing possible stage power abuse is a step in the right direction, but 
further procedural safeguards are necessary to ensure an effective rebalance of 
China’s criminal justice system. Apart from improving its legal system to fully 
comply with international human rights standard, the reform must fit within the 
Chinese culture and way of life. Therefore, the government must consider further 
actions to address and develop the cultural and social conditions of the Chinese 
criminal justice system.  
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Chapter One Introduction 
The criminal justice system is in People’s Republic of China (China) at the stage of 
being developed just like its economy. Many problems are apparent, not only in law 
but also in practice. The essence of criminal procedure law is to combine the 
punishment of crime with the protection of human rights.1 On one hand, the state 
must use harsh measures such as detention and arrest to restrict the freedom of 
citizens in order to punish crime and maintain social and public order. On the other 
hand, in order to protect the innocent against being investigated unjustified for 
criminal responsibility and prevent the state from infringing upon the citizen’s rights, 
the design of criminal proceedings must be focused on human rights protection of 
suspects. The concept of due process is central to fundamental human rights because 
it requires equal protection for all individuals. In particular, human rights protection 
for all legal actions concerning the suspects, who are in a situation of inferiority and 
weakness remains a major challenge in the area of overall improvement in respect of 
the individual. Therefore, there are long-term struggles between public safety and 
individual freedom with serious conflicts between crime control and due process. 
Striking the appropriate balance between these interests is always a complex issue 
for law enforcement agencies. Such issues have become much more urgent, 
especially after 9/11 all over the world. China is one of the countries actively seeking 
the balance between crime control and due process in its reform of the criminal 
justice system.2 In 1996, China completed a major revision of its Criminal Procedure 
Law of People’s Republic of China (CCPL), which was originally enacted in 1979.3 
Considerable attention has been paid to ensure due process and establish fundamental 
                                               
1
 The best-known framework for evaluating the criminal process is that of Herbert Packer, developed in the 1960s, 
see H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, (Stanford University Press, 1968). 
2
 Packer’s theory was introduced into China in early 1990s, See Xingjian Li, On the Structure of Criminal 
Procedure, (Chinese University of Political Science and Law Press, 1992). 
3
 Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (1996 Amendment), 17/03/96, [hereafter CCPL 
1996]. 
3 
 
human rights for suspects and defendants in modern criminal justice systems in 
China. 
 
At the same time, human rights have become of increasing relevance and demanding, 
nationally and internationally, in recent years. International human rights law, such as 
the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 
contain strict rules about human rights protection for suspects which are applicable at 
all times.4 As reviewed in this thesis, the principles established by these instruments 
include the presumption of innocence, prohibition against arbitrary detention, 
prohibition against torture, and right to defence, etc. They represent common agreed 
principles of desirable practice by which governments can assess and upgrade their 
own criminal justice systems, harmonise legislative provisions and operational 
procedures across national frontiers, and so contribute to the development of the 
concept of the international rule of law. In particular, the ICCPR has become the 
universal standard of achievement and has played an active guiding role in criminal 
justice and its reform for both the East and the West, as those standards and norms 
express common human values and the vast majority of the countries in the world 
have signed and ratified the ICCPR. The performance of governments, and even their 
legitimacy, is being measured against the standards of these international standards. 
The member States are under legal obligation to take the necessary legislative and 
practical measures to put an end to all practices that violate the rules set forth in the 
ICCPR and therefore to raise the standards of human rights protection to the same 
level as the international community. 
 
As an active participant in globalisation and also one of the signatories to the ICCPR, 
China demonstrates its desire to ratify the ICCPR and effectively implement it. 
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Criminal justice is an area of great potential for improvement in implementing the 
ICCPR standards in China. China is becoming more receptive to international 
monitoring too, even though “the predomination of Western Values in the 
international human rights regime” and “interference into internal affairs” are still 
often an issue for debate.5 While reforms to the laws of criminal procedure in China 
have begun to recognize and redress the inadequacies and limitations according to 
the requirements and spirit of the ICCPR, the ongoing progress may have 
demonstrated many clear signs of positive progress in the right direction. But a 
realistic view suggests that the procedural changes promulgated in the CCPL of 1996 
cannot currently be relied upon to guarantee a fair trial for suspects as required by 
international standards. Sustained effort over a period of years will be needed for 
China to be able to meet its ICCPR commitments on human rights protection laws. 
This thesis is intended to demonstrate the gap, challenges and prospects for China to 
promulgate amendments to the Law and practice of the criminal justice system in 
conformity with ICCPR provisions and to finally grant suspects the right to a fair 
trial. Obviously, any discussion of the changes to this legal system is based on a 
fundamental belief that the ICCPR standards are common standards for the 
protection of human rights. 
 
1. The Current Situation of the Criminal Legal System and Human 
Rights Protection in China  
1.1 Human Rights Protection in the Constitution 
The law should keep up with the times. The 1982 Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China is still in place today, and its amendments have largely been 
concerned with adjusting the Constitution to reflect practice. The 15th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP) decided in September 1997 to 
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 See State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Human Rights in China (White Paper), 11/91; for a good 
overview and a literature study on this issue see, Stijn Deklerck, “Human Rights in China: Tradition, Politics and 
Change”,  (2003) 6, Studia Diplomatica, Vol 56., pp. 53-108. 
5 
 
ensure that the people should enjoy extensive rights and freedom endowed by law, 
and that human rights are guaranteed and respected.6  In 1999 China’s National 
People’s Congress (NPC) amended the Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China to insert “the rule of law” into that document as a leading principle for the first 
time. Later the term “respect for and protection of human rights by the State” was 
adopted in 2004 in the Chinese Constitution as well. This is the first time for China 
to mention the word human rights in its Constitution, which points to progress in the 
development of human rights in China.  
 
The President of China and CCP Secretary-General Hu Jintao has reiterated the 
importance of the Constitution on behalf of the government, and stated that the 
Constitution should be a legal weapon to safeguard citizens’ rights and for this 
purpose, education on the Constitution must be provided, especially at Party and 
cadre schools. No organization or individual is privileged to stand above the 
Constitution and other laws.7 The implementation of human rights concepts will take 
time in China. But with a highly significant move to include a human rights 
provision into the Constitution and the express pledge to the same from the 
government, full commitment to the international human rights law is logically a 
further development for current law and practice in China. 
 
1.2 Criminal Procedure Law in China  
Implementation of the human rights treaties will involve both international and 
domestic action on the part of China. But it is the domestic implementation that is the 
most crucial and most elusive obligation. Briefly speaking, in China, the criminal 
legal system mainly consists of the CCPL and the Criminal Law of the People’s 
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Republic of China (CCL) with relevant legal interpretations.8 In many contemporary 
western countries, criminal procedure features procedural protection afforded to 
suspects, such as right to notification, right to silence, right to bail, the exclusion of 
wrongly obtained evidence, and the right to legal counsel, and much more. In these 
countries, the public shares the horror at the prospect of wrongly convicting an 
innocent person, and hence commits to the basic protection of human rights with a 
broad spectrum, and besides, most notably values the relentless pursuit of truth. 
However, much of what has been accepted as fundamental to a Western criminal 
justice system has only now entered public discourse in China. Human rights 
protection is especially inadequate in China’s criminal justice system. This position 
of current CCPL is a result of a combination of factors embraced in the political 
structure, social ideology of individual rights and the traditional culture of Chinese 
characteristics as illustrated in this thesis. 
 
One of the principal goals of the revisions of CCPL in 1996 was to strengthen human 
rights protection available to suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings. The 
reform in 1996 has attracted almost universal acclaim and has been seen as a 
milestone on the road to the rule of law in the field of criminal justice in China.9 The 
amendment introduces some key rights and procedural safeguards for suspects into 
China’s criminal justice system, such as the recognition of the presumption of 
innocence, the expansion of the right to counsel, the limits set to non-judicial 
determination of guilt, and the establishment of a more transparent trial process. It 
shows the intention of the Chinese government to follow the trends in the 
development of human rights and move towards being a country that respects the 
rule of law. There are high expectations that the amendment will afford suspects 
more procedural protection in China’s criminal justice system and bring China’s 
criminal procedure closer to international standards.  
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However, there is still a long way to go for China to realize human rights protection 
and development. Noticeably, the CCPL of 1996 has merely 225 Articles, and does 
not have specific provisions on many issues, which can barely meet the practical 
needs. Soon after the revised CCPL was put into practice, the different legislative 
and judicial organs, under pressure from all sides, again have had to issue a series of 
detailed, and sometimes conflicting, amendments and supplementary provisions to 
this law in the form of legal interpretations.10 Expedient countermeasures against the 
reforms of criminal justice abounded. Up till the present, the status of Chinese 
suspects and defendants is not satisfactory, which can be indicated by the simple fact 
that the rate of defence lawyers appear in court is very low.11 Doubts have been 
raised as to how much impact the reform since 1996 has had in practice. In recent 
years, numerous reports have been issued, based on international and domestic 
observation and studies, highlighting the human rights abuses in the criminal process 
of China.12  All these reports raised serious concerns, particularly regarding three 
main areas of implementations related to the legal interests of the suspects under the 
CCPL of 1996.13 First, they found the various time limits on detention had been 
widely ignored. Second, torture had reached epidemic proportions, although both the 
CCPL and the CCL prohibit it. Third, lawyers representing defendants or suspects in 
criminal cases encountered a great deal of difficulty in carrying out their professional 
duties. These situations reflect the fact that the promised protection of human rights 
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for suspects in the CCPL of 1996 has not yet reached international standards and this 
issue needs to be solved by further revising the CCPL. The amendment of the CCPL 
has been included in the legislature plan of the 10th NPC. 14  It is important to 
investigate the most pressing issues during the coming revision. 
 
2. China and the ICCPR 
2.1 The Meaning of Ratification of the ICCPR to China 
With the development of society there is no excuse for China to say it does not want 
to ratify the ICCPR. This international guideline is the minimum requirement 
wherein criminal justice ensures basic human rights, so every civilization and legal 
state should obey these basic guidelines. Internationally, China has claimed in 
relation to international human rights law that any convention acceded to by China 
becomes binding as soon as it has been signed. The process of signature, ratification 
and deposit signifies that the state identifies with and has committed itself to the 
human rights standards laid down in the international treaties. The signature is the 
first step in this identification. China signed the ICCPR on 5 October 1998 and is 
now studying it with a view to early ratification. It is an important step in committing 
the Chinese government to the protection of those internationally recognized human 
rights embodied in the Covenant. But signing a document is a very different matter 
from abiding by it. Ratification in the ICCPR is the process whereby a state finally 
confirms that it intends to be bound by a treaty which it has previously signed, 
consent not being effective until such ratification takes place.  
 
Ratification of the ICCPR by China as early as possible is the earnest desire of the 
many Chinese scholars, the Chinese government and the whole international 
community.15 China has been reiterating in its reports to the United Nations (UN) 
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human rights machinery that treaty law becomes domestic law on ratification without 
any further change.16 Therefore, once China ratifies the ICCPR, it must implement 
the obligations stated therein and act realistically as required. In theory, international 
law in China is directly applicable. In the event of a discrepancy between the 
provisions of an international instrument and domestic law, the latter is to be brought 
into line with the former. Where subtle differences remain, international instruments 
took precedence over domestic law.17 In practice this has proven to be true at least in 
cases of commercial or civil disputes. However, in other types of disputes there is no 
such clear reference. So far there have not been overt references to the influence of 
international human rights law on domestic law by courts other than rhetorically. As 
in the case of China’ s own current laws, enforcement and implementation are all too 
often lacking, even if backed by real political will. The state is simply not capable of 
delivering even the limited rights it accords its citizens.  
 
As presented later in this thesis, China has no traditional philosophical foundation for 
the concept of human rights, which has its origins in the liberal democratic tradition 
of Western Europe. There are different cultures and different approaches towards 
human rights in China.18 It is obvious that China cannot now accept the ICCPR into 
its law in the way that the HRA 1998 in United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland (UK) accepted the ECHR. But reflection can be drawn from the 
reception of the ECHR into UK domestic law by the Human Right Acts 1998. 
Fenwick commented that it may be viewed as a public statement from the nation as a 
whole of the importance that they attach to human rights, has given the judges a 
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clearer mandate to develop a domestic human rights jurisprudence. 19  The UK 
experience inspires China with the hope that the ratification of the ICCPR may give 
further impetus to build a culture of rights and responsibilities across China. Through 
such influence, mutual understanding of human rights protection can be reinforced 
and spread, so that human rights protection for the suspects is promoted. Also, this 
will bring more positive changes to the criminal justice system and the overall legal 
system. The ratification of the ICCPR can ensure that those who are making 
domestic laws pay attention to the basic rights they will always have to justify 
interfering with. They should not ignore individual rights just because they conflict 
with the collective interest and should focus on the issues which involve possible 
infringements or limitations of rights. Furthermore, ratifying the ICCPR will make 
China subject to more international monitoring of its human rights situation. But 
through genuine improvement, China can limit the number of cases taken to the 
international level, and therefore limit the political embarrassment such a case can 
cause. 
 
2.2 Obligation to Enact the ICCPR in Good faith before Ratification 
The PRC is still preparing for its ratification. Then what should China do before its 
ratification? Although the Chinese government has expressed a few times on various 
occasions that China is committed to ratifying the ICCPR when the conditions are 
right, it has however never given a clear timetable.20 According to the Constitution of 
China, signing conventions with other countries and acceding to international treaties 
are matters that can be deliberated more than once by the Standing Committee of the 
NPC, for there is no restriction as to how many times nor how long the deliberation 
may take.21 The ratification of international instruments that the Standing Committee 
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of the NPC has decided to join can be approved with just over half the votes of the 
Committee members.22 In regard to important international conventions, treaties and 
laws, the Standing Committee usually has several deliberations so that the members 
may have sufficient time to understand their contents, to consult each other, as well 
as to study and discuss in depth the more important issues at stake. The State Council 
has not yet submitted the ICCPR for deliberation.  
 
Moreover, from the perspective of domestic Law, the more reservations or 
declarations are resorted to, the easier it is for the State and the Covenant to be in 
agreement. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the International Human Rights 
Covenants, State Parties should make as few reservations or declarations as possible, 
as these would lead to more discord or divergence between Domestic Law and 
International Covenants. According to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, to which China is a party, a State party cannot take action counter to 
the object and purpose of the Convention, namely, it cannot make reservations 
violating the purpose of a treaty. Thus, although China has the right to make 
reservations, the basic principle of the ICCPR is not subject to reservations.  
Therefore like other countries, China has to consider, on the basis of its own situation 
and sufficient commitment to its obligations under the Covenant, what reservations 
to make regarding the covenants. This issue deserves separate research. Only in this 
way will the covenants be implemented after ratification, otherwise, they would be 
no more than empty words. To study the implications carefully is a responsible 
attitude to assume towards the covenants as well as common practice in the 
international community. Similar situations have occurred in other western countries. 
For instance, the USA signed the ICCPR in 1977, but only ratified it 15 years later in 
1992.  
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However, before ratification of the ICCPR, China should firstly effectuate the treaty 
voluntarily. It seems that at this stage China may carry out any domestic legislation, 
in line with or not in line with the principle of human rights protection for suspects 
stipulated in the ICCPR, because there is no executive responsibility of a State party 
before ratifying a treaty. But as stated in Article 2(2) of the ICCPR, “where not 
already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt 
such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant”.23 This article creates an affirmative duty on 
signatories to comply with the ICCPR provisions. It is the signatory state that bears 
responsibility for ensuring and promoting the ICCPR standards domestically and 
defining broad language within the UN’s and the Covenant’s minimum standards of 
human rights protection.  
 
In addition to negative obligations preventing state authorities from interfering with 
or depriving individuals of civil and political rights, the provisions of the ICCPR also 
impose positive obligations upon states. State parties must establish procedures and 
mechanisms which effectively ensure protection of ICCPR rights. Also under the 
universal principle, a state is legally obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat 
the object and purpose of the treaty in the period between signature and ratification 
or until it has indicated that it will not be bound; and this before entry into force of 
the treaty, provided that the latter is not unduly delayed.24 It seems that the obligation 
to abstain from pre-treaty acts prejudicial to the treaty is necessary if states wish to 
conduct their international relations with assurance and in good faith. It follows 
logically that if this pre-treaty obligation carries legal force, a breach of it will itself 
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involve international responsibility.25  
 
Therefore it is vital to introduce the international standards of criminal justice into 
the releveant part of domestic law. It would be more promising if China carefully 
revised its domestic law to increase the standard of human rights protection for 
suspects in preparation for the ratification of the ICCPR. But as discussion in later 
chapters will demonstrate, in the CCPL of 1996 there are many provisions which are 
inconsistent with the rules and practices in ICCPR. There is much work to be done 
before the Chinese government ratifies this Covenant. First of all, the knowledge of 
how to correctly interpret and understand the ICCPR is crucial. The rich 
jurisprudence with respect to the interpretations of the Covenant by the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) has not been adequately taken into account in the research 
done in China on the ICCPR. Only after the Covenant can be comprehended in a 
correct way to substantially grasp and sufficiently understand it, can a useful 
theoretical preparatory work for the ratification and implementation of the ICCPR by 
China be enforced. Research on the interpretation therefore must be further 
strengthened. Second, there is an issue of the concordance between Chinese domestic 
Law and international human rights Covenants in the course of ratification and 
application, including modifying some domestic law progressively and establishing 
the social idea of the supremacy of human rights for the whole of society. Presently, 
there already exists a series of mechanisms for implementing the obligations of the 
international Covenants, consisting mainly of legislative, administrative, judicial and 
legal monitoring measures in China. Regarding the application of the ICCPR, though 
these existing domestic mechanisms cannot fully guarantee success, they will 
continue to play an important role in accordance with the requirements of the 
Covenant. It is on the basis of this prerequisite that China signed the covenants.  
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Proposing standards and norms is not difficult. What is difficult, however, is for 
countries to actually make improvements to their justice systems. ICCPR provides a 
spur to Chinese legislation. Unless specific and feasible methods and procedures are 
laid down, it is virtually impossible, however hard one tries, to initiate and achieve 
such improvements. For example, an important use of the ECHR for the UK was to 
successfully reveal basic flaws in UK law.26 Legislation prompted by the ECHR, at 
least in part, includes, for example, the Contempt of Court Act 1981.The Strasbourg 
Court’s judgment in Sunday Times v UK (No.1) was an important factor leading to 
the reform. 27  Both at the time of pending ratification and at the stage of actual 
implementation of the ICCPR by China, it is obviously necessary to take a look at 
what the ICCPR actually says in criminal justice and what impact it will have upon 
China’s ratification. Those minimum international standards for criminal justice need 
to be used for reference to assess the justice of the national criminal procedure, and 
to be absorbed and step by step become part of national law. When suspects assert 
their rights in the criminal proceedings, those standards could also be their reasons 
for protecting their rights. China’s introduction of a general human rights guarantee 
in its Constitution, passing new legislation or amending existing legislation would 
best be done prior to the ratification of the covenants. This would bring up new 
challenges as well as opportunities for the modernisation of the Chinese criminal 
procedure. 
 
3. Methodology, Scope and Route Map 
3.1 Methodology and Scope 
Through a comparative study, this thesis aims mainly to address the disparity 
between the relevant international standards and Chinese law and practice on the 
issue of human rights protection in criminal justice, and to see what can be done to 
reduce the gap in the context of China’s possible ratification, so as to raise the 
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consciousness of human rights and accelerate the realization of criminal justice in 
China. The thesis has been guided by the emerging fair trial standards set by the UN, 
particularly under the ICCPR, and the standards in ECHR. The research method will 
be based on a literature review of primary and secondary sources. These include 
official international and regional human rights treaties, pieces of national legislation 
and case law. Secondary sources are books, articles from the Internet, reports, 
international rules and standards and local newspapers. Regarding the methodology 
of this research, there are some limitations because information and statistics on 
human rights violations of suspects in trouble with the law are very difficult to obtain 
in China. They happen mostly within closed doors and are perpetrated by agents of 
the state. Therefore, without conducting interviews with victims or field research in 
China, any information or statistics on the subject will be based primarily on books, 
government sources or sources from specific international organisations. 
 
Understandably, a full discussion covering all the issues on human rights protection 
in criminal justice is wide-ranging. However, the scope of this research is limited in 
volume and time. So it would seem more advisable to confine it to a specific issue. 
Therefore this thesis does not seek to indict the entire criminal justice system in 
China. Instead, it will focus on the issues related to human rights protection for 
suspects in pre-trial procedure. Only four major issues related to human rights 
protection for suspects are discussed here, namely the changing guiding ideology, the 
pre-trial compulsory measures system, prevention of the use of illegal evidence 
obtained through torture and the right to legal counsel before trial. Admittedly, these 
are in no way the only issues limiting the full exercise of human rights protection for 
suspects in China, even in the pre-trial stage only. However, they are a good 
reflection of some of the main current issues in this area, not only from a Chinese 
perspective, but internationally as well. None of the four issues have received a wide 
analysis also due to the constraints mentioned above. However, in some ways, they 
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present a good link between the status of China’s criminal legal system and the 
requirements of the ICCPR. The discussion is sufficient to afford the reader some 
appreciation of the significant progress made so far and the challenges that remain in 
China.   
 
At the same time, Chinese scholars have already been actively conducting research 
on the CCPL reform, but the results and suggestions in most Chinese expert drafts 
for the further reform of CCPL are still not fully achieving the international 
requirements of the ICCPR and other international human rights instruments.28 Most 
drafts are limited to the mere understanding of the literal meaning of the Covenant 
text, without comprehensively and sufficiently looking into the first-hand materials 
of the interpretations and development of the Covenant by the HRC in the General 
Comments, the Concluding Observations and the final views adopted after the 
consideration of individual communications. Furthermore, when discussing the 
understanding of the ICCPR and the differences between the provisions of the 
Covenant and the relevant current CCPL and practice, some research even uses 
domestic law as a reference to determine whether the Chinese law complies with the 
rule of ICCPR or not.29 However, the meaning of the ICCPR must be determined by 
the Covenant and the HRC. If consideration of ratification is based on an inadequate 
understanding and interpretation in relation to the theories, rules and practices of 
international standards, it may well leave many difficulties and hindrances 
encumbrances for the future application and implementation and so jeopardize the 
commitment of China to the Covenant. Therefore this thesis considers the subject in 
several steps.  
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In order to consider how to conform to the standards set in the ICCPR with real 
commitment during the further reform of the CCPL and more effectively facilitate 
the ratification process of ICCPR in China, it is necessary to begin the research by 
providing a comprehensive, clear and correct knowledge and understanding of the 
international standards directly relevant to the field of human rights protection for the 
suspects. The correct grasp and substantive understanding of the interpretation of the 
ICCPR by the work of the HRC must constitute an integral and indispensable part of 
this thesis. Their work is very helpful and crucial to an adequate and thorough 
understanding of the object and purpose of the ICCPR and the exact scope and 
meanings of the requirements set forth in its provisions. It is not the intention here to 
present an exhaustive review of all the jurisprudence on these rules, but rather to give 
an in-depth commentary on the leading jurisprudence and latest approach to the 
protection of suspects’ rights adopted by the judicial bodies under the covenant when 
considering violations of the relevant rules. The relevant ICCPR rules on fair trial in 
criminal justice, namely Articles 7, 9 and 14, and their definitions and interpretations 
by the HRC will be carefully examined and studied, thus establishing an instructive 
model for this discussion.  
 
Since developments on the international level have not occurred in isolation, the 
contribution of the regional organisations will also be considered. The ECHR is the 
most developed system for the international protection of civil and political rights, 
not necessarily in the sense of being the best devised, or having a supervisory body 
with the most sophisticated reasoning, but as having the most extensive interpretative 
case law, covering almost 60 years.30  Many issues relevant to the protection of 
suspects’ rights have arisen before the European Commission and Court of Human 
Rights but have not yet even arisen in the other systems. Moreover, the opinions 
                                               
30
 See Iain Cameron, “The European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and United Nations Security 
Council Counter-Terrorism Sanctions”, 06/02/06, reported at Committee of Legal Advisers on Public 
International Law (CAHDI), 32nd Meeting, Athens, 13-14 September, 2006. 
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expressed by the European Court of Human Rights (European Court) in their cases 
have some link with the HRC, which usually use them as evidence to interpret a 
provision of the ICCPR or to deliver a General Comment thereof. Therefore, the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR with its rich case law mirrors, to a certain extent, the 
standards and norms as set out in the ICCPR from a wider point of view not only 
with respect to how the specific issue is understood but also how the European Court 
has interpreted those State Party’s obligations under a human rights instrument.  
 
As a result, although it is impossible for China to be a member state of the ECHR, 
some relevant rules and cases delivered by the European Court have been a valuable 
reference for China in its understanding of the ICCPR in depth. It is also worth 
noting that the European system has been able to function effectively because of the 
existence of the same liberal democratic tradition in Western Europe and the co-
operation between governments in European countries.31 However, observation of 
these relevant key cases in the ECHR has also been of invaluable inspiration for 
China to identify and estimate whether its concrete situation is compatible with 
international standards and so continue implementing relevant reforms. The 
advantages and limitations of human rights protection for suspects under ECHR are 
therefore considered and quoted when necessary in the thesis to understand and 
explain specific questions. The standards specified in the ECHR relevant to this 
research are mainly set out in Article 3, Article 5 and Article 6. Moreover, whilst 
rights in the international treaties are set out in general terms, some development of 
the UK common law and express statutory enactment under the UK system therefore 
is presented in the thesis to seek to provide a more specific and detailed example 
through which to study the protection of suspects’ rights. The national courts 
contribute to the development of domestic criminal procedure law and it is their task 
                                               
31
 See the Preamble of the European Convention on Human Rights; A.H. Robertson and J.G. Merrills, Human 
Rights in the World, 4th ed., (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1996),[hereafter Robertson 
and Merrills, Human Rights in the World], p2, p155. 
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to apply the international treaties at home and in external relations. 32  From the 
analysis of relevant UK domestic case law and relevant provisions it can be observed 
now a member State can work continuously to improve its criminal justice system by 
the application of international treaties to its own national situation. It is anticipated 
that these concrete applications can be a useful example for Chinese criminal justice 
reform.  
 
The thesis will then turn into examining the CCPL of 1996 based on the 
corresponding principles of the ICCPR and the ECHR. The research concentrates on 
suspects’ rights in the pre-trial proceedings, which are composed of the investigation 
proceedings and an examination of prosecution proceedings in China. Several 
questions are considered during this discussion. To what extent has the current 
situation achieved the international standards for expanding the rights of individuals 
suspected of criminal offences? How far does the CCPL of 1996 fall short of 
international standards? Law is interrelates with the everyday life of people in a 
society and that law and social situation are mutually influencing and interacting 
with one another. If so, how can China accommodate those internationally accepted 
standards or a modern legal system in its particular situation as a country? What 
changes would have to be made in the first place? Also, what has been the objective 
of the reform? Therefore, through a comparative study of several difficult but 
important issues in the current situation of the criminal justice system in China, 
progress made hitherto should be applauded. The analysis will also explore the 
weakness of the reform so far.  
 
Special attention is paid to the concrete obstacles and tensions that China has been 
facing in any further reform to develop a modern system of criminal procedure which 
meets its own practical and sociological needs and at the same time fulfils the 
                                               
32
 See Asbjorn Aide and Gudmundur Alfredsson (eds.), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common 
Standard of Achievements, (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999) p. xxv.. 
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guidelines of international criminal justice. Should a presumption of innocence be 
accepted fully and its implications spelled out? Should suspects generally be granted 
bail during the investigation period instead of languishing in detention as at present? 
What protection should be enacted to reduce the likelihood that suspects will be 
tortured and to curb widespread protracted detention? Should all illegally-obtained 
evidence be excluded from trials? Should suspects have a right to keep silent and not 
incriminate themselves? Should defence lawyers be allowed to monitor police 
interrogations, conduct their own investigation prior to indictment and freely meet 
detained clients? What steps should be adopted to make defence lawyers available 
for accused person who more often than not go unrepresented? In order to solve 
these problems, all these observations and investigations will be guided by and 
compared to emerging international standards of criminal justice, in particular under 
the ICCPR, and the standards of the ECHR.  The recommendations following the 
analysis aim to give guidance for future policy and legislative action for criminal 
justice reform.  
 
To perceive and comprehend the challenges faced by the reform of the Chinese 
criminal justice system, the study must be placed in the context of a society which 
has traditionally valued public order and social stability above the protection of 
human rights. As this thesis will demonstrate, the reform of the Chinese criminal 
legal system is not easy and cannot be carried out in a very short time, since it will 
depend on many other factors, such as its unique legal history, legal culture, 
economic conditions and social system. These factors have hitherto continued to 
affect the reform of the law. A human rights culture, especially the rights of accused 
persons, has yet to take root. China has always gone its own way. Therefore the 
particular legal tradition, especially regarding the very different concept of law and 
human rights protection, and the salient characteristics of the Chinese criminal 
justice system deserve close attention and an insightful understanding before the 
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concrete fields of law and the substantive rules are delved into. The special Chinese 
characteristics always have to be taken account of in the reform process. However, at 
the same time, in order to establish a modern criminal justice system, a series of 
judicial ideologies such as human rights protection and due process has to be 
gradually established and updated in China. The development of this spirit of modern 
law in China represents a fundamental change in the concepts and ideologies of the 
people. In this transition stage, therefore, there must also be an awareness that the 
application of Chinese characteristics only serves to avoid debates and to refute 
evolution. The problem of how to conduct a creative transformation of these 
traditional judicial concepts and absorb and transplant the international guidelines 
into the coming reform of the CCPL demands much thought along with the 
discussion on the reform of specific regulations or mechanisms.  
 
3.2 Route map of the Study 
The thesis is organised into four parts with eight chapters. After this introduction as 
Part One and Chapter One to introduce the background to the research, and the 
methodology and structure of the thesis, Part Two demonstrates the relevant 
standards of international instruments concerning human rights protection for 
suspects with a view to correctly understanding its scope and meaning. In doing so, 
Chapter Two will review the international standards of the ICCPR as a guide for the 
following investigation. Broadly speaking, Chapter Three looks at the relevant 
regulations developed in the ECHR as valuable inspiration.  
 
Part Three then highlights four issues in the revised CCPL in four chapters. A 
comparative analysis of relevant provisions in the CCPL of 1996 will be undertaken 
in these chapters to point out the ways in which that law might be viewed as 
consistent or inconsistent with international standards. It also points to several key 
issues where the revision has signified little or no progress towards bringing the 
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Chinese criminal justice process into conformity with international standards. At the 
end of each chapter, possible suggestions for improvements specifically reflecting 
upon the existing problems of each issue will be duly proposed for the coming CCPL 
reform. This is in order to redress the inadequacies of the past and perfect the system 
in China’s quest for compliance with international standard and to provide further 
safeguards for suspects.  
 
Having dealt with the above in Part Three, Chapter Four briefly traces the change of 
the guiding ideologies of Chinese criminal justice throughout China’s history and 
traditions, and through more recently developed views in government circles, 
academia and the civil society in general. Various aspects of the CCPL of 1996 
relevant to the application of the changing guiding ideologies will be noted. Chapter 
Five then deals with the pre-trial compulsory system in the CCPL of 1996. It will 
investigate both the achievements hitherto and the numerous difficulties and 
problems which have arisen in the application of the compulsory measures in the 
CCPL. Chapter Six examines the problems of using torture and ill-treatment to 
obtain evidence in the CCPL of 1996. In particular, it includes a study of the 
complicated reasons for torture and ill-treatment for the sake of extracting 
confessions during the pre-trial process. The right to remain silent and the 
exclusionary rule prohibiting the illegally obtained evidence in the CCPL will be 
critically investigated.  Chapter Seven seeks to examine the impact of the 1996 
CCPL on the role of China’s criminal defence lawyers at the pre-trial stage and to 
identify some key factors which have contributed to the failure or ineffectiveness of 
the current law.  
 
The concluding Part Four, Chapter Eight, gives a brief summary of the thesis by 
reviewing the main themes and relevant arguments raised and discussed in the thesis. 
It also points out the main findings of the study and offers recommendations urging 
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the Chinese authorities to do what it can to assist in the long and difficult process of 
bringing China’s criminal justice system into compliance with international standards. 
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Part II 
 
The Main Contents in the International Instruments for the 
Protection of Suspects’ rights 
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Chapter Two 
An Analysis of Key Rights for Suspects in the Pre-trial 
Proceedings Recognised in ICCPR 
 
1. Introduction 
The reform of criminal procedure to protect the human rights of suspects has always 
been a concern of the UN. It was pointed out the relationship between the ICCPR and 
the reform of the criminal procedure law in China in the Introduction chapter. As a 
reference point and in the context of China’s possible ratification, this chapter addresses 
the issue of the adequately and comprehensive understanding of the ICCPR and its 
interpretation by HRC in order to effectively facilitate the further reform of CCPL. At 
the same time, this reform is playing an improving role for China in the earliest possible 
ratification of the Covenant with genuine commitment. In doing so, the following part of 
this chapter will briefly present the general characteristic of the ICCPR. Some other 
instruments of human rights protection for the suspects in criminal justice based on 
ICCPR will also be briefly introduced in this chapter. Then the relevant provisions of 
ICCPR and the decisions of the HRC concerning those rights for suspects in pre-trial 
proceedings, which are mainly in the Article 7, 9 and 14, will be carefully reviewed and 
analysed by referring to the actual practice and jurisprudence of the HRC, focusing on 
the concept of fair trial in criminal procedure law.  
 
The idea of fair trial has been established in all concepts of modern democracy ever 
since modern democracy developed, during the Middle Ages. The genesis of the concept 
of fair trial can be traced back to Magna Carta, in which the king promised that “no free 
man (nullus liber homo) shall be taken or imprisoned or deprived of his freehold or his 
liberties or free customs or outlawed or exiled or in any manner destroyed, nor shall we 
come upon him or send against him, except by legal judgment of his peers and by the 
law of the land (per legem terrae).” The concept of fair trial is embodied in the common 
law traditions of England, the Constitution of the United States, and many modern 
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constitutions.1 The protection of procedural due process is not, in itself, sufficient to 
protect against human rights abuses but it is the foundation stone for substantive 
protection against state power. 2 The right to fair trial has been reaffirmed and elaborated 
since 1948 in legally binding international and regional treaties such as the ICCPR, 
ECHR and ACHR.3 These human rights standards were drafted to apply to all legal 
systems in the world and take into account the rich diversity of legal procedures, and 
they set out the minimum guarantees that all systems should provide.  
 
Every government has the duty to investigate and bring to justice those responsible for 
crimes. It is important to bear in mind that the applicability of the right to a fair trial on a 
criminal charge does not start when charges are actually presented, but from the first 
contact between the person concerned and the State on the case.4  As stated in the 
introduction to the Amnesty International Fair Trials Manual, “the risk of human rights 
abuse starts at the first moment that officials raise suspicions against a person, through 
the moment of arrest, in pre-trial detention, during the trial, during all appeals, right 
through to the imposition of any punishment.5 This allows to loosely group fair trial 
rights into pre-trial rights, rights during the trial, and post-trial rights. The distinction 
between pre-trial procedures, the actual trial and post trial procedures is sometimes 
blurred in fact, and the violation of rights during one stage may well have an effect on 
another stage. The international community has developed fair trial standards which are 
designed to define and protect people’s rights through all these stages. Unless human 
rights are upheld in the police station, the interrogation room, the detention centre, the 
court and the prison cell, the government has failed in its duties and betrayed its 
responsibilities and the justice system itself loses credibility.6 The right to a fair trial is a 
fundamental safeguard to assure that individuals are not unjustly punished. It is a core 

 
1
 See generally, P. Van Dijik, The Right of the Accused to a Fair Trial under International Law, (Utrecht: SIM Special, 
1983); D. Weissbrodt and R. Wolfrum (eds.), The Right to a Fair Trial, (Berlin: Springer, 1997). 
2
 See Richard Clayton & Hugh Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.550. 
3
 On the origin of the right to a fair trial as articulated in the ICCPR see, e.g. David Weissbrodt, The Right to a Fair 
Trial under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
(The Hague, Boston & London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001). 
4
 See Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary (N.P. Engel, Arlington: 
1993), [hereinafter Nowak Commentary], p244. 
5
 See Amnesty International, Fair Trials Manual, December 1998, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/002/1998/en/81bf7626-d9b1-11dd-af2b-
b1f6023af0c5/pol300021998en.pdf.   
6
 Ibid. 
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element in the concept of Rule of Law, as well as for the protection of human rights in 
general.7 
 
2. General Characteristics of ICCPR 
Following the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the UN has 
developed a number of international instruments on human rights, in particular the 
International covenant on Economic, social and Cultural Rights, and the International 
Covenant on civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocols adopted by the UN 
General Assembly by its resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.8 Most of the 
rights within the UDHR found their way into treaty form in these two international 
Covenants.9 ICCPR provides for the protection of civil and political rights. So many of 
the rights guaranteed focus on protecting citizens from the abuse of state power. As such, 
it contains a list of substantive human rights guarantees in its Part III. Any country 
bound by it is obliged to protect its inhabitants from having their rights violated. The 
covenant applies to every human living in a state under the covenant regardless of age, 
gender or race. As of October 2009, the ICCPR had 72 signatories and 165 parties.10 It 
made headlines in 1998 when China signed it.  
 
As the most authoritative legal instrument in the field of civil and political rights, the 
ICCPR is an essential component of The International Bill of Human Rights which 
represents a milestone in the history of human rights.11 Obviously this Covenant is most 
explicit and specific about human rights protections in the administration of criminal 
justice. There are three main differences between the ICCPR and the UDHR. Firstly, the 
rights protected in the Covenant are further described and clarified and the definitions 
given are frequently broader so that the covenant is more feasible and legally binding. 
For example, Article 14, on the rights to a fair trial, is a provision of particular 

 
7
 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, p345. 
8
 The instruments in the field of human rights, see Human rights: a Compilation of International Instruments, 
Universail Instruments,Vol.1-2, (New York: United Nations publication, 2002). 
9
 A notable exclusion concerns the rights to property in art 17(1) UDHR, which would not have conformed to the 
socialist theorist prevailing in the Eastern Bloc while the Covenants were being drafted. 
10
 Data from UN Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en, retrieved by 20/10/09. 
11
 Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1) The International Bill of Human Rights. 
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importance and wide scope. In addition to the usual guarantees of an independent and 
impartial tribunal, public hearings, the presumption of innocence and the rights of the 
defence, it also provides for protection against self-incrimination, the right of appeal, 
and compensation for miscarriage of justice, and lays down the principle that no one 
may be tried twice for the same offence. Secondly, the covenant is not only designed to 
respect various human rights, but also have to take the necessary steps, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to 
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.  
 
Thirdly, the Covenant created an agency, HRC, to promote compliance with its norms. It 
is made up of an expert body of judges and legal specialists, supervises the 
implementation of the ICCPR. 12  The eighteen members of the HRC serve in their 
personal capacity as experts rather than as state representatives, which gives them some 
freedom to express their own perspectives as experts rather than those of their country. 
The Committee has the power under the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR to consider 
individual petitions.13 However, it is obvious that the coming into force of the Covenants, 
by which States parties accepted a legal as well as a moral obligation to promote and 
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, did not in any way diminish the 
widespread influence of the UDHR. On the contrary, the very existence of the 
Covenants, and they contain the measures of implementation required to ensure the 
realization of the rights standard and norms set out in the Declaration, gives greater 
strength to the Declaration. Moreover, On the other hand, the Covenants, by their nature 
as multilateral conventions, are legally binding only on those States which have accepted 
them by ratification or accession. While the UDHR is truly universal in scope, as it 
preserves its validity for every member of the human family, everywhere, regardless of 
whether or not Governments have formally accepted its principles or ratified the 
Covenants.  
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 Introduction of the Human Rights Committee see, generally, UN webpage: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm.  
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 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 19/12/66. 
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The purpose of the UN standards and norms is to set forth generally agreed-upon 
principles.14 Because they represent consensus, most countries meet the standards, i.e., 
they are usually minimum standards. Since its establishment in 1945, the UN has 
initiated and elaborated a series of standards and norms that are applicable to numerous 
aspects of the criminal justice process and to the various State institutions responsible 
for responding to the crime problem. They therefore embody what can be deemed an 
expression of a common ideal, a vision of how the criminal justice system should be 
structured, how criminal policy should be developed, and how crime prevention and 
criminal justice should be secured. These standards and norms in criminal justice 
provide important agreed benchmarks for official action in ensuring respect for human 
rights and the proper administration of criminal justice throughout the world.15 ICCPR 
provides basic and comprehensive principles which are to be respected in developing 
and implementing various international instruments in crime prevention and criminal 
justice. Therefore it provides the direct and concrete guidelines in the criminal justice 
reform for the state party.16 
 
3. Some Other Instruments of Human Rights in Criminal Justice based 
on ICCPR 
Also the criminal justice standard for the accused in ICCPR have been refined and 
extended in a series of instruments that have been formulated and promoted by UN 
bodies, providing more and detail guidance as to how governments may comply with 
their international legal obligations. For example, in 1950 the General Assembly 
authorized the convening every five years of the UN Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. The First Congress unanimously adopted the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Standard Minimum Rules) in 
1955, based on International Penal and Penitentiary Commission revisions of standards 
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 See Robertson and Merrills, Human Rights in the World, p78. 
15
 See, e.g., Human rights in the Administration of Justice, General Assembly resolution 50/181, 22/12/95; Economic 
and Social Council Resolution [hereafter ECOSOC resolution] 1992/22, section VII, 30/07/92; ECOSOC resolution 
1993/34, section III, 27/07/93; ECOSOC resolution 1994/18, 25/07/94; ECOSOC resolution 1995/13, 24/07/95. 
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 See UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, "Use and application of United Nations standards 
and norms", E/CN.15/2002/3, 26/02/02, p.4. 
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endorsed by the League of Nations in 1934. 17  It had a profound influence on the 
development history of the UN standards on contemporary law relating to the 
administration of justice and the treatment of persons deprived of liberty. Good 
principles and practice in the treatment of prisoners and the general management of 
institutions were laid out.18 These Minimum Rules are applicable to all categories of 
prisoners, criminal or civil, untried or convicted, including prisoners subject to “security 
measures” or corrective measures required by the judge. They are designed to stimulate 
an endeavour to ensure their implementation, in the knowledge that they represent, as a 
whole, the minimum conditions which are accepted as suitable by the UN.19 They have 
been used on numerous occasions by the HRC to interpret the provisions of the ICCPR 
that deal with torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in 
order to apply the Rules to conditions of detention. 
 
In accordance with the recommendations of the congresses, other important instruments 
have been adopted in more recent years, such as in the Fifth Congress adopted by 
General Assembly on 9 December 1975, the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment which was to open the way to adoption of the Convention of 
the same name some years later;20 the Code of Conduct for law Enforcement Officials in 
1979 which has been designed to be inserted directly into the national regulations 
applying to law enforcement officials, particularly members of the police force and other 
security forces, underline that those who exercise police power are to respect and to 
protect human dignity and to uphold the human rights of all persons and thus is a 
primary means of directly incorporating the injunctions contained in Article 7 of the 
ICCPR;21 standards were further developed by the General Assembly’s adoption of the 
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 See ECOSOC resolution 663 C I (XXIV), 31/07/51. 
18
 See R. S. Clark, The United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme: Formulation of Standards 
and Efforts at Their Implementation (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), pp. 97-100 and 147-177. 
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 United Nations and Human Rights: 1945-1995, (United Nations Blue Books Series Vol. 7), (New York: United 
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Procedures for the Effective Implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners on 25 May 1984.22 
 
On 10 December 1984 the General Assembly put all those principles relative to the same 
topic in a legally binding form by adopting the Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) which is legally binding 
on all States party to it and established the Committee against Torture.23 The Convention 
bans torture under all circumstances, imposes on States parties the obligation to make 
torture a crime and to prosecute and punish those found guilty of it. In particular, it 
defines torture,24 requires states to take effective legal and other measure to prevent 
torture, and declares that no state of emergency, other external threats, nor orders form a 
superior officer or a public authority may be invoked to justify torture.25 It requires 
states to assert jurisdiction when torture is committed within their jurisdiction, either 
investigate and prosecute themselves, or upon proper request extradite suspects to face 
trial before another competent court.26  
 
Furthermore, each state is obliged to provide training to law enforcement and military on 
torture prevention, keep its interrogation methods under review, and promptly 
investigate any allegations that its officials have committed torture in the course of their 
official duties.27 It must ensure that individuals who allege that someone has committed 
torture against them are permitted to make any official complaint and have it 
investigated, and, if the complaint is proven, receive compensation, including full 
medical treatment and payments to survivors if the victim dies as a result of torture.28 It 
forbids states to admit into evidence during a trial that any confession or statement made 
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during or as a result of torture.29 It also forbids activities which do not raise to the level 
of torture, but which constitute cruel or degrading treatment.30 
 
What is so revolutionary about the Convention is that it is the first international human 
rights treaty to embody the principle of universal jurisdiction.31 The courts of any State 
party, no matter where the offences were committed, may try tortures. It also requires 
states to cooperate with any civil proceedings against accused torturers.32 International 
monitoring of the observance of treaty obligations is incumbent upon the Committee 
against Torture, which is made up of 10 independent experts. 33  Apart from the 
mandatory state reporting procedure and the optional inter-state and individual 
complaint procedures, as a further innovation of this Convention, within the meaning of 
Article 20 of the Convention an international inquiry may be instituted if there is reliable 
information indicating that torture is being practised in the territory of a State party. 
 
The work of the UN in this field had been expanded by the additional standards adopted 
by the Seventh Congress (Milan, 1985) and endorsed by the General Assembly on 29 
November 1985, namely the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.34 
The Basic Principles emphasize that the independence of the judiciary should be 
guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the constitution or law of the country. They 
point out, inter alia, that justice requires that everyone be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, in accordance with the 
principles proclaimed in the UDHR, ICCPR and other UN instruments. In order to 
secure the independence of the judiciary, the Basic Principles set forth criteria 
concerning the status of judges, such as their qualifications, selection, training, 
conditions of service and tenure, and professional secrecy and immunity. The Basic 
Principles also state that judges shall enjoy freedom of expression and association, and 
shall be free from undue disciplinary procedures. Now this Basic Principles are widely 
applied. Only a few countries indicated that they were still struggling to improve the 

 
29
 Ibid., Article 15. 
30
 Ibid., Article 16. 
31
 Article 5(2) of the CAT. 
32
 Ibid., Article 9(1). 
33
 Ibid., Article 17. 
34
 General Assembly Resolutions 40/32, 29/11/85; Resolutions 40/146, 13/12/85. 
33 
 
fundamental guarantees to ensure the independence of the judiciary in all its aspects. 
Further, the principle of the independence of the judiciary is of central concern to many 
States. A large number of States are undertaking significant efforts to ensure the use and 
application of the Basic Principles in their national law and practice. Differences in legal 
systems, however, particularly between the common law and the civil law, seem to 
suggest different approaches to the subject of judicial independence.  
 
Further, in December 1988, General Assembly adopted the Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Body of 
Principles) which set forth a set of principles to apply for the protection for the accused 
under any form of detention. 35  In 1989, the Economic and Social Council, on the 
recommendation of the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, adopted the 
Principles on the Effective prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and 
Summary Executions,36 the Procedures for the Effective implementation of the Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the judiciary and the Guidelines for the Effective 
Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials.37 In 1990, a 
considerable number of new standards, guidelines and model treaties had been adopted 
by the Eighth United Nations Congress and Welcomed by the General Assembly in its 
resolutions at 45th secession in 1990 to enhance international co-operation for crime 
prevention and criminal justice in the context of development. These new standards, 
guidelines and model treaties are, such as: United Nations Rules for the Protection of 
Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty which advocate the least possible use of deprivation 
of liberty, especially in prison and other closed institutions; United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules) which emphasize that 
imprisonment should be considered as a last resort; Basic Principles for the Treatment of 
Prisoners; Model Treaty on Extradition; Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters; Model Treaty on the Transfer of proceedings in Criminal Matters; Model 
Treaty on the Transfer of Supervision of Offenders Conditionally Sentenced or 
Conditionally Released; Basic principles on the Role of Lawyers; Guidelines on the Role 
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of Prosecutors; Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials; and a series measures against international terrorism.38  
 
The most recent standards and norms relative to the rights protection for the accused, 
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) is adopted on 18 December 2002 at the 
fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly of the UN and is available for signature, 
ratification and accession as from 4 February 2003. 39  The objective of the present 
Protocol is to establish a system of regular visits undertaken by independent 
international and national bodies to places where people are deprived of their liberty, in 
order to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.40 OPCAT entered into force on 22 June 2006 after 20 States became party 
to the Protocol. 
 
All these principles confirm the fundamental rights of the accused. They are extremely 
helpful in assessing reform needs all over the world. First, they can be used at the 
national level, by fostering in-depth assessments leading to the adoption of much needed 
and often overdue criminal justice reforms. Secondly, they can be used regionally and 
sub regionally, by providing a framework for the formulation of regional and/or sub 
regional plans of action with concrete strategies to be implemented in phases and subject 
to periodic evaluations. Thirdly, in the largest sense, globally or internationally, they 
highlight “best practices” and help States to adapt them to their specific needs so as to 
increase the prospects of cooperation between States. 
 
4. Article 7: The Prohibition of Torture and the Right to Humane 
Conditions during Pre-trial Detention 
4.1 In General 
The aim of Article 7 is to protect both the dignity and the physical and mental integrity 
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of the individual.41 It has made clear that the prohibition in Article 7 includes acts which 
cause mental as well as physical suffering to the victim.42  Moreover, that it covers 
excessive chastisement ordered as punishment for a crime or as an educative or 
disciplinary measure.43 Therefore corporal punishment,44 punishment by placing in a 
dark cell,45 and all cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments are completely prohibited 
as punishments for disciplinary offences.46 The prohibition in Article 7 is of particular 
importance to people deprived of their liberty as following discussion of Article 9. 
 
In this research, the first paragraph of Article 7 will be discussed in detail and leave the 
second paragraph aside, since no necessary link of this thesis to the second paragraph. 
The first paragraph of Article 7 provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. This provision is identical to 
Article 5 of the UDHR. In addition to a general prohibition of torture, international 
standards impose a positive obligation on the states to treat all persons deprived of their 
liberty humanely and with respect for human dignity. The prohibition of torture has 
taken on a special status in the protection of human rights under international law. This 
right guaranteed by Article 7 is absolute and non-derogable including during a state of 
emergency.47 It applies to all people. It may never be suspended even during times of 
war, threat of war, internal political instability, or states of emergency. As Pieter 
Kooijmans, the first Special Rapporteur on Torture for the UN Commission on Human 
Rights and current ICJ justice, noted, “[T]he prohibition of torture can be considered to 
belong to the rules of jus cogens. If ever a phenomenon was outlawed unreservedly and 
unequivocally it is torture.”48 He further illustrated that “if there was some disagreement 
[in the General Assembly] in respect to [CAT], it had to do with the methods of control 
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and implementation. There was no disagreement whatsoever on the fact that torture is 
absolutely forbidden.”49 
 
4.2 Definition of the Torture 
The HRC has not issued a specific definition of torture for the purposes of Article 7 of 
ICCPR. Indeed, it has decided not to differentiate between the three levels of banned 
treatment in this provision since the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and 
severity of the treatment applied.50 Therefore the Committee often fails to specify which 
aspect of Article 7 has been breached. This may contrasted with the practice of the 
European Court in its interpretation of the equivalent provision for the Article 3 of 
ECHR as observed in Chapter 3.51 However on the other hand the Committee has been 
able to elaborate and develop the scope of the prohibition without actually defining the 
terms because of the same reason.  
 
In numerous early cases against Latin American States, the HRC found various 
combinations of the following acts to constitute torture. Systematic beatings, 
electroshocks, burns, extended hanging from hand and/or leg chains, repeated 
immersions in a mixture of blood, urine, vomit, and excrement, standing for great 
lengths, simulated executions, and amputations. In Muteba.v. Zaire, Miango 
Muiyo.v.Zaire and Amd Kanana.v.Zaire, the HRC found that various combinations of 
the following acts constituted torture: beatings, electric shocks to the genitals, mock 
executions, and deprivation of food and water, and thumb presses.52 Torture entails a 
certain severity in pain and suffering. 
 
The definition of protection against torture was elaborated in the CAT, which is a widely 
accepted definition. 53  The term “torture” means any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
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purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing 
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, 
or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.54 This definition lists a number of example 
purposes, though the list is not exhaustive.55 The enumerated purpose is all linked to a 
desire personally to persecute victims because of who they are.56  In this thesis, the 
purpose “as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession” is paid 
particularly attention, which often arises in the process of criminal justice and damages 
the right for the suspects. 
 
4.3 Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
Article 7 prohibits three levels of bad treatment or punishment of a person. The 
prohibition on “treatment” is broader than the prohibition on “punishment”; the latter is 
inflicted for a disciplinary purpose, whilst treatment can be inflicted for numerous 
purposes. It has been addressed by the Committee in State reports, in its General 
Comment and in the Optional Protocol. However, similarly, the HRC decided not to 
differentiate between the three levels of banned treatment or punishment in article 7.57 
Therefore no specific definitions of “cruel”, “inhuman”, or “degrading” treatment have 
emerged under ICCPR or even CAT.  
 
However, in one case, the HRC observed that the assessment of what constitutes 
inhuman and degrading treatment “depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as 
the duration and manner of the treatment, its physical or mental effects as well as the sex, 
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age and state of health of the victim”.58 The requirements of severity, intention, and 
purpose are presumably applied more leniently in determining whether such treatment 
has occurred. For example, in case Rojas Garcia v Colombia, the police intended to 
perform the impugned acts, but did not intend to perform them on the actual victims of 
those acts. The Committee has rarely undertaken a close examination of the intent of a 
perpetrator of Article 7 abuse and considered that ordinarily Article 7 requires intent on 
the part of an actor as to possible effect of his act, and the lack of such intent works to 
eliminate or extenuate unlawfulness of the act.59  
 
Article 7 is complemented in ICCPR by Article 10, which prohibits less serious forms of 
treatment than that prohibited by Article 7. Article 10 of the ICCPR provides in 
paragraph 1 that “All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”.60 In general, it may be said 
that inhuman treatment as referred to in Article 10 pertains to a “lower intensity of 
disregard for human dignity than that within the meaning of Article 7”.61 But the line 
between Articles 7 and 10 is, admittedly, sometimes hard to draw, as evidenced by the 
case law of the Committee. For instance, the combined consideration of issues under 
Articles 7 and 10 related to the burden of proof in respect of allegations of torture and 
ill-treatment in the cases of Teran Jijon v Ecuador and Jelaya Blanco v Nicaragua led to 
the conclusion that both provisions were violated.62 Beatings by policemen after arrest 
and deplorable pretrial detention conditions led to a finding of violations of Articles 7 
and 10 in the case of Silbert Daley v Jamaica.63 In the relatively recent case of Sandy 
Sextus v Trinidad and Tobago, the Committee clarified its approach of dealing jointly 
with Article 7 and 10 by reasoning as follows: “in the light of this finding in respect of 
Article 10, a provision of the Covenant dealing specifically with the situation of persons 
deprived of their liberty and encompassing for such persons the elements set out 

 
58
 A. Vuolanne v. Finland (265/1987), para 9.2. 
59
 Rojas Garcia v Colombia (687/1996), para 2.1. 
60
 See also American Convention on Human Rights [hereafter American Convention], Article 5; African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, [African Charter], Articles 4-5; Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, Principle 
1; and Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment [hererafter 
Body of Principle], Principle 1. 
61
 Manfred Nowak, op.cit., fn 4, p186. 
62
 Teran Jijon v Ecuador (277/1988); Zelaya Blanco v Nicaragua (328/1988). 
63
 Silbert Daley v Jamaica, (750/1997). 
39 
 
generally in Article 7, it is not necessary to separately consider the claims arising under 
article 7”.64 However, an important distinction between Article 7 and 10 is that the latter 
is a derogable right.  
 
While the prohibition in Article 7 covers specific attacks on personal integrity and 
applies to all persons, whether in any form of detention or not, Article 10 relates more to 
the general state of a detention facility and/or the conditions of detention and is meant to 
encompass only the treatment of persons actually deprived of liberty.65  The HRC has 
stated that the duty to treat detainees with respect for their inherent dignity is a basic 
standard of universal application. States cannot claim a lack of material resources or 
financial difficulties as a justification for inhumane treatment. States are obliged to 
provide all detainees and prisoners with services that will satisfy their essential needs.66 
For instance, detainees have a right to food, to clothing, 67  to adequate medical 
attention,68 and to communicate with their families. In Quinteros v Uruguay, a mother 
submitted the communication, alleging that she and her daughter were both the victims 
of the violations of the Covenant by Uruguay. The Committee found that the State was 
responsible for the disappearance of the daughter and the breaches of Article 7, 9 and 
10(1). In addition, the Committee noted that the anguish and stress caused to the mother 
by the disappearance of her daughter and by the continuing uncertainty concerning her 
fate and whereabouts. The author has the rights to know what has happened to her 
daughter. In these respects, she too is a victim of the violations of the Covenant suffered 
by her daughter in particular, of Article 7.69  
 
In its General Comment on Article 10, the HRC observed; “thus, not only may persons 
deprived of their liberty not be subjected to treatment that is contrary to Article 7, 
including medical or scientific experimentation, but neither may they be subjected to any 
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hardship or constraint other than that resulting from the deprivation of liberty; respect 
for the dignity of such persons must be guaranteed under the same conditions as for that 
of free persons”.70 For example, Article 10(2) and (3) are related to the segregation of 
different groups of detainees and to the requirement of rehabilitation being the essential 
aim of penitentiary systems. The Committee emphasises the right of accused persons to 
be segregated from convicted ones, also due to their right to be presumed innocent.71 
Through a reference to Article 6(5), the Committee draws a presumption that persons 
under 18 years of age are to be considered juveniles in the meaning of Article 10.72 A 
violation of Article 10(2) was established in Dieter Wolf v Panama because the author, 
as an accused person, had not been segregated from convicted persons.73 In Damian 
Thomas v Jamaica, a violation of Article 10(2) and (3) was found when a person was 
segregated from adults neither when arrested for a crime at the age of 14 nor when 
serving his prison sentence from the age of 15.74 
 
4.4 State Obligation 
States Parties are obliged to take effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other 
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under their jurisdiction.75 The most 
fundamental of the specific measures is the requirement that states parties must 
criminalise torture and prosecute perpetrators under its domestic laws. The HRC does 
not distinguish between public and private torture. It is clear that those perpetrators of 
torture stipulated by the Article 7 of ICCPR should be a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity, outside their official capacity, or in a private capacity, 
instead of the specific State organs or the persons who perform public service in the said 
specific State organs.76 State parties should indicate when presenting their reports the 
provisions of their criminal law which penalise torture and specifying the penalties 
applicable to such acts.77 Those who violate article 7, whether by encouraging, ordering, 
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tolerating or perpetrating prohibited acts, must be held responsible.78 The fact that they 
were ordered to do so by their superiors may not be used as a justification; in fact, they 
are bound by international standards to disobey such orders and to report them.79 The 
fact that a person is also considered dangerous does not justify torture. The most recent 
and typical example is the use of torture on detainees in Guantanamo Bay.80 The ICC 
Statute definition of torture includes acts committed independently of any public official, 
for example, by private individuals with private motives.81 The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir 
Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, has ruled that the characteristic of the offence of torture was 
to be found in the nature of the act committed, rather than in the status of the person who 
committed it.82 
 
In its General Comments 20 on Article 7 of the ICCPR, which corresponded in part to 
those set forth in the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and the 1992 UN Declaration 
on Enforced Disappearance, the HRC has stressed that in implementing this right, it is 
not sufficient to prohibit torture or to make it a crime. When read together with Article 2, 
there arises a duty on States parties to ensure effective protection through some 
machinery of control. The right to lodge complaints against maltreatment prohibited by 
Article 7 must be recognized in the domestic law. Also, the alleged victims must 
themselves have effective remedies at their disposal, including the right to obtain 
compensation.83 In particular, the HRC emphasizes the obligation of states to investigate, 
as expeditiously, impartially and thoroughly as possible, well-founded allegations of 
torture and other gross violations of human rights, and to bring the perpetrators to justice 
in its case law on individual complaints.84 The reports of States parties should provide 
specific information on the remedies available to victims of maltreatment and the 
procedure that complainants must follow, and statistics on the number of complaints and 
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how they have been dealt with. In case of Herrera Rubio v Colombia, the HRC regarded 
that it is implicit in article 4, paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol that the State party 
has the duty to investigate in good faith all allegations of violation of the Covenant made 
against it and its authorities, and to furnish to the Committee the information available to 
it.85 In Zelaya Blanco v. Nicaragua, the HRC noted that violations of Article 7 and 10(1) 
are extremely serious and require prompt and impartial investigation by competent 
authorities of the States parties so as to make remedy effective.86  
 
The HRC has listed a number of preventive duties for the States to prevent torture: the 
prohibition of incommunicado detention, routine visits by physicians, attorneys and 
family members, centralized registration and information regarding all imprisoned 
persons, prohibition of the use of evidence obtained through torture, as well as 
corresponding training of law enforcement officials and medical personnel. 87   For 
example, the HRC has instructed states to ensure that all places of detention are free 
from any equipment liable to be used for inflicting torture or ill-treatment.88 In one of 
the HRC’s first merits decision, Massera v Uruguay, the Committee found that detention 
in conditions detrimental to health constituted a breach of Article 7. 89  Also the 
Committee states that prolonged solitary confinement of the detained or imprisoned 
person may amount to acts prohibited by Article 7.90 Moreover, in Shaw v Jamaica, 8 
months’ detention incommunicado in overcrowded, damp conditions constituted 
inhuman and degrading treatment. It concerned the shortest period for which a period of 
detention incommunicado has been found to breach Article 7.91   
 
Other state obligations to fulfil arise from the special obligation of States parties towards 
detainees, a group of particularly vulnerable human beings, who are not in a position to 
satisfy their most basic needs by themselves, and who are subject to a high degree of 
violence, ill-treatment and humiliation by prison wardens and fellow inmates alike. For 
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example, the Committee has dealt with most cases regarding poor general conditions of 
detention under Article 10(1), indicating that it has retreated from its Massera position.92 
It should be stressed that, the right to humane treatment in Article 10 imposes a positive 
obligation on states. This obligation is intended to ensure the observance of minimum 
standards with regard to conditions of detention and the exercise of a detainee’s rights 
while deprived of liberty.  
 
4.5 The Prohibition on the Use of the Evidence Obtained through Unlawful Means 
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled “not to be 
compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt” in Article 14(3)(g) of ICCPR.93 
The prohibition against compelling an accused to testify or confess guilt is broad. This 
privilege protects the accused’s communications and testimony. The burden is on the 
State to prove that a confession has been obtained without duress.94 Rooted in English 
common law, the right against self-incrimination is considered “one of the great 
landmarks in men’s struggle to make himself civilized”. 95  This provision aims to 
prohibit the authorities from engaging any form of coercion, whether direct or indirect, 
physical or mental, and whether before or during the trial, that could be used to force the 
accused to testify against himself or to confess guilt. It is unacceptable to treat an 
accused person in a manner contrary to Article 7 of the Covenant in order to extract a 
confession. Therefore it prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. It 
prohibits treatment which violates the right of detainees to be treated with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person. It also prohibits the imposition of judicial 
sanctions to compel the accused to testify.96 
 
Although the exclusion of evidence obtained through torture and unlawful means or 
treatment is not expressly covered by Article 14 (3)(g), it is a well-established 
interpretation that such evidence should be strictly excluded at trial to protect the right 
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against self-incrimination.97 The law should require that evidence provided by means of 
such methods or any other form of compulsion is wholly unacceptable.98 The judge must 
have the authority to consider an allegation of coercion or torture at any stage of the 
proceedings. 99  Furthermore, the HRC reaffirm recently that it is important for the 
discouragement of violations under Article 7 that the law must prohibit the use or 
admissibility in judicial proceedings of statements or confessions obtained through 
torture or other prohibited treatment.100 Article 7 in this respect complements Article 14 
(3)(g) of ICCPR. In Concluding Observations on Romania, the Committee is also 
concerned at the lack of legislation invalidating statements of accused persons obtained 
in violation of Article 7 of the Covenant. The State party should adopt appropriate 
legislation that places the burden on the State to prove that statements made by accused 
persons in a criminal case have been given of their own free will, and that statements 
obtained in violation of article 7 of the Covenant are excluded from the evidence.101  
 
The right to silence has been deemed to be implicit in the European Convention which 
will be discussed in next chapter.102 More recent international documents have explicitly 
set it out as a right in the jurisprudence from the Draft Body of Principles on the Right to 
a Fair Trial, the recent Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the criminal 
tribunals established for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and, and the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court.103  The most recent articulation of the right to 
silence in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides for a broad 
interpretation in that “silence may not be used as evidence to prove guilt and no adverse 
consequences may be drawn from the exercise of the right to remain silent”.104 The 
HRC’s comments on the UK with concerned on the provisions of the Criminal Justice 
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and Public Order Act of 1994 indicate that a crucial aspect of one’s right to silence is the 
right to be free from adverse inferences drawn from one’ silence.105 The right to silence 
during police questioning and at trial is incorporated into many national legal systems. It 
has been also deemed to be implicit in other protected rights, such as the right to be 
presumed innocent, which will be discussed below.106 Thus, the burden is on the State to 
prove that a confession has been obtained without duress. Implementation of certain 
procedures, such as the audio or video recording of police interviews, assists in 
alleviating such a burden.107 According to Guideline 16 on the Role of Prosecutors, 
prosecutors shall refuse to use evidence which they “know or believe on reasonable 
grounds” to have been “obtained through recourse to unlawful methods, which 
constitute a grave violation of the suspect’s rights”, in particular when such methods 
have involved recourse to torture or other human rights abuses.108 
  
5. Article 9: The prohibition on arbitrary arrest and detention 
5.1 In General 
There is nothing novel about rights to liberty.109 Deprivation of personal liberty in the 
form of imprisonment or as a preventive measure for further offences occurring, flight or 
interference with material facts or witnesses has long represented the most common 
means used by the state to fight crime, preserve the rights of others and therefore 
maintain internal security. There is a tendency under human rights law to require that 
such detention is only used when necessary, accused persons should normally be 
released on condition of appearance at a specified court of law and specified time. Any 
deprivation of liberty will invariably put the person affected into an extremely 
vulnerable position, exposing him or her to the risk of being subjected to torture and 
inhuman and degrading treatment. The provisions of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court deal with this issue – Article 60 provides for the possibility of 
conditional release pending trial. 
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Article 9(1) firstly provides that “everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person”.110 The term “liberty of person” is quite narrow and must not be confused with 
that of liberty in general. It relates only to a very specific aspect of human liberty: the 
freedom of bodily movement in the narrowest sense.111 An interference with personal 
liberty result only the forceful detention of a person at a certain, narrowly bounded 
location, such as a prison or some other detention facility, a psychiatric facility, a re-
education, concentration or work camp, or a detoxification facility for alcoholics or drug 
addicts, as well as an order of house arrest.112  Only in these cases are the procedural 
guarantees under Article 9 applicable. All less grievous restrictions on freedom of bodily 
movement, such as limitations on domicile or residency, exile, confinement to an island 
or expulsion from State territory, do not fall within the scope of the right to personal 
liberty but instead under freedom of movement pursuant to Article 12 and 13. 113 
Restrictions on other rights of liberty, such as freedom of religion, association or 
assembly, come still less within the scope of personal liberty. Security has been taken to 
mean the right to be free from interference with personal integrity by private persons. A 
breach of this Article occurs, inter alia, when an individual is physically confined in a 
prison or detention facility.  
 
Although Article 9(1) is applicable to all deprivations of liberty, most cases have 
concerned detention for the purposes of criminal justice.114 Article 9(2) to (5) of the 
Covenant, which will be discussed below, provide appropriate guarantees for persons 
under arrest or detention. Although largely designated to terminate, prevent, or 
discourage unlawful or arbitrary detention, the guarantees apply to all persons arrested 
or detained, whether or not the arrest or detention is lawful and warranted. The HRC 
further held that Article 9(1) protects the right to security of person also outside the 

 
110
 Article 9(1), ICCPR; also see Article 5(1), ECHR. 
111
 See section on “Use of Terms” in the Body of Principles; also see generally, J. L. Murdoch (ed.), Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: The Protection of Liberty And Security of Person, (Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe, 2002), pp16-18. 
112
 Torres v Finland (291/1988); also see 3.2.1, pp.111-113. 
113
 Celepli v. Sweden, (456/1991), para 5.2., 6.1. see ICCPR, Article 12 and Article 13.  
114
 See General Comment No. 08: Right to liberty and security of persons (Article. 9), [hereafter General Comment 
No.8], 30/06/82, para 1.  
47 
 
context of formal deprivation of liberty.115 As the case W. Delgado Páez v. Colombia 
suggested, that States cannot be passive in the face of the threats to the personal security 
of non-detained persons, but are under a legal obligation to take reasonable and 
appropriate measures to protect them.116 
 
In general, in contrast to such absolute rights as the prohibitions of slavery and torture 
which discussed above, international instruments do not completely abolish of state 
measures about deprivation of liberty, rather, they merely restrict to establishing 
procedural guarantees and minimum standards for those deprived of their liberty. It is 
not the deprivation of liberty in and of itself that is disapproved of but rather which is 
arbitrary and unlawful. All countries are confronted by the practice of arbitrary 
detention.117 To comply with Article 9, no one shall be “deprived of his liberty except on 
such grounds and procedures as are established by law”. In the case of Clifford 
McLawrence v. Jamaica, the HRC held that the principle of legality is violated if an 
individual is arrested or detained on grounds which are not clearly established in 
domestic legislation.118 It means there are two permissible limitations to one’s right to 
liberty under Article 9. The references to “grounds” and “procedures” will mean that 
deprivation of liberty must be in accordance with domestic substantive and procedural 
law.119 Furthermore, such laws must be applicable and accessible to all. It obligates a 
state’s legislature to define precisely the grounds on which deprivation of liberty is 
permissible and the procedures to be applied and to make it possible for the independent 
judiciary to take quick action in the event of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of liberty 
by administrative authorities or executive officials. An example of an “unlawful” arrest 
occurred in Domukovsky et al v Georgia.120 This case appears to confirm that an arrest 
must be lawful in the law of both the arresting state and the law of the state where the 
arrest takes place.  
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Also Article 5 of the ECHR to help understand what is meant by “established by law” 
which will be discussed in Chapter 3.121 Appling the same reason, “established by law” 
in Article 9 does not just mean that the detention is in compliance with the relevant 
domestic law of a State party but the detention must be in compliance with the standard 
of lawfulness set by the ICCPR. 122  Also the HRC in A v Australia held that by 
stipulating that the court must have the power to order release if the detention is not 
lawful, Article 9(4), requires that the court be empowered to order release, if the 
detention is incompatible with the requirements in Article 9 (1), or in other provisions of 
the Covenant. This conclusion is supported by Article 9(5), which obviously governs the 
granting of compensation fro detention that is unlawful either under the terms of 
domestic law or within the meaning of the Covenant.123 As such “lawful” in Article 9(4) 
and (5) means that it must also be in accordance with the standard of lawfulness set out 
in the ICCPR. Based on this, it is submitted that established by law in Article 9(1) has 
the same meaning as lawful in Article 9(4) and (5). Any detention carried out by a State 
party of the ICCPR should be in compliance with the standards of lawfulness set out in 
the ICCPR. 
 
Although the right of liberty of person may be restricted in the case of a public 
emergency within the meaning of Article 4, the HRC has taken the view that the 
requirement of court review over the lawfulness of detention forms a “non – derogable” 
element in Article 9.124 The right to personal liberty is not forfeitable pursuant to Article 
5(1).125 The Commission on Human Rights established the Working Group in 1991 to 
investigate allegations of arbitrary deprivation of liberty.126 To enable it to carry out its 
tasks using sufficiently precise criteria, the Working Group adopted criteria applicable in 
the consideration of cases submitted to it, drawing on the relative provisions of the 
UDHR and ICCPR as well as the Body of Principles. Resolution 1997/50 considers that 
deprivation of liberty is not arbitrary if it results from a final decision taken by a 
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domestic judicial instance and which is (a) in accordance with domestic law; and (b) in 
accordance with other relevant international standards set forth in the UDHR and the 
relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned. The HRC has 
further specified “the prohibitions against unacknowledged detention are not subject to 
derogation. The absolute nature of these prohibitions, even in times of emergency, is 
justified by their status as norms of general international law.”127 
 
Article 9(1) states that no one shall be subjected to “arbitrary arrest or detention”. The 
prohibition on arbitrariness means that the deprivation of liberty, even if provided for by 
law, must still be proportional to the reasons for arrest, as well as predictable. The 
meaning of arbitrariness in the context of article 9(1) was considered in Van Alphen v 
the Netherlands.128 The HRC made the comments that arbitrariness is not to be equated 
with “against the law”, but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of 
inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability. 129  This means that remand in 
custody pursuant to lawful arrest must not only be lawful but reasonable and necessary 
in all the circumstances.130  Any deprivation of liberty provided for by law will be 
“arbitrary” when it is manifestly discriminatory, inappropriate, disproportionate, unjust 
or unpredictable in view of the circumstances of the case.131 Thus, deprivations of liberty 
that fall short of “illegal” conduct nevertheless qualify as breaches of Article 9(1). The 
HRC stated clearly that this means that remand in custody pursuant to lawful arrest must 
not only be lawful but reasonable in the circumstances. Remand in custody must further 
be necessary in all the circumstances, for example, to prevent flight, interference with 
evidence or the recurrence of crime.132 
 
A useful example of a state violation of rights contained in Article 9 and the HRC’s 
analysis is provided by the case of Albert Womah Mukong v. Cameroon.133 The author 
alleged that he had been arbitrarily arrested and detained for several months. The State 
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party rejected the allegation on the basis that the arrest and detention had been carried 
out in accordance with the domestic law. In 1988 the author was arrested and detained 
after a BBC broadcast in which he had criticised the Cameroonian government. The 
reason given for his arrest was that he had made subversive comments contrary to a 
State Ordinance. He was subsequently charged with offences under the Ordinance. The 
Committee concluded that article 9(1) had been violated, since the author’s detention 
“was neither reasonable nor necessary in the circumstances of the case”. The Committee 
considered that national unity under difficult political circumstances cannot be achieved 
by attempting to muzzle advocacy of multi-party democracy, democratic tenets and 
human rights, and that the author’s right to freedom of expression had therefore been 
violated. Consequently, the Committee also concluded that the author’s arrest and 
detention were contrary to article 9(1) of the Covenant. 134 
 
A further element of arbitrariness arises in that the shift from judicial to police and 
prosecutorial discretion means, in effect, that whether or not an offender is subject to a 
period of imprisonment is determined outside of court proceedings. In relation to such 
decision-making, there is no regulation, transparency or public scrutiny. Mandatory 
minimum sentences remove a check on the power of the prosecution, and concentrate 
discretion with respect to sentencing in the hands of the executive.135 The UN Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention has stated that the use of “administrative detention” under 
public security legislation resulting in a deprivation of liberty for unlimited time or for 
very long periods without effective judicial oversight, as a means to detain persons 
suspected of involvement in terrorism or other crimes, is not compatible with 
international human rights law.136 
 
For more recent, as it can be noticed that by flouting international law in its treatment of 
detainees, the Bush administration has drawn worldwide criticism and undermined 
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support for U.S. counterterrorism efforts.137 Three years after it was created, the U.S. 
government continues to detain people in the prison camp at Guantanamo indefinitely 
without charge or trial or without applying the Geneva Conventions. The fate of the 
military commissions created to try them is also uncertain. Only four of the some 550 
detainees at Guantanamo currently face charges, either for war crimes or other crimes. 
After a federal court in November 2004 ruled that the commissions did not meet the 
requirements of the Geneva Conventions or basic guarantees for fair trials, the Pentagon 
suspended proceedings in all of the cases. Human Rights Watch has consistently 
criticised the military commissions as fundamentally flawed, lacking the rules and 
structure necessary to ensure fair trials.138  
 
One of the four cases, United States v. David M. Hicks, Mr. Hicks was seized and 
concurrently detained in Afghanistan in or around November 2001. The armed conflict 
in Afghanistan concluded at the latest 1 May 2003.139 On 3 July 2003, Mr. Hicks was 
designated as eligible for trial by military commission. Charges were instituted against 
Mr. Hicks on 10 June 2003. Mr. Hicks appeared before the commission for the first time 
25 August 2004. However, it is obvious that Mr. Hicks was arbitrarily and improperly 
detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Although the United States Government has 
claimed the right to detain individuals such as Mr. Hicks until the “war on terrorism” is 
over, even if such individuals are tried by a military commission and found not guilty, 
his ongoing detention at Guantanamo Naval Base is no longer appropriate.140 Mr. Hicks 
was detained indefinitely, solely on the basis that he allegedly participated in the 
hostilities in Afghanistan. This is completely disproportionate and unjust, and therefore 
arbitrary. Mr. Hicks’s arrest and detention do not comply with U.S. domestic or 
international substantive law. In Conclusion Observations on Ireland, the HRC 
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expressed concern over laws that permitted the arrest of someone “on suspicion of being 
about to commit an offence”.141 Again, punitive protective detention is not recognised 
by either U.S. or international law, such as Article 9 of ICCPR. In the habeas corpus 
petition of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the Federal District Court for the District of 
Columbia faulted the Department of Defense for not properly determining the legal 
status of the detainees and for imposing rules of evidence that violate fair trial standards 
and military commission proceedings for Guantanamo detainees was properly halted 
until the Bush administration complies with the Geneva Conventions in November 
2004.142 
 
5.2 The Right to Know the Reasons for Arrest 
Article 9(2) of the ICCPR provides that anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the 
time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges 
against him.143 The right to know the reasons for arrest is another essential guarantee 
which means that anyone who is arrested or detained must be immediately informed of 
the reasons why he is deprived of his liberty, and subsequent information, containing 
accusations in the legal sense, must be furnished “promptly.”  The rights contained in 
Article 9(2) of the ICCPR relate only to the stage of arrest. One violation concerned the 
fact in Kelly v Jamaica was not informed of his charge for 26 days.144 The State party 
has not denied that the author was not apprised in any detail of the reasons for his arrest 
for the several weeks following his apprehension and that he was not informed about the 
facts of the crime in connection with which he was detained or about the identity of the 
victim. The committee considered the relationship between Article 9(2) and Article 
14(3)(a). The comments held that those remanded in custody pending the result of police 
investigations is covered by Article 9(2) while the requirement of prompt information in 
Article 14(3)(a) only applies once the individual has been formally charged with a 
criminal offence.145 The Body of Principles further reinforces the principle that anyone 

 
141
 HRC, Concluding observations: Ireland, 24/07/2000, UN Doc. A/55/40, paras 422-451, para 15. 
142
 Salim Ahmed Hamdan v Donald H. Rumsfeld, Civil Action No. 04-1519 (JR), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/inthecourts/supreme_court_hamdan.htm.  
143
 See also ECHR, Article 5(2). 
144
 Kelly v Jamaica, (Comm.253/1987). 
145
 Ibid., para 5.8. 
53 
 
who is arrested should be informed at the time of his arrest of the reason for his arrest 
and should be promptly informed of any charges against him.146 
 
Also the provisions have been interpreted to mean that anyone who is arrested must be 
informed of the general reasons for the arrest “at the time of arrest”, while subsequent 
information, to be furnished “promptly”, must contain accusations in the legal sense. It 
was doubted that “as soon as is reasonably practicable” satisfied this requirement.147 The 
Committee has found a violation of this right in several cases in which no information at 
all or with a delay of several weeks had been provided. The shortest delay, which has 
been found actually to breach Article 9(2), remains the 7 days delay in Grant v 
Jamaica.148 In Hill and Hill v Spain the Hill brothers had contended that 8 hours had 
passed before they were informed of the reason for their arrest.149 While the committee 
chose to accept the State’s evidence that this period of time was only 3 hours, as well as 
the evidence that the interpreter was sufficiently competent. It is therefore uncertain 
whether 8 hours’ delay would have constituted a breach of Article 9(2). A written arrest 
warrant is not unconditionally required, but the lack of a warrant may, in some cases, 
give rise to a claim of arbitrary arrest.150  
 
In addition, one must be reasonably aware of the precise reasons for one’s arrest. Initial 
information must be provided at the time of arrest, which may merely be a limited 
description of the reasons for arrest. It is not sufficient for the purposes of the Article 9(2) 
to arrest and detain a person on grounds of a presumed connection with subversive 
activities; the arrested and detained person must be given explanations as to the scope 
and meaning of “subversive activities”, which constitute a criminal offence under the 
relevant legislation. 151 There must be sufficient information to permit the accused to 
challenge the legality of his or her detention. The right to be informed in Article 9(2) 
serves the legal interests of arrested persons concerned. As the HRC has explained in 
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Campell v Jamaica, one of the most important reasons for the requirement of “prompt” 
information on a criminal charge is to enable a detained individual to request a prompt 
decision on the lawfulness of his or her detention by a competent judicial authority.152 
 
For example, in case Drescher Caldas v Uruguay, it is not sufficient to be informed that 
one is being arrested “under prompt security measures without any indication of the 
substance” of the reasons for the arrest.153 Similarly, the HRC expressed concern about 
detentions in Sudan on grounds of “national security”. The Committee recommended 
that the concept of national security be defined by law and that police and security 
officials be required to provide written reasons for a person’s arrest, which should be 
made public and subject to review by the courts.154 While in Stephens v Jamaica, the 
committee rejected an allegation of a violation of article 9(2) on the basis that the author 
was fully aware of the reasons for his detention as he had surrendered himself to the 
police and a detective had cautioned the author whilst he was in custody.155 The reasons 
for arrest and the explanation of any other rights must be given in a language that the 
person arrested understands. This right extends to all pre-trial proceedings. 156 
Accordingly, the accused has a right to a competent interpreter in the event that he or she 
does not understand the local language.157  
 
In contrast, the Committee finds no violation of Article 9(2) in Griffin v Spain with 
regard to the author’s claim that he was not informed of the reasons for his arrest and of 
the charges against him as there was no interpreter present at the time of his arrest.158 
But the committee observed that although no interpreter was present during the arrest, it 
is wholly unreasonable to argue that the author was unaware of the reasons for his arrest 
because in any event he was promptly informed of the charges held against him in his 
own language. Similarly, in D. McTaggart v. Jamaica, where the author alleged that he 
was not promptly informed of the charges against him but where there was evidence that 
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he had seen a lawyer during the first week of his detention, the Committee concluded 
that it was “highly unlikely that neither the author nor his counsel were aware of the 
reasons for his arrest”.159 
 
5.3 The Right to a Prompt Appearance before a Judge 
Article 9(3) refers specifically to the rights of a person arrested or detained on a criminal 
charge, who “shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law 
to exercise judicial power”.160 One of the keys to the interpretation of Article 9(3) is the 
meaning of the word “promptly”. “Promptly” is not defined but the practice of 
enlightened states helps determine its meaning. The time limit within which a person 
held in custody on arrest must be bought before the competent judicial officer varies: in 
many countries it is 48 hours, in others, even to 24 hours.161 The UN Special Rapporteur 
on Torture has stated that “those legally arrested should not be held in facilities under 
the control of their interrogators or investigators for more than the time required by law 
to obtain a judicial warrant of pre-trial detention which, in any case, should not exceed a 
period of 48 hours”. 162  Where periods of custody on arrest maybe extended at the 
request of the police or public prosecutor, the period of extension is usually limited to 
the same length as the initial period. Ordinarily, then, delay for longer periods would 
violate the Covenant. It has been interpreted by the HRC to mean that the period of 
custody, before an individual is brought before a judge or other officer, may not exceed 
“a few days”.163 This comment is quite vague indeed.164 In McLawrence v. Jamaica, the 
Committee held that the term “promptly” in Article 9(3) must be determined on a case-
by-case basis. It explicitly referred to its “few days” rule in General Comment 8/16 and 
concluded that a delay of 1 week in a capital case cannot be deemed compatible with 
Article 9(3).165 The HRC has specified that this right applies at all times, including 
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during states of emergency.166 
 
In Portorreal v Dominican Republic the Committee found that there was no breach of 
Article 9(3) even though the author was held for 50 hours before being brought before a 
judge.167 Also in Ban der Houwen v The Netherlands, 73 hours of detention without 
being brought before a judge was held not to be a violation of Article 9(3).168 However, 
in the later case of Borisenko v Hungary, the author’s unexplained detention for 3 days 
prior to presentation before a judicial officer constituted a breach of Article 9(3).169 
Furthermore in Freemantle v Jamaica and Jijon v Ecuador, the committee found a delay 
of 4 and 5 days before the accused was brought a judge constituted a violation of Article 
9(3).170 Therefore, it is indicates that the limit of “promptness” for the purposes of this 
Article guarantee of judicial review lies somewhere around 3 days. But in recent 2000 
Concluding Observations on Gabon, the Committee has taken a stricter view that the 
state should take action to ensure that detention a police custody never lasts longer than 
48 hours and ensure full de facto compliance with the provisions of Article 9(3).171  
 
Another term need to be noticed is the meaning of “other officer authorized by law”. The 
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has suggested that the decision to deprive 
someone of personal liberty must be made by an impartial and independent judicial 
body.172 According to principle 11(1) of the Body of Principles, the detained person shall 
have the right to defend himself or to be assisted by counsel as prescribed by law.173 The 
requirement that a person be brought before a judge or “other officer authorised by law 
to exercise judicial power” is precisely the same as Article 5(3) of the ECHR. Thus the 
interpretation developed by the European Court in the Schiesser v Switzerland case 
would be useful for the interpretation of this provision: a judicial assistant must be 
independent of the executive, personally hear the person concerned and be empowered 
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to direct pre-trial detention or to release the person arrested. Thus, custody must end 
within a few days with either release or remittal by a judge to pre-trial detention.174  
 
For example, Kulomin v Hungary concerned the authorization and renewal of pre-trial 
detention by the public prosecutor.175 The author of the communication was detained 
more than 9 months before he was brought before a judge. The decision was based on 
the decisions of the prosecutors. As regards the compatibility of the procedure with the 
requirements of Article 9, paragraph 3, the State party interprets the term “other officers 
authorized by law” as meaning officers with the same independence towards the 
executive as the Courts. In this connection, the State party notes that the law in force in 
Hungary in 1988 provided that the Chief Public Prosecutor was elected by and 
responsible to Parliament. All other public prosecutors were subordinate to the Chief 
Public Prosecutor. The State party concludes that the prosecutor’s organization at the 
time had no link whatsoever with the executive and was independent from it. The State 
party therefore argues that the prosecutors who decided on the continued detention of Mr. 
Kulomin can be regarded as other officers authorized by law to exercise judicial power 
within the meaning of Article 9, paragraph 3, and that no violation of the Covenant has 
occurred.  
 
However, the committee observes that Article 9(3) is intended to bring the detention of a 
person charged with a criminal offence under judicial control and considered that it is 
inherent to the proper exercise of judicial power, that it be exercised by an authority 
which is independent, objective and impartial in relation to the issues dealt with.176 The 
Committee rejected the state party’s arguments in relation to Article 9(3) and think the 
public prosecutor could not be regarded as having the institutional objectivity and 
impartiality necessary to be considered an “officer authorized by law to exercise judicial 
Power” within the meaning of Article 9(3) of the Covenant.177 The HRC further stated 
that vesting the authority to decide upon the continuation of pre-trial detention with the 
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Procurator and not with a judge is incompatible with Article 9(3) of the ICCPR.178 
However, it is still vague as to how the public prosecutor lacked sufficient “institutional 
objectivity and impartiality”.179 While no blending function, it means, for example, a 
prosecutor did not perform investigation and prosecution functions in the same case and 
in respect of the same defendant, it cannot say it will violate the impartiality. Especially, 
when arrest power and prosecution power are divided into different apartment even if 
charged by the same prosecutor office. However, if showing the blending function, 
namely, a prosecutor performed investigation and prosecution functions in the same case 
and in respect of the same defendant, the impartiality will be doubted. Under this 
circumstance, division and balance should be considered.  
 
5.4 The Right to trial within a Reasonable Time 
Another right guaranteed in Article 9(3) as well is that a person arrested or detained 
“shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release”.180  Some questions arise. 
First, what grounds are adequate for continued detention pending trial? It is thus to be 
limited to essential reasons, such as danger of suppression of evidence, repetition of the 
offence and absconding. In reviewing the grounds given by the national authorities for 
detaining an individual pending trial, one must first consider whether the grounds relied 
on to prolong detention can be justified by the terms of Article 9(3), and second, whether 
continued detention is warranted by the facts of the case. Initially, as discussed above, a 
person may be arrested or detained for the purpose of bringing him before a competent 
legal authority merely on the basis of reasonable suspicion that he has committed an 
offense. Article 6 of The Tokyo Rules, sets down that pre-trial detention should only be 
used “as a means of last resort in criminal proceedings, with due regard for the 
investigation of the alleged offence and for the protection of society and the victim”, and 
should be no longer than is necessary. Applying similar provision in the ECHR, the 
European Court observed in the Neumeister case, Stögmüller case and the Matznetter 
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Case that the persistence of suspicion is not sufficient to warrant continued detention 
after the lapse of a reasonable time for investigation.181  
 
The only basis for continuing detention, as for the original arrest, is the reasonable belief 
that the person has committed a crime and will be brought to trial. Article 9(3) implies 
that if he cannot be brought to trial within a reasonable time, he must be released; in fact 
failure to bring the person to trial within a reasonable time precludes trial thereafter, and 
he must be released. Another ground for continued detention pending trial is the risk that 
the accused will commit a further offense. As examined in detail in next Chapter, the 
European court held that in the special circumstances of the case the risk of further 
offense was sufficient to justify continued detention pending trial.182 On the other hand, 
there was no such risk and that continued detention was unwarranted.183 Other grounds 
which have been found to justify continued detention pending trial are the risks of 
suppression of evidence and of collusion.184 The same considerations should govern the 
application of the ICCPR. 
 
Secondly, what constitutes “trial within a reasonable time”? Pre-trial detention should be 
an exception and as short as possible.185 Article 9(3) refers to “a reasonable time”. This 
time limit is considered to be shorter than the time limit provided for in Article 14(3)(c) 
without undue delay, within which prosecution is to be initiated, but longer than the time 
taken to impose a judgement against a juvenile pre-trial detainee, which must be made 
“as speedily as possible”.186 In Koné v. Senegal, the reasonableness of a period of pre-
trial detention has been assessed on a case-by-case basis by the HRC. 187  Factors 
considered in examining the reasonableness of a period of pre-trial detention include: the 
seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed; the nature and severity of the 
possible penalties; and the danger that the accused will abscond if released. Also 
examined are whether the national authorities have displayed “special diligence” in the 
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conduct of the proceedings, considering the complexity and special characteristics of the 
investigation, and whether continued delays are due to the conduct of the accused such 
as refusing to cooperate with the authorities or the prosecution, as detail discussion 
shown in the case law in ECHR on Article 5(3). 188 
 
Even if a person is bound over for trial, detention pending trial may not be justified. The 
practical observation of this guarantee requires particular attention against the backdrop 
of an enormous backlog of cases pending trial as well as where there is over reliance on 
pre-trial detention as a means to secure the defendant’s appearance.  The HRC has 
inquired about safeguards existing and measures taken against unreasonably prolonged 
detention.189 For example, in the case of Fillastre v Bolivia 1988 the Committee held 
that the lack of adequate budgetary appropriations for the administration of criminal 
justice does not justify a period of 4 years until adjudication at first instance.190 In Kone 
v Senegal the HRC also held that detention of over 4 years was not compatible with 
Article 9(3) of the ICCPR, unless special circumstances existed where the delay was 
attributable to the actions of the accused or the accused’s representative.191  
 
It must be doubted whether pre-trial detention of years could ever be justified. Long 
periods of pre-trial detention may be permitted when the detainee is charged with a very 
serious offence. There is a risk that such people will escape or pose a danger to society if 
released pending trial. Thus, for example, Pre-trial detention for 12 and 14 months, for a 
trial for capital murder, did not breach article 9(3) in case Mctaggart v Jamaica and 
Thomas v Jamaica.192Also even a 4-year delay in bringing someone to trial so long as 
they have not been detained the whole time maybe justified by the complexities of the 
case or by obstruction on the part of the accused.193 However, in the case of a murder 
suspect in Panama, held without bail for more than 3 and a half years before his acquittal, 
the HRC stated that “in cases involving serious charges such as homicide or murder, 
where the accused is denied bail by the court, the accused must be tried in as expeditious 
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a manner as possible”.194 The twenty-month period permitted by one penal code was 
considered an “extremely long period”.195 The HRC also concluded in McLawrence v. 
Jamaica that holding a person charged with capital murder for 16 months before trial, in 
the absence of satisfactory explanations from the state or other justification discernible 
from the file, was a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time or 
released.196  
 
In contrast, it is worthy noting that in a case from Uruguay, where a detainee was held 
incommunicado for 4 to 6 months, and his trial by military court on charges of 
subversive association and conspiracy to violate the constitution began after 5 to 8 
months, the HRC held that Article 9(3) of the ICCPR had been violated because he was 
not brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise 
judicial power and because he was not tried within a reasonable time.197 In 1992, there is 
a limit on pre-trial detention under the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia Penal Code of 4 months, which may be extended by a judge to 6 months.198 
Therefore whether a time limit is appropriate can be evaluated only in light of all the 
circumstance of a given case in HRC jurisprudence. It can be noted therefore the HRC 
has adopted a flexible approach in determining what constitutes a violation of the right 
to be tried within a reasonable time. The prosecution however has a continuing 
obligation to ensure that suspects get their day in court as reasonably fast as possible. 
 
5.5 The Right to Release Pending Trial 
Article 9(3) also provides that “it shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial 
shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, 
at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and should occasion arise, for execution of 
the judgement”. It makes clear that pre-trial detention “shall not be the general rule” and 
implicitly provides a detainee with a legitimate claim to release in exchange for bail or 
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some other guarantee of appearance at the trial.199 Detention for the sole purpose of 
further interrogation is not justifiable. For instance, the Ugandan constitution provides 
that suspects charged with a capital offense, which includes treason and terrorism, may 
be held in pre-trial detention for up to 360 days.200 As noticed from the report by Human 
Rights Watch, this lengthy period of 360 days allows for and encourages police and 
prosecutorial inefficiency in the gathering of evidence.201 Although the prosecutor is 
required to appear at the magistrates’ court every two weeks or so with the prisoner, 
“investigation still pending” or “the investigation is still continuing, a further remand is 
needed” are the routine excuses by the prosecutor. The court routinely grants another 
adjournment and remands the prisoner to prison. The wait for trial may be the longest 
period of all, and there is no time limit set by legislation on this stage, regardless of 
whether or not the defendant has been able to post bail. The indefiniteness of the time 
the defendant must wait for trial, usually in jail because of unavailability of bail, can be 
converted to pressure on the defendant to abandon his right to fair trial and to sign a 
request for amnesty, thereby admitting guilt. Thus there are few cases of treason or 
terrorism that actually are tried. The charges are used instead to justify prolonged 
arbitrary detention, sometimes for years. 
 
Under the Covenant, in cases where the danger of absconding can be avoided by bail or 
other guarantees, it is the duty of the national authorities to see that the accused is 
released pending trial. 202  However, the Article 9(3) allows pre-trial detention as an 
exception under some circumstance. In the case of Van Alphen v The Netherlands, the 
HRC stated that “remand in custody must not only be lawful but necessary in all the 
circumstances…for example, to prevent flight, interference with evidence or the 
recurrence of crime”.203 Also since the author’s detention was based on considerations 
that there was a serious risk that he might interfere with the evidence against him if 
released, the Committee found in case W.B.E. v The Netherlands that “pre-trial detention 
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maybe necessary to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial, avert interference 
with witnesses and other evidence, or the commission of other offences”.204  
 
The guarantee does not have to be of a financial nature. Bail is a procedure by which a 
Judge or a Magistrate sets at liberty one who has been arrested or imprisoned, upon 
receipt of security to ensure the released prisoner’s later appearance in court for further 
proceedings. Release from custody is ordinarily effected by posting a sum of money, or a 
bond, although originally bail included the delivery of other forms of property, such as 
title to real estate. The principal use of bail in modern legal systems is to secure the 
freedom, pending trial, of one arrested and charged with a criminal offense. The 
purposes of bail pending trial in criminal cases are to avoid inflicting punishment upon 
an innocent person who may be acquitted at trial and to encourage the unhampered 
preparation of his defence. The committee, in its Concluding Observations on Argentina, 
reiterated the requirement that bail be reasonably available as an alternative to pretrial 
detention.  
 
It must not be overlooked that in this regard States parties have been provided with 
broad discretion on this issue and a violation of this right to release on bail has only been 
found by the Committee in rare cases. For example, in Michael and Brian Hill v Spain, 
the applicants were foreigners in Spain who were arrested on suspicion of firebombing a 
bar.205 The complainants stated that they were refused bail in violation of Article 9(3) of 
the ICCPR. The State Party argued that it had a well-founded concern that the applicants 
would leave Spain if they were to be released on bail, but did not provide sufficient 
evidence to sustain the claim. The Committee reaffirmed the principle that: pre-trial 
detention should be the exception and that bail should be granted, except in situations 
where the likelihood exists that the accused would abscond or destroy evidence, 
influence witnesses or flee from the jurisdiction of the State Party. It held further that 
“the mere fact that the accused is a foreigner does not of itself imply that he may be held 
in detention pending trial.” The Committee thereby found that the rights of the 
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applicants under Article 9(3) had been violated.206 
 
5.6 The Right to Challenge the Lawfulness of the Detention before a Court 
All persons who have been deprived of their liberty of person are - regardless of the 
reasons - entitled to a right to have the detention reviewed in court without delay. 
Without expressly mentioning it, Article 9(4) provides for the right to habeas corpus, 
that is, the right of anyone deprived of liberty by arrest or detention to “take proceedings 
before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his 
detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful”.207 This provision lays 
down the principle of judicial control over every arrest or detention. In this context it 
should be noted that the term “court” signifies not only a regular court, but a special 
court, including an administrative, constitutional or military court as well; it should be 
noticed that review by a superior military officer, government official or advisory panel 
would be insufficient. For example, in Vuolanne v Finland stating that review of 
detention of a soldier by a superior military officer does not satisfy Article 9(4).208 In 
Torres v Finland, where the author had been detained under the Finnish Aliens Act 
under orders of the police, the lawfulness of the detention could not be reviewed by a 
court until, after 7 days, the detention order had been confirmed by the Minister of the 
Interior. The HRC has made clear that the body reviewing the lawfulness of detention 
must be a court, in order to ensure a high degree of objectivity and independence. 
Therefore the Ministry of the Interior does not satisfy Article 9(4) of the ICCPR.209  
 
Unlike Article 9(3), there is no obligation on the part of the state to bring the detainee to 
court. The proceedings must be initiated by the detainee. In the case of Stephens v 
Jamaica, the HRC found no violation of Article 9(4) when the detainee could have but 
did not do so. However, the state is obliged to make the right to challenge the lawfulness 
of one’s deprivation of liberty effectively available to the person detained. The 
Committee held that there had been a violation of article 9(4) where the person deprived 
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of liberty had been held incommunicado and thereby been “effectively barred from 
challenging his arrest and detention”.210  In case E. D. Santullo Valcada v. Uruguay, 
during his detention the applicant did not have access to legal counsel. He had no 
possibility to apply for habeas corpus. Nor was there any decision against him which 
could be the subject of an appeal. The Committee has found a violation of article 9(4) 
since habeas corpus being inapplicable in this case, the applicant was denied an 
effective remedy to challenge their arrest and detention.211  Likewise, in Carballal v 
Uruguay, Carballal was arrested on 4 January 1976 and held incommunicado for more 
than 5 months.212 During his detention, for long periods he was tied and blindfolded and 
kept in secret places. Attempts to have recourse to habeas corpus proved unsuccessful. 
He was brought before a military judge on 5 May 1976 and again on 28 June but was 
detained for over a year. The Committee found inter alia violations of Article 9(1), (2), 
(3) and (4).213 
 
The UN Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities called on all states “to establish a procedure 
such as habeas corpus by which anyone who is deprived of his or her liberty by arrest or 
detention shall be entitled to institute proceedings before a court, in order that court may 
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his or her detention and order his or her 
release if the detention is found to be unlawful”.214 Such procedures must be simple, 
speedy and free of charge if the detainee cannot afford to pay.215 For example, in Berry v 
Jamaica, where the author could, in principle, have applied to the courts for a writ of 
habeas corpus, but where the author had no access to legal representation throughout his 
detention for 2 and a half month, the Committee clearly links access to legal 
representation with enjoyment of the right in Article 9(4) and therefore concluded that 
article 9(4) of the Covenant had been violated.216 On the other hand, in L. Stephens v. 
Jamaica, where there was no evidence that either the author or his legal representative 

 
210
 H. G. Dermit on behalf of G. I. and H. H. Dermit Barbato (Comm. 84/1981), para. 10. 
211
 See, e.g., E. D. Santullo Valcada v. Uruguay, (Comm.R.2/9), para. 12. 
212
 Carballal v Uruguay (Comm. 33/1978). 
213
 Ibid., para 7 and 13. 
214
 Habeas corpus.,E/CN.4/RES/1992/35, 28/02/92 and Sub-Commission Resolution 1991/15, 28/08/91. 
215
 Body of Principles, Principle 32(2). 
216
 A. Berry v. Jamaica, (Comm. 330/1988), para. 11.1. 
66 
 
applied for such a writ, the Committee was unable to conclude that the former “was 
denied the opportunity to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed in court without 
delay”.217 
 
If such a proceeding is initiated, the detaining authorities must produce the detainee 
before the relevant court without unreasonable delay. The requirement that a decision 
must be made speedily or “without delay” applies to the initial decision on whether a 
detention is lawful and to any appeals against that decision provided for by national law 
or procedure. Courts examining the lawfulness of detention must order the release of the 
detainee if their detention is not lawful. For example, in the Committee’s view in M. I. 
Torres v. Finland the 7 days delay violated Article 9(4), according to which a detained 
person must be able “to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may 
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the 
detention is not lawful”. It should be noted that the lawfulness of administrative 
detention must be directly reviewed by a court, not only by a higher administrative 
authority.218 
 
The detainee also has the right to continuing review of the lawfulness of detention at 
reasonable intervals.219 For example, in the case the Committee was satisfied that the 
review of the author’s detention under the Extradition Act by the Helsinki City Court at 
two-week intervals satisfied the requirements of article 9(4) of the Covenant.220 Further, 
the court must be one which not only has the jurisdiction to decide on the lawfulness of 
the detention, the court must also be empowered to order the release of the detainee if it 
finds the detention to be unlawful. 221  As already discussed above, the standard of 
“lawfulness” in this provision is the standard of lawfulness under the Convention, and 
not only the domestic law. 
 
5.7 The Right to Legal Counsel during Pre-trial Detention 
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A person’s right to the help of a lawyer in pre-trial proceedings is not expressly set out in 
the ICCPR. However, the HRC has all recognised that the right to a fair trial requires 
access to a lawyer during detention, interrogation and preliminary investigations. It has 
stated that “all persons arrested must have immediate access to counsel”. 222  Also 
Principle 1 of the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers establishes the right to 
assistance at all stages of criminal proceedings, including interrogations. 223  It is an 
important and central safeguard to a fair trial which ensures necessary legal advice and 
assistance on the detained individual’s rights at the pre-trial stage.224 The right to legal 
counsel remains relevant throughout all stages of criminal proceedings which are also an 
important element of the right to adequate facilities for the preparation of a defence and 
the right to a defence which will be discussed below. 225  For example, where the 
complainant had not had access to legal representation from December 1984 to March 
1985 in Campbell v Jamaica, the HRC concluded that there was a violation of article 9(4) 
of the Covenant “since he was not in due time afforded the opportunity to obtain, on his 
own initiative, a decision by a court on the lawfulness of his detention”. 226  In 
Concluding Observations on Ireland, the Committee made clear that pre-charge 
detainees are also permitted access to legal aid if they are unable to afford their own 
legal counsel.227 The lack of access to a lawyer, whether counsel of his own choice or a 
public defender, was also an element in the Committee’s decision to conclude that there 
had been a violation of article 9(3) in the case of D. Wolf v. Panama, since the author had 
not been brought promptly before a judge or other judicial officer authorized by law to 
exercise judicial power.228 
 
5.8 The Prohibition on Incommunicado Detention 
People held lawfully in detention or imprisonment forfeit for a time the right to liberty, 
and face restrictions on other rights such as the right to privacy, freedom of movement 
and freedom of assembly. Although detainees are to be presumed innocent until they 
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have been convicted, detainees are inherently vulnerable because they are under the 
control of the state. ICCPR recognises this and places special responsibility on the state 
to protect detainees. When the state deprives a person of liberty, it assumes a duty of 
care for that person. The duty of care is to maintain the safety and safeguard the welfare 
of people deprived of their liberty. Detainees are not to be subjected to any hardship or 
constraint other than that resulting from the deprivation of liberty.229  
 
Incommunicado detention means the practice of holding detainees incommunicado, that 
is to say, keeping them totally isolated from the outside world without even allowing 
them access to their family and lawyer. ICCPR do not expressly prohibit 
incommunicado detention in all circumstances. However, international standards and 
expert bodies provide that restrictions and delays in granting detainees access to the 
outside world are permitted only in very exceptional circumstances for very short 
periods of time. The HRC has found that prolonged incommunicado detention may 
violate Article 7 of the ICCPR which prohibits torture, inhuman, cruel and degrading 
treatment, because it facilitates the perpetration of torture, ill-treatment and 
“disappearances” and can in itself constitute a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. 230The HRC has stated in its General Comment No. 20, on article 7 of the 
Covenant, that provisions should be made against incommunicado detention.231 
 
The prohibition of torture during detention pending trial is an essential pre-trial 
guarantee. The U.N. Committee against Torture said in 2002 that it was “deeply 
concerned” over the (then) five-day incommunicado detention period in Spain and stated 
that regardless of the legal safeguards for its application, it facilitates the commission of 
acts of torture and ill-treatment.232 Again, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Theo 
van Boven, issued a report on Spain in February 2004 in which he emphasised that 
prolonged incommunicado detention may facilitate the perpetration of torture and could 
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in itself amount to a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.233 In Conteris v 
Uruguay case, the author was held incommunicado for 3 months and subjected to 
various forms of physical torture, including hanging by the wrists and burning. After 
having been forced to sign a confession he was sentenced by a military court to 15 
years’ imprisonment. The Committee found violations of several Article 7, Article 9(1), 
9(3), 9(4), 10(1), 14(1) and 14(3) of ICCPR.234  Therefore the HRC has stated that 
provisions should also be made against incommunicado detention as a safeguard against 
torture and ill-treatment. 235  For example, the Committee has also stated that 
“incommunicado detention is conducive to torture and ... consequently this practice 
should be avoided, and that urgent measures should be taken to strictly limit 
incommunicado detention, in relation to the Committee’s examination of Peruvian laws 
allowing up to 15 days’ incommunicado detention at the discretion of the police to 
interrogate detainees suspected of terrorism-related offences.” 236  Prolonged 
incommunicado detention can be in itself a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.  
 
Principle 16 of the Body of Principles requires that the family of any arrested or detained 
person must be notified promptly of the arrest and the location of their family member. 
If the detainee is moved to another facility the family must be notified of that change. A 
detainee cannot be denied the right to communicate with his family and counsel “for 
more than a matter of days”.237 Principle 19 of the Body of Principles states that a 
“detained or imprisoned person shall have the right to be visited by and to correspond 
with, in particular, members of his family and shall be given adequate opportunity to 
communicate with the outside world, subject to reasonable conditions and restrictions as 
specified by law or lawful regulations”.238 At a minimum, the right to communicate with 
the “the outside world” includes the right to communicate with a detainee’s family, a 
lawyer and a doctor. Therefore people held in custody by law enforcement officials have 
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the right to be examined by a doctor and, when necessary, to receive medical treatment 
as well. This right is viewed as a safeguard against torture and ill-treatment, among other 
things, as well as an integral part of the duty of the authorities to ensure respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person. The HRC has stated that the protection of 
detainees requires that each person detained be afforded prompt and regular access to 
doctors.239 
 
Furthermore, where the detainee is in pre-trial detention he or she is entitled to visits by 
family and friends, subject only to restrictions “necessary in the interests of the 
administration of justice and of the security and good order of the institution”. 240 
Regarding access to lawyers, see above which discusses access to legal counsel. With 
respect to doctors, the General Comment 20, the Body of Principles and the Standard 
Minimum Rules all state that detainees must be provided prompt and regular access to 
medical care. Finally, if the detainee is a foreign national, he or she must be permitted to 
communicate with, and receive visits from, representatives of their government.241 In a 
case from Uruguay, where a detainee was held incommunicado for 4 to 6 months, 
though the precise dates being disputed, and his trial by military court on charges of 
subversive association and conspiracy to violate the constitution began after five to eight 
months, the HRC held that Article 9(3) of the ICCPR had been violated “because he was 
not brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise 
judicial power and because he was not tried within a reasonable time”.242 
 
5.9 The Right to Compensation 
Last but not least, Article 9(5) provides that “anyone who has been the victim of 
unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.243 The 
HRC stated in the General Comment that states parties have in accordance with Article 
2(3) also to ensure that an effective remedy is provided in other cases in which an 
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individual claims to be deprived of his liberty in violation of the Covenant.244 Such a 
claim arises when the arrest or detention has contravened the provisions of Article 9(1) 
to (4) and/or a provision of domestic law. For example, in Bolanos v Ecuador 
compensation was held payable for violations of article 9(1) and (3).245 However, the 
way in which a claim for compensation is to be implemented is not explicitly spelled out, 
but is generally considered to refer to an individual’s right to bring a civil law suit either 
against the state or the particular body or person responsible for the wrongful conduct.246 
The plausible interpretation is that the state must ensure that the victim’s remedy is 
effective, and regardless of whether there is a remedy against the state in the first 
instance, the state must assure compensation if the individual official cannot pay it.247 
The provision requires a remedy even if the unlawful arrest or detention was innocently 
motivated.248 In the HRC, there was approval for countries that recognized that victim of 
unlawful arrest or detention was entitled to compensation for moral as well as actual 
damages.249 
 
6. Article 14: Rights of the Suspect to a Fair Trial 
6.1 In General 
The protection of the right to a fair trial in civil and criminal proceedings is vital in any 
democratic society. In this thesis, however, only are the criminal trials discussed. The 
fairness of the legal process has a particular significance in criminal cases. Article 14 of 
the ICCPR therefore is undoubtedly a necessary and pertinent to this review. Article 14 
sets out a series of rights which are required in both civil and criminal proceedings. The 
aim of the provisions is to ensure the proper administration of justice.250 Also inherent in 
these procedural guarantees is a far-reaching potential for a step-by-step adaptation of 
the differing national legal systems to a common minimum standard of the “rule of law” 
in civil and criminal trials. The fundamental importance of this right is illustrated not 
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only by the extensive body of interpretation it has generated but by a proposal to include 
it in the non-derogable rights provided for in Article 4(2) of the ICCPR.251  While 
international law permits the derogation of certain rights in a state of emergency, any 
such derogation is permitted only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
actual situation. The guarantees of fair trial and of the rights to be presumed innocence 
may never be made subject to measures of derogation that would circumvent the 
protection of non-derogable rights.252 
 
Article 14(1) outlines the general guarantee. Elements of fair trial specifically mentioned 
in Article 14(1) are the publicity and fairness of the trial, the requirement that the 
competence of the court or tribunal is established by law, and that is independent and 
impartial. Whereas article 14(2) to (7) sets out specific guarantees in relation to criminal 
trials and criminal appeals. In Gerardus Strik v Netherlands, the Committee confirmed 
that the provisions of Article 14(2) to (7), as well as Article (15), apply only to criminal 
charges. 253  The guarantees outlined in Article 14(1) apply to all stages of the 
proceedings in all courts. They also supplement the Article 14(3) requirements by acting 
as a residual guarantee.254  In case Maleki v Italy, the committee found a breach of 
Article 14(1) even though a reservation had been entered to the relevant guarantee in 
Article 14(3).255 The following section elaborates the meaning of the rights set out in 
Article 14 in the order in which they arise. 
 
6.2 The Right to the Presumption of Innocence 
According to Article 14(2) of the ICCPR, everyone charged with a criminal offence 
shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.256 As a 
basic component of the right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, inter alia, 
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means that the burden of proof in a criminal trial lies on the prosecution and that the 
accused has the benefit of the doubt.257 The judge must permit the latter to produce 
evidence in rebuttal. Despite the fact that Article 14(2) does not specify the standard of 
proof required, it is generally accepted that guilt must be proved to the intimate 
conviction of the truer of fact or beyond a reasonable doubt, whichever standard of proof 
provides the greatest protection for the presumption of innocence under national law.258 
Being treated as innocent is fundamental to a fair trial and intrinsically related to the 
protection of human dignity. Above all, it guarantees against abuse of power by those in 
authority and ensures the preservation of the basic concepts of justice and fairness. 
 
The presumption of innocence must, in addition, be maintained not only during a 
criminal trial with regards to the defendant, but also in relation to a suspect or accused 
throughout the pre-trial phase. 259  The obligations deriving from the presumption of 
innocence go beyond the conduct of the judges during the criminal trial itself. As the 
committee referred to its General Comment No 32 on Article 14, it is the duty of both 
the officials involved in a case as well as all public authorities to maintain the 
presumption of innocence by refraining from prejudging the outcome of a trial.260 In 
particular, in the case of excessive “media justice” or the danger of impermissible 
influencing of lay or professional judges by other powerful social groups, the states is 
under a corresponding positive obligation to ensure the presumption of innocence.261 
Ministers or other influential officials may, in this respect, commit a violation of Article 
14(2). For instance, in case Gridin v Russian Federation, with regard to the allegation of 
a violation of the presumption of innocence, including public statements made by high 
ranking law enforcement officials portraying the author as guilty which were given wide 
media coverage. Furthermore, the investigator had called upon the public to send social 
prosecutors, and during the trial the courtroom had been crowded with people who were 
screaming that Mr. Gridin should be sentenced to death, which is what actually 
happened to the applicant shortly thereafter. The Committee notes that the Supreme 
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Court referred to the issue, but failed to specifically deal with it when it heard the 
author’s appeal and therefore the authorities failed to exercise the restraint that article 
14(2) requires of them.262  
 
During the pretrial stage, the presumption is important because it limits the use of 
detention on remand and, in cases where a person is detained, governs the conditions of 
detention. The detainee should be treated as an innocent person who is only suspected of 
acrime and not as a convicted person. For that reason, among others, the Covenant 
requires that “accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated 
from convicted persons and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their 
status as unconvicted persons”263 Denial of bail to a pre-trial detainee, in principle, does 
not affect the presumption of innocence. In Cagas, Butin and Astillero. v. The 
Phillippines, the HRC concluded, nevertheless, the excessive period of preventive 
detention, exceeding nine years, does affect the right to be presumed innocent and 
therefore reveals a violation of Article 14(2).264 
 
6.3 Equality of Arms 
Article 14(3) provides that everyone charged with a criminal offense shall be entitled to 
a series of “minimum guarantees, in full equality”.265 These guarantees also constitute 
essential elements of the concept of “fair trial” in criminal proceedings. The words 
“minimum guarantees” clearly show that the rights expressly enumerated are not 
exhaustive, are necessary but not always sufficient, and that a trial may not conform to 
the general standard of “fair trial” required by Article 14(1) even where the minimum 
rights have all been respected. These minimum rights apply to all stages of the criminal 
proceedings, from the time when the accused is charged until his final conviction or 
acquittal. The main idea is that the prosecution and the defence should be on equal 
footing.266 Procurators should not be afforded special privileges or preferential treatment. 
Thus judges must remain impartial and may not assume procurator functions during trial. 
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6.3.1 The Right to Adequate Time and Facilities for the Preparation of a Defence 
Article 14(3)(b) of the ICCPR provides that in the determination of any criminal charge 
against him everyone is entitled to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation 
of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing. 267  It is an 
important element of the guarantee of a fair trial and an important aspect of the principle 
of equality of arms.268 The term “adequate facilities” has been interpreted to include 
access to documents and other evidence. Further, the defence must be able to conduct its 
own investigation and have its experts treated equally to state experts. Although the ICCPR 
does not expressly impose an obligation on the prosecution to disclose material in its 
possession which is favourable to the accused, to be on equal footing, the accused and 
defence counsel must be granted access to all materials that the prosecution plans to 
offer in court against the accused or that are exculpatory. Exculpatory material should be 
understood as including not only material establishing innocence but also other evidence 
that could assist the defence.269 In any event, the right to disclosure of the prosecution 
case including documentary evidence is an important implication drawn from the right 
to a fair trial protected by Article 14(1). 
 
However the provision does not contain an explicit right of an accused to have direct 
access to all documents used in the preparation of the trial against him in a language he 
can understand. In case Harward v Norway, the question before the Committee is 
whether the failure of the State party to provide written translations of all the documents 
used in the preparation of the trial has violated the author’s right to have adequate 
facilities to prepare his defence under Article 14(3)(b). The Committee noted that it is 
important for the guarantee of fair trial that the defence has the opportunity to familiarise 
itself with the documentary evidence against an accused. However, this does not entail 
that an accused who does not understand the language used in court, has the right to be 
furnished with translations of all relevant documents in a criminal investigation, 
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provided that the relevant documents are made available to his counsel.270 It may be 
sufficient that the relevant documents in the case file are made available to counsel if the 
accused is represented by counsel who is familiar with the language.  
 
Moreover, an individual’s right to communicate with counsel of his or her own choosing, 
is the most important element of the right to adequate facilities for the preparation of a 
defence.271 It includes the opportunity and means for identifying and engaging counsel. 
If the state deprives the accused of access to defence counsel during crucial aspects of 
the investigative phase, it impedes his right to prepare for and ultimately receive a fair 
trial. In case Gridin v Russian Federation The author claimed that he did not have a 
lawyer available to him for the first 5 days after he was arrested, the Committee notes 
that the State party has responded that the author was represented in accordance with the 
law. The State party has not, however, refuted the author’s claim that he requested a 
lawyer soon after his detention and that his request was ignored. Neither has it refuted 
the author’s claim that he was interrogated without the benefit of consulting a lawyer 
after he repeatedly requested such a consultation. The committee finds that denying the 
author access to legal counsel after he had requested such access and interrogation him 
during that time constitutes a violation of the author’s right under Article 14(3)(b).272 
Furthermore, the Committee considers that counsel should be able to advise and to 
communicate with the accused in conditions that fully respect the confidentiality of their 
communications. 273  Article 14(3)(b) was also violated in the case of Wright v 
Madagascar, who was kept incommunicado without access to legal counsel during a 
ten-month period while criminal charges against him were being investigated and 
determined.274 This right overlaps substantially with the rights contained in Article 7 and 
Article 9(4) discussed above and Article 14(3)(d) which will be further considered 
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below. 275  The Committee has confirmed on numerous occasions that detention 
incommunicado breaches Article 14(3)(b) as it renders access to legal assistance 
impossible.  
 
What constitutes “adequate time” will depend on the nature of the proceedings and the 
factual circumstances of a case. 276  Factors to be taken into account include the 
complexity of a case, the defendant’s access to evidence, the time limits provided for in 
domestic law for certain actions in the proceedings, etc. For instance, a violation of 
Article 14(3) (b) was found by HRC in the fact that “the author did not have more than 
half an hour for consultation with counsel prior to the trial”; that was all the more 
unacceptable as it happened in a capital punishment case.277 One state reported to the 
Committee that it was its practice to limit a defendant to 6 days to prepare his defence. 
In response, one committee member suggested that this limitation violated the right to 
“adequate time”.278  However in case the Committee denied a breach of Article 14(3)(b) 
where the accused had not asked for an adjournment.279 In the case Wright v Jamaica, 
the committee held it was equally uncontested that no adjournment of the trial was 
requested by the author’s counsel though there was considerable pressure to start the 
trial as scheduled. However, if counsel reasonably feels that the time for the preparation 
of the defence is insufficient, it was incumbent upon them to request the adjournment of 
the trial. Therefore the Committee did not consider that the inadequate preparation of the 
defence may be attributed to the judicial authorities of the State Party. 280 No violation 
can be found when the restrictions on the defence in the pre-trial phase entirely depend 
on the fault of the accused, or his lawyer, or when a remedy would have been available 
during the trial, but the accused did not resort to it.281 
 
 The right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a defence applies not only 
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to the defendant but to his defence counsel as well and is to be observed in all stages of 
the proceedings.282 In case Phillip v Trinidad and Tobago, the Committee recalls that 
while Article 14(3)(d), does not entitle the accused to choose counsel provided to him 
free of charge, the Court should ensure that the conduct of the trial by the lawyer is not 
incompatible with the interests of justice. 283 The Committee considers that in a capital 
case, when counsel for the accused who was not experienced in such cases requests an 
adjournment because he is unprepared to proceed the Court must ensure that the accused 
is given an opportunity to prepare his defence. The Committee found that the author was 
not effectively represented on trial because his counsel should have been granted an 
adjournment, in violation of Article 14(3)(b).284 But the State party is not to be held 
responsible for the conduct of a defence lawyer. 
 
6.3.2 The Right to Defend Oneself in Person or Through Legal Counsel 
The right to counsel in the pre-trial stages of a criminal trial, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, is clearly linked to the right of all accused of a criminal charge to defend 
themselves in person or through legal counsel of their own choosing and to be informed 
of this right as set out in Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR in all stage of criminal 
proceedings, including the preliminary investigation and pre-trial detention.285 “Legal 
assistance” includes counsel as well as representation in court. Article 14(3)(d) overlaps 
to a large extent with the Article 14(3)(b) guarantee, particularly regarding one’s right to 
legal representation. Hence, simultaneous breaches of the two sub-paragraphs are often 
found. Assignment of counsel by the court contravenes the principle of fair trial if a 
qualified lawyer of the accused’s own choice is available and willing to represent him. 
For example, in the case of Estrella v Uruguay, the HRC held that a military court had 
violated the defendant’s right to choose counsel by limiting him to a choice between two 
appointed attorneys.286 In Lopez Burgos v Uruguay the Committee found a violation of 
Article 14(3)(d) when the author was forced to accept a certain person as his legal 
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counsel even though this lawyer was connected with the government.287  In Pinto v 
Trinidad and Tobago, the author should not have been forced to accept a court-appointed 
lawyer, who had performed poorly in the trial at first instance, when “he had made the 
necessary arrangements to have another lawyer represent him before the court of 
Appeal”.288  
  
Article 14(3)(d) guarantees the right to have legal assistance assigned to accused persons 
whenever the interests of justice so require, and without payment by them in any such 
case if they do not have sufficient means to pay for it. For instance, in Aliboeva v. 
Tajikistan, HRC has held it is axiomatic that the accused involving capital punishment 
must be effectively assisted by a lawyer at all stages of the proceedings.289 The right to 
counsel may also imply the right to competent counsel, but this is not expressly stated in 
the international instruments as well. However, General Comment 32 clearly stated that 
all states must ensure that assigned counsel provide effective representation for suspects 
and accused.290 However, in OF v Norway a person accused of speeding would not 
necessarily be entitled to have counsel appointed at the expense of the state.291 Principle 
6 of the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers established that any person arrested, 
detained or charged with a criminal offence is entitled to have a lawyer of experience 
and competence commensurate with the nature of the offence assigned to them in order 
to provide effective legal assistance.292 Therefore the gravity of the offence is important 
in deciding whether counsel should be assigned “in the interest of justice” as is the 
existence of some objective chance of success at the appeals stage. 293  But Article 
14(3)(d) does not entitle the accused to a choice of counsel if the author is being 
provided with a legal aid lawyer, and is otherwise unable to afford legal 
representation.294  
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However, court appointed counsel must be able to fulfil their task effectively and 
actually advocate in favour of the accused.295 For example, in case Brown v. Jamaica, 
the Committee is of the opinion that the magistrate, when aware of the absence of the 
author's defence counsel, should not have proceeded with the deposition of the witnesses 
without allowing the author an opportunity to ensure the presence of his counsel. The 
fact entails the responsibility of the State concerned for a violation of Article 14(3) 
(d).296 Also in case Chan v. Guyana, the HRC noted that it should have been manifest to 
the judge in a capital case that counsel’s request for an adjournment of the trial for only 
two week days, during which he was engaged in another case, was not compatible with 
the interests of justice, since it did not provide the author with adequate time and 
facilities to prepare his defence.297 Therefore the Committee concludes that the author 
was not effectively represented at trial, in violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (b) and (d), 
of the Covenant.298 On the other hand, the State must not impair the adequacy of the 
defence, the equality of arms, or other aspects of a fair trial.299 For example, in case 
Arutyunyan v. Uzbekistan there is also a violation of this provision because once counsel 
was allowed to represent the author’s brother, the counsel was prevented from seeing 
him confidentially; counsel was allowed to examine the court’s records only shortly 
before the hearing in the Supreme Court.300 
 
At the same time, the wording of the Covenant is clear in all official languages, 
providing the possibility for the accused to reject being assisted by any counsel. 
Presumably if he insists on defending himself the state cannot compel him to accept 
counsel. This right to defend oneself without a lawyer is not absolute, however.301 In 
case Correia de Matos v. Portugal, the committee pointed out that notwithstanding the 
importance of the relationship of trust between accused and lawyer, the interests of 
justice may require the assignment of a lawyer against the wishes of the accused, 
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particularly in cases of a person substantially and persistently obstructing the proper 
conduct of trial, or facing a grave charge but being unable to act in his own interests, or 
where it is necessary to protect vulnerable witnesses from further distress if the accused 
were to question them himself.302 But the committee concludes that the right to defend 
oneself in person, guaranteed under article 14(3)(d) of the Covenant has not been 
respected. Because in the present case, the legislation of the State party and the case law 
of its Supreme Court provide that the accused can never be released from the 
requirement to be represented by counsel in criminal proceedings, even if he is a lawyer 
himself, and that the law takes no account of the seriousness of the charges or the 
behaviour of the accused. Any restriction of the wish of accused persons to defend 
themselves must have an objective and sufficiently serious purpose and not go beyond 
what is necessary to uphold the interests of justice. But the state party has not provided 
any reasons. Therefore, domestic law should avoid any absolute bar against the right to 
defend oneself in criminal proceedings without the assistance of counsel.303 
 
7. Conclusion 
From the previously given description and analyses, it can be noticed that developments 
in international rights protection for the suspects have proceeded at a rapid pace and will 
likely continue to do so whilst the international community is struggling with the 
increasing crime and terrorism. When dealing with universal treaties, there is greater 
danger that national legal systems and their practical application may be inconsistent 
with the international obligations of these states. By their very nature, procedural 
guarantees are not directed at requiring states parties to refrain from doing something but 
rather require them to undertake extensive positive measures to ensure these guarantees. 
Without being exhaustive, this chapter has first introduced some of the essential human 
rights that must be guaranteed during pre-trial investigation into criminal activities in 
ICCPR. It has extensively explained the interpretation of these principal rights by the 
HRC that must be effectively ensured to suspects in the determination of any criminal 
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charges against them, rights which must be protected from the beginning of the trial 
proceedings until conviction or acquittal.  
 
The rights dealt with in this chapter are manifold and it is impossible to single out some 
as being more important than others. All these international standards of guaranteeing 
the rights of suspects in ICCPR, which China has signed already, are the minimum 
request and basic guideline wherein criminal justice to ensure basic human rights. 
Although some of these rights need to be shaped more clear and enforceable, they 
indeed form a whole and constitute the foundation on which a society respectful of 
human rights in general, including the rule of law, is built. Therefore with the continuing 
development of constructing the rule of law, China should carry out all these basic rules 
in criminal procedural activities. Those abovementioned international guidelines need to 
be transformed into domestic laws. China’s legal system faces the challenge on how to 
obey these international rules of criminal justice under the present situation of China. 
The challenge resolves in the forthcoming modification of CCPL. The HRC has used 
various mechanisms and rules in interpreting the ICCPR to meet the specific object and 
purpose of the Covenant. The study on the rules and interpretation of the ICCPR which 
directly relevant to the field of human rights protection for the suspects in the pre-trial 
criminal proceedings in this chapter is crucial and necessary for the following research 
as a basic reference. 
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Chapter Three  
An Analysis of Key Rights for Suspects in the Pre-trial 
Proceedings Recognized in the ECHR  
  
1. Introduction 
This section is going to review some advanced experiences under ECHR. The rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR are based on those outlined in the UDHR and was primarily 
intended to protect civil and political rights.1 As with the UN instruments, most 
rights in ECHR guarantees are reserved for those accused with a criminal offence. 
While the previous chapter has established the benchmarks for this research, the 
issues discussing in this chapter are also important to Chinese law reforms. As the 
“most developed and effective international system for protecting human rights in the 
world”, the standards maintained under the ECHR are examined largely for 
comparative purposes to provide a broader perspective and deeper understanding of 
UN standards regarding to the human rights protection for suspects, though they are 
not on the basis that they are actually likely to be adopted in China.2 This brief 
indication of some latest approach is intended to provide a valuable insight into the 
considerably more specific nature, purposes, contents and interpretations of the 
international standards on the human rights protection for the suspects in Europe 
countries. The purpose of this chapter is to further comprehend the importance to 
guarantee the rights of the suspects that should not be violated by the activities of 
national authorities in their efforts to strike at crime. How to establish and implement 
proper legislation in China in order to strengthen the control of the course of 
investigation and achieve the balance between criminal control and human rights 
protection in modern criminal proceedings can be reflected in the discussions of later 
chapters through the observation of this section.  
 
                                               
1
 The history of ECHR see, generally, J. G. Merrills & A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 4th ed, (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press: Juris 
Publishing, 2001), [hereafter Merrills Human Rights in Europe]. 
2
 See Robertson and Merrills, Human Rights in the World, p.155; also see Andrew Z. Drzemczewski, European 
Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law: A Comparative Study, (New York, Oxford University Press,1983), 
p.17. 
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But it would not be possible or desirable, within the scope of this research, to give a 
comprehensive account of all the case law of ECHR as to the right to a fair trial in 
criminal cases. Aiming at the discussion in Part Three, this chapter includes: Article 
3 to prohibit torture, and “inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, Article 5 
to provide the right to liberty, subject only to lawful arrest or detention under certain 
other circumstances, such as arrest on suspicion of a crime or imprisonment in 
fulfilment of a sentence, and Article 6 to  provide a detailed right to a fair trial, 
including the presumption of innocence. These rights, which are highlighted for 
everyone at all times indeed and has been ratified by all the Member States of ECHR, 
are served as the starting point for defining a minimum common standard for 
procedural safeguards. The examples to be given in subsequent parts will show that 
the development of the ECHR human rights standards in step with the new human 
needs that continue to emerge in society. 
 
As mentioned in introduction, in the following discussion it is especially useful to 
explore some UK case law in this field as well for the purpose of comparison more 
concretely. There is no doubt that incorporation of the ECHR in UK has opened the 
eyes of English lawyers and judges to the creative ways in which international legal 
obligations interact with domestic laws.3 The approach of the UK domestic courts 
has been largely consistent with that of the European Court thus far, although in 
recent years laws have been passed to give the police more powers in situations 
involving terror suspects.4 But the UK law covers the pre-trial rights for the suspects 
in many detailed aspects such as during police powers to stop and search, search 
premises, arrest, and detain suspects by a set of Codes of Practice under the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and by the development of the case law. 
The UK’s new Human Rights Act with its duty to give domestic effect to the ECHR 
and the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court will have a significant effect on many 
aspects of the Article 3, 5 and 6 application in the criminal and regulatory process. 
The briefly case study of under the UK system of law can be a crucial reflection for 
China on understanding and observing how these universal human rights standards 
                                               
3
 See Lord Bingham of Cornhill “Incorporation Of The European Convention On Human Rrights: The 
Opportunity And The Challenge”, address delivered to members of the Royal Court and of the States of Jersey on 
10th July 1998, in the Royal Court House, (1998) 2 St Helier, Jersey and Guernsey Law Review, Issue.3.    
4
 See David Pollard, Neil Parpworth, David Hughes, Constitutional and Administrative law: Text with Materials, 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 2007),p.803. 
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effectively influence the domestic law and provide a guidance to the domestic legal 
professions in their work to protect individuals according to different social 
situations, when the country commit itself to incorporating the international 
instrument. 
 
2. Article 3: Prohibition of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
2.1 Introduction 
Article 3 of ECHR provides that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment”. 5  That is the extent of the Article. It is 
identical to Article 5 of the UDHR, except that the word “cruel” in the UN text has 
been omitted. 6  Merrills and Robertson regarded that “the omission has no 
importance”, since the sense of “cruel” is equally covered by “inhuman”.7 In other 
words, this absolute right is imprecise in nature. The simple statement of the Article 3 
that hides their complexity has been given a broad interpretation by the European 
Court. Such that the treatment of detainees and prisoners, its most obvious field of 
application, is now only one of the potential uses to which it may be put. Most cases 
under Article 3, as one would expect, involve physical maltreatment of some kind. In 
some cases, however, which it shall be examined separately, conduct may be alleged 
to infringe Article 3 even without any physical element. Article 3, like Article 2, is 
one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention.8  The notion of absolute 
right, what kind of prohibitied acts and then the state obligation are going to discuss 
in this section on the Article 3 of ECHR under the topic of this thesis. The 
discussions try to deeper recognizing and reinforcing of the prohibition of torture and 
ill-treatment, and also helping to look for the obvious step for combating and 
preventing torture under national legal reform in China which will be discussed in 
Chapter Six. 
 
2.2 Does Article 3 Provide an Absolute Right? 
The idea that Article 3 contains absolute rights is generally accepted. Nevertheless, 
not surprisingly, a significant number of complaints involving Article 3 are still made 
                                               
5
 See ECHR, Article 3; also see discussion about Article 7, Chap2, 4, pp.34-45. 
6
 See UDHR, Article 5. 
7 See J. G. Merrills & A.H. Robertson, op.cit., fn 1, p.35. 
8
 See Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439 para 88; McCann and Others v UK, (1995) 21 EHRR 97, para.147. 
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against the police and concern the alleged ill-treatments of individuals who are in 
custodies. In the circumstance in this kind of case, such as Tomasi v France 
concerning mistreatment during police interrogation, the Court normally has to 
consider two issues, which are whether the alleged ill-treatment can be proved and, if 
it can, whether it is sufficiently serious to transgress the Convention.9 However, 
before discuss these issues it is necessary to explore the ambit of absolute rights in 
Article 3 which could basically affect the application of the Article. In the light of 
Strasbourg case law the notion of absolute rights looks indistinct because it involves 
an assessment of subjective factors.10 But as mentioned above, “fundamental”, that is 
how the European Court regarded the right under Article 3. The importance of the 
Article 3 is reflected in its absolute and non-derogable status. In common with 
Article 2, 4(1), and 7, Article 3 cannot be the subject of a public emergency 
derogation under Article 15 even in time of war or public emergency.11 That is why 
the rights embodied by this article may not be infringed by a state, no matter what the 
justification, and no matter what threat the state may be acting against. Unlike the 
other substantive rights laid down by the Convention, Article 3 appears without 
express exception or qualification, and the European Court has refused to find any 
implied exceptions. 12 Thus, on the fact of it, once a State has been found to fall 
within its terms, no justification is possible.13 This principle has been reiterated time 
and time again by the European Court, for example, recently in Ramirez Sanchez v 
France, and Labita v Italy and many others.14 
 
Article 3 does not expressly provide that its terms are absolute. Nor does the 
Convention employ terms such as “absolute right”. The characterisation of the 
prohibitions in Article 3 as absolute has emerged from general human rights 
discourse and litigations before the Strasbourg supervisory organs. In the interstate 
case Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece (the Greek 
case (1969), by using the phrase “in the particular situation is unjustifiable” the 
Commission appeared to leave the door for it to be argued that there are 
                                               
9
  (1992) 15 EHRR 1 para.107. 
10
 Detail discussion see, Michael K. Addo and Nicholas Grief, “Does Article 3 of The European Convention on 
Human Rights Enshrine Absolute Rights?”, EJIL 1998 9(3), pp.510-524. 
11
 ECHR, Article 15(2); also see e.g. Aksoy v Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 533, para.62.  
12
 See Chap2, 4.1, p.35.  
13
 Ireland v UK (1978) 2 EHRR 25. 
14
 See Ramirez Sanchez v France (2007) 45 EHRR 49, para 96, and Labita v Italy (2008) 46 EHRR 50, para.119. 
87 
 
circumstances within which ill-treatment could be justified.15 However, in Ireland v 
UK, the European Court closed the loophole left open by the earlier decision.16 
Furthermore, in case Tomasi v France, the French Government argued that the 
behavior of the police could be excused in the light of the circumstances of the fight 
against terrorism in Corsica.17 The European Court, however, refused to accept any 
limitations on the protection to be afforded to the physical integrity of individuals. 
The decision has made it clear that the use of forms of Article 3 treatment in order to 
extract information, even in order to combat terrorism, is unjustifiable. 18  This 
absolute nature of the prohibition is well illustrated by the case Chahal v UK and 
some recent cases again.19  The European Court emphasised that “Article 3 enshrines 
one of the most fundamental values of democratic society”. The European Court is 
“well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States in modern times in protecting 
their communities from terrorist violence”. It cannot therefore underestimate the 
scale of the danger of terrorism today and the threat it presents to the community. 
However, even in these circumstances, the Convention “prohibits in absolute terms 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the activities of the 
individual in question in the past or possibly in the future, however undesirable or 
dangerous, cannot be a material consideration”.20  
 
It should be noticed that the European Court is guided in its decision-making by such 
principles as “effective protection” and “margin of appreciation” through which 
relativity is injected into its thinking.21 The Commission and the European Court 
have always operated on the basis that assessment of the specific conduct under 
consideration can only be subjective, whilst the prohibitions in Article 3 are absolute 
and in principle not negotiable. A good indication of the flexible nature of the 
processes for assessing compliance with Article 3 can be found in the Commission’s 
opinion in the Greek Case.22 The European Court has found that such factors include 
the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its mental and physical effects 
                                               
15
 (1969), Yearbook XII 186-510. 
16
 (1978) 2 EHRR 25, para.163. 
17(1993) 15 EHRR 1. 
18
 Ibid., para.56; Assenov and others v Bulgaria (1999) 28 EHRR 652, para.93. 
19
 (1997) 23 EHRR 413; Saadi v Italy, (2009) 49 EHRR 30, para.141; N. v Finland, (2005) 43 EHRR 12 para.159 
20
 Chahal v UK, para 80; also see, e.g. Egmez v Cyprus (2002) 34 EHRR 753, para.77. 
21
 See Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, “From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the Margin 
of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, (2001) 23 
Human Rights Quarterly, No.3, pp.625. 
22
 Yearbook XII 186 -510. 
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and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.23  Inevitably, it 
is a process which does not lend itself to objective analysis. The subjective nature of 
the determining factors to be assessed in Article 3 cases, for instance, severity, has 
already been mentioned in the context of the case Ireland v UK. 24  The case is 
especially important for its contribution to the case law on the definition of the terms 
used in Article 3 as shown below, but it contains many mixed signals. 25  While the 
majority limited the finding to inhuman and degrading treatment, several judges in 
the minority concluded that the five techniques amounted to torture. In particularly, 
the British judge, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in his noticeable dissenting opinion 
concluded that they did not amount even to inhuman and degrading treatment. His 
opinion provides a good illustration of the subjectivity of the process involved in 
determining whether a particular act or series of acts is in breach of the guarantees 
enshrined in Article 3.  
 
In Addo and Grief’s analysis, there is a serious risk of inconsistency in Article 3 
decisions, at least at first sight, since the practice under Article 3 based on the effects 
of various subjective factors on the particular facts of each case.26 Noticeably, in the 
case Soering v UK, the European Court endorsed the absolute nature of Article 3.27 
However, under the consideration on searching “a fair balance between the demands 
of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the 
individual’s fundamental rights”, the European Court also indicated that it might be 
necessary to take account of factors such as “the manner in which it is imposed or 
executed, the personal circumstances of the condemned person and a 
disproportionality to the gravity of the crime committed, as well as the conditions of 
detention awaiting execution”. 28  The European Court concluded that the 
circumstances to which the applicant would be exposed to the “death row 
phenomenon” constituted a real risk of treatment that his extradition would be 
contrary to Article 3.29  In European Court’s view, Article 3 should therefore be 
construed in harmony with the provisions of Article 2 and Article 3 is no exceptions 
                                               
23
 Ibid., p.186. 
24
 (1978) 2 EHRR 25. 
25
 See M. O’Boyle, “Torture and Emergency Powers under the European Convention on Human Rights” (1977) 
71 AJIL, pp 674-706. 
26
 See Michael K. Addo and Nicholas Grief, op.cit., fn 10. 
27
 (1989) 11 EHRR 439 para.83. 
28
 Ibid., paras.89 and 104. 
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 Soering v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439,  para.111. 
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or derogations.30  
 
Accordingly national interests could not override the interests of the individual, even 
if they are a notorious terrorist, drug trafficker or mafioso, by virtue of Article 3 the 
State is prohibited from ill-treating them or from expelling them to another country 
where they are likely to be ill-treated. The decision of the European Court in Soering 
v UK raised an important point concerning a government may be confronted by a 
dilemma in respect of persons who are suspected of being international terrorists but 
who cannot be placed on trial due to the sensitivity of the evidence and the high 
standard of proof and cannot be extradited, or deported to their country of origin. 
This is because there are grounds to think that these terrorists would there be subject 
to a substantial risk of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, and to do so 
would violate Article 3 of the Convention.31 In UK, the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights appeared to take the view that the government could have escaped from the 
demands of Article 3 by denouncing the whole Convention and then re-entering it, at 
the same time entering a reservation to Article 3. However, Fenwick argued that it is 
probable that such a reservation would have been viewed as invalid since as a matter 
of general international law it is accepted that reservations are not permitted to non-
derogable Articles.32 Had the UK sought to take this immensely controversial course, 
it would almost certainly have been found to be in breach of Article 3 and would also 
have breached the ICCPR which does not allow for derogation from Article 7, which 
covers Article 3 treatment.33 Thus, on one view, the government was caught between 
the provisions of Articles 3 and 5, in relation to a number of suspected international 
terrorists, and therefore had to find a compromise which would allow for their 
detention.34 
 
In view of the object and purpose of the ICCPR and the ECHR, as an instrument for 
the protection of individual human beings, provision about preventing torture must, 
“like any other provision thereof, be interpreted and applied so as to make its 
                                               
30
 Ibid., para 103. 
31
 See Helen Fenwick, “The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11 
September?”, 65 [2002] MLR 724, pp.731 and 755. 
32
 Ibid., p731. 
33
 See Chap2, 4.1, p.34. 
34
 This issue related to Article 5 will be discussed again in 3.5.5.2, pp.140-145. 
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safeguards practical and effective”.35 Therefore, in a dynamic human rights regime, 
the ambit of the “absolute right” and the various issues which can arise under Article 
3 should be continually considered and evaluated with reference to the facts of each 
case. However, being guided by the practical circumstances of each case coupled 
with the principle of effectiveness and the aim of upholding European public order, 
Merrills regarded that it would be unfair to conclude that Strasbourg’s supervisory 
organs do not respect the absolute character of the guarantees in Article 3.36 Freedom 
from torture is not only valuable in itself but also is instrumental in making possible 
the enjoyment of all other rights such as rights to liberties and securities, rights to a 
fair trial. From this angle, the supervisory organs of the Convention happen to have 
the same view as HRC.  
 
2.3 The State’s Obligation 
As recent developments in the jurisprudence relating to violations of Article 3 have 
focused upon the ambit of the application of Article 3, consequentially the extent of 
States’ obligations has also been a central issue in many cases.37  Strasbourg bodies 
have ruled that the responsibility of the State extends beyond prohibiting the use of 
Article 3 treatments by its agents. It includes a duty to ensure that individuals within 
their jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatments by other individuals. The State 
also has a positive obligation to carry out an effective investigation into allegations 
of breaches of Article 3 while the provisions are in the form of prohibitions.  
 
2.3.1 The Negative Obligation 
States have an obligation to refrain from acts of torture and other forms of ill-
treatment foreseen in Article 3. They are responsible for the acts of all public 
officials such as police and security forces. States cannot escape responsibility for 
acts contrary to Article 3 by claiming that they were unaware of such acts. For 
example, in Ireland v UK, the European Court held that “it is inconceivable that the 
higher authorities of a State should be, or at least should be entitled to be, unaware of 
the existence of such a practice. Furthermore, under the Convention those authorities 
are strictly liable for the conduct of their subordinates; they are under a duty to 
                                               
35
 Soering v UK, (1989) 11 EHRR 439, para.87. 
36
 J. G. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1995), at Chapter 5.; Soering v. the UK, para.88. 
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 The same requirement as that in Article 7 of ICCPR, see Chap2, 4.4, pp.40-43. 
91 
 
impose their will on subordinates and cannot shelter behind their inability to ensure 
that it is respected”.38 In Hurtado v Switzerland, the Commission confirmed that the 
State has a specific positive obligation to protect the physical well-being of persons 
deprived of their liberty.39  
 
A State may avoid liabilities for Article 3 treatments where there appears to be 
individual acts of ill discipline in respect of which the State takes appropriate actions. 
But the State must take rigorous steps to discipline those responsible and adopt 
measures to ensure there is no repetition of such actions. For example, in Cyprus v 
Turkey (No.2), the Commission found there was evidence that soldiers had engaged 
in “wholesale and repeated acts of rape” against women and children in their 
custody. 40  The Commission stated that “the evidence shows that rapes were 
committed by Turkish soldiers and at least in two cases even by Turkish officers, and 
this not only in some isolated cases of indiscipline. It has not been shown that the 
Turkish authorities took adequate measures to prevent this happening or that they 
generally took any disciplinary measures following such incidents. The Commission 
therefore considers that the non-prevention of the said acts is imputable to Turkey 
under the Convention.”41 The European Court has clearly stated that States are under 
an obligation to set up a framework that enables both public officials and private 
parties to be punished for, or discouraged from, treatment in violation of Article 3.42  
 
The exact nature of a State’s obligation to protect individuals from violations has 
been examined extensively in respect of expulsion and extradition cases particularly. 
The leading case on this issue is Soering v UK as well.43 As regards the duty to 
protect individuals, the finding of a violation attaches not to the receiving State 
because of what it might do, but to the returning State for exposing the individual to 
ill-treatment.44 For the purposes of the present discussion, this approach emphasizes 
that, where there is a threat of serious physical harm risked a violation of Article 3, a 
state owes individuals a duty to provide effective protections for the potential victims 
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 Ireland v UK, (1978) 2 EHRR 25, para.159. 
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 (1994) ECHR 1 paras.68, 79-80. 
40
 (1982) 4 EHRR 482, paras.371 – 372. 
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 Ibid., paras.373 – 374. 
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 A v UK (1999) 27 EHRR 611, and Z v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 3. 
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 (1989) 11 EHRR 439; also see Cruz Varas v Sweden (1991) 14 EHRR 1, Vilvarajah v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 248. 
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 See Soering v UK, 2.2, pp.87-88. 
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to prevent the harm according to the Convention. One particular UK case provides a 
good example of this situation. The case is Thompson and Venables v News Group 
Newspapers.45 The two applicants, both young men aged 18, claimed that they could 
suffer death or serious injury if they were identified. They had been convicted of a 
particularly shocking murder, that of the 2-year-old James Bulger. The judge made 
an order forbidding publication of material which might identify them, and the 
newspapers sought to have this removed; Thompson and Venables claimed that the 
order was necessary for their protection. The European Court heard evidence of 
serious threats made against them and found that there was a real and serious risk of 
death or serious injury to the two young men, and therefore was a risk of violations 
of Article 3, as well as Article 2. The judgment does not distinguish between the 
threats under each Article, but it is clear that, if the threats were carried out, if death 
did not result, very serious harm qualifying as torture, or inhuman or degrading 
treatment might well do. Thus, the order restraining publication was continued, even 
though that would interfere with the rights of expression of the newspapers under 
Article 10. The risk must be a real one and not a mere possibility.46 
 
2.3.2 Violation due to a Lack of Investigation 
Following the decision in Ribitsch v Austria, there are a number of cases which hold 
that a State’ s responsibility under Article 3 can be engaged by its failure to provide 
methods by which protection against torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment 
or punishment can be ensured, and under which incidents of those ill treatment can 
be verified.47 The failure to conduct a thorough and effective official investigation 
may constitute a violation of Article 13.48 Whereas the term “thorough” generally 
relates to the scope and nature of the steps taken in carrying out an investigation, 
“effective” relates to the quality of the investigation.49 In more detail, as REDRESS 
observed, “the European Court has analysed what steps authorities must take when 
gathering evidence, and has made reference in its jurisprudence to offers of 
assistance; objectivity; attitude of the authorities towards victims and alleged 
perpetrators; timely questioning of witnesses; seeking evidence at the scene, e.g. by 
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 [2001] 2 WLR 1038, p.100. 
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 See also Bader and Others v Sweden, (2008) 46 EHRR 13, paras.43-47. 
47
 (1996) 21 EHRR 573. 
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 See, e.g. Aydin v. Turkey, (1998) 25 EHRR 251, para.103; Ilhan v Turkey (2002) 34 EHRR 36. 
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searching detention areas, checking custody records, carrying out objective medical 
examinations by qualified doctors; use of medical reports, and, in death in custody 
cases, obtaining forensic evidence and carrying out an autopsy.”50  
 
For example, the authorities failed, without good explanation, to interview key 
witnesses, in particular the doctor who examined the application after his arrest. 51 In 
Kmetty v Hungary, the applicant complained that he was ill-treated by the police, and 
that the investigations into his related complaints had been inadequate, in breach of 
Article 3 of the Convention.52  He claimed that he had been assaulted by police 
officers while being arrested and again subsequently in police custody. The European 
Court found that the injuries the applicant was proven to have suffered fell within the 
scope of Article 3. However, the European Court also found “it impossible to 
establish on the basis of the evidence presented whether or not the applicant’s 
injuries were caused by the police exceeding the force necessary to overcome his 
resistance to a lawful police measure, either while immobilising and taking him to 
the police station or during his custody”. 53  The European Court did, however, 
consider that, taken together, the medical evidence, the applicant’s testimony and the 
fact that “he was detained for more than three hours at the Police Department give 
rise to a reasonable suspicion that he may have been subjected to ill-treatment by the 
police”.54  This “arguable claim” of ill-treatment ought to have been investigated 
properly by the authorities.55 In this case, the European Court was not persuaded that 
this investigation was sufficiently thorough and effective to meet the requirements of 
Article 3.56 Those shortcomings in the proceedings deprived the applicant of any 
opportunity to challenge the alleged perpetrators’ version of the events.  
 
If the injuries occurred after arrest, the burden would have fallen on the State to 
explain how the applicant sustained his injuries. For example, in Assenov v Bulgaria, 
the European Court notes that the authorities was prepared to conclude that Mr 
                                               
50
 See Report by REDRESS, “Taking Complaints of Torture Seriously: Rights of Victims and Responsibilities of 
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Assenov’s injuries had been caused by his father, despite the lack of any evidence 
that the latter had beaten his son with the force which would have been required to 
cause the bruising described in the medical certificate.57 Also there is no attempt by 
the authorities have been made to ascertain the truth through contacting and 
questioning these witnesses in the immediate aftermath of the incident. Assumption 
without any explanation was made to conclude that the reason of the blow on the 
body is because Mr Assenov had not been compliant.58 In view of the lack of a 
thorough and effective investigation into the applicant’s arguable claim that he had 
been beaten by police officers, the European Court finds that there has been a 
violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Therefore authorities must always make a 
serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded 
conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions. 59 
 
The European Court has also established that any investigation, as with that under 
Article 2, should be thorough and capable of leading to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not 
be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or the omissions of the authorities. If this were 
not the case, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment and punishment, despite its fundamental importance would be ineffective 
in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the 
rights of those within their control with virtual impunity.60 This principle has also 
been applied in a number of other cases. The application of this approach can be seen 
in the case Martinez Sala and Others v Spain as well.61 The European Court could 
but note that the domestic judicial authorities had dismissed all the applicants’ 
requests for evidence to be obtained, thereby denying them a reasonable opportunity 
to establish the matters of which they complained. Consequently, the European Court 
found that there had been a violation of Article 3 on account of the absence of a 
thorough and effective investigation into the applicants’ allegations.  
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For an investigation into alleged unlawful killing by State agents to be effective, it 
may generally be regarded as necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying 
out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events. This 
means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical 
independence.62 For example, in Ognyanova and Choban v Bulgaria, the applicants 
alleged that Mr Stefanov had died as a result of his ill-treatment by the police while 
in custody and that the authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation 
into the circumstances surrounding his death.63 The European Court observed that 
the authorities have never asked lieutenant I.C.’s to clarify the inconsistencies in his 
accounts of the version of events. The credibility of the witness statements had been 
reserved, because some of whom might have been under pressure to corroborate the 
police’s version of events.64 
 
Moreover, similar as the ruling established by the HRC, in Aksoy v Turkey, the 
European Court believed that a prompt and impartial investigation is implicit in the 
notion of an effective remedy, although there is no express provision existing in the 
ECHR to impose such a duty as that in CAT. 65  When examining whether an 
investigation is effective, the European Court has applied the test of whether the 
authorities reacted effectively to the complaints at the relevant time.66 The European 
Court regarded that investigation should be of reasonable scope and duration in 
relation to the allegations.67 Therefore the obligation to conduct a timely, thorough 
and impartial investigation in EHCR is well established. This obligation is later 
described as a “procedural obligation” which devolves on the State under Article 3.68 
Therefore, although the absence of a proper and timely investigation is likely to 
make it difficult to support the applicants’ evidence, a failure to conduct such an 
investigation may itself constitute a violation of the Convention. 69  
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2.3.3 Evidential Issue 
The starting point is that any allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by 
appropriate and sufficient evidence. In other words, the applicant bears the 
responsibility of providing evidence of treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3. 
As mentioned above, in respect of the impact of the failure to investigate upon 
victims’s access to a remedy and reparations, European jurisprudence suggests that 
States will have violated victims’ rights when they have failed to investigate despite 
the existence of and “arguable claim”.70 In Veznedaroglu v. Turkey, the European 
Court implied that a complaint needs to be “arguable” in order to trigger the State’s 
obligation to carry out an effective investigation.71 In the Boyle and Rice v UK, the 
European Court did not think that “it should give an abstract definition of the notion 
of arguability. Rather it must be determined, in the light of the particular facts and 
the nature of the legal issue or issues raised”.72 However, a rather high standard of 
proof required by the European Court in assessing allegations of ill-treatment is 
“beyond reasonable doubt”, although this has rightly been the subject of criticism in 
cases of ill-treatment of detainees where the only available evidence may be in the 
hands of the authorities. 73 The European Court made similar statements in later cases, 
such as the recent decisions in Farbtuhs v Latvia and in Nachova and Others v 
Bulgaria in regard to Article 14.74 But the European Court is not to rule on criminal 
guilt or civil liability but on Contracting States’ responsibility under the 
Convention.75 
 
Evidence may take the form of medical reports of injuries, but also witness 
statements, photographs etc. Such evidence must be able to provide concrete 
strongholds in order to allow the European Court to assess whether the injuries 
indeed existed and whether they were sufficiently serious to reach the threshold of 
severity under Article 3. For instance, there was found to be insufficient evidence in 
Martinez Sala and Others v Spain to confirm that the applicant had been ill-treatment 
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in police custody. 76 Apart from marks made by the handcuffs and a few minor 
bruises and haematoma, the reports drawn up by the forensic doctors did not mention 
any significant signs or traces of ill-treatment. As to the allegations of some of the 
applicants that they had been subjected to serious ill-treatment, the European Court 
was unable to make any finding in the absence of medical or other evidence. Nor did 
the results of the medical examinations carried out by private practitioners offer any 
assistance on that point either. 77  In addition, the investigation by the domestic 
authorities had not been sufficiently complete to establish which version of events 
was the more credible. Therefore the European Court found that the applicants’ 
allegations were not sufficiently supported by the evidence they had adduced and 
held that there had been no violation of Article 3.  
 
As regards the issue of proof, it obviously presents that the victim could well not be 
in as strong a position as the State in relation to the collection and presentation of 
evidence.78 The result induced by this risk was unfortunate, to say the least, not only 
because of its impact on the burden of proof but also because it undermined the spirit 
of “absolute guarantee” in Article 3. In Aksoy v Turkey, while in detention the 
applicant allegedly was subjected by the police to torture. No sufficient explanation 
is offered by the authorities as to how these injuries might have occurred other than 
through ill-treatment by state agents.79 The European Court therefore considers that 
“where an individual is taken into police custody in good health but is found to be 
injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible 
explanation as to the causing of the injury”.80 Consequently, although there is no 
general principle that the burden of proof should fall upon the authorities to establish 
that the applicant’s suffering was not caused by their actions, however, the European 
Court has shown itself very willing to draw inferences from the State’s failure to 
provide evidence in cases where the applicant has suffered ill-treatment while in 
police custody and the onus is on the authorities to produce evidence to show that the 
State was not responsible.81 In Rehbock, v Slovenia, the European Court held that the 
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burden of proof also shifts to the State in respect of persons who are injured during 
an arrest.82 Where a person is injured in such circumstances, the burden rests with the 
State to show that the use of force applied during the arrest was not excessive.83 
 
The European Court is increasingly mindful of this problem. For instance, in case 
Khudoyorov v Russia, the European Court has recognised that Convention 
proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a rigorous application of the 
principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges something must prove that 
allegation) because in certain instances the respondent Government alone have 
access to information capable of corroborating or refuting these allegations.84 On the 
other hand, the European Court also recognising that there must be compelling proof 
of a State’s failure before condemning the State under the Article.85 Indeed, the 
European Court has emphasised on many occasions that proof sufficient to reach the 
standard of proof of “beyond all reasonable doubt may follow from the coexistence 
of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted 
presumptions of fact.” For example, in Salman v Turkey, the European Court stated 
that where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive 
knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, 
strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such 
detention.86 Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities 
to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation.87 Moreover, the actions of the 
victim may also be taken into account in assessing the degree of burden on the State 
to prove that the use of force was not excessive. 88  
 
2.3.4 Finding a Violation in Respect of Property Damage 
Also, though the ill-treatments of detainees is the commonest way in which the 
forces of law and order are likely to violate Article 3, it is not the only way. In the 
Selcuk and Asker case, for example, the security forces in Turkey deliberately 
destroyed the applicants’ homes and most of their property, depriving them of their 
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livelihoods and forcing them to leave their village.89  In particular, the European 
Court considered that the reason that the acts in question were carried out without 
any intention of punishing the applicants but instead to prevent their homes being 
used by terrorists or as a discouragement to others would not provide a justification 
for the ill-treatment.90 The European Court had no hesitation in concluding that the 
suffering caused by these callous and premeditated actions qualified as inhuman 
treatment for the purposes of Article 3.91 Again in its consideration of the case of 
Bilgin v Turkey, the European Court took note of the fact that the destruction of the 
applicant’s home and possessions deprived him of his livelihood and shelter.92 Even 
assuming that the acts in question were carried out without any intention of 
punishing the applicant, the European Court considered that the material losses had 
deeply affected the applicant and had caused suffering sufficiently severe so as to 
amount to ill-treatment. This decision was recently upheld in several cases such as 
Dulas v Turkey, where the European Court also found that there had been violation 
of Article 3 in respect of property damage.93  
 
2.4 Distinguishing the Prohibited Acts 
The issue as to what acts or omissions can be defined as such abuses should be 
considered for the suspects’ rights protection under Article 3, as mentioned above, 
after the issue as to what is the extent of States’ obligations to prohibit and prevent 
such violation being specified. It is clear that, in order to determine this issue, present 
views must be considered rather than the views at the time when the Convention was 
drawn up. The infringement of Article 3 can involve a wide range of acts, from those 
which humiliate the victim to acts of extreme brutality. As to the notions of torture 
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which affect the scope and 
the practice of the provision, the ICCPR and the ECHR choose two attitudes. As 
mentioned in above chapter, Article 7 of the ICCPR contains no definition of the 
notions covered thereby, nor did the HRC “consider it necessary to draw up a list of 
prohibited acts or to establish sharp distinctions between the different kinds of 
punishment or treatment”, since “the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and 
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severity of the treatment applied”.94 However, the European Court has developed a 
standard approach, whereby the three prohibited acts are distinguished from each 
other. The distinction between the three categories of infringement identified in 
Article 3 is useful for the purpose of applying the appropriate label to a particular 
form of abuse. It may also affect the amount of compensation awarded under Article 
50 and to a state’s reputation. Nevertheless, all forms of ill-treatments which fall 
within the scope of Article 3 are prohibited with equal force no matter at which end 
of the spectrum they fall, and there is a close inter-relationship between inhuman and 
degrading treatment and punishment. It covers physical as well as mental ill-
treatmentin both official and private contexts.95 
 
2.4.1 Entry Threshold Requirements for Article 3 
As Addo and Grief regarded, in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdictions 
involving Article 3, the European Court and the Commission of Human Rights have 
dealt with a variety of matters which could not have been predicted by the architects 
of the Convention.96 Definitional characteristics of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment have emerged from the jurisprudence of the European 
judicial bodies.97 The first case which defined these concepts was the Greek case.98 
In this case Commission defined torture as inhuman treatment which has a purpose, 
such as the obtaining of information or concessions, or the infliction of punishment.99 
Nearly 10 years after the Greek case, in order to determine under what category 
classify the five techniques that the UK authority interrogated people accused of 
being the activists of IRA, the European Court regards that ill-treatment must, 
primarily, attain a minimum level of severity in order to trigger the provision’s 
application in case Ireland v. UK.100 According to the Ireland v. UK judgment, the 
torture is a deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering. 
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Those three forms of treatments mentioned basically represent three different levels 
of seriousness rather than purpose.101  
 
This sliding scale places torture at the apex of the severity scale, followed by 
inhuman and then degrading treatment or punishment.102  In the case of Aydin v 
Turkey the European Court restated the defining characteristics of torture established 
in the ruling of Ireland v UK, and held that in certain circumstances rape causes 
physical and mental suffering sufficiently severe so as to amount to torture. 103 
Recently the European Court has further broadened the scope situations which 
amount to torture. In Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine it considered that whilst the 
authorities had complied with the manner of force-feeding prescribed by the relevant 
decree, the restraints applied – handcuffs, mouth-widener, a special tube inserted into 
the food channel – with the use of force, and despite the applicants resistance, had 
constituted treatment of such a severe character warranting its characterisation as 
torture.104 Selmouni v France is also a significant case concerning the issue of scope 
of Article 3, as it made an unprecedented reference to the definition contained in 
Article 1 of the UN CAT in order to establish whether the acts complained of were 
sufficiently severe so as to amount to torture.105 The limitation upon the scope of 
Article 3 in this context no longer only concerns the gravity of the injuries sustained 
but is related to their cause. The European Court has taken an equally robust line 
with the perspective of the “severity of suffering” and held in Keenan v. The UK that 
“while it is true that the severity of suffering, physical or mental, attributable to a 
particular measure has been a significant consideration in many of the cases decided, 
under Article 3, there are circumstances where proof of the actual effect on the 
person may not be a major factor”.106 For example, in respect of a person deprived of 
his liberty, recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by 
his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the 
right set forth in Article 3. 107  
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Moreover, in Ilhan v Turkey, the purposive element of torture was highlighted in 
very strong terms.108 This approach has been followed in some subsequent decisions 
such as Bati and Others v Turkey.109 The European Court found that all the thirteen 
applicants had lived throughout their time in police custody in a permanent state of 
physical pain and anxiety owing to uncertainty about their fate and the intensity of 
the violence to which they had been subjected. In the European Court’s opinion, such 
treatment had been “intentionally meted out by agents of the State in the performance 
of their duties, with the aim of extracting confessions or information. The violence 
inflicted on them, taken as a whole and having regard to its purpose and duration, 
had been particularly serious and cruel, had been capable of causing ‘severe’ pain 
and suffering and had amounted to ‘torture’.”110 Clearly, torture can be distinguished 
due to the level severity of suffering caused and the purpose for which the suffering 
was inflicted. This is in keeping with the definition of torture as set out in UN CAT. 
This formula, which has been endorsed on numerous occasions, now forms the basis 
of the Commission’s and European Court’s approach in cases concerning allegations 
of ill-treatment of detainees.  
 
Clearly, treatments which could not come within the restricted definition of torture 
could still fall within one of the other two heads, especially the broad head 
“degrading treatment”. However, it must be remembered that acts of inhuman and 
degrading treatment are no less of a violation of Article 3 than acts of torture. Clearly 
Article 3 will cover only the grossest instances of ill treatments.111 Treatments may 
be both inhuman and degrading, but degrading treatment may not also amount to 
inhuman treatments.112 In order to characterise a treatment as inhuman, it must reach 
a minimum level of severity.113 In the Greek case, inhuman treatment or punishment 
was defined as “treatment deliberately causing severe suffering, mental or physical, 
which, in the particular situation, is unjustifiable”. 114  The Commission placed 
inhuman treatment at the middle of a consideration of a violation of Article 3 by 
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developing more complex definitions for torture and degrading treatment with 
specific characteristics. In Ireland v the UK, intense physical assaults and 
interrogation techniques causing psychological disorientation have been found to 
amount to inhuman treatments.115 A threat of a treatment which violates Article 3 
would also itself amount to a breach of that provision, provided the threat is 
sufficiently real and immediate.116  
 
Unlike inhuman treatment, degrading treatment has been the subject of more 
substantial definitional considerations, possibly because it can be considered the 
baseline for acts to be categorised as a violation of Article 3. The commission 
considered degrading treatment as “a treatment that grossly humiliates an individual 
vis-à-vis other persons, or forces him to act against his will or consciousness” in the 
Greek case.117 It is sufficient if the victim is humiliated in his own eyes. In Ireland v 
the UK the European Court held that a treatment can be classified as degrading 
where “it is such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority 
capable of debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral 
resistance”.118 The level of humiliation required for a breach of Article 3 to occur 
must be other than that usual element of humiliation. The assessment is, in the nature 
of things, relative as well: “it depends on all the circumstances of the case and, in 
particular, on the nature and context of the punishment itself and the manner and 
method of its execution”.119 Although it may be a factor to be taken into account in 
the consideration of the quantum of damages, a lack of sufficient intent to be 
prohibited as torture will not bar the finding of a violation of those Ill-treatments that 
reach the minimum level of severity contemplated by Article 3.120 A string of cases 
as to conduct not reaching the severity threshold for Article 3 may, nonetheless, 
breach Article 8 which protects physical and moral integrity as part of an individual’s 
fear of privacy during the course of arrest and detention.121  
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Therefore the European Court has always allowed itself a degree of flexibility when 
considering the prohibited acts. In a recent case Wainwright v. the UK, the European 
Court has reiterated that the assessment of a minimum level of severity “depends on 
all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical 
and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the 
victim”.122 Inevitably, the threshold is relative. However, following the decisions in 
Selmouni v France and Ilhan v Turkey, it is unclear whether one of these defining 
characteristics is more influential than the other when categorising an act as “torture”. 
Evans and Morgan regarded that this approach of jurisprudence reinforces the 
tendency to consider what amounts to torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment in a 
rather impressionistic fashion.123  Whilst the European Court have stated that the 
three prohibited acts can and should be distinguished, nevertheless it can be difficult 
to pinpoint the distinguishing elements of such a categorisation. 
 
But the European Court is clear that the individual circumstances of the case, and 
especially factors pertaining to the victims, and sometimes his or her near relatives, 
must be taken into account. Two questions need to be considered with these factors: 
whether the nature of the allegations is sufficient to amount to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment and whether the suffering can be distinguished from ill 
treatment or other inhumane acts and be regarded as torture. The discussion above 
has shown how wide a range of situations can potentially fall within the prohibitions 
in Article 3. As society continues to evolve, the scope of these provisions will 
continue to expand beyond strict literal definitions: new forms of treatment may be 
brought within the ambit of the law deemed threats to the dignity and worth of the 
human person.124 In recent case Elci v Turkey, the European Court restated that the 
increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human 
rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater 
firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies.125 
This is a key restatement of the degree of flexibility which the European Court 
affords itself when considering allegations of Article 3 in order to try and afford the 
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greatest possible protection to individual. It can be noted that, by taking this 
approach, the European Court and Commissions have been able to and can continue 
to respond to the challenges faced by new as well as traditional forms of ill-treatment 
and abuse. From this point modernity does not always bring progress and the ECHR 
and the ICCPR reach the same goal by different routes.126  
 
As the European Court has recognised that the boundaries may shift. In a general rule, 
it is the national courts to make its own assessment as to whether a convention right 
has been breached in its particular circumstances.127 A domestic court is bound to 
take all relevant factors into account, and engage in a delicate balancing act, in 
considering whether a person has been subjected to torture or one of the other 
prohibited forms of ill-treatment. It opens up the possibility of domestic law perfectly 
entitled to apply a higher standard than that operating on the international level. For 
instance, in UK it would seem that the domestic court was adopting a broader 
concept of “inhuman and degrading treatment” than that so far used by the European 
Court. The Scottish court has even held that in regard to Article 3 “it was not 
founded merely on the conditions which prevailed in the place where the petitioner 
had been detained, but upon the whole circumstances as they had affected the 
petitioner, including the physical and mental effects and the state of his health”.128 
However, in recent case Wainwright v Home Office, the House of Lords held that a 
strip-search of people visiting a relative who was on remand did not involve a breach 
of Article 3, despite the fact that it had not followed the approved procedure under 
the Prison Rules. Lord Hoffmann, giving the leading speech, held that “the conduct 
of the searches came nowhere near the degree of humiliation which has been held by 
the European Court to be degrading in similar situations”.129 As a result, it may be 
that the approach has in Wainwright did not take sufficient account of the broadening 
of the scope of Article 3 which seems to be taking place in the European Court case 
law.  
 
2.4.2 Assessment of Conditions of Detention 
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When assessing conditions of detention, the European Court has to take account of 
the cumulative effects of the conditions which are compatible with respect for human 
dignity, that “the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject 
the individual to distress or hardship exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering 
inherent in detention, and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, the 
person’s health and well-being are adequately secured, with the provision of the 
requisite medical assistance and treatment, as well as the specific allegations made 
by the applicant”.130 Overcrowding and failure to provide sleeping facilities in itself 
could amount to treatment contrary to Article 3, even in the absence of aggravating 
factors such as the lack of light or ventilation.131  In Poltoratskiy v Ukraine, the 
European Court held that “serious economic difficulties experienced by Ukraine” 
could not explain or excuse the unacceptable conditions of the applicant’s 
detention. 132  Furthermore, inadequate heating, sanitation, food, recreation and 
contacts with the outside world can also amount to inhuman treatment and degrading 
treatment.133 
 
The availability or non-availability of such services in society at large is not the 
touchstone by which is to be judged. Again the result is that the thresholds of ill-
treatment must be worked out from within that context and the special circumstances 
relating to it. For example, in Becciev v Moldova, the applicant spent relatively short 
time in detention, 37 days, having regard to the harsh conditions in the cell, the lack 
of outdoor exercise, the inadequate provision of food and the fact that the applicant 
was detained in these conditions for 37 days, the European Court considers that the 
hardship he endured went beyond the unavoidable level inherent in detention and 
reached the threshold of severity contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.134 However, 
in case Ramirez Sanchez v France, the applicant was detained in solitary 
confinement for 8 years and 2 months.135 He was kept in a single cell, had no contact 
with other prisoners or the prison warders, was not allowed outside his cell apart 
from a two-hour daily walk, and had very restricted visiting rights. He was, however, 
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allowed to read newspapers and watch television.136 The European Court noted that 
he was not suffering from complete sensory isolation – in addition to TV and 
newspapers, his lawyer visited him 57 times, his family are not subject to any 
restrictions on visiting rights but never ask for permission to visit, and he received 
regular visits by doctors.137 The European Court concluded that the general and very 
particular conditions in which the applicant had been detained, and the length of that 
detention, did not reach the minimum level of severity necessary to constitute 
inhuman treatment, particularly in view of the applicant’s personality and the 
exceptional level of danger that he posed.138 
 
As shown above, a number of cases present at European Court have questioned the 
practice of using solitary confinement.139 The Commission has accepted that the use 
of solitary confinement may breach Article 3. 140  Incommunicado detention is a 
particularly serious form of solitary confinement and should be declared illegal. 
Prolonged isolation constitutes per se torture and cruel and inhuman treatment. It is 
unlawful to prevent people held incommunicado from challenging the legality of 
their detention or from effectively preparing their defence. Solitary confinement 
cases fall into two categories: those in which the detainee is subjected to total social 
and sensory isolation and those in which a detainee is removed from association with 
other prisoners for reasons of the administration of justice, security, protection or 
discipline.141 In order to determine whether breach of Article 3 has occurred, as the 
European Commission expressed in Ramirez Sanchez v France, it is necessary to 
have “regard for the surrounding circumstances, including the particular conditions, 
the stringency of the measure, its duration, the objective pursued and its effects on 
the person concerned. Complete sensory isolation coupled with complete social 
isolation can no doubt ultimately destroy the personality; this constitutes a form of 
inhuman treatment which cannot be justified by the requirements of security”.142 As 
instructed by UN, solitary confinement should only be used when the security or the 
                                               
136
 Ramirez Sanchez v France (2007) 45 EHRR 49, para.128. 
137
 Ibid., 131. 
138
 Ibid., para 150. 
139
 See Aksoy v Turkey, (1997) 23 EHRR 553, para 83. 
140
 Ensslin, Baader and Raspe v Federal Republic of Germany, (1979) 14 DR 64, p109; Treholt v Norway, App. 
14610/89, (1991) 71 DR 168. 
141
 Richard Clayton & Hugh Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
p401. also see Ensslin, Baader and Raspe v Germany, para 109. 
142
 (2007) 45 EHRR 49, para 120. 
108 
 
well-being of persons or property are in danger and should be subject to regular 
judicial supervision. Solitary confinement should not be used as a punishment.143 
Prompt judicial intervention to examine the lawfulness of a deprivation of liberty is 
instrumental in ensuring respect for a detained person’s physical and mental integrity 
as will discuss below.144 
 
Thus, in determining whether a particular treatment to the accused, such as solitary 
confinement, physical mistreatment in the course of arrest amounts to a violation of 
article 3, a number of factors must be taken into account, though the fact that they 
relate to, or have occurred in, places of detention is a critical factor.145 For instance, 
where degrading conditions of detention are self-imposed there will be no breach of 
Article 3.146 It also established that account must be taken of the cumulative effect of 
conditions and not simply specific allegations.147 In order to assess these conditions, 
the European Court and Commission would rely not only on witness testimony but 
could also conduct an on-site visit. Recently they have been assisted by and have 
made increasing use of the reports prepared by European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture, the regional visiting body established under the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.148 
 
2.4.3 Acts in the Course of Interrogation 
Interrogation techniques which include beatings, threats and other abuse will tend to 
violate Article 3.149 In addition to physical assaults, the interrogation of persons in 
detention in connection with acts of terrorism in Ireland v UK involved “five 
techniques” causing intense psychological suffering and illegal acts of violence need 
not necessarily attain the threshold of seriousness necessary to engage responsibility 
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under Article 3. The European Court considered the judicial corporal punishment is 
institutionalised violence and thus although the applicant did not suffer any severe or 
long lasting physical effects, his punishment constituted an assault on precisely that 
which it is one of the main purposes of Article 3 to protect, namely a person’s dignity 
and physical integrity.150 If institutionalised physical violence is degrading treatment, 
unauthorised physical violence meted out by those in authority must also fall within 
the bounds of Article 3. 
 
In UK, for example, the custody officer is responsible for ascertaining and 
safeguarding a detained person’s right under police powers according to PACE. 
Examples of serious physical mistreatments in the obtaining of confessions are 
comparatively rare. Questioning is regulated by s. 76 to 78 of the PACE and Code of 
Practice C under s. 66 of the Act and evidence that is unlawfully obtained is excluded 
as well. If an accused is beaten or threatened and humiliated by police officers in 
order to obtain a confession, this may be sufficiently severe to breach of Article 3. In 
relation to the Human Rights Act 1998, a particular issue related to Article 3 is the 
extent to which the police have the power to take fingerprints, or samples, from a 
suspect to aid their inquires. The powers of the police in this area are covered by ss55 
and 61-65 of PACE para. 4 and Annex A of Code of Practice C; and paras 3 and 5 of 
Code D. A general power to take photographs of detainees, without consent if 
necessary, was added to PACE by the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, 
and now appears as s64A. 
 
3. Article 5: The Right to Liberty and Security 
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter one, Abuse of compulsory measures can easily happen in 
Chinese criminal justice nowadays.151 Issues concerning arrest and detention also 
arise frequently and account for a large proportion of the jurisprudence in the 
ECHR. 152  The ECHR deals with liberty and security of persons in Article 5. 
Deprivation of liberty is only permissible if the grounds of a detention are lawful and 
the procedures followed upon detentions are also in accordance with the law. Article 
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5 enshrines the fundamental human right of protecting the individual against 
arbitrary interferences by the state with the right of liberty: as the Court emphasised 
in Brogan v UK judicial control of such interferences is implied by the rule of law 
and is one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society.153 The right to 
physical liberty is not absolute. It must give way where vital community interests are 
at stake. That applied in assessing whether the application of the arbitrariness 
prohibition to an Article 5 deprivation of liberty is “necessary in a democratic 
society”. 154  Article 5 can be derogated from under Article 15 and this issue is 
discussed further below.  
 
Article 5 is a vital means of protection for some of the least popular groups in society, 
including the accused suspects in the criminal procedure. The Fourth Protocol to the 
ECHR adds a number of rights to the Article 5 guarantee. The contrast here between 
the ECHR and the ICCPR furnishes a clear illustration of different approaches to the 
drafting of human rights treaties. The general principle of the Article 9 in the ICCPR 
is expanded to nearly a page by using the method of detailed and precise definition in 
Article 5 of ECHR.155 Article 5 proclaims the right of individual liberty, specifically 
enumerates the range of situations in which the right might be lawfully justified in 
the Contracting States, and lays down the essential conditions which must be 
observed if that power is to be controlled by law. It will be noted that Article 5 deals 
with two distinct questions within the context of the accused rights. It requires that 
every arrest or detention is lawful both procedurally and substantively and that it has 
in fact been carried out for one of the six specified reasons in sub-paragraphs 5(1) (a) 
to (f), which amounts to an exhaustive list of circumstances.156 There are also a 
number of procedural rights which are detailed in paragraphs (2) to (5). The aim of 
the Convention is to secure real rights to liberty for individuals, which means that the 
rights should be one with a substantive content and not simply affording a mere 
formal guarantee. In seeking to grasp the requirements of Article 5, the interpretation 
of the text by the European Court is vital. As with all the articles of the Convention, 
the European Court has interpreted every provision of Article 5 in a purposeful and 
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dynamic manner, inevitably taking one beyond the literal terms of the text of the 
Convention in determining what particular provisions entail. In practice the 
application of the Convention has shown Article 5 to be an extremely important 
provision and one which produces a regular stream of case law.  
 
3.2 The Scope for Article 5 
Article 5 opens by stating the general principle that “everyone has the right to liberty 
and security of person”.157 This is a combined right, with the right to security of 
person having no separate meaning from the right to liberty.158 The specific concern 
of the right is to ensure that no one is deprived of his or her liberty in an “arbitrary 
fashion”.159  In 1970, in the case of De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium, the 
European Court said that the right to liberty is too important for a person to lose the 
benefit of the protection of the Convention for the single reason that he gives himself 
up to go into custody.160 Hoffman regarded that “that is remarkable”, because even 
when a man volunteers to be detained, his liberty is protected by the Convention.161 
The European Court there emphasised the importance of liberty itself, and how it 
should be kept safe by the law. The justifications for restricting liberty under Article 
5 are given a narrow construction although the instances included are potentially 
wide.162 
 
3.2.1 The Notion of Deprivation of Liberty  
To decide whether someone has been deprived of his rights under Article 5(1) it is 
necessary to begin by establishing that he has been “deprived of his liberty”. 
“Personal liberty” under the Convention means simply the freedom of physical 
movement of persons from one place to another.163 In most cases, demonstrating its 
applicability is quite straightforward. A person has obviously suffered a deprivation 
of liberty when detained at a police station, thrown into prison or locked up in a 
mental hospital and so the only question in such cases will be whether the detention 
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can be justified. However, Article 5 is not engaged by every restriction on an 
individual’s liberty. The provision is concerned with actual deprivation of liberty 
rather than with mere restrictions on liberty or movement.164 The difference between 
a deprivation of and a restriction on liberty is more of degree or intensity rather than 
of nature or substance.165 In UK, the Court of Appeal had to consider more extensive 
forms of control order in case Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ in 
2006.166 This is a case raising the question at what precise point a control order 
amounts to a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of the Convention in any 
particular case in UK. Each of the subjects of the control orders in this case had to 
live in his own one-bedroom flat for 18 hours a day and in the remaining hours they 
could only visit specific areas. The flats were subject to spot searches. The Court of 
Appeal agreed with the judge Sullivan J that the restrictions imposed by the order 
were so extensive that they violated Article 5 of the Convention and as there was no 
derogation order in place, the orders had to be quashed.167  
 
As Merrills observed, when deciding whether there has been a deprivation of liberty 
the Strasbourg institutions are guided by the individual’s actual and concrete 
circumstances rather than by formal or theoretical considerations.168 In Guzzardi v 
Italy, the European Court regarded that factors such as the type, duration, effects, and 
manner of implementation of the impugned conduct are the starting point to 
determine the existence of a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5.169 
This approach, which is a general feature of their interpretation of the Convention, is 
well illustrated in case H.L v UK case.170 Also, Pannick and Lester noted that whether 
or not an individual is detained may depend on the intention of the state.171 As a 
result, stopping someone for a short time with the purpose of searching them may not 
sufficient to trigger Article 5 protection. For example, in X v Germany, the 
Commission decided that the object of police action was not clearly to deprive those 
                                               
164
  Engel v Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647, para 58; The European Court noted in H.M. v Switzerland, (2002) 
38 EHRR 314, restrictions on freedom of movement are the concern of Article 2 of Protocol 4 to the Convention.; 
The discussion concerning the line between deprivations of liberty of Article 5 and restrictions on freedom of 
movement of Article 2 of Protocol No.4 see Chapter 18 in Clare Ovey & Robin White, op.cit., fn 68. 
165
 Guzzardi v Italy (1980) 3 EHRR 333, para 92; Ashingdane v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 528, para 41;  
166
 [2006] H.R.L.R. 38; [2006] EWCA Civ 1141 
167
 ibid. para 1 and 11; 
168
 J. G. Merrills & A.H. Robertson, op.cit., fn 1, p56. 
169
  Guzzardi v Italy, para 92. 
170
 (2005) 40 EHRR 761, para 93. 
171
  See Antony Lester and David Pannick , Human Rights Law and Practice, (London: Butterworths, 1999), 
p.164. 
113 
 
involved of their liberty. The police action was simply to obtain information from 
them about how they obtained possession of the objects found on them and about 
thefts which had occurred in the school previously. The Commission therefore held 
that a 10 year-old girl who was questioned at a police station for two hours without 
being arrested, locked into a cell or formally detained was not deprived of her liberty 
for the purposes of Article 5. 172  However, very short periods of detention are 
deprivations of liberty where there has been close confinement or arrest by the police 
or other authorities. For example, in case X v Austria, where the police took X to an 
institution so that a blood test could be carried out in relation to ongoing affiliation 
proceedings, the Commission found that the intention was to deprive X of his liberty, 
notwithstanding that the underlying court proceedings were civil in nature.173  
 
3.2.2 Lawful Arrest and Detention 
The deprivation of liberty must be “lawful” and carried out “in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law”. The phrases “lawful”, and “in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law” mean two requirements.174 On one hand, the arrest and 
detention must have been carried out according to the procedural and substantive 
rules of national law.175 Where, for example, a warrant is required for arrest and 
detention, the warrant must be in the correct form and time-limit or the arrest or 
detention will not be lawful under Article 5. In the case Voskuil v. the Netherlands, 
the applicant complained that, contrary to domestic law, he had not been provided 
with a copy of the order for his detention in writing within 24 hours. 176  He also 
complained that the written copy, when he eventually received it, contained no 
reasoning. The European Court observes that, although the decision ordering the 
applicant detained on the ground of refusing to give evidence was not required to be 
reasoned as the applicant suggested, domestic law did provide for notification in 
writing of the detention order within 24 hours.177 The Government did not deny that 
the applicant was only provided with a written copy of the order some three days 
later. The European Court therefore finds that the procedure prescribed by law has 
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not been followed.178 There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5(1) of the 
Convention.179 Similarly, where force is used in order to effect an arrest, the degree 
of force used must not exceed that authorised in the circumstances by domestic law.   
 
On the other hand, any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose 
of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness.180 It seems that 
European Court want to allow state to take reasonable measures to control crime, 
therefore reviewing compliance with domestic law tends to be left to the national 
courts in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.181  However, in Steel and 
others v UK, the European Court regarded that the domestic laws and their 
application must be sufficiently precise to allow their citizen to foresee, to a degree 
that is reasonable in all circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail. 182  Therefore, it must contain clear and accessible rules governing the 
circumstances in which it is permissible for the State to deprive an individual of his 
liberty and the procedure which must be followed.183 Where someone is arrested for 
doing something which they should have realised was criminal, it is quite another for 
them where they could not have know that what they were doing was against the law. 
This may be because the words of a statute are not precise or because the court’s own 
order is unintelligible. For example, in Baranowski v Poland the European Court 
found deficiencies in the Polish law on pre-trial detention.184  It was the practice in 
Poland in 1993 to 1994 that the accused could continue to be detained on remand 
until trial without the need for a court order once a bill of indictment had been 
lodged.185 The European Court found that this practice of maintaining detention on 
the basis of the indictment was not founded on any specific legislative provision or 
case law but stemmed from the absence of clear rules.186 It did not satisfy the test of 
foreseeability. 187  Therefore, even where the national law is clear and has been 
complied with, the deprivation of liberty will not be lawful if domestic law allows for 
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arbitrary or excessive detention.188  
 
The European Court further stressed that the unacknowledged detention of an 
individual is a complete negation of the guarantees contained in Article 5 and 
discloses a most grave violation of it.189 In the recent case Menesheva v Russia, the 
European Court observes that no documents pertaining specifically to the applicant’s 
initial arrest and her overnight stay at the police station could subsequently be 
found.190 It follows that for some 20 hours after the applicant’s arrest there existed no 
records such as the date, time and location of detention, the name of the detainee, the 
reasons for the detention and the name of the person effecting it. Even assuming that 
the police intended to press charges for the administrative offence, this did not 
absolve them from complying with such basic formalities before locking her up. That 
fact in itself must be considered a most serious failing with the requirement of 
lawfulness and with the very purpose of Article 5 of the Convention. The 
unacknowledged detention could easily continue for an unlimited and unpredictable 
period was contrary to the principle of legal certainty and open to arbitrariness and 
abuse. However, the practice of the European Courts exercising supervisory 
jurisdiction is not to rehear evidence supporting detention and in most cases they will 
refuse to hear applications from persons convicted of criminal offences who 
complain that their convictions or sentences were based on errors of fact or law.191 
 
3.3 Reasonable Suspicion: Article 5(1)(c) 
Article 5(1)(c) authorises the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the 
purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion 
of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably suspicion of having 
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his 
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so. 192  This is the longest 
paragraph of Article 5(1) and contemplates pretrial detention or “detention on 
remand”. It permits the lawful arrest or detention of a person for the purpose of 
bringing him before the competent legal authority in three sets of circumstances.193  
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The first situation is arrest or detention on reasonable suspicion and in practice is the 
most important. The second situation is preventive detention, which clearly requires 
careful monitoring, and the third is detention to prevent flight after an offence has 
been committed. This provision, read in conjunction with Article 5(3) and Article 6, 
is part of an overall scheme for the investigation and prosecution of a person for a 
criminal offence, and is clearly limited to the arrest or detention of persons for the 
purpose of enforcing the criminal law. 194  The interpretation of these Articles is 
difficult both because of unclear wording of Article 5(1)(c) and (3) and because of 
the differences between the systems of criminal procedure in common law and civil 
law jurisdictions in Europe, as Clayton noted, the European Court has to balance the 
need for a common European standard of procedure against respect for national 
approaches.195  
 
However, the European Court reiterates that the requirement of reasonable suspicion 
is an essential safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention.196 This requirement 
applies to all the three alternative circumstances in which an arrest may be lawful 
under Article 5(1)(c).197 Clayton and Tomlinson even regard that the overlap of the 
three grounds for detention means that only the first ground arrest or detention on 
reasonable suspicion has been considered in detail.198 In the case of Fox, Campbell 
and Hartley the interpretation of the concept of reasonable suspicion divided the 
European Court and the case is a good illustration of the type of problem which can 
arise in practice.199 The three applicants in this case were arrested and detained under 
section 11(1) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 which 
provided that “any constable may arrest without warrant any person whom he 
suspects of being a terrorist”.200 As interpreted by the House of Lords in the UK this 
section imposed a subjective test of honest belief, rather than an objective 
requirement of reasonable suspicion.201 The applicants, who had been questioned and 
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released without being charged, argued that the Act itself was in conflict with Article 
5(1)(c) and, furthermore, that on the facts their arrests had not been shown to have 
been based on reasonable suspicion. The European Court found a violation of Article 
5(1)(c) on the basis that “genuine and honest” suspicion was a lower standard than 
reasonable suspicion and was, therefore, not acceptable under the Convention. The 
mere fact that a person has committed some offence in the past will not be a 
sufficient basis for a reasonable suspicion. In the European Court’s view, “reasonable 
suspicion supposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an 
objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence”.202 It 
is not enough that the arresting officer believes it to be reasonable.  
 
The European Court held that what might be regarded as “reasonable” must depend 
on all the circumstances.203 For example, in connection with arrests and detention 
under criminal legislation enacted to deal with acts of terrorism, the European Court 
has explained that in view of the difficulties inherent in the investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist-type offences, the “reasonableness” of the suspicion 
justifying such arrests cannot always be judged according to the same standards as 
are applied in dealing with conventional crime.204 In order to illustrate this special 
situation, it is worth to compare the European Court’s conclusion in the Fox case 
with its subsequent decisions in the Murray v UK case and later the Erdagöz v. 
Turkey case in both of which the level of suspicion required by Article 5(1)(c) was 
again in issue.205 In Murray case, another terrorist case which the applicant was 
arrested under similarly worded legislation as the Fox, the European Court was less 
robust in its defence of Article 5(1)(c), but the principles in the case are specific and 
may not apply in non-terrorist cases.206 The European Court decided by fourteen 
votes to four that the applicant’s arrest on suspicion of collecting money to buy arms 
in the US had not violated Article 5(1), since two of her brothers had been convicted 
of buying arms and the applicant had visited them there.207 On the contrary, in the 
Erdagöz v Turkey, the European Court decided by seven votes to two that Turkey had 
violated Article 5(1) by detaining a man on suspicion of fabricating evidence, but 
                                               
202
 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK, (1991) 13 EHRR 157, para 32. 
203
 Ibid.; Murray v. UK (1995) 19 EHRR 193, para 51. 
204
 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK, para 32. 
205
 See Murray v UK, para 51; Erdagöz  v Turkey (2001) 32 EHRR 19, para 112. 
206
 (1995) 19 EHRR 193, para 51. 
207
 Ibid., para 62. 
118 
 
emphasized that since the object of questioning during detention under paragraph (c) 
is to confirm or dispel the suspicion, less evidence is needed to justify an arrest than 
to bring a charge.208  
 
However, the European Court stressed all the time that the exigencies of dealing with 
terrorism could not justify stretching the notion of “reasonableness” to the point 
where the essence of the safeguard was impaired. 209  Therefore even though the 
Contracting States cannot be asked to establish “the reasonableness of the suspicion 
grounding the arrest of a suspected terrorist by disclosing the confidential sources of 
supporting information or even facts which would be susceptible of indicating such 
sources of their identity”, the European Court must nevertheless be enabled to 
ascertain whether “the essence of the safeguard afforded by Article 5(1)(c) has been 
secured”.210 This means that where the domestic law did not require ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ as such but only “honest suspicion”, the respondent Government have to 
furnish at least some facts or information capable of satisfying the European Court 
that the arrested person was reasonably suspected of having committed the alleged 
offence.211 It will not be enough that the suspicion is of some vaguely described 
conduct. The European Court has recognised that there can be instances where there 
is some uncertainty as to whether known facts could reasonably be considered as 
falling within a particular prohibition on behaviour by the criminal law. But there is a 
need to be able to demonstrate not only a link between the person deprived of liberty 
and the events supposed to constitute an offence but also a sufficient basis for 
concluding that those events fall within the scope of the offence alleged.212  The 
absence of a criminal prohibition was relatively clear-cut. For example, in Lukanov v 
Bulgaria, the main problem was that most of the accusations brought against the 
applicant did not amount to any criminal offence under Bulgarian law.213 
 
But an arrest on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence will not 
necessarily violate Article 5 if the detainee is not subsequently charged or taken 
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before the court, provided that the arrest had been made for that purpose.214 For 
example, in both Brogan v UK and Murray v UK the domestic authorities in these 
two cases had concluded that after questioning the persons concerned it was 
impossible to pursue their suspicions against them and that in these circumstances 
charges could not be brought. 215  The European Court regarded that Article 5(1)(c) 
does not presuppose that the investigating authorities should have obtained sufficient 
evidence to bring charges, either at the point of arrest or while the arrested person is 
in custody.216 The object of questioning during detention under Article 5(1)(c) is to 
further the criminal investigation by way of confirming or dispelling the concrete 
suspicion grounding the arrest. Thus, facts which raise a suspicion need not be of the 
same level as those necessary to justify a conviction or even the bringing of a charge, 
which comes at the next stage of the process of criminal investigation.217 Therefore 
the European Court declined to find a violation of Article 5(1)(c) in these two cases. 
These cases shows that there is no requirement that the police should have obtained 
sufficient evidence to bring charges, either at the point of arrest, or while a person is 
in custody.218 But the legality of continued detention depends upon the reasonable 
suspicion of the detainee persisting.219 Arrests for the purpose other than ultimately 
to bring a prosecution, for example merely gathering information, are not permitted 
in UK.220 
 
3.4 Prompt Reasons for Arrest: Article 5(2) 
Now it should move on to consider the requirements which Article 5 imposes 
following an arrest. The elementary safeguard that any person arrested should be 
promptly given adequate information in simple, non-technical language that he can 
understand, to discern both the essential legal and factual grounds for his deprivation 
of liberty.221 Hoffman and Rowe regarded that it is an additional safeguard against 
arbitrary arrest: if the person making the arrest cannot say why they are doing so 
immediately after the arrest has been made, they are unlikely to be able to 
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demonstrate that it is not arbitrary.222 An explanation may have the beneficial effect 
of making it clear that resistance is not appropriate and thereby facilitate the task of 
the officials involved. In addition, the need to explain why such a measure is being 
taken is likely to encourage public officials to consider whether they are acting 
within the limits of their powers and to avoid taking action for which no adequate 
justification can be given. The person arrested is able, if he sees fit, to apply to a 
court to challenge the deprivation in accordance with Article 5(4).223 
 
It seems that the requirements of Article 5(2) have been applied very loosely by the 
European Court. Article 5(2) does not require that any particular form of 
communication be used, such as a warrant or other documentation. For example, the 
case Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK appears to indicate that Article 5(2) does not 
require the detainee to be expressly informed of the reasons for his arrest, as long as 
they can be inferred from the circumstances. 224  The person arrested must 
consequently be interrogated in sufficient detail about their suspected involvement in 
specific criminal acts and their suspected membership of proscribed organizations.225 
Such lack of rigour might be acceptable if there was a real connection between a 
failure to give information to suspects and an advantage to be gained in an 
emergency situation, since the principle of proportionality would then be satisfied. 
Clayton and Tomlinson commented that this finding was an unacceptable dilution of 
a basic guarantee.226 In Ireland v UK, the European Court held that it was not enough 
to tell an arrested person that he or she was being held pursuant to the provisions of 
emergency legislation.227 In cases arising under Article 5(1)(c), it is unnecessary to 
indicate all of the charges that might later be brought against an arrested person, so 
long as the information provided justifies the detention.228 The explanation is perhaps 
best given by a direct statement to the person affected by the official depriving of 
liberty. 
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What is sufficient information is matter for determination on special features of each 
case.229 In the Kerr case the applicant was informed at the time of his arrest of the 
provision of domestic law under which he was detained (the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 1996).230 The European Court held that a bare indication of the legal basis for an 
arrest could not, on its own, be sufficient for the purposes of Article 5(2).231 However, 
in this case, the reasons for the applicant’s detention must have been sufficiently 
clear to him for the purposes of Article 5(2) because the applicant was questioned 
about his suspected involvement in a recent bomb explosion at a military barracks, 
his membership of a proscribed organization, and about the use he had made of items 
seized by the police from his house, in particular computer equipment and the 
information stored on the computer immediately after his arrest.232 The ruling in this 
case underlined that a degree of specificity is required in order to satisfy Article 5(2). 
Where the capacity of the individual to appreciate the notification is impaired as, for 
example, in cases of minors or the mentally handicapped, the information must 
nevertheless be communicated to his representative, legal agent or guardian.233  
 
Whether the promptness of the information conveyed was sufficient is to be assessed 
in each case according to its special features as well.234  The obligation to give 
information about the arrest or charge “promptly” does not mean that the information 
must be given in its entirety immediately upon arrest.235 This is different from Article 
9(2) of ICCPR.236 The detained person must be informed of the legal and factual 
grounds for his arrest whether at one time or over an interval within a sufficient 
period following the arrest in order that Article 5(2) is complied with.237 This is 
obviously relevant if the arrested person is drunk or otherwise incapacitated, but can 
also be important in other situations. All the facts of the particular case must be taken 
into account; and periods of 6 to 8 hours, 24 hours and even 2 days between arrest 
and information were acceptable.238 The question of the timing of notification was 
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raised in the Murray case as well. Soldiers had occupied the applicant’s house, thus 
clearly taking her into detention, but she was not informed of the fact of arrest for 
half an hour. The question arose whether she was falsely imprisoned during that half 
hour. The European Court found that no breach of Article 5(2) had occurred in those 
circumstances. Mrs Murray was interval of a few hours had elapsed between the 
arrest and informing her of the reason for it, this could still be termed prompt.239 As 
Fenwick regarded, these decisions of European Court provide examples of the 
European Court’s tenderness to claims of a threat to national security made by 
governments of Member States. 240 
 
3.5 Prompt Appearance before a Court: Article 5(3) 
Article 5(3) is specifically concerned with the rights of those who are arrested or 
detained in accordance with Article 5(1)(c).241 Its purpose is to “minimise the risk of 
arbitrariness” by providing judicial control over the executive’s interference with the 
right to liberty in the criminal process.242 A literal reading of Article 5(3) would 
suggest that the authorities have a free choice either to release a person pending trial 
or else to try him within a reasonable time. This restrictive interpretation has been 
rejected by the European Court. The European Court has found in Wemhoff v 
Germany that these are not alternatives: there is a right to be released pending trial 
unless detention can be justified.243  Although Article 5(3) does not guarantee an 
absolute right to bail, the presumption is in favour of release.244 No violation of 
Article 5(3) can arise if the arrested person is released “promptly” pending trial 
before any judicial control of his detention would have been feasible.245 And there is 
no need for release to receive judicial approval.  
 
3.5.1 Justifying Pre-trial Detention 
The European Court has repeatedly asserted that the existence of a reasonable 
suspicion is essential for the initial detention but not sufficient for any prolongation 
of detention after a certain lapse of time.246 As established in Neumeister v. Austria 
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(No.1), until conviction, the accused must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of 
the second limb of Article 5(3) is essentially to require his provisional release once 
his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable. 247  Therefore, a continuing 
obligation on the detaining authorities is required throughout the detention to 
consider whether its continuation is really justified at the first place and whether it is 
still appropriate. The European Court must then establish whether the other grounds 
cited by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. 248  The 
factors that are relevant in assessing whether a period is “reasonable” include the 
complexity of the case, the difficulty of obtaining evidence, the volume of the 
evidence, the length and nature of the charge, whether the accused has contributed 
towards the lengthening of proceedings and, in particular, whether there have been 
any unjustified delays on the part of the judicial authorities. Continued detention can 
be justified in a given case only if there are specific indications of a genuine 
requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, 
outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty.249 
 
Consequently, although reasonable suspicion must continue in order to justify 
detention under Article 5(1)(c), Article 5(3) requires in addition that there be specific 
indications of “relevant and sufficient” and “genuine” public interest reasons to 
justify interfering with the liberty of a person presumed to be innocent. 250  As 
summary by the P Van Dijk and G J H Van Hoof, it is obvious that for each 
individual case and at each moment the interests of the accused will have to be 
weighed against the interests of the protection of society and the interest of effective 
prosecution.251 As the European Court stated in the Neumeister judgment that it is for 
the national judicial authorities to seek all the facts arguing for or against the 
existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying a departure from the 
rule of respect for individual liberty.252 It is essential that applications for release be 
examined with an open mind.   
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3.5.1.1 Risk of Flight  
The ground most frequently relied upon by national courts is the risk of flight. Most 
of the cases regarding bail concern the fear that the accused will abscond. However, 
the European Court has emphasized that the risk must be substantiated in each case 
and assessed by reference to a number of factors which may either confirm the 
existence of a danger of absconding or make it appear so slight that it cannot justify 
detention pending trial.253  Also since the risk decreases as time passes, the European 
Court will be correspondingly more exacting in its scrutiny the longer pre-trial 
detention lasts. 254 There must be an overall evaluation of the risk of flight with 
reference to a number of other relevant factors which may either confirm the 
existence of a danger of absconding or make it appear so slight that it cannot justify 
detention pending trial. 255  Other factors include the accused’s clear distaste of 
detention;256 the probable civil liability of the accused if convicted and the threat of 
further proceedings;257  the character of the accused, his morals,258  his home, his 
occupation, his asserts, his family ties,259 all kinds of links with the country in which 
he is being prosecuted;260 the likelihood of absconding itself and indications that he 
has links with another country261 or that he is planning to escape.262 However, it is 
not sufficient to invoke any of these factors pointing to the risk of flight as a 
justification in itself for continuing to deprive someone of liberty.  
 
Even when the accused is charged with a particularly serious crime and the evidence 
against him is strong, for example, in case Chraidi v. Germany, the European Court 
nonetheless emphasized again that the existence of a strong suspicion of the 
involvement of the person concerned in serious offences, while constituting a 
relevant factor, cannot be gauged solely on the basis of the severity of the sentence. 
263
 The European Court accepts that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant 
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committed the offences with which he had been charged, being based on cogent 
evidence, persisted throughout the trial leading to his conviction. It also agrees that 
the alleged offences were of a serious nature. 264  As regards the danger of the 
absconding, the European Court was satisfied that a substantial risk of the applicant’s 
absconding persisted throughout his detention since there is the fact that “the 
applicant had been extradited from Lebanon to Germany for the purposes of criminal 
proceedings in the context of international terrorism. He had neither a fixed dwelling 
nor social ties in Germany which might have prevented him from absconding if 
released”. 265  Therefore, the European Court also accepted the domestic courts’ 
finding that no other measures to secure his presence detention and would have been 
appropriate. There is a need to assess how significant such factors are in the 
particular circumstances of the case and to weigh them against any of the factors 
present which might point against the person concerned being likely to flee. For 
instance, in Stögmüller v Austria, the applicant had flown abroad several times 
during a period of provisional release and had always returned, a slight delay in 
doing so on one occasion had also been satisfactorily explained.266  Similarly, in 
Letellier v France there had been no attempt to abscond when the applicant had 
previously been released for a 4 week period.267  
 
Certainly a ruling which is based on a stereotyped form of words without any 
explanation as to why the risk of absconding exists will never be considered 
acceptable by the European Court. 268  For example, in Sarban v. Moldova, the 
domestic courts limited themselves to paraphrasing the reasons for detention 
provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure, without explaining how they 
applied in the applicant’s case.269 The only exception was that they referred to the 
applicant’s Romanian passport, which could have enabled him to abscond abroad, 
and his lack of a permanent job. However, the domestic courts did not react in any 
way to the applicant’s argument that both his Romanian and Moldovan passports 
could have been seized by the authorities if they had decided that this was necessary 
to prevent his absconding and that alternative preventive measures existed, some of 
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which provided virtually the same guarantees against absconding as pre-trial 
detention, for house arrest. 270  Neither were any other factors in favour of the 
applicant’s release examined, such as his appearance before the investigator at the 
latter’s first request, despite an express requirement to do so under Article 176 (3) of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure and the applicant’s reference to several prima facie 
relevant reasons against detention.271 The European Court also takes into account that 
the applicant was held for over two years in detention pending trial, even though no 
new reasons were advanced for the continued need for such detention.272 
 
3.5.1.2 The risk of Interference with the Course of Justice and Preventing Crime 
Another common ground invoked to justify pre-trial detention is the risk of 
interference with the course of justice prior to trial. Furthermore in most cases this is 
a ground for continued deprivation of liberty which will become less and less 
compelling as the various stages of an investigation are completed, such as the taking 
statements and the carrying out verifications. It will not generally be an admissible 
justification once the whole process has been completed as held in Muller v 
France.273 Bail may be refused where there is evidence that release of the accused 
well use the opportunity to undermine the preparation of a case against him by his 
destruction of documents, collusion with other possible suspects or interference with 
witnesses. 274  Obviously there must be some concrete factual circumstances 
supporting these possibilities in respect of the person deprived of his liberty. 
However, the European Court will always make its assessment by reference to the 
facts of the particular case and these can sometimes be so exceptional as to justify 
deprivation of liberty until trial.  
 
For instance, a substantial risk of collusion until trial was considered to exist in W v 
Switzerland because of the exceptional extent of the case, the extraordinary quantity 
of the documents seized and their intentionally confused state, the large number of 
witnesses to be questioned, the behaviour of the applicant before and after release 
reflecting an intention of systematically deleting all evidence of liability, and the fear 
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of the applicant’s being able to eliminate items of evidence still hidden, to 
manufacture false evidence and to connive with witnesses, as well as the extension of 
the investigation to offences in Germany.275 It was undoubtedly significant in this 
regard that the case indicated that other proceedings the applicant had manufactured 
exonerating evidence, antedated documents and manipulated witnesses. However, it 
should be noted that this was not the sole justification for continued deprivation as 
there was also a risk of the applicant’s fleeing.  
 
As to the need to prevent crime, again, the domestic court judgments must show that 
this risk was substantiated: all the circumstances of the case must be taken into 
account and reference to past crimes may not be sufficient.276 But the European 
Court also suggested that in “special circumstances” a person presumed innocent 
may still be detained in the belief that, if released, the accused will commit another 
serious offence of the kind with which he is already charged. For example, in 
Matznetter v Austria, the applicant was an accountant charged with committing a 
number of serious company frauds. 277  The European Court held that it was 
compatible with Article 5(3) for the national court to rely on the risk of re-offending 
as a ground for refusing bail, since Matznetter had the skill and experience, such as 
to make it easy for him to resume his unlawful activities.278 Similarly, in the Assenov 
v Bulgarian case the Bulgarian authorities were entitled to rely on this ground since 
the applicant was charged with a long series of thefts, some of which had allegedly 
been committed subsequent to his initial arrest and questioning by the police.279 The 
fact that the person concerned had previous convictions for the same or similar 
offences to the one under investigation would thus be significant, as would other 
offences apparently being committed between the beginning of the investigation and 
the person being charged with the one for which his or her detention is sought. 
However, the continued detention of the person in such cases is likely to be 
inappropriate where the offences concerned were not comparable in either their 
nature or degree of seriousness.280  Moreover, argument that financial difficulties 
would be a temptation to commit further offences is unlikely to be convincing.281 
                                               
275
 (1993) 17 EHRR 60, para 36. 
276
 Ringeisen v Austria, (1979-80), 1 EHRR 455,para 109. 
277
 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 198. 
278
 Ibid., para 9. 
279
 (1999) 28 EHRR 652. 
280
 See Clooth v Belgium (1991) 14 EHRR 717, para 40, Muller v France, (Application No. 21802/93), 17/03/97 
128 
 
 
3.5.1.3 The Need to Maintain Public Order and Protection of Defendant 
The test raised in Letellier v France is whether municipal law recognises the ground 
to justify fears of disturbance and there is evidence that the accused’s release “will 
actually disturb public order”. 282  The European Court acknowledged that, in 
exceptional circumstances, by reason of their particular gravity and public reaction to 
them, certain offences, such as murder, may give rise to a social disturbance capable 
of justifying pre-trial detention, at least for a time.283  However, the European Court 
explained that this ground can be regarded as relevant and sufficient only provided 
that it is based on facts capable showing that the accused’s release would actually 
prejudice public order. 284  In this case, the European Court noted that no concrete 
manifestations of disorder had been cited and indeed the mother and sister of the 
deceased had not opposed the applicant’s release. Therefore, the contested detention 
had ceased to be based on relevant and sufficient grounds. In addition, as concluded 
in Tomasi v France, detention will continue to be legitimate only if public order 
remains actually threatened, since it might have disappeared after a certain time.285 
 
A defendant may also be detained before trial if such detention is necessary for his 
own protection, at least for a time.286 However, the European Court underlined that 
there can only be detention on this ground “in exceptional circumstances having to 
do with the nature of the offences concerned, the conditions in which they were 
committed and the context in which they took place”.287 It could not be relied upon 
simply because of the nature of the offence involved. For example, in I.A. v France, 
the invocation of concern about reprisals by a murder victim’s relatives was 
ineffective because they were vague but also implausible.288 
 
3.5.2 The right to Release on Bail 
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As held in Wemhoff v Germany, where such grounds to justify the continued 
detention do not exist or the circumstances as discussed above can be avoided by bail 
or other guarantees, whether initially or at a later stage, there is an obligation on the 
national authorities to consider such alternatives to detention.289  In any of these 
situations, the reason advanced must be justified by the facts in the particular case. 
But if there is still reasonable suspicion regarding the commission of an offence, the 
person concerned should be released on bail but this may be subject to guarantees 
designed to ensure that he appears for trial. In those countries which have the system 
of bail on financial sureties, the amount of the sureties must not be excessive, and 
must be fixed by reference to the purpose for which they are imposed, namely to 
ensure that this particular defendant appears for trial.290 The sum must never be set 
exclusively by reference to the seriousness of the charge without considering the 
accused’s financial circumstances. For example, in Neumeister v Austria, where the 
domestic authorities calculated the amount of bail solely in relation to the loss 
imputed to the applicant, the European Court found this contrary to Article 5(3), 
since the bail is designed to ensure the presence of the person accused to the hearing 
and is not the reparation of the loss caused by the accused.291 The amount of the bail 
must also correspond to this aim and thus must be calculated by reference to the 
accused, his assets and the relationship with the person providing the security.292 The 
accused must make available information related to his assets while the doemestic 
authorities are under a duty to carefully assess this information for a proper 
assessment of the security to be calculated. Even if such guarantees as monetary 
cannot be obtained or are not considered reliable, consideration ought to be given in 
all cases to the suitability of other measures than deprivation of liberty for ensuring 
those dangers discussed above do not occur. For example, in order to the same end of 
ensuring the accused’s presence at the trial, it can also require that the person 
concerned reside in a particular place, give up his travel documents or frequently 
report to the police.293  
 
3.5.3 The Length of Pre-trial Detention  
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However, even if the reasons justifying continued deprivation of liberty can still be 
demonstrated to be applicable to a particular individual, there is also a need to ensure 
that he is brought to trial within a reasonable time if he is held in custody and not 
release pending trial and this necessarily sets limits to the overall period for which 
such a deprivation can be allowed to endure.294 Article 5 (3), for its part, refers only 
to persons charged and detained.295 Once the accused has been released on bail, 
Article 5(3) does not apply. 296 Also, the European Court has held that the end of the 
period with which this provision is concerned is the day on which the charge is 
determined, even if only by a court of first instance. It follows that it is not the day 
on which the judgement becomes final.297 In the case of B v Austria, where the 
European Court confirmed its Wemhoff judgment to hold that, despite the rule of 
Austrian law that sentence becomes final only with the determination of any appeal, 
but the important guarantees of Article 5(3) of the Convention are not dependent on 
national legislation.298 So the applicant’s detention on remand came to an end for the 
purposes of the Convention with the finding of guilt and sentencing at first 
instance.299  
 
However, if the accused is released and later taken back into custody, the relevant 
period is the aggregate period of detention.300 Where an accused person is detained 
for two or more separate periods pending trial, the European Court declared those 
complaints regarding these periods inadmissible if an application was lodged more 
than 6 months after the end of initial periods of detention.301 However, the European 
Court has reinstated in recent cases such as Solmaz v Turkey and Baltaci v Turkey 
that the “reasonable time” guarantee of Article 5(3) requires a global assessment of 
the accumulated periods. 302  The European Court notes that, in the absence of 
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domestic remedies, the 6-month time limit starts to run from the act being 
complained of.303 
 
There is no maximum length of pre-trial detention as long as there remain “relevant 
and sufficient circumstances” to show that detention was not unreasonably prolonged 
and contrary to Article 5(3) of the Convention as discussed above.304 The European 
Court reiterates that the issue of whether a period of detention is reasonable cannot 
be assessed in abstracto.305 The reasonableness of an accused person’s continued 
detention must be assessed in each case according to its special features and the 
factors which may be taken into consideration are extremely diverse. 306 For example, 
in a recent case Khudobin v Russia, the European Court recalled that “the gravity of 
the charge cannot by itself serve to justify long periods of detention pending trial. 
Nor can it be used to anticipate a custodial sentence”.307 Also, the reasons for the 
applicant’s detention in this case, referred to by the Government as the danger of 
absconding and the applicant’s “character”, were not mentioned in the domestic 
courts’ decisions, and the European Court cannot accept that those reasons transpire 
from the circumstances of the case. 308  On the other hand, such factors as the 
applicant’s young age, health problems, the absence of a criminal record, the fact that 
he had a permanent place of residence and stable family relations called for a careful 
scrutiny of his applications for release and for their analysis in the judicial decisions. 
The European Court regarded that “it appears that the lack of reasoning was not an 
accidental or short-term omission, but rather a customary way of dealing with 
applications for release in Russia”. Against this background the European Court 
concludes that the applicant’s detention pending investigation and trial 1 year and 23 
days was not justified by “relevant and sufficient” reasons.309  
 
The complexity and special characteristics of the investigations are factors to be 
considered by European Court justify a long period of pre-trial detention. 310  In 
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Wemhoff v Germany the pre-trial period was 3 years, the need to obtain further expert 
evidence was held by the European Court in this case as a justifiable reason for delay 
in prosecution of a case.311 This approach is still the position can be seen from the 
decisions in the coming cases. For example, in Contrada v Italy the European Court 
held that detention for a period of 2 years and 7 months to enable complex 
investigations to be carried out did not breach Article 5(3). 312  The right of an 
accused person to have his case considered with particular expedition should not 
hinder the efforts of the domestic courts to carry out their tasks with proper care. 313 
In W v Switzerland, which bore some resemblance to Wemhoff, Judge Pettiti 
dissented and suggested that there ought to be an absolute limit to the length of 
proceedings and that strong evidence should be necessary to justify both refusing bail 
and extending proceedings for more than 4 years.314 However, the European Court 
finally held that a total of 4 years and 6 months pre-trial detention was considered 
acceptable because there were good grounds for refusing bail and the complexity of 
the case, rather than any delays attributable to the authorities, was the cause of the 
extended proceedings.315  
 
At the same time the European Court regarded that the complexity of a case does not 
per se absolve the prosecution from its responsibility to promptly bring an accused to 
trial.316 For example, in case Solmaz v. Turkey, the European Court observes that the 
Istanbul State Security Court examined the applicant’s continued detention at the end 
of every hearing, either of its own motion or upon the applicant’s request. 317 
However, it also noted that, from the material in the case file, that the court ordered 
the applicant’s continued detention using identical, stereotyped terms, such as 
“having regard to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content 
of the file” at the end of most of the hearings. Although, in general, the expression 
“the state of evidence” may be a relevant factor for the existence and persistence of 
serious indications of guilt, in the present case it nevertheless, alone, cannot justify 7 
years and 2 months of the pre-trial detention.318 
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Where such grounds to justify the continued detention are “relevant” and “sufficient”, 
the European Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities 
displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings.319  The need for 
special diligence does not, however, imply any upper limit on time in custody, or 
preclude very long periods of detention in an appropriate case. 320  Periods of 
inactivity by the national authorities lasting more than a few months are usually 
taken by the European Court as a sign of lack of diligence, particularly if the overall 
duration of the detention was long. An example of a successful claim under Article 
5(3) is Scott v Spain, where the applicant had been detained for 2 years and 4 months 
pending trial on rape charges of which he was acquitted.321 The European Court 
rejected the argument of the Spanish Government that the difficulties of liaising with 
the alleged victim, who lived in Finland, could justify the delay.322 In contrast, in 
recent case Chraidi v. Germany, the applicant’s detention on remand thus lasted 5 
years and almost 6 months.323 When the European Court ascertained whether the 
judicial authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings, 
the European Court takes the view that the applicant’s case involved many witnesses 
and plaintiffs with a terrorist and international background was extremely 
complex.324 The European Court noted that hearings took place on 281 separate days 
with on average two hearings per week until the Regional Court’s decision of 
13 November 2001. The hearings were regularly attended by five defendants, their 
fifteen lawyers, 106 joint plaintiffs and their 29 lawyers. Therefore the European 
Court held that having regard to the difficulties intrinsic to the prosecution of 
offences committed in the context of international terrorism, the competent judicial 
authorities cannot be said to have displayed a lack of special diligence in handling 
the applicant’s case. 325 
 
                                               
319
 See e.g., Stögmüller v Austria (1969) 1 EHRR 155, para 5; Castravet v. Moldova, 23393/05, (2007), para 31; 
Assenov v. Bulgaria, (1998) 28 EHRR 652, para 54. 
320
 Jason Coppel, The Human Rights Act 1998: Enforcing the European Convention in the Domestic Courts, 
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1999) p.225. 
321
 (1997) 24 EHRR 391. 
322
 Ibid., para  83. 
323
 (2008) 47 EHRR 2. 
324
 Ibid., para 43. 
325
 Ibid., para 44. 
134 
 
A suspect is not considered by the European Court to be under any obligation to co-
operate but his conduct in not doing so will be recognised as factor in slowing the 
overall progress of an investigation. For example, in case W v Switzerland, lack of 
co-operation of the accused, as well as actual obstruction that as a result of the state 
of their accounts there had been great difficulties in reconstructing the financial 
situation of his companies will thus also be considered in assessing whether or not 
the total period of pre-trial detention is excessive.326 But in case Stögmüller v Austria, 
even though the European Court accepted the delays caused by certain of the 
applicant’s applications and appeals and, in particular, his challenges to judges, it 
unanimously held that there has been in this case a breach of Article 5 (3) because 
“at that time the length of his detention had already ceased to be reasonable”.327 In 
Jablonski v Poland, the domestic courts extended the applicant’s detention beyond 
the statutory time-limit because he had previously inflicted injuries on himself and 
had thus obstructed the progress of the trial.328 However, the European Court found a 
violation of Article 5(3), arguing that the national courts failed to consider any 
alternative “preventive measure” such as bail or police supervision when they 
decided that the applicant should be kept in detention in order to ensure the proper 
conduct of the trial. 329 
 
3.5.4 The character of the Competent Legal Authority 
If the accused is not released pending trial promptly before any judicial control of his 
detention would have been feasible, he is entitled to a prompt appearance before a 
judge or judicial officer.330  The importance of the right to be brought promptly 
before a judge under Article 5(3) arises from the objective and purpose of Article 5 
itself: to protect the individual against arbitrary interferences by the state with his 
right to liberty.331 So Article 5(3) emphasises the state’s duty to have the accused’s 
arrest and detention approved by a judge at an early stage and differs from Article 
5(4) and Article 6. The “officer” must hear the individual brought before him in 
person and review whether or not the detention is justified. If it is not justified, the 
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“officer” must have the power to make a binding order for the detainee’s release.332 
The European Court note the word “officer authorised by law to exercise judicial 
power” using in Article 5(3) is quite vague but tries to emphasis the limits of the 
distinction which it establishes.333  A number of cases have considered the character 
of the “other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power”.  
 
The important concern on the independence and impartiality is whether or not there 
is a possibility of the officer may intervene in subsequent criminal proceedings on 
behalf of the prosecution.334 This aspect of Article 5(3) was examined in detail in the 
Schiesser v Switzerland case.335 The “officer” need not be a judge but must display 
judicial attributes sufficient to protect the rights of the detained person. Judge or 
other judicial officer authorised by law has the same meaning as “competent legal 
authority’ in Article 5(1)(c), in other words that it is independent of the executive and 
is impartial in relation to the parties.336 In addition, the European Court explained 
under Article 5(3), there are both a procedural and a substantive requirement. 337  The 
procedural requirement places the “officer” under the obligation of hearing himself 
the individual brought before him; the substantive requirement imposes on him the 
obligations of reviewing the circumstances militating for or against detention, of 
deciding, by reference to legal criteria, whether there are reasons to justify detention 
and of ordering release if there are no such reasons.  
 
Therefore in the Schiesser case it was decided that a Swiss District Attorney satisfied 
the requirements of Article 5(3) because, although he could act as a prosecuting as 
well as an investigating authority, in the present case he had acted solely as an 
investigating authority and, in accordance with the usual practice, had taken his 
decision to detain the applicant in complete independence and in conformity with the 
procedural and substantive requirements of the Convention. On the contrary, in case 
Assenov v Bulgaria the European Court therefore held that the prosecutor who 
authorised the applicant’s continued detention on remand could not provide 
sufficient guarantees of independence since he could in theory have taken over the 
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prosecution of the subsequent criminal proceedings.338 As Macovei concluded, from 
a number of cases, the problem of objective impartiality is likely to be much more 
acute given the structure of prosecution systems.339 The basic problem is that the 
prosecutor is a party to the proceedings and the person taking that role could not 
therefore be expected to be impartial when performing a judicial function in the same 
case. The officer needs to display judicial attributes sufficient to protect the rights of 
the accused. The European Court does not rule out the possibility of the judicial 
officer who orders the detention carrying out other duties, but reiterates the 
independence or impartiality of the officer for the purposes of Article 5(3) all the 
time. 
 
It is hard to guarantee in advance that a person taking a detention decision will not 
subsequently be involved in the prosecution. Also there will be a need to ensure that 
the “officer” is truly independent and that means not only from political pressures but 
also from superiors. In Schiesser v Switzerland, this does not mean that the “officer” 
may not be to some extent subordinate to other judges or officers provided that they 
themselves enjoy similar independence.340 In some circumstances, subordinates may 
be expected to follow their superior’s instructions regarding an individual case and 
they will not therefore have the requisite independence. This problem were 
extensively examined and discussed by the European Court in the case of Niedbala v 
Poland. 341 The European Court firstly observed that under Polish law at the material 
time, the tasks of the prosecution during criminal proceedings were carried out by 
prosecutors. The latter were subordinated to the Prosecutor General who at the same 
time carried out the function of the Minister of Justice. The Polish constitutional law 
provides for the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. The judicial 
power is entrusted solely to the independent courts. This made it indisputable that 
prosecutors, in the exercise of their functions, are subject to supervision of an 
authority belonging to the executive branch of the government. The European Court 
also held that their role as guardians of the public interest cannot be regarded as 
conferring on them a judicial status. Since the prosecutors performed investigative 
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and prosecuting functions, they must be seen as a party to the criminal 
proceedings.342 Consequently, the European Court found that the prosecutor in the 
polish legal system was not an “officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power”.  
 
The case Salov v Ukraine is one of the latest applications of this approach.343 The 
applicant in this case complained that he was not brought promptly before a judge or 
other judicial authority to have his arrest reviewed. The Government maintained that 
the applicant had been detained in accordance with the decision of the prosecutor. 
They stressed that the prosecutor, pursuant to the reservation made by Ukraine in 
respect of Article 5 of the Convention, could be considered another officer authorised 
by law to exercise judicial power. However, the European Court observes that “under 
Ukrainian legislation, a prosecutor cannot be regarded as an officer exercising 
‘judicial power’ within the meaning of Article 5(3)”. Moreover, his status cannot 
offer guarantees against any arbitrary or unjustified deprivation of liberty as he is not 
endowed with the attributes of “independence” and “impartiality” required by Article 
5(3). Furthermore, the prosecution authorities not only belong to the executive 
branch of the State, but they also “concurrently perform investigative and 
prosecution functions in criminal proceedings and are party to those proceedings”.344 
The European Court therefore reiterates its position as to the status of the prosecutor, 
who cannot be regarded as “an officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power” 
and rejects the Government’s arguments in this respect.345 
 
3.5.5 The time-frame for supervision 
3.5.5.1 The Notion of Promptness 
It follows also that, if this safeguard, the right to be brought promptly before a judge, 
is to be effective, the interpretation of the word “promptly” assumes a crucial 
importance and much of the case law on Article 5(3) has concerned this question. 
The European Court reiterates that such judicial control cannot be made to depend on 
an application by the detained person, which might defeat the purpose of Article 
5(3), but must be automatic.346 For example, in recent case Salov v. Ukraine, the 
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applicant was apprehended by the police but that his detention was not reviewed by a 
court 16 days after his arrest. The European Court considers that the Government’s 
explanations as to the delay in reviewing the applicant’s arrest are immaterial as they 
presuppose that there was no automatic judicial review of detention and that such a 
review depends only on whether the detainee has complained to the court about the 
lawfulness of his or her detention.347  
 
As to the assessment of the notion “promptness”, there is no concrete limit on the 
acceptable length since it considers that this must depend on an assessment of the 
“special features” of each case as under Article 5(2).348 There have been some cases 
where the detention concerned lasted far longer than could ever reasonably be 
regarded as acceptable. Thus the lapse of 3 months before judicial supervision in 
Assenov and Others v Bulgaria and in Jecius v Lithuania were thus unanimously 
held to violate the promptness requirement.349  The European Court considers that 
“the wording ‘brought promptly’ in Article 5(3) implies that the right to be brought 
before an appropriate officer relates to the time when a person is first deprived of his 
liberty under Article 5(1)(c).”350 However violations of the obligation will also arise 
where the intervals are not quite so extreme. Although the European Court has never 
put a finite limit on the acceptable length of preliminary detention, the degree of 
flexibility attaching to the assessment of the notion “promptness” is limited.351 Some 
guidance is provided by the Brogan and Others v the UK judgment, which concerned 
the arrest and detention by virtue of powers granted under special legislation of 
persons suspected of involvement in terrorism in Northern Ireland.352  
 
In Brogan and Others v the UK, the shortest length of detention after arrest was 4 
days and 6 hours and the longest was 6 days and 16 hours. Here the issue to be 
decided by the European Court was whether, having regard to the special features 
relied on by the Government, each applicant’s release can be considered as “prompt” 
for the purposes of article 5(3). All the applicants were questioned about specific 
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terrorist incidents, it is clear that none of the applicants had been brought before a 
judge or judicial officer during his time in custody before his release.353 Turning to 
the particular facts, the European Court recognised that the investigation of terrorist 
offences in Northern Ireland presents the authorities with special problems. Account 
was also taken of the safeguards of ministerial control, the constant monitoring of the 
need for the legislation by Parliament and the regular review of its operation. The 
European Court agreed subject to the existence of adequate safeguards, the context of 
terrorism in Northern Ireland has the effect of prolonging the period during which the 
authorities may, without violating Article 5(3), keep a person suspected of serious 
terrorist offences in custody before bringing him before a judge or other judicial 
officer.354 Therefore the European Court held that it is for the European Court to 
determine and balance the significance to be attached to different background 
circumstances.  
 
However, the European Court still regarded that the special features of this case can 
never be taken to the point of impairing the very essence of the right guaranteed by 
Article 5(3).355 So the promptness has to be made in the light of the overall object 
and purpose of Article 5.356 The undoubted fact that arrest and detention of the 
applicants were inspired by the legitimate aim of protecting the community as a 
whole from terrorism is not on its own sufficient to ensure compliance with the 
specific requirements of Article 5(3).357 In this case, even the shortest of the four 
periods of detention, namely the 4 days and 6 hours spent in police custody by one 
applicant in this case fell outside the strict constraints as to time permitted by the first 
part of Article 5. The case Brogan v UK recognised that the word “promptly” in 
Article 5(3) should be interpreted strictly and with only a limited degree of flexibility 
to cater for special circumstances. Later cases have fully endorsed this approach.358 
For example, in case Salov v Ukraine, there was no hesitation on the part of the 
European Court in finding a violation of Article 5(3) even if the Government’s 
argument that the applicant had contributed to the delay by not applying for release 
were accepted, where his detention for 7 days without any judicial control fell 
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outside the strict constraints of time laid down by the Convention.359 Either it has 
been impossible to persuade the European Court that delay of 5 or 6 days could be 
acceptable.360  
 
3.5.5.2 State of Emergency 
The most frequent emergency measure resorted to by states in emergency situations, 
such as organised terrorism or threats to national security, is the detention without 
trial. Especially after 11 September, the general perception was that further attacks 
could well occur, and that they might happen anywhere in the world. Thus the UN 
Security Council required states in Resolution 1373 to take measures to prevent 
terrorist attacks, which include denying a safe haven to those who plan, support or 
commit such acts.361 The European Court has given the broad definition of a public 
emergency as an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which effects the whole 
population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which 
the State is composed.362 Faced with such a situation Article 5 about the right to 
liberty and security of persons is one article therefore that may be derogated from its 
convention obligations in so far as it is permitted to do by the State in such an 
emergency.  
 
Due to the nature and extent of the terrorist threat and the resulting problems in 
obtaining evidence sufficient to bring charges, member states have invoked the need 
to keep terrorist suspects in custody before bringing him before a judge or other 
judicial officer for some time following arrest. For example, the UK government’s 
response to the Brogan and others v UK judgment was to file a derogation of Article 
5 under Article 15 of the Convention after the European Court found a violation of 
Article 5(3) in the case, although later the derogation has been withdrawn with effect 
from 2001. 363  Interestingly, the Government did not seek to derogate from the 
equivalent right to liberty contained in Article 9 of ICCPR. In UK, the period of 
detention without charge has been extended from 48 hours to 7 days by the 
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Terrorism Act 2000.364 In the case Brannigan and McBride v UK, the European 
Court gives a considerable “margin of appreciation” to the State on the question 
whether resort to emergency measures were justified.365 The UK has not overstepped 
the margin of appreciation by derogating from their obligations under Article 5 of the 
Convention to the extent that the individuals suspected of terrorist offences were 
allowed to be held for up to 7 days without judicial control.366  
 
The UK has had lengthy experience in indefinitely detaining those suspected to be 
terrorists without trial. 367  Since 9/11, the government in the UK has faced the 
difficult task of balancing the rights of individuals with the security of the state.368 
There has been intense legislative activity in UK. The issue was tackled and 
controversial during the drafting of all the Terrorism Act, especially on the detention 
of suspected terrorists without trial.369  After 7 July bomb attacks in London the UK 
Parliament has passed the Terrorism Act 2006 (UK).370 Under this Act, the detention 
for an initial period of 48 hours, is then reviewed by a judicial authority sitting in 
private rather than in an open court, and is then renewable for every 7 day periods up 
to a maximum of 28 days, with a senior judge considering applications for 
detainment for the final 14 days. 371  This was a considerable increase over the 
existing term permitted by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which allowed for a 
maximum 14 days detention before charges were laid and contrast also to the 
maximum of 4 days detention without charge allowed in cases of murder, rape and 
complex fraud under ordinary legislation, with further 36 hours and 24 hours 
extensions being granted by a judicial authortiy after the initial 36 hours.372 The 
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parliament has warned that the growing number of cases and the increases in 
suspects monitored by the police and security forces make it entirely possible that 
compelling evidence for a longer detention period will become available.373  
 
It can of course be argued that the government has a responsibility to protect the 
public from the threat of terrorism. The reasons for extension of detention have 
included difficulties relating to resources, such as interpreters, time and logistical 
difficulties, and technological or forensic difficulties, such as breaking encryption. 
Also the UK government have reviewed whether the powers of extended detention 
could be conferred on the normal courts, but have concluded that it would not be 
appropriate to involve courts in such decisions. 374  The reasons held by the 
government is that the sensitive nature of the information not presented to the 
detainee or his legal adviser might have to be only disclosed in any judicial 
supervision of the detention in the essentially adversarial common law system, and 
therefore, the risk that judicial involvement in any decisions of the extension might 
“undermine public confidence in the independence of the judiciary”, not least 
“because it was small in numbers and vulnerable to terrorist attack.375 Conversely, 
the questions are raised as to whether special laws are required to deal with terrorists, 
and whether it is justified for these laws to interfere with human rights if necessary to 
tackle this threat.376  
 
For example, despites lots of criticism the period of detention permitted under the 
Terrorism Act 2000, on 14 December 2001, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act was introduced in UK in the wake of the attacks.377 This legislation enables non-
UK nationals, who are suspected to be international terrorists, to be detained without 
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charge or trial in circumstances where they cannot be removed from the UK. In 
December 2004, the case, A(FC) and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, relates to the indefinite detention of a number of foreign nationals on 
the grounds that the Secretary of State has a reasonable suspicion that they are 
international terrorists. 378  The court was posed with the problem of whether 
indefinite detention was a proportionate response to the terrorism emergency and 
whether there was indeed a public emergency threatening the life of the nation that 
justified the making of the derogation from Article 5. A majority of the judges 
accepted that the UK government was within its powers to find that the UK was in a 
state of public emergency after 11 September 2001 but found that the measures taken 
were not “strictly requires by the exigencies of the situation”.379 The House of Lords 
quashed the derogation order from ECHR Article 5 and declared that s23 of the Anti-
terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 providing indefinite detention without trial 
was a disproportionate response to the threat of terrorism and incompatible with 
Article 5 of the ECHR.  
 
Lord, Hoffmann, however, even goes further and does not agree and considers that 
the Government cannot justify in law its claim that there is a threat to the life of the 
nation. He added that the real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people 
living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from 
terrorism but from laws such as these.380 That is the true measure of what terrorism 
may achieve. The judgment of this case is the most dramatic and landmark decision 
in favour of liberty and freedom of the individual where legislation about terrorism 
has been used to maintain a particular regime in power.381 Accordingly, in UK, a 
person may be deprived of his liberty, but only if the exercise of powers of arrest and 
detention by state authorities is governed by due process of law and consistent with 
recognised standards. It reminded that no threat, however real, can justify 
abandoning basic principles of liberty and justice.382  
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Moreover, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 which allows for control orders 
restricting the freedom of terrorism suspects was rushed through UK parliament in 
response to the judgment of the above leading A case. 383  The Act gives the 
government the power to impose control orders amounting to house arrest, provided 
that it first “derogates” from Article 5 of ECHR. 384  House arrest is a gross 
interference with liberty which impacts not only the person subject to the order, but 
any family members with whom he resides. So-called “derogating” control orders 
can only be made by the court, upon application by the Secretary of State. The 
evidence presented by the government must establish “reasonable grounds” for 
suspecting involvement in terrorism-related activities, in a preliminary hearing from 
which the individual and his or her lawyer can be excluded, as Murray v UK.385 The 
court must then conduct a narrow judicial review of the order in a subsequent full 
hearing, with all parties present, applying the civil standard of proof. The court 
would be entitled to consider secret evidence in closed sessions from which the 
controlled person and his or her lawyer would be excluded.  While house arrest can 
be ordered for an absolute maximum of 12 months, there is no limit on the number of 
times that other control orders may be renewed. The Act will remain in force for 1 
year, but may be renewed for another year.386 It is still severely criticized. “First we 
had indefinite detention, now we have curfews and tagging – but still without trial. 
That hardly counts as progress, the government refuses to acknowledge a basic truth: 
punishment without trial is unacceptable, no matter what”, said Ben Ward, special 
counsel in the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch. 387    
 
However, the government has a corresponding duty to ensure that counter-terrorism 
measures are fully compatible with its obligations under human rights law. Though 
the Brannigan and McBride v UK judgment demonstrates that there are 
circumstances in which automatic judicial supervision of detention can be deferred 
for such a significant period. The exceptional nature of such a step is underlined by 
the need to demonstrate that there was a genuine emergency and the importance 
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attached to the existence of other safeguards against potential abuse of the 
vulnerability of those who are detained. 388  In the same case the European Court also 
insisted that the State do not enjoy an unlimited power of appreciation. Even where a 
Government has derogated from its Article 5(3) obligations, it is for the European 
Court to rule on whether inter alia the States have gone beyond the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the crisis.389 So ultimately the resort to derogation is 
subject to a European supervision. As Ovey and White regarded, judicial safeguards 
are of particular importance in connection with emotive crimes of this nature, when 
the police and prosecution are likely to be under pressure to secure convictions and 
may be tempted to use unorthodox means to force confessions.390 This term comes 
from the overarching prohibition of any arbitrariness with respect to a person’s 
detention. 
 
This approaches later confirmed in the European Court judgment Aksoy v Turkey.391 
The applicant was arrested on suspicion of involvement with the terrorist 
organization and detained incommunicado for 14 days under emergency provisions 
in force in South-east Turkey, which allows a person detained in connection with a 
collective offence to be held for up to 30 days in the state of emergency region. 
Although the European Court accepted that the investigation of terrorist offences 
“undoubtedly presents the authorities with special problems” and even taking into 
account the difficulty of investigating terrorist offences, an incommunicado detention 
power of up to 14 days was excessive too long to hold a suspect without judicial 
supervision and without access to a lawyer, doctor or friend.392 Also as discussed in 
previous section about Article 3 of ECHR, the decision was expressly linked to the 
protection of detainees from torture and in the context of the finding that the 
applicant in this case, held for over 12 days had been tortured and denied access to 
prompt medical treatment. 393  Therefore the period was not only to arbitrary 
interference with the applicant’s right to liberty but also to torture. Therefore the 
European Court held that there was a violation of Article 5 of the Convention even 
though Turkey has made a derogation from Article 5.  
                                               
388
 (1993) 17 EHRR 539, para 47. 
389
 Ibid., paras 49-50. 
390
 Clare Ovey & Robin White, op.cit., fn 68, p.132.  
391
 (1997) 23 EHRR 553;  
392
 Aksoy v Turkey para 83-84; also see 2.3.3, p97 and 2.4.2, pp104-108. 
393
 Ibid., para 56.  
146 
 
 
3.6 Speedy Review of Detention: Article 5(4) 
3.6.1 The Nature of the Review 
Article 5(4) provides that when a person is deprived of his liberty by arrest or 
detention he “shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his 
detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention 
is not lawful”.394 It is the habeas corpus provision of the Convention.395 It applies 
whatever the basis of the detention and whether or not it is justified under Article 
5(1). The question as to whether a person’s right under Article 5(4) has been 
respected has to be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case.396 The 
European Court regards that the notion of “lawfulness” in Article 5(4) has the same 
meaning as Article 5(1), and entitles an arrested or detained person to bring 
proceedings for the review by a court of the procedural and substantive conditions 
which are essential for the lawfulness of their deprivation of liberty.397 This means 
that the review must moreover be conducted in conformity with the aim of Article 5 
to protect the individual against arbitrariness, in particular with regard to the time 
taken to give a decision, as held in Keus v the Netherlands.398  
 
Specifically on the topic of this thesis, if a person is detained under Article 5(1)(c) of 
the Convention, the “court” must be empowered to examine whether or not there is 
sufficient evidence to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he or she has 
committed an offence, because the existence of such a suspicion is essential if 
detention on remand is to be “lawful” under the Convention.399 But, as Clayton 
regarded, Article 5(4) requires the right to challenge the lawfulness of the deprivation 
of liberty must be available even though a detention is “lawful” under the 
Convention.400 For example, in De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium Article 5(4) 
was found to be infringed because the applicants had no right of appeal to a court 
against administrative decisions ordering their detention while Article 5(1) was 
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not.401 However, the European Court held that once an infringement of one of the 
provisions in Article 5 has been found, it will not necessarily rule on compliance 
with Article 5(4).402 The European Court has recognised that the need to examine the 
whole range of remedies available to a detainee, as apparent shortcomings in one 
procedure may be remedied by safeguards available in other procedures.403 
 
3.6.2 The Principle of Equality of Arms during the Review 
The European Court considered that Article 5(4) necessarily implies various 
procedural requirements which in general will be similar to the obligations imposed 
by Article 6, but they may not always be the same and they will vary according to the 
deprivation of liberty in question.404 The requirements of Article 5(4) in this aspect 
therefore are more exacting than those of Article 5(3). In particular, the European 
Court has stated in many times the proceedings examining an appeal against 
detention must be adversarial and must always ensure “equality of arms” between the 
parties, the prosecutor and the detained person, which allows the detained person to 
challenge the evidence put forward in support of his detention.405 In addition, as the 
European Court emphasised in Benjamin and Wilson v UK, the competent judicial 
body must “have the ability to decide the lawfulness of the detention and to order 
release if detention is found to be unlawful. A mere power of recommendation is 
insufficient”.406 The domestic remedy must of course be available sufficiently certain, 
not just in theory but also in practice.407 The European Court has even tended to 
acknowledge the need for a hearing before a judicial authority only in cases under 
Article 5(1)(c) and (e).408 In the more recent decision of Schöps v. Germany, the 
European Court stated that proceedings under Article 5(4) should, to the largest 
extent possible in the context of an ongoing investigation, meet the basic 
requirements of a fair trial.409 
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Firstly, regard to the characteristics of a “court” in Article 5(4), in the Weeks v UK 
case the European Court summarised from an organisational point of view that the 
“court” does not necessarily have to be a classic court of law, which is formally part 
of the state’s judicial machinery. 410  However, this term implies only that the 
authority called upon to decide thereon must exhibit the necessary judicial 
procedures and safeguards appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in 
question, including most importantly independence of the executive and of the 
parties.411 The impartiality requirement will be doubtful if the “court” has in some 
way had a previous involvement with the case. For example, in Vodenicarov v 
Slovakia the European Court held that the possibility open to the applicant to seek 
redress before the public prosecutor does not meet the requirements of Article 5(4) as 
the procedure followed by a prosecutor lacks judicial character.412 Also in Varbanov 
v Bulgaria, the applicant’s detention was ordered by a district prosecutor, who then 
became a party to the proceedings against him seeking the applicant’s psychiatric 
internment. 413   The district prosecutor’s order was subject to appeal to higher 
prosecutors only.414 Here the European Court found that the applicant was deprived 
of his right to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed by a court, contrary to 
Article 5(4). 
 
Secondly, a detained person must be given time and facilities to prepare his case.415 
It has been held that “equality of arms” means that the court should give the 
applicant the opportunity to appear at the same time as the prosecutor. 416  For 
example, in the case Fodale v. Italy, the applicant complained that he had been 
unable to participate in the hearing before the Court of Cassation to review the 
lawfulness of detention.417 No summons to appear was served on the applicant or his 
counsel. The respondent was thus unable to file written pleadings or to present oral 
argument at the hearing, in response to the submissions of the public prosecutor’s 
office. By contrast, a representative of that office was able to do so before the Court 
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of Cassation. The European Court is unable to find that the requirements of 
adversarial proceedings and equality of arms were met. 418  The European Court 
insisted that the burden of proof lies on the state to show that detention is lawful.419 
A violation was established in Weeks since the prisoner was not allowed access to all 
of the documents which were used by the Parole Board in assessing his case.420 
Moreover, most detainees are unlikely to be in a position to prepare all the necessary 
arguments and then to have effective recourse to the remedy. Therefore the European 
Court regarded that the guarantees provided in Article 6 concerning access to legal 
assistance have been found for the purpose of mounting a challenge under Article 
5(4).421 Where the detainee cannot afford a lawyer the expense will have to be borne 
by the State.422 
 
There are some special circumstances of the case made it impossible for the applicant 
to be able to consult with and be assisted by his lawyer in connection with the 
proceedings taken to test the legality of his detention, such as incommunicado 
detention. For example, in Öçalan v. Turkey, the applicant complained that contrary 
to Article 5(4), he had not had an opportunity to take proceedings by which the 
lawfulness of his detention in police custody could be decided.423 During the first ten 
days of his detention he had been held incommunicado. The European Court noticed 
the applicant was kept in total isolation prevented his using the remedy personally.424 
Also as regards the suggestion that the lawyers instructed by the applicant or by his 
close relatives could have challenged his detention without consulting him, the 
European Court observes that the movements of the sole member of the applicant’s 
legal team to possess an authority to represent him were obstructed by the police. 
The other lawyers, who had been retained by the applicant’s family, found it 
impossible to contact him while he was in police custody. Moreover, in view of the 
unusual circumstances of his arrest, the applicant was the principal source of direct 
information on events in Nairobi that would have been relevant, at that point in the 
proceedings, for the purposes of challenging the lawfulness of his arrest. The 
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European Court holds that there has been a violation of Article 5(4) as absence of 
possibility of obtaining review of lawfulness of detention.425 
 
One of the key elements in a lawyer’s effective representation of a client’s interests 
is the principle that the confidentiality of information exchanged between them must 
be protected.426 In case Modarca v. Moldova, the European Court considered that an 
interference with the lawyer-client privilege does not necessarily require an actual 
interception or eavesdropping to have taken place.427 The applicant complained that 
he had not been allowed to meet in private with his lawyer and had been separated 
from him by a glass partition, preventing normal discussion or work with documents. 
As a result they had had to shout to hear each other and had both refused on several 
occasions to meet in such conditions, informing the court that they were unable to 
prepare for hearings. It also made it impossible to read texts together or pass 
documents between them. In the Court’s view, “a genuine belief held on reasonable 
grounds that their discussion was being listened to might be sufficient to limit the 
effectiveness of the assistance which the lawyer could provide. Such a belief would 
inevitably inhibit a free discussion between lawyer and client and hamper the 
detained person’s right effectively to challenge the lawfulness of his detention.”428  
 
In this case the European Court noted that the glass partition was a general measure 
affecting indiscriminately everyone in the remand centre, regardless of the personal 
circumstances of the accused. The lack of confidentiality of lawyer-client 
communications in the detention centre was a matter of serious concern for the entire 
community of lawyers in Moldova for a long time and that it had even been the cause 
of strike organised by the Bar Association in Moldova.429 Also, the demands of the 
Bar Association to provide lawyers with rooms for confidential meetings with their 
clients and take down the glass partition in the detention centre in order to check that 
there were no listening devices were refused.430 Accordingly, the European Court’s 
conclusion is that the applicant and his lawyer could reasonably have had grounds to 
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believe that his conversations in the lawyer-client meeting room were not 
confidential.431 The Convention is intended to guarantee the right to access lawyer 
that are practical and effective.432 Noticeably, in Kröcher and Möller v. Switzerland 
in which the fact that the lawyer and his client were separated by a glass partition 
was found not to violate the right to confidential communications since the applicant 
were accused of extremely violent acts and were considered very dangerous.433 In 
case Modarca v. Moldova, the security reasons invoked by the Government had been 
rejected, as “there is nothing in the file to confirm the existence of a security risk”. 434 
The European Court further regarded that in exceptional circumstances where 
supervision of lawyer–client meetings would be justified, visual supervision of those 
meetings would be sufficient for such purposes. 
 
The European Court reiterates that equality of arms is not ensured if counsel is 
denied access to those documents in the investigation file which are essential in order 
effectively to challenge the lawfulness, in the sense of the Convention, of his client’s 
detention.435 In Nikolov v Bulgaria, as confirmed by the Government, at the relevant 
time access to the case files in pending investigation proceedings was refused as a 
matter of established practice. The European Court held that this approach was 
incompatible with Article 5(4). 436  Particularly in the Lamy v. Belgium case, the 
European Court consider that the failure to make documents available promptly to 
the applicant’s lawyer precluded the possibility of an effective challenge to 
statements which formed the basis of the decision to detain, giving rise to a violation 
of Article 5(4).437 
 
Thirdly, the remedy under the domestic law should satisfy the requirement of Article 
5(4).438 For example, in case Öçalan v. Turkey, as to the Government’s assertion 
before the Grand Chamber that the applicant could have claimed compensation under 
the domestic law, the Grand Chamber also considers that such a claim cannot 
constitute proceedings of the type required by Article 5(4) since the court’s lack of 
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jurisdiction to order release if the detention is unlawful.439 Also the domestic law 
merely provides the prisoners who have been detained unlawfully or without due 
cause with an action in damages against the State. The domestic law therefore cannot 
award reparation for a breach of the Convention if the detention complies with 
domestic law.440 The European Court considered that those proceedings to claim for 
compensation under the domestic law were not the type required by the Article 5(4). 
 
3.6.3 Continuing Review 
The justification for a prolonged period of detention is liable to vary over time. It is 
important to appreciate that the review required by Article 5(4) is not necessarily a 
once and for all affair but may need to be repeated.441 This does not mean that the 
detainee must be able to bring proceedings at any and every moment. That could 
obviously lead to paralysis in the criminal justice system. In De Jong, Baljet and can 
der Brink v Netherlands, the European Court held that fulfilment of the procedure 
prescribed in Article 5(3), first part, may affect compliance with Article 5(4). Thus in 
case where initial detention is ordered or confirmed promptly by a “court”, the 
judicial control of lawfulness required by Article 5(4) is incorporated in this initial 
decision.442 However, the guarantee assured by Article 5(4) is of a different order 
from, and additional to, that provided by Article 5(3).  The European Court itself has 
on several previous occasions examined whether the same set of facts gave rise to a 
breach of both paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 5, without ever suggesting that the 
safeguards provided might not apply concurrently.443 This is because circumstances 
change so does the possibility that a previous legal justification for a detention is 
increasingly likely no longer applicable as time pass by. A person in detention 
therefore is likely to have grounds for arguing that the detention is improper prior to 
conviction. Thus the detained person is entitled under Article 5(4) to apply for 
judicial review of the detention’s continued legality at reasonable intervals or there 
must be arrangements for periodic review to ensure that the detention is still 
justified. 444  This proposition was first enunciated in case of indefinite detention 
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under mental health legislation, but has been extended to cases where continuing 
detention is conditioned upon a view that the person is dangerous in a broader sense, 
and even to cases of detention on remand.445 What is of importance in this context, as 
the European Court regarded, is the nature and purpose of the detention in question, 
viewed in the light of the objectives of the sentencing court, and not the category to 
which it belongs under Article 5(1).446   
 
The case law points to much shorter intervals being appropriate in the situation of 
someone being detained pending trial. In the case Bezicheri v Italy, the applicant was 
arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant and was remanded in custody on suspicion 
inter alia of having been an accessory to an aggravated murder. 447  His lawyer 
submitted a further application for his release from detention or placing under house 
arrest. The applicant lodged his second application a month after the dismissal of the 
first. Accordingly, new issue could arise for the European Court on whether at a later 
stage the applicant was subsequently entitled, after a reasonable interval, to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his continued detention was decided speedily 
by a court.448 Regard to the reasonable interval, in the European Court’s opinion, the 
nature of detention on remand calls for short intervals. There is an assumption in the 
Convention by Article 5(3) that detention on remand is to be of strictly limited 
duration, because its justification is essentially related to the requirements of an 
investigation which is to be conducted with expedition.449 Therefore the European 
Court held that in the present case an interval of 1 month is not unreasonable.  
 
3.6.4 The Notions of “Speedily”  
The aim of Article 5(4) is to limit the length of a person’s detention and not to 
promote a speedy trial.450 Therefore, the final requirement of Article 5(4) is that the 
remedy to challenge detention must be available “speedily”. For purposes of 
determining the length of the proceedings, it starts to run when Article 5(4) 
proceedings are instituted, and ends, not when the person is released, but when the 
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final decision is made as to the legality of the detention.451 In the case Kolev v 
Bulgaria, the applicant submitted that the “speediness” requirement had been 
breached in the proceedings instituted by the prosecutor against the Sofia City 
Court’s decision of 11 November 1998 to release the applicant on bail as it took 
several months for the Sofia Appellate Court to issue a decision.452 The European 
Court notes that on a number of occasions the examination of the applicant’s appeals 
against his detention was delayed. In particular, on 8 October 1999 his appeal was 
not examined. The applicant’s appeal of 20 December 1999 was examined by the 
Sofia City Court more than a month later, on 21 January 2000. The applicant’s 
ensuing appeal to the Sofia Appellate Court was decided on 25 February 2000, 
another month later. Those appeals were not, therefore, examined “speedily”, as 
required by Article 5(4) of the Convention.453  
 
The issue of “speedily” cannot be assessed in the abstract but has to be determined in 
the light of the particular circumstances of each case; and any delays caused by both 
the detainee and the authorities should be taken into account.454 For example, when 
the European Court considers that the applicant was released before an issue under 
Article 5(4) could arise, in a recent case Harkmann v. Estonia, the European Court 
found the complain of the fact that the lawfulness of his detention had not been 
decided on speedily is manifestly ill-founded. 455  Also, where there is an 
administrative decision prior to access to a court under Article 5(4), the length of the 
proceedings is calculated from the time when the administrative tribunal is seized of 
the case. 456  There are two aspects of this “speedy” requirement. Firstly, the 
opportunity for the initial legal review should take place particularly quickly, 
normally it must be provided soon after the person is taken into detention, and 
thereafter at reasonable intervals if necessary as discussed above. In the case De Jong, 
Baljet and can der Brink v Netherlands, Mr. de Jong was 7 days, Mr. Baljet 11 days 
and Mr. van den Brink 6 days in custody before being referred for trial and hence 
without a remedy. 457  In the European Court’s view, even having regard to the 
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exigencies of military life and military justice, the length of absence of access to a 
court was in each case such as to deprive the applicant of his entitlement to bring 
proceedings to obtain a “speedy” review of the lawfulness of his detention. 458 The 
European Court concluded that there was a breach of Article 5(4) in each case. 
 
Secondly, the court must act speedily. A delay must not be unreasonable and a lack 
of resources or vacation periods is not acceptable justifications for delay. Where it 
appears, prima facie, that there has been a delay, the onus is on the state to show that 
the proceedings have in fact been conducted speedily.459 The review proceedings 
must be conducted with “due diligence”. If an application for release from detention 
is under review for a period of several months then, unless there are special factors, 
the decision will be that the Convention has been violated. In a case of a 
straightforward bail application by a man detained on suspicion of drug-trafficking, 
for example, the European Court held that 3 weeks was too long.460 Longer periods 
might be acceptable in more complex cases, but given the importance of the right to 
liberty, there is still a pressing obligation on the authorities to deal quickly with such 
applications for release.461 In the Baranowski v Poland case, for example, the fact 
that it took a court deciding a bail application 6 weeks to obtain a report from a 
cardiologist and a further month to obtain evidence from a neurologist and a 
psychiatrist was evidence of lack of due diligence and gave rise to a violation of 
Article 5(4).462 In this context, the European Court also recalled that the accused 
should benefit fully from the principle of the presumption of innocence in case 
Ilowiecki v Poland.463 There is no violation to the Article 5(4) if delays attributable to 
the detained person.464 
 
It is the obligation of the state to organise its court system efficiently. In case 
Bezicheri v Italy, the fact that the judge allegedly had a heavy work-load at the time 
was not considered as relevant, since the European Court emphasized that “the 
Convention requires the Contracting States to organize their legal systems so as to 
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enable the courts to comply with its various requirements”.465 So that neither judges’ 
holidays is a justifiable excuse of delay where the right to liberty is at stake. For 
example, in the case E v Norway, approximately 2 months elapsed between the 
institution of proceedings and the delivery of the judgement. 466 Part of this delay was 
caused by administrative problems due to the vacation period. However, the 
European Court emphasized that “it is incumbent on the judicial authorities to make 
the necessary administrative arrangements, even during a vacation period, to ensure 
that urgent matters are dealt with speedily and this is particularly necessary when the 
individual’s personal liberty is at stake. Appropriate provisions for this purpose do 
not appear to have been made in the circumstances of the present case.”467 Therefore 
the 5 weeks that elapsed between the filing of the application for judicial review and 
the additional three weeks that were required to write the judgement did not comply 
with the notion of “speedily” in article 5(4) which, consequently, had been 
violated.468 
 
3.7 Compensation for Wrongful Detention: Article 5(5) 
The European Court reiterates that Article 5(5) provides for compensation if the 
arrest or detention contravenes the other provisions of Article 5, whether or not the 
detention was unlawful under national law.469  Therefore for the European Court to 
find a violation of Article 5(5), most often, there will be a finding of a violation of 
one or more elements of Article 5. 470  Even if a person is found to have been 
unlawfully arrested under domestic law in the domestic court, but no compensation is 
available, he or she can apply to the European Court on the basis of the lack of 
compensation under Article 5 of ECHR.471 Therefore it will be noted Article 5(5) is 
unique in the Convention system that Article 5(5) exists as an independent and 
specific right and so it differs from the general remedies provision of Article 13.  
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Article 5(5) requires a remedy “before a court” leading to a legally binding award of 
compensation that can be enforced by the courts.472 Noticeably, the European Court 
will not require the victims to exhaust the local remedies in order to find out whether 
they could obtain a remedy before the national authorities.473 For example, in the Fox, 
Campbell and Hartley and Brogan cases, for example, the European Court found 
Article 5(5) have been breached since there was no rule of Northern Irish law which 
would have provided compensation for the arrest and prolonged initial detention of 
the applicants under the prevention of terrorism legislation.474 More recently, the 
European Court came to the same conclusion in the case Harkmann v. Estonia, 
where the applicant complained of the violation of his right to compensation for 
unlawful detention.475 The Government submitted that, although the applicant could 
not rely on the Unjust Deprivation of Liberty (Compensation) Act before the 
termination of the criminal proceedings, there had been other remedies available to 
him whose rights were violated by unlawful activities of a public authority. The 
Government pointed out that he could claim damage to seek remedies under the State 
Liability Act. However, the European Court has no doubt the lawfulness of the 
applicant’s detention under Estonian law. Therefore the European Court considered 
“in these circumstances it does not appear that a claim for compensation made by the 
applicant under any of the relevant provisions of the Estonian law would have had 
any reasonable prospect of success. Nor did Estonian law provide for a distinct right 
to compensation for detention in violation of Article 5 of the Convention.”476 
 
However, if a state can show with “a sufficient degree of certainty” that a remedy of 
the type required by Article 5(5) is available to the victim, the European Court will 
find no violation of this provision.477  For instance, in case Ciulla v Italy, the Italian 
Government maintained that the Convention has been incorporated into its domestic 
legal order and the status of constitutional law prevailed over all ordinary laws, 
regardless of date.478 However, the European Court considered this argument does 
not “accord with the preponderance of the case-law of Italian first-instance and 
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appellate courts, since none of the decisions brought to the European Court’s notice 
expressly recognises that the Convention prevails over later statutes.” Therefore the 
European Court held that “effective enjoyment of the right guaranteed in Article 5(5) 
is not ensured with a sufficient degree of certainty”.479  
 
The requirement of Article 5(5) as to the quantum of compensation for unlawful 
arrest or detention is a live issue. In practice, it is likely to be financial compensation. 
The European Court held that although a person may be a victim of an Article 5 
breach, damage giving rise to compensation may be no pecuniary or non-pecuniary, 
including moral damage such as pain and emotional distress.480 For example, in case 
Sakik and others v Turkey, the applicants claimed compensation for the non-
pecuniary damage resulting from the deprivation of their liberty, which, they asserted, 
had been aggravated by the damage to their “reputations as members of 
parliament”.481 The European Court notes that the applicants were detained in police 
custody for 12 days or 14 days without judicial intervention. It is in no doubt that the 
circumstances in which they were deprived of their liberty must have caused them 
non-pecuniary damage for which the domestic courts have not awarded them any 
compensation.482 In respect to the cost and expense, the European Court observed 
that “the injured party must have incurred them in order to seek prevention or 
rectification of a violation of the Convention, to have the same established by the 
Commission and later by the Court and to obtain redress therefor. It must also be 
shown that the costs were actually and necessarily incurred and that they are 
reasonable as to quantum.” 483  Prior to deciding the compensation, the national 
authorities may require evidence of the damages which had resulted from the breach 
of Article 5. 
 
4. Article 6: The Right to a Fair trial in Criminal Cases 
4.1 Introduction 
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As Stavros regarded, Article 6 of ECHR is full of difficult clauses.484 Almost each 
part of every sentence raises a range of legal questions. The method of definition 
employed in the Convention made it necessary to elaborate Article 6 in much greater 
detail. Many provisions in the Article 6 of ECHR have been extensively interpreted. 
Also, as Fenwick observed, due to its machinery for enforcement the Article 6 of 
ECHR has had far more effect on the Member States law than any other human 
rights treaty.485 The provisions and those case-laws constitute an important source of 
information and guidance for judges and lawyers in different countries, especially in 
Europe. References to related Convention case law are to be found in the decisions of 
the United Nations treaty bodies, including the decisions of the HRC on individual 
applications under the ICCPR. Therefore the greater specificity of Article 6 of ECHR 
provides a clearer framework of protection. Without purporting to be exhaustive, this 
section examines some key factors to guarantee the human rights at the pre-trial stage 
under the criminal limb of Article 6 and shows the ongoing process of the 
development and applications of the Article 6 of ECHR with a few illustrative 
examples of the voluminous case laws.  
 
4.2 General Characters of Article 6 of ECHR  
The importance and fundament of the right to a fair trial hardly needs any 
explanation in this paper.486 Set forth by the UDHR in 1948, the right to a fair trial 
has since then been further elaborated and is recognized by several international and 
regional human rights standards, including the ICCPR and ECHR. 487  The main 
statement of the right is rather similar in the Article 6 of ECHR and Article 14 of 
ICCPR. It guarantees the right to a fair and public hearing in the determination of an 
individual’s civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him. In 
criminal cases, it may be necessary to balance the rights of the individual defendant 
against the general public interest.488 When considering the fair trial provisions, the 
courts are repeatedly faced with decisions as to the extent to which the rights of the 
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suspects should be modified or restricted in the public interest. In the case of 
Delcourt v Belgium, the European Court stated that in a democratic society within 
the meaning of the Convention, the right to a fair administration of justice holds such 
a prominent place that a restrictive interpretation of Article 6 (1) would not 
correspond to the aim and the purpose of that provision.489 Any restriction on the 
rights of the defence is to be scrutinized with special care and strictly restricted. 490 If 
a less restrictive measure can suffice then that measure should be applied. 491 
Therefore it is particularly important that the place of right to a fair trial be well 
defined and moderately applied.  
 
The relationship between the right to a fair trial in Article 6(1) and the specific rights 
set out in Article 6(2) and (3) has been described as “that of the general to the 
particular”.492 As the demonstration below, this approach has enabled the European 
Court to imply into Article 6 that the prosecution authorities disclose to the defence 
all material evidence for or against the accused.493 Also, the right to a fair trial in 
Article 6 has been given a particularly open-textured interpretation due to its 
prominent place in a democratic society, allowing scope for a range of rights to be 
read into its text by implication.494 Therefore it has enabled the European Court to 
imply into Article 6 the right to consult with a solicitor privately and free from state 
supervision, the right to remain silent and not to contribute to incriminating 
himself.495 The extent of these limitations is not subject to any general formula and 
depends very much upon the context of each case and especially upon the nature of 
the right in question.496 The European Court will frequently find no violation of 
Article 6 because it considers that the proceedings “taken as a whole” were fair, as a 
higher court was able to rectify the errors of the lower court.497  
 
As discussed in the above parts, Ill-treatment or torture by the police, long preventive 
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detention, damage to reputation and personal property are some examples of the 
legitimate or illegitimate, usual or extreme consequences that pre-trial procedures 
may produce on the individual. Pre-trial procedures may severely affect the rights 
and interests of the suspect and it may even determine the issue of the trial, as it 
happens when the judgment is based on evidence taken before trial. Therefore, while 
the European Court would point to the difference in the nature of the interests 
protected by different Articles,498 there is an enormous amount of overlap between 
Article 6 and other Articles in ECHR, such as Article 2, 3, 5 and 8, while the 
applicant appears to be unfair treated during pre-trial procedures.499 For example, as 
Article 6 has been described as “a pithy epitome of what constitutes a fair 
administration of justice”, the emphasis in Article 5 on due process of law in relation 
to the liberty overlaps with the more general and comprehensive protection for 
procedural due process granted by Article 6.500 Therefore, the pre-trial procedures 
play a crucial role in an evaluation of the “fairness” of the trial.501  
 
4.3 Disclosure of Evidence 
There is no express reference to the equality of arms in Article 6 of the ECHR.502 
Nevertheless, the concept of “equality of arms” was first mentioned in the 
Neumeister v Austria and has been a feature of Article 6(1) ever since. 503  The 
European Court regards that a fair trial implies procedural equality in both criminal 
and civil cases. 504  Every party to the proceedings must have a “reasonable 
opportunity of presenting his case to the court under conditions which do not place 
him at substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent”.505 In the criminal sphere, the 
criminal defendant’s opponent is the State. In a recent case, Dowsett v. UK, the 
European Court recalled that the fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial 
provided for in Article 6 is that criminal proceedings should be adversarial and that 
                                               
498
 e.g. see McMichael v UK, (1995) 20 EHRR 205, para 91. 
499
 See e.g. Öçalan v. Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 985; Mayzit v. Russia (2006) 43 EHRR 38. 
500
 J. Cremona, “The public character of trial and judgment in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights” in F. Matscher and H. Petzold, Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension: Studies in Honour of 
Gerard J. Wiarda (Koln, 1990), at 107. 
501
 Barbéra, Messegué and Jabardo v Spain, (1989) 11 EHRR 360, para 68; also see J. G. Merrills & A. H. 
Robertson, op.cit., fn 1, p88. 
502
 See Chap2, 6.3, p.74; The complexity of the Equality in the context of human rights is discussed thorough in 
e.g. S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.97. 
503
 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 91, para 22. 
504
 Ibid. para 23. 
505
 See De Haes and Gijsels v Belgium (1997) 25 EHRR 1 para 53; Dombo Beheer BV v Netherlands (1993) 18 
EHRR 213, para 33; Delcourt v Belgium (1970) 1 EHRR 355 para 28. 
162 
 
there should be equality of arms between the defence and the prosecution.506 As 
previously interpreted by the European Court, this means that “both parties must be 
given the opportunity to have knowledge of, and command on, the observations filed 
and the evidence adduced by the other opponent at the time when it can most 
effectively serve to protect the rights of the defence”. 507  Therefore the general 
principle of equality of arms in Article 6(1) requires “the prosecution should 
normally disclose to the defence all material evidence in their possession for or 
against the defense”, and overlaps, in this respect, with the right of an accused under 
Article 6(3) (b) to have adequate facilities for the preparation of his defence.508 The 
European Court has formulated this fundamental rule in a number of relevant cases 
and that the failure to do so gave rise to a defect in the trial proceedings.509  
 
Noticeably, a failure to disclose of the original trial may be remedied by 
consideration of the relevant evidence on appeal as in case Edwards v UK since the 
European Court considered the proceedings as a whole was fair. 510  As to the 
domestic law, for example in the UK, the English Court of Appeal further stated in R 
v Makin that, “the duty of disclosure continues as long as proceedings remain 
whether at first instance or on appeal”.511 This means that there is a continuing duty 
on the prosecution to disclose throughout the proceedings, including at appeal. The 
defence had the opportunity, to some extent, to comment on the issue, the 
undisclosed material was not put to the jury or the trial judge assessed at all times the 
need for disclosure. 512  On the contrary, in Rowe and Davis v UK, during the 
applicants’ trial at first instance it was the prosecution without the knowledge or 
approval of the trial judge, who decided to withhold certain relevant evidence on 
grounds of public interest.513 The European Court finds that such unilateral decision-
making on the part of the prosecution is clearly incompatible with Article 6, despite 
the fact that the Court of Appeal had subsequently considered the withheld material 
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and found the conviction to be safe.514 The European Court distinguished Edwards 
on the ground that there had been no opportunity for adversarial argument before the 
Court of Appeal.515  
 
The European Court has reiterated that “in criminal proceeding there may be 
competing factors, such as national security, or the need to protect witnesses at risk 
of reprisals, or to keep secret police methods of investigation of crime, which must 
be weighed against the rights of the accused”.516 This is also a general problem 
which comes up in several different contexts in the case-law in particular with regard 
to Article 6(3)(b), (c) and (d) as discussed below. Thus any disclosure regime must 
reconcile and balance the obligation of disclosure to ensure a fair trial with duties of 
confidentiality and privacy. In some cases it may be necessary to withhold certain 
evidence from the defence so as to preserve the fundamental rights of another 
individual or to safeguard an important public interest, provided that such measures 
are permissible under Article 6(1).517 Especially there are situations brought about by 
the terrorism legislation where the defendant will not be allowed to know who is 
giving evidence against him, or what that evidence is.  
 
As said in Lord Goldsmith’s speech, “terrorism is a huge international challenge. But 
terrorism is a particular challenge for democracies who must strive to protect 
individual liberties while at the same time ensuring collective security.”518 The need 
to reconcile these competing demands is the theme of recent heated debates in UK. It 
is not impossible to explain here how the UK has sought to achieve the right balance 
in enacting its domestic legislation on terrorism. But the UK government is 
constantly being criticized for striking the wrong balance. For example, in UK under 
the Prevention Terrorism Act 2005 “Control orders” can be based on secret 
intelligence not disclosed to the people concerned or to their legal counsel of 
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choice.519 The Secretary of State may withhold evidence that information he relies on 
to impose an “order” had been obtained under torture. If the domestic court agrees 
with the Home Secretary that in the interest of “national security” the “evidence” 
should not be disclosed to the person concerned or to their legal counsel of choice, 
then a Special Advocate is appointed who is able to participate in the secret closed 
proceedings.520 However, in the same way as with the controversial Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 proceedings, the Special Advocate is not allowed to tell 
the person concerned what the secret intelligence is, nor receive instructions from 
them.521 The cumulative effect of this restricts those subjected to “control orders” the 
right to a defence and the possibility of clearing their name. In April 2006, in his 
judgment in the case of Re MB, Mr Justice Sullivan issued a declaration under 
section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 that section 3 of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005 was incompatible with the right to fair proceedings under Article 6 of the 
ECHR.522   
 
Obviously, the ex parte procedure of the UK cases whereby the prosecution can 
obtain permission not to disclose on grounds of public interests without informing 
the defence is always under challenge in Strasbourg.523 The international and national 
tests of fairness of the trial and soundness of the conviction might lead to different 
conclusions. The European Court reiterates in many cases that it will not itself 
examine whether or not an order permitting non-disclosure was justified in any 
particular case. It will only review the decision-making procedure to ensure that it 
complied, as far as possible, with the requirements of a fair trial.524 Both in Fitt v UK 
and Jasper v UK, the English law had been changed compared with the case Rowe 
and Davis v UK, the prosecution were required to make an application to the trial 
judge for authority not to disclose the evidence in question.525  The defences were 
kept informed and permitted to make submissions and participate in the earlier 
decision-making process as far as was possible without revealing to them the 
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material which the prosecution sought to keep secret on public interest grounds.526 
Furthermore the non-disclosed material played no further role in the case. 527 
Emphasis was placed on the role of the trial judge in monitoring the propriety of 
withholding the material, especially since he was fully versed in all the evidence and 
issues in the case and in a position to monitor the relevance to the defence of the 
withheld information both before and during the trial.528 The European Court, albeit 
on a narrow majority of 9-8, held that the procedures were compatible with Article 
6(1).529 It had left avenues open for further argument where the judge who heard the 
ex parte hearing was also the judge of factual issues in the case. 
 
In Edwards and Lewis v UK, again, the decision related to the ex parte procedures 
used to determine applications not to disclose material on the grounds of public 
interest immunity.530 Both applicants had been arrested by undercover police officers 
and faced separate criminal trials during which the prosecution successfully applied 
at ex parte hearings to withhold material evidence on the basis of public interest 
immunity. The applicants unsuccessfully applied under section 78 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to have the prosecution evidence excluded on the basis 
that they had been entrapped by undercover officers into committing the offences in 
question.  The applicant Edward was convicted and that conviction was upheld on 
appeal. The applicant Lewis pleaded guilty.  Both complained to European Court that 
their right to a fair trial under Article 6 had been infringed because it had been 
impossible, on the evidence that had been made available to them, for them to 
establish whether or not the involvement of agents provocateurs rendered 
proceedings against them unfair. 
 
In this case the problem arose under Article 6 because in the absence of any 
representative of the defence, the same trial judge had already seen the prosecution’s 
evidence which likely have been of assistance to the defence case.  The European 
Court emphasised again that there should be an equality of arms between the 
prosecution and defence and that the prosecution authorities should disclose all 
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material evidence in their possession for or against the accused.531 As a matter of 
English procedural law, the trial judge must determine, as a question of fact and 
taking into account such matters as the accused’s past criminal record and any 
evidence concerning his dealings with the police, whether or not it is established on 
the balance of probabilities that the police improperly incited the offence. In order to 
conclude whether or not the accused had indeed been the victim of improper 
incitement by the police, in both cases the trial judge had examined the reason for the 
police operation, the nature and extent of police participation in the crime and the 
nature of any inducement or pressure applied by the police.532  
 
The European Court distinguished the material from the earlier one in Jasper and 
Fitt v UK which related to disclosure of unused material, and held that the 
undisclosed evidence related, or may have related, to an issue of fact decided by the 
trial judge.533 If the defence had been able to persuade the judge that the police had 
acted improperly, “the prosecution would, in effect, have had to be discontinued”. 
Therefore, the applications in question were of determinative importance to the 
applicants’ trials, and the public interest immunity evidence may have related to facts 
connected with those applications.534 Despite this, the applicants were denied access 
to the evidence because of the secret nature of this procedure. The defence parties 
were unable to know whether or not the undisclosed evidence was in fact harmful to 
the accused’s allegations of entrapment, and, if so, whether the evidence was 
accurate or could have been rebutted in the course of the ex parte hearings. Therefore 
it was not possible for the defence representatives to argue the case on entrapment in 
full before the judge. 535  In the case of Mr Edwards it was subsequently shown that 
that material was damaging to his application. In Mr Lewis’ case, although the nature 
of the material which the judge had seen had not been disclosed, it was possible that 
the material was damaging to the applicant’s submissions on entrapment. Under 
English law where material for which public interest immunity was claimed was 
unlikely to assist the accused, but would in fact assist the prosecution, the trial judge 
was unlikely to order disclosure.536 
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For these reasons the European Court concluded that a procedure that denies the 
defence that opportunity fails to comply “with the requirements to provide 
adversarial proceedings and equality of arms” and fails to incorporate “adequate 
safeguards to protect the interests of the accused”.537 The European Court recognised 
the importance of “the public interest in the fight against crime” but held that the 
requirements of a fair trial are paramount, and that police incitement amounting to 
entrapment would render it unfair to try a defendant. 538  It here saw its task as 
determining whether the procedure for determining the issues of disclosure and 
entrapment was fair. Ashworth and Strange regard that the Edwards and Lewis 
judgment is significant in the area as to disclosure of evidence.539 Some changes will 
no doubt need to be made in member States as a result of this judgment: for example 
in UK, new Attorney-General’s Guidelines on the use of special counsel in public 
interest immunity hearings will be required.540  
 
4.4 The Presumption of Innocence  
The European Court has examined a number of alleged violations of the presumption 
of innocence and consequently established standards for the practical application of 
this presumption under Article 6(2). It has there been repeatedly recognised that the 
presumption of innocence, enshrined in Article 6(2), is a fundamental principle of the 
fair criminal trial as required by Article 6(1).541 It is a right which, like other rights 
contained in the Convention, must be interpreted in such a way as to guarantee rights 
which are practical and effective as opposed to theoretical and illusory.542 Matters 
such as the ability of an accused’s previous convictions, the admissibility of 
confession evidence and the right to silence are closely linked to the presumption of 
innocence.543 Also there is a certain amount of overlap between the presumption of 
innocence, the requirement of a fair hearing under Article 6(1) and the specific 
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guarantees listed in Article 6(3). The presumption of innocence, together with the 
high standard of proof required, is generally regarded as a necessary right, 
safeguarding the citizen against an all-powerful state.  
 
The presumption of innocence applies throughout criminal proceedings, regardless of 
their stage. Article 6(2) might be violated if, without any finding of guilt, there is a 
judicial decision reflecting that an accused is guilty, such as the refusal to pay costs 
to an acquitted defendant. For instance, in an important case Minelli v. Switzerland, 
the European Court found a violation of the presumption of innocence when a 
defendant was ordered by the Swiss courts to pay part of court costs and 
compensation of the expenses even though the case had been discontinued on 
account of time limitations.544 Also, the decision of the Swiss court concluded that in 
the absence of statutory limitations the case would very probably have led to the 
conviction of the applicant.545 The European Court deemed that the presumption of 
innocence would be violated if a judicial decision concerning the accused reflects an 
opinion that he is guilty without his having previously been proved guilty according 
to law and notably without his having had the opportunity of exercising his rights of 
defence. It suffices that there is some reasoning suggesting that the court regards the 
accused as guilty.546 Also, the award to Minelli made by the European Court was not 
confined to reimbursement.547  
 
By stressing the crucial role of the presumption of innocence within the right to a fair 
trial, the European Court has clearly spelled out that the presumption of innocence 
“requires, inter alia, that when carrying out their duties, the members of a court 
should not start with the preconceived idea that the accused has committed the 
offence charged; the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and any doubt should 
benefit the accused”.548 However, it seems that these formulations are not of great 
use in predicting whether the operation of a particular presumption is in breach of 
Article 6(2). The below account has illustrated however that it is also accepted that 
there may be compromises to this principle. This section will focus on some issues of 
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particular importance in the criminal law, the use of presumptions, the effect of 
prejudicial publicity, and the right to silence. 
 
4.4.1 The Use of Presumptions 
Article 6(2) guarantees the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings which 
is crucial for the evidence-taking process, in that it places the burden of proof on the 
prosecution and allows the accused to rebut evidence against him and get the benefit 
of the doubt. 549 It may be in issue where the burden of proof is transferred to the 
accused to establish a defence or where a presumption of law or fact is applied 
against the accused. Modern statutes in many countries have been created offences 
and imposed burdens on a defendant with words such as “unless he proves the 
contrary”.550 The domestic courts have regarded the burden of proof on the defendant 
as being “on a balance of probabilities”, which is a burden lower than that resting on 
the prosecution, who must prove guilt so that the court is sure. This still imposes 
what is known as a persuasive burden, which is the onus of satisfying the court that 
the defence is proven, as opposed to an evidential burden, a burden simply to provide 
enough evidence to credibly raise the defence, which the prosecution must then 
disprove. The European Court deals with the question as to in what circumstances is 
a reverse onus in a criminal case compatible with the presumption of innocence 
under Article 6(2) of the Convention in many cases. 
 
According to the European Court, the presumption of innocence does not require that 
guilt be proved “beyond a reasonable doubt”. Article 6(2) simply requires evidence 
“sufficiently strong in the eyes of the law to establish guilt”.551 The definition of the 
elements of an offence is a matter for national law. 552  Article 6 (2) does not 
necessarily prohibit presumptions of law or fact, but any rule which shifts the burden 
of proof or which applies a presumption operating against the accused must be 
confined within “reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what is 
at stake and maintain the rights of the defence”. 553  It follows then that the 
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presumption of innocence is not absolute and that interference with it may be 
justified, provided that the overall burden of proof remains with the prosecution.554 
For example, in the case Salabiaku v France, the applicant was charged with the 
criminal offence of illegally importing narcotics and with the customs offence, also 
criminal, of smuggling prohibited goods.555 Under the terms of which “the person in 
possession of contraband goods shall be deemed liable for the offence” in Article 
392(1) of the French Customs Code, the applicant complained that the almost 
irrebuttable presumption was incompatible with Article 6(2). The European Court 
maintained whether Article 392(1) conforms to the Convention cannot be considered 
in abstracto. The task for the European Court is to determine whether it was applied 
to the applicant in a manner compatible with the presumption of innocence.556 The 
European Court regarded that the domestic courts were careful to avoid resorting 
automatically to the presumption laid down in Article 392(1) and they exercised their 
power of assessment on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties before them. 
The domestic courts inferred from the fact of possession a presumption which was 
not subsequently rebutted by any evidence of an event responsibility for which could 
not be attributed to the perpetrator of the offence or which he would have been 
unable to avoid.557 Moreover the domestic courts identified in the circumstances of 
the case a certain “element of intent”, even though legally they were under no 
obligation to do so in order to convict the applicant.558 In the result the European 
Court rejected the applicant’s complaint that the French courts applied Article 392(1) 
in a way which infringed the presumption of innocence.  
 
The European Court also regards that there is not necessarily a violation of Article 
6(2), provided that the provision creating the presumption is restrictively worded and 
that it is neither irrebutable nor unreasonable.559 For example, contrary to section 
30(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, the applicant in X v UK had been convicted 
of knowingly living on the earnings of prostitution.560 He complains the presumption 
under the subsection (2) of that section which provided that a man living with a 
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prostitute was knowingly living off immoral earnings was incompatible with Article 
6(2). The Commission rejected this challenge and regarded that a provision could 
have the same effect as a presumption of guilt if widely or unreasonably worded. 
And it was not only the form but also the substance and effect of the provision 
needed to be examined. To oblige the prosecution to obtain direct evidence of “living 
on immoral earnings” would in most cases make its task impossible. Therefore in 
present instance the provision created a rebuttable, reasonable and restrictively 
worded presumption which the defendant could disprove, and was not a presumption 
of guilt.  
 
Thus the question in any case must be whether, on the facts, the reasonable limits to 
which a presumption must be subject have been exceeded. This can be a difficult 
question to answer. Dennis regarded that the domestic courts and lawyers need to 
know the relevant factors to be taken into account in decisions on the allocation of 
the burden of proof, and they also need to know how these factors are to be weighed 
and whether there are general principles to structure decision-making. 561   Clear 
guidance is all the more essential given the importance of what is at stake. 562 
Following Salabiaku v France, the European Court held in Janosevic v Sweden that 
in employing presumptions in criminal law, the Contracting States are required to 
strike a balance between the importance of what is at stake and the rights of the 
defence. 563  In other words, the means employed have to be reasonably proportionate 
to the legitimate aim to be achieved. As Sachs J of the South African Constitutional 
Court said in State v Coetzee, “there is a paradox at the heart of all criminal 
procedures, in that the more serious the crime and the greater the public interest in 
securing convictions of the guilty, the more important do constitutional protections 
of the accused become, he is most in need of the right to a fair trial.”  
 
The European Court has consistently maintained that the same standards of fairness 
must apply to all types of offence. 564  Mere reference to the prevalence and 
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seriousness of the crime would not suffice or add any special element to the scales as 
part of a justificatory balancing exercising.” 565  In answer to the argument that 
terrorism poses an extreme threat to the security or the state, and that the state can 
properly require some degree of co-operation from its citizens in fighting it, the 
European Court declared in Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland that the security and 
public order concerns of the Government cannot justify measures which extinguish 
the very essence of an applicant’s defence rights, including the privilege against self-
incrimination guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.566 As Ashworth observed, 
the prosecution, therefore, might be required to demonstrate that “the reversal of the 
burden of proof was rationally connected to a clear policy justification, and that it 
was proportionate, in the sense that the objective in question could not be met by the 
imposition of a purely evidential burden in the context of the particular offence at 
issue”.567 
 
So the attitude to the domestic cases where the law has imposed a burden of proof on 
a defendant should now be appraised afresh, because of the influence of the 
Convention case law on the approach of the domestic courts. For example, in UK, 
Viscount Sankey’s “golden thread” speech in Woolmington v DPP is one of the most 
celebrated passages in English criminal law: “No matter what the charge or where 
the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part 
of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be 
entertained”.568 The presumption of innocence is a fundamental component of the 
absolute right to a fair trial in UK. However, the jurisprudence in the UK on the issue 
of the reverse onus has still left some uncertainty and theoretical incoherence. The 
House of Lords gave fuller guidance on reverse burden provisions in recent cases of 
R v Johnstone and Sheldrake v DPP (No. 4 of 2002).569 The English House of Lords 
quoted the comment of Salabiaku v France in its case R v Johnstone, when deciding 
whether the reverse onus in s.92(5) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 was justifiable.570 
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Lord Nicholls held that in order to justify a reverse onus “there must be a compelling 
reason why it is fair and reasonable to deny the accused person the protection 
normally guaranteed to everyone by the presumption of innocence”.571 The House of 
Lords emphasised the need for judicial deference, noting that Parliament, not the 
court, is charged with the primary responsibility for deciding, as a matter of policy, 
what should be the constituent elements of a criminal offence.572 
 
In Sheldrake v DPP (No. 4 of 2002), the defendant in the appeal was charged before 
the justices with being in charge of a motor vehicle after having consumed so much 
alcohol that the proportion of it in his breath exceeded the prescribed limit, contrary 
to section 5(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1981.573 He argued that the defense under 
section 5(2), which cast upon the defendant the burden of proving that there was no 
likelihood of his driving the vehicle while over the limit, was not compliant with the 
presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6(2) of the Convention. The House 
of Lords concluded that the provision was directed to a legitimate object, which was 
the prevention of death, injury and damage caused by unfit drivers.574 The provision 
may have infringed the presumption of innocence but it was nevertheless held that 
the burden it placed on a defendant was not beyond reasonable limits or arbitrary. 
The likelihood of driving was a matter so closely conditioned by the driver’s own 
knowledge and state of mind at the material time as to make it much more 
appropriate for him to prove on the balance of probabilities that he would not have 
been likely to drive than for the prosecutor to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he 
would.575 
 
4.4.2 Prejudicial Publicity 
The presumption of innocence may also prevent prejudicial publicity concerning 
suspects. The evaluation of the risk of prejudicial influence should be made in the 
light of the circumstances of each case. It has long been argued that to succeed in 
establishing a violation of Article 6, the applicant has to show that his conviction was 
influenced by that publicity which will be very difficult, especially if he has 
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contributed to it by his own actions. For example, in case Ensslin, Baader & Raspe v 
Germany, an application against Germany by convicted members of the terrorist 
Baader-Meinhof gang was rejected by the Commission on the grounds that their own 
statements and behaviour were responsible for the unfavourable publicity and 
exceptional security surrounding their trial and that, in any case, a professional judge 
would not be influenced by these elements.576 Also where the accused has a criminal 
record, bringing this to the attention of the judge or jury before conviction might be 
thought to constitute a clear violation of the presumption of innocence. It has, 
however, been held that as this practice is followed in a number of Contracting States, 
no violation is involved.577 Moreover, as noted repeatedly in the case-law of the 
European Court, Article 6(2) governs criminal proceedings in their entirety 
“irrespective of the outcome of the prosecution”. 578  Therefore the fact that the 
accused was ultimately found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment cannot vacate 
the accused’s initial right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to 
law, as the European Court reiterates in recent case Matijašević v. Serbia.579 
 
However, as noticed, Article 6 imposed obligations not only on criminal courts but 
also on other public authorities.580 This situation may happen to a person who has 
been arrested by the police, even before being charged. In Allenet de Ribemont v 
France a senior police officer stated at a press conference that the applicant had been 
the instigator of a murder, although formal charges had not yet been brought.581 
Article 6(2) was violated because there had been a clear statement of the applicant’s 
guilt, which would have led the public to consider him guilty and which prejudged 
the assessment of the facts by the competent judicial authorities before he has been 
proved guilty according to law.582 It is sufficient even in the absence of any formal 
finding, that there is some reasoning suggesting that the court regards the accused as 
guilty.583 The European Court acknowledged that in view of the right freedom of 
expression as guaranteed in Article 10 of the authorities to receive and impart 
information, Article 6(2) could not prevent the police from informing the public 
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about on-going criminal investigations, but they should do so with all the discretion 
and circumspection necessary if the presumption of innocence was to be respected.584 
This is also applied to a recent case Y.B. and others v. Turkey, where a breach of the 
presumption of innocence on account of statements made by the police to the 
press.585 
 
A more widespread problem is that of prejudicial comments in the media concerning 
suspects, given ever more intrusive press coverage of the judicial process. The 
question arises whether journalists can publish information at any time on the 
progress of a legal investigation or court case, i.e. whether the public has the right to 
be informed at all times, at the risk of influencing the investigation or the court case 
if the information published has any bearings on them. This risk is especially high 
where juries or lay judges are involved in criminal proceedings when any article 
published during the sub judice period.586 Also, it is probably sufficient that the 
matter of prejudicial publicity can be aired on appeal.587 Since the Sunday Times v 
the UK judgment handed down by the European Court, it has been accepted that the 
press can and indeed should disclose information on court cases subject to certain 
conditions, in particular respect for “the right of individuals in their capacities as 
litigants”.588 In this judgment, the ECHR states that Article 10 guarantees not only 
the right to inform the public but also the right of the public to be properly informed. 
It would not be realistic to expect the media to wait for the outcome of a court case 
that is arousing strong public feeling before reporting on it.589  
 
The accuracy of information is important for both the credibility of judicial 
authorities and police services as well as the credibility of the media.590 In particular, 
case law requires the media to observe the presumption of innocence principle. In the 
landmark case Worm v Austria, the European Court confirmed that journalists must 
also respect the presumption of innocence, as defined in Article 6, even for public 
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figures and politicians.591 In this case, an Austrian journalist had published articles 
attacking a former finance minister who was tried by a magistrates’ court comprised 
of two lay and two professional judges. By doing so, the journalist considerably 
reduced the politician’s chances of having a fair trial and conducted a kind of 
pseudo-trial in the media, which, according to the ECHR, threatened to undermine 
public trust in the role of the courts in administering justice in criminal law cases.592 
The European Court has stated more recent in case Du Roy and Malaurie v.France 
that “journalists reporting on criminal proceedings currently taking place must, 
admittedly, ensure that they do not overstep the bounds imposed in the interests of 
the proper administration of justice and that they respect the accused’s right to be 
presumed innocent”.593  
 
4.4.3 Right to Silence 
The right to silence is an inherent facet of the presumption of innocence. Coming 
from the Anglo-Saxon tradition, this right can be given either a narrow or a wide 
interpretation.594 Even though there are substantial differences between national legal 
systems, there is also widespread consensus on the importance of respecting both the 
right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination, as well as general 
agreement on the importance of the values these doctrines serve. As held in Murray v 
UK, “the right to remain silent under police questioning, and the privilege against 
self-incrimination are generally recognised international standards which lie at the 
heart of the notion of fair procedure under Article 6”.595 A set of principles in a series 
of cases has been crafted to define how the issue of the right to silence is understood 
but also how the European Court has interpreted State Parties’ obligations under a 
human rights instrument, although there is no specific language creating a right to 
silence in any of the provisions of ECHR. In its first case on this topic, Funke v. 
France, the European Court held that the right of silence was infringed under Article 
6 of the Convention which impliedly protects it by a French law requiring persons 
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suspected of exchange control offences to produce their bank statements to the 
investigators on request.596  
 
But that does not stop the law or a court from drawing adverse inferences from 
silence. According to the European Court, the right to silence is not an absolute 
right.597 Again, the European Court stressed that each case must be judged on all its 
particular facts.598 When determining whether the proceedings as a whole have been 
fair, the weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the 
particular offence at issue may be taken into consideration and be weighed against 
the individual interest that the evidence against him be gathered lawfully.599 For 
example, it should also aware how the court should deal with the reasons for 
remaining silent given by the accused. In dealing with this issue it must be said that 
the reason often given is that the accused have been advised to do so by their legal 
advisers. There is overlap with the right of access to a lawyer, since representation by 
a lawyer is often meaningless unless some prior consultation is included in the 
“facilities” provided to the defendant as discussed below.600  This then raises the 
question of how much weight should be given to the following of that advice and 
whether the following of the advice should enable the accused to avoid any adverse 
inference being drawn. As held in Murray v UK, the line must be drawn somewhere 
in the middle, according to the situations where inferences may be drawn, the weight 
attached to them by the national courts in their assessment of the evidence and the 
degree of compulsion inherent in the situation.601 The parameters of the right to 
silence under Article 6 are two-fold as explain below. 
 
On one hand, it will be incompatible with the right to silence to found a conviction 
solely or mainly on the accused’s silence or on a refusal to answer questions or give 
evidence.602 In Condron v UK, the European Court found that Article 6 had been 
violated because of the insufficient direction to the jury where a solicitor had advised 
the accused, whom he felt were suffering from drug withdrawal symptoms, not to 
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answer questions.603 The European Court observed that as a matter of fairness, the 
jury should have been directed that if it was satisfied that the applicants’ silence at 
the police interview could not sensibly be attributed to their having no answer or 
none that would stand up to cross-examination it should not draw an adverse 
inference.604 Furthermore, the very fact that an accused is advised by his lawyer to 
maintain his silence must also be given appropriate weight by the domestic court.605 
The European Court regarded that the unfairness which resulted from such 
misdirection could not be cured on appeal, since the Court of Appeal had no means 
of knowing whether the applicants’ silence had played a significant role in the jury’s 
decision to convict them.606 The Court therefore concluded that the applicants did not 
receive a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6(1). Ovey and White regard that 
this case illustrates the European Court’s tendency to assess the fairness of 
proceedings looked at as a whole, rather than to formulate rigid procedural rules.607  
 
Therefore, the right to silence and the right to the privilege against self-incrimination 
have usually been considered by the European Court in relation to Article 6(1) rather 
than Article 6(2).608 In case Saunders v the UK, the Court is called upon to decide 
whether the use made by the prosecution of the statements in trial obtained from the 
applicant by the Inspectors amounted to an unjustifiable infringement of the right to 
silence and the right not to incriminate oneself. 609 At the time of the applicant’s 
interrogation by the inspectors he was under a duty under the Companies Act to reply 
to the inspectors’ questions on pain of contempt proceedings. The European Court 
considered that “the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6(1) presupposed that 
the prosecution must prove its case without resort to evidence obtained through 
methods of coercion in defiance of the will of the accused”. The European Court thus 
recognised that “the right to the privilege against self-incrimination was closely 
linked to the presumption of innocence contained in Article 6(2)”.610 Meanwhile, the 
European Court further emphasised that the right not to incriminate oneself is 
primarily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent. In 
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this case, the issue must be examined by the European Court “in the light of all the 
circumstances of the case”. In particular, it must be determined whether the applicant 
has been subject to compulsion to give evidence and whether the use made of the 
resulting testimony at his trial offended the basic principles of a fair procedure 
inherent in Article 6(1) of which the right not to incriminate oneself is a constituent 
element.611  
 
On the other hand, the accused’s silence may also be taken into account in situations 
which clearly call for an explanation.612 According to the European Court, although 
the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked in order to prevent the use of 
certain evidence in criminal proceedings, it may not prevent the authorities from 
obtaining the information through the use of compulsory powers but which has an 
existence independent of the will of the suspect, such as documents acquired 
pursuant to breath, blood or urine samples, bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA 
testing, or documents obtained under a warrant, as in Saunders v UK.613 Noticeable, 
it has been argued that the provisions of domestic law “drawing adverse inferences” 
create a very real risk that an accused will feel compelled to forfeit his right to 
silence, and to give potentially incriminating evidence.614  
 
In Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland, an Irish statute, section 52 of the Offences 
against the State Act 1939 required citizens to give the authorities, if requested, an 
account of their movements at a given time in the context of terrorist 
investigations. 615  The Government maintained that section 52 was a reasonable 
measure given that a statement made pursuant to that section was not later admissible 
in evidence against its author and because any evidence obtained as a result of such a 
statement could only be admitted if the trial judge considered it fair and equitable to 
do so. The European Court considered that the legal position as regards the 
admission into evidence of section 52 statements was particularly uncertain in 
October 1990 when the applicants were questioned.616 In any event, the applicants 
were provided with conflicting information in this respect by the questioning police 
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officers. When the section 52 requests were then made during those interviews, they 
were then effectively informed that, if they did not account for their movements at 
particular times, they risked six months’ imprisonment. The only reference during the 
interviews to the possible use of statements made by the applicants in any later 
proceedings was to inform them that anything they did say would be written down 
and might be used against them. Accordingly, the Court finds that the “degree of 
compulsion”, imposed on the applicants by the application of section 52 of the 1939 
Act with a view to compelling them to provide information relating to charges 
against them under that Act, in effect, destroyed the very essence of their privilege 
against self-incrimination and their right to remain silent.617 
 
However, the European Court does not consider that the drawing of inferences from 
an accused’s silence is in itself incompatible with Article 6, as long as judicial 
safeguards operate to ensure fairness. Article 6(1) and (2) require the prosecution at 
least to establish prima-facie that the accused has committed an offence, and that it is 
permissible for a court to draw an inference of guilt from the accused’s failure to 
provide an explanation only where this is the sole common-sense conclusion to be 
drawn.618 For example, under European jurisprudence, the European Court found in 
case Murray v UK that the anti-terrorism legislation applied did not violate Article 6 
but the directions of the trial judge must be scrutinized carefully.619 A convicted 
person Mr Murray, arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989. He was 
refused to answer any questions after his arrest, despite being warned each time that 
a court might draw such inferences as appeared proper from his failure or refusal to 
do so. On his subsequent trial the judge drew adverse inferences against the accused 
under articles 4 and 6 of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 
1988.  Article 4 permits the drawing of an adverse inference in certain defined 
circumstances against an accused person who fails to give evidence.  Noticeably, the 
European Court thought that the judge should have stressed to the jury that they 
should give “due weight” to the applicant’s reliance on legal advice to explain his 
silence. 620  However, the European Court noted that the applicant had not been 
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subject to direct coercion, being neither fined nor threatened with imprisonment.621 
The factor concerning the lack of legal advice on its own cannot be decisive. The 
European Court further agreed that “the use of inferences was an expression of the 
common sense implication drawn where an accused fails to provide an innocent 
explanation for his actions or behaviour”.622  There were sufficient safeguards to 
comply with fairness, the repeated warning given during the interviews, and the 
general burden of proof remained with the prosecution who had to establish a prima 
facie case before the inference could be of relevance. 623  Its decision is highly 
relevant to future challenges asserting the right to silence.  
 
The drawing of adverse inferences from the silence of the accused in interview also 
depend upon the strength of the case put to the accused and whether those questions 
put during interview are based on a case so strong as to warrant an explanation. This 
was applied in Telfner v Austria.624 The applicant chose not to give evidence at trial, 
and the prosecution case relied almost entirely on the findings of the police that the 
applicant was the principal user of the car which is registered in his mother’s name 
and had not been at home at the time of the accident. The Court notes, in particular, 
that the victim of the accident had not been able to identify the driver, nor even to say 
whether the driver had been male or female, and that the Regional Court, after 
supplementing the proceedings, found that the car in question was also used by the 
applicant's sister.625 The European Court held that the persuasiveness of the evidence 
adduced by the prosecution was extremely weak and the prosecutor had not first 
established a convincing prima-facie case against the accused. 626  Therefore, in 
requiring the applicant to provide an explanation, the courts in effect shifted the 
burden of proof from the prosecution to the defence, giving rise to a violation of 
Article 6(2).627 
 
It could be seen there is a contrast in the UK domestic approach on the issue of right 
to silence. In the UK, led by Lord Bingham in Brown v Stott, they accepted that the 
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broader interests of the community in general, and the need to maintain road safety in 
particular, could justify a limited infringement of the right to silence of this sort.628 
For example, the UK courts have had to consider a large number of cases involving 
the “inferences from silence” provisions contained in ss.34 and 35 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and equivalent provisions in Ireland since they 
came into operation, to the extent that the Court of Appeal described s.34 as “a 
notorious minefield” in R v. B (K. J.) in 2003.629 Many domestic decisions in UK in 
this area thus have been on occasion difficult to reconcile both with Strasbourg case 
law and with each other.630  
 
R v Beckles in 2004 was a case being referred back to the English Court of Appeal by 
the Criminal Cases Review Commission after the European Court ruled the 
defendant had been denied a fair trial under Article 6.631 Here the Court of Appeal 
stated that the question in the end, which is for the jury, is whether regardless of 
advice, genuinely given and genuinely accepted, an accused has remained silent not 
because of that advice but because he had no or no satisfactory explanation to 
give.632 The judge’s direction here was inadequate because it failed to draw the jury’s 
attention specifically to the need to consider the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
silence, nor was the jury directed to consider the genuineness of the defendant's 
decision to accept the advice.633 This direction appears be crucial for UK domestic 
cases.634 It is clear that the mere fact that silence is counselled is not sufficient to 
prevent s. 34 from operating.635 It should also take into account whether or not that 
advice was honestly given or genuinely taken.636 Suspects who do genuinely rely on 
bona fide legal advice should not have adverse inferences drawn against them.  
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As summed up by Woolf LCJ, it accepted that an assertion of reliance on legal 
advice was easy to make but difficult to investigate because of legal professional 
privilege, and the Court of Appeal recognised that defendants should be able to be 
advised by their lawyer without having to reveal the terms of that advice.637 But 
where the defendant genuinely accepts advice honestly given, the English courts 
have ruled that the crucial question for determination by the jury relates to the 
reasonableness or the true explanation for his silence of the defendant’s decision to 
act on that advice. The accused must not have been using the advice to conceal his 
lack of an adequate explanation.638 Any suspect who seeks to shield himself from an 
adverse inference in these circumstances surely cannot be regarded as having 
genuinely accepted the advice he was given since the advice is being used merely as 
a device to shield his inability to provide an explanation.639 The approach of the 
decision in R v Beckles appears a return to the approach of the courts before R v 
Howell, following “R v Betts which is more favourable to the accused”.640 It is for the 
jury to consider whether the defendant genuinely and reasonably relied on the legal 
advice to remain silent, not for the Judge to give the jury a checklist of whether the 
legal advice given by the accused’s representative is of proper quality. 
 
Noticeably, in a recent case O’halloran and Francis v UK the English approach laid 
by Lord Bingham in Brown v. Stott also had got it right under European 
jurisprudence.641 In each case, a car belonging to the applicant had been snapped by a 
roadside camera when speeding. The central issue in each case is whether the 
coercion of a person who is the subject of a charge of speeding under section 172 of 
the Road Traffic Act 1988 to make statements which incriminate him or might lead 
to his incrimination is compatible with Article 6 of the Convention. To the extent 
possible, the European Court will therefore consider the two cases together. Their 
applications were rejected by the Grand Chamber. In this case the European Court 
decided that the right to remain silent, and the right not to incriminate oneself, it said, 
are not absolute, and certain derogations from them are permissible without 
infringing Article 6 of the Convention.642 Relying on its earlier ruling in Jalloh v 
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Germany the European Court concluded that “in order to determine whether the 
essence of the applicants’ right to remain silent and privilege against self-
incrimination was infringed, the European Court will focus on the nature and degree 
of compulsion used to obtain the evidence, the existence of any relevant safeguards 
in the procedure, and the use to which any material so obtained was put”.643 The 
derogation imposed by section 172 of the RTA was justified for two reasons.  
 
The first was its direct nature.644 The duty to provide information it imposes was 
created as part of a scheme for regulating an activity which for citizens is optional. 
Because motor cars are potentially dangerous, the state is justified in making laws to 
regulate their use; and those who choose to keep and drive motor cars can be taken to 
have accepted certain responsibilities and obligations as part of the regulatory regime 
relating to motor vehicles.645 Secondly, there was the limited nature of the inquiry.646 
Section 172(2)(a) applies only where the driver of the vehicle is alleged to have 
committed a relevant offence, and authorizes the police to require information only 
as to the identity of the driver. Therefore the information requested of the applicant is 
thus markedly more restricted and very specific.647 The European Court referred the 
case of Brown v. Stott, the identity of the driver is only one element in the offence of 
speeding, and there is no question of a conviction arising in the underlying 
proceedings in respect solely of the information obtained as a result of section 
172(2)(a).648 Overall the European Court considered that the nature of information 
sought by a notice of intended prosecution under section 172 did not destroy the 
essence of the applicants’ right to silence and their privilege against self-
incrimination and therefore there is no violation of Article 6(1) and (2). 
 
As Birdling commented, from the judgment of O’halloran and Francis v UK the 
previous inconsistency between British and European Court jurisprudence on the 
matter as to the limitation of the rights to silence and against self-incrimination 
appears to have now been harmonized.649 In this case, the European Court insisted its 
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own principle that while the right to a fair trial under Article 6 is an unqualified right, 
what constitutes a fair trial cannot be the subject of a single unvarying rule but must 
depend on the circumstances of the particular case.650 But this phrase could actually 
also have been drawn directly from Lord Bingham’s judgment in Brown v Stott.651 
Concern has been raised on whether there is now any coherent guidance on the 
precise scope of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence under 
the Convention. 652  Ashworth and Redmayne suggested that the apparent 
inconsistencies in the European jurisprudence could be harmonised in a principled 
fashion.653 However, the European Court has developed a very flexible standard for 
determining what constitutes a criminal charge that would infringe Article 6 
protection that accords with the diverse legal systems of its member states. It has led 
the European Court to approve the use of adverse inferences from silence and left 
doors open for member states to resolve and reconsider how to incorporate the right 
to silence into its domestic law, particularly in the very difficult area of the 
prevention of terrorism. Overall, the European Court has demonstrated its strong 
support for the core principle that the right to silence and the privilege against self-
incrimination is an aspect of the fair trial requirement of Article 6. 
 
4.5 Admissibility of Evidence 
As a result of the wide variation in rules of evidence followed in different European 
legal systems, the European Court has not laid down any rules of evidence regarding 
issues of the admissibility as a requirement of the guarantee of the right to a fair trial 
under Article 6.654 The question for the European Court, which must be answered, is 
whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was 
obtained, were fair.655  As known, for example, under English law evidence was 
admissible if it is relevant and relevant evidence remains admissible even if it has 
been obtained illegally.656 However, admissible evidence may be excluded at the 
discretion of the trial judge if it would have an unacceptably adverse effect on the 
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fairness of the proceedings.657 In this aspect, the UK domestic courts proceeds on a 
broadly similar basis as the European Convention in relation to improperly obtained 
evidence.658 
 
But then a further question arises. Can it be accepted that there is a genuinely fair 
trial where a person’s guilt for any offence is established through evidence obtained 
in breach of the human rights guaranteed by the Convention? Fenwick considered 
that it might be found that a breach of the Convention guarantees in the pre-trial 
procedures would make it virtually inevitable that the trial would be rendered unfair 
if evidence deriving from the breach was not excluded.659 What is most important is 
not the breach per se, but the way that the breach impacts on the proceedings. In a 
strongly worded dissenting judgment in Khan v UK, Judge Loucaides expressed the 
argument in favour of an exclusionary rule.660 “Breaking the law, in order to enforce 
it, is a contradiction in terms and an absurd proposition”.661 The law enforcement 
authorities cannot be effectively deterred from repeating their impermissible conduct. 
The analysis of the preceding approaches by Ormerod also suggested that a refined 
discretion should be established.662  
 
European Court has provided some guidelines as to the rules of admissibility of 
evidence that may be applied and a breach of one of these rules may, on the facts of a 
case, render a trial unfair such as in the following circumstances: evidence obtained 
by torture or ill-treatment contrary to Article 3;663 confessions obtained by torture 
were admitted an evidence during a criminal trial;664 evidence obtained by powers of 
compulsory questioning;665 and evidence obtained by police incitement of an offence 
which would not otherwise have been committed;666 the failure to make adequate 
disclosure or call relevant witnesses in relation to any purported illegally obtained 
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evidence.667 Also, early access to a lawyer was part of the procedural safeguards to 
which the European Court would have particular regard when examining whether a 
procedure had extinguished the very essence of the privilege against self-
incrimination.668 The fairness is not confined to the trial itself, but extends to the pre-
trial phase and to the particular methods used to gather evidence. 
 
Here concentrates on the issue raised by the use of evidence obtained by torture, 
including confessions by the accused, which concern not only the procedural right to 
a fair trial, but also play a part in protection from the abhorrence of torture itself. 669 
One of the general challenges is maintaining the absolute nature of the torture 
prohibition under Article 3 of ECHR, which cannot be suspended or weighed against 
competing interests even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation. 670  For example, in the recent case Jalloh v. Germany, the applicant 
complains that an emetic was administered to him by force to make the applicant 
regurgitate a tiny plastic bag of cocaine he had swallowed and about the use of 
evidence thus obtained, in his view illegally, in the criminal proceedings leading to 
his conviction.671  He further claims that his right not to incriminate himself was 
violated. He relies on Article 3, Article 6 and Article 8 of the ECHR. The European 
Court noted that the forcible medical intervention had entailed risks to the applicant’s 
health, not least because of the failure to obtain a proper anamnesis beforehand.672 In 
the European Court’s view, even if it had not been the authorities’ intention to inflict 
pain and suffering on the applicant, the manner in which the impugned measure was 
carried out had been liable to arouse in the applicant feelings of fear, anguish and 
inferiority that were capable of humiliating and debasing him. 673  Therefore the 
German authorities had subjected the applicant to a grave interference with his 
physical and mental integrity against his will in order to retrieve evidence they could 
have equally obtained by less intrusive methods.674 The European Court firstly found 
that the evidence was obtained by a measure which breached one of the core rights 
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guaranteed by the Convention. He had been subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatment contrary to Article 3.675  
 
Then the next question in this case is whether the admission at trial of the real 
evidence obtained in violation of Article 3 renders the trial as a whole unfair.676 The 
European Court noted that this evidence obtained through ill-treatment proved the 
decisive element in securing the applicant’s conviction. 677  Moreover, although 
German law afforded safeguards against arbitrary or improper use of the measure, 
any discretion on the part of the national courts to exclude that evidence could not 
come into play as they considered the administration of emetics to be authorised by 
the domestic law.678 The European Court regarded that the public interest in securing 
the applicant’s conviction could not justify allowing the evidence obtained in a way 
which breached one of the core rights guaranteed by the Convention to be used at the 
trial.679 Accordingly, in this case the use in evidence of the drugs obtained by the 
forcible administration of emetics to the applicant was a sufficient base to conclude 
his trial as a whole was unfair and therefore constitutes a violation of Article 6(1).680 
The illegality of the investigation is a factor in the determination of the fairness of 
the proceedings.681 Although the European Court left open the question whether a 
trial based on evidence obtained by inhuman or degrading treatment could 
nevertheless be fair, the European Court recognised Article 15 of the UN CAT which 
provides that statements which are established to have been made as a result of 
torture shall not be used in evidence in proceedings against the victim of torture.682 
From the above judgments, the violation of the absolute prohibition of torture will 
always outweigh any interest in using the evidence concerned. In this way, Article 3 
appears to be read by the European Court as an exclusionary rule that demands 
exclusion of all evidence obtained by torture or ill-treatment and regardless of where 
it occurred.683 
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This approach is also followed by another recent case Harutyunyan v Armenia, 
relying on Article 6(1), the applicant complained that his right not to incriminate 
himself and his right to a fair trial had been breached by the use at his trial of 
statements which had been obtained from him and two witnesses through torture.684  
The European Court first noted that the coerced statements by the applicant and 
witnesses played a decisive role in securing the applicant’s conviction from the 
judgments of the courts at all three levels of jurisdiction. But none of the domestic 
courts at all three levels of jurisdiction explicitly declared the statements in question 
inadmissible, despite several requests to that effect by the defence.685 The European 
Court emphasised that the use of evidence obtained in violation of Article 3 in 
criminal proceedings raises serious issues as to the fairness of such proceedings.686 
The European Court further noted that the fact that the applicant and the two 
witnesses had been coerced into making confessions had been confirmed by the 
domestic courts when the police concerned were convicted of ill-treatment.687 This 
respect was taken into account by the European Court for the purposes of deciding 
on compliance with the guarantees of Article 6. 
 
Even the domestic courts justified the use of the confession statements by the fact 
that the applicant confessed to the investigator and not to the police officers who had 
ill-treated him and the fact those two witnesses confirmed their earlier confession 
later. The European Court was not convinced by such justification and addressed that 
the credibility of the statements made by them during that period should still have 
been seriously questioned, and these statements should certainly not have been relied 
upon to justify the credibility of those made under torture.688 The European Court 
concluded that “regardless of the impact the statements obtained under torture had on 
the outcome of the applicant’s criminal proceedings, the use of such evidence 
rendered his trial as a whole unfair”.689 There has accordingly been a violation of 
Article 6(1) even if the admission of the evidence obtained by torture was not 
decisive in securing the conviction. It has been observed under European 
jurisprudence, the admission of evidence obtained by torture may contrary to Article 
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6(1), if the complain of coercion and torture appeared to be substantiated, regardless 
of any further consideration, be they related to the identity of the torturer state, to the 
persons concerned or to the probative value. 690 
 
The question of the admissibility of the evidence obtained by torture has been raised 
widely with different views in different countries, especially in the context of the 
worldwide prevention of terrorism. The interface between domestic law and the 
requirements of Article 6(1) will be of great importance. The use of evidence 
obtained by torture is capable of being a sufficiently grave violation of ECHR, so 
that domestic courts of the party states making the evaluation must even avoid a real 
risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 existing and therefore an unfair trial by 
admitting evidence has been extracted by torture.691 The judgement of A and others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2) in UK may be regarded as the 
leading judgment on this issue. 692  The ten appellant detainees, X, in the case 
appealed against a decision that the fact that evidence in their appeals before the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission had, or might have, been procured by 
torture inflicted by foreign nationals without the complicity of the British authorities 
was relevant to the weight of the evidence but did not render it legally inadmissible.  
 
While the Court of Appeal were content to accept the admissibility of the evidence 
obtained by torture, the House of Lord unanimously held that evidence is 
inadmissible if obtained by torture, no matter where, by whom or on whose authority 
the torture is inflicted.693 This solution adopted by the House of Lord in UK was in 
full conformity with Article 6 and was in line with the general attitude international 
law takes towards the practice of torture.694  Firstly reviewing the over 500-year 
history of the well-established common law rule regarding the prohibition against the 
use of torture, even in times of emergency, their lordships observed that the 
condemnation of torture by the common law as a constitutional principle is not only 
the unreliability of any information obtained through the use of torture, but also is 
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mainly based on the grounds of its barbarism, its illegality and its inhumanity.695 It is 
more than a rule of evidence. Unlike the Court of Appeal in this case, their lordship 
recognised that English common law insisted on an exclusionary rule and had 
refused to accept that oppression or inducement should go to the weight rather than 
the admissibility of the confession.696  
 
Further Lord Bingham addressed that the principles of common law did not stand 
alone and effect had to be given to the ECHR, which itself takes account of the all 
but universal consensus embodied in the international law, such as Article 3 of 
ECHR and Article 7 of ICCPR.697 Therefore examining Article 15 of CAT, Lord 
Bingham pointed out that it was a blanket rule broad enough applicable in all 
proceedings whether the offending evidence was a confession or an accusatory 
statement.698 The same conclusion would be also reached under Article 6 of ECHR. 
When adjudicating upon Article 3 issues, the European Court has frequently invoked 
relevant provisions of the UN CAT as in Jalloh v. Germany. Moreover, referred to 
the case of Saunders v UK and Teixera de Castro v Portugal, Lord Bingham 
observed that although the European Court had not prescribed a standard regarding 
admissibility of evidence, it had held that the way in which evidence has been 
obtained or used may be such to render the proceedings unfair since the proceedings 
are to be assessed as a whole for their fairness and the manner in which evidence has 
been obtained is one element of the proceedings.699 Therefore if the evidence is used 
against the victim of an act of torture, the right against self-incrimination renders 
such evidence inadmissible. 700  If it is used against someone who has not been 
tortured, the unreliability of evidence obtained by torture will weigh heavily in the 
overall assessment as to the fairness of the proceedings.701 Based on a series of 
international instruments and statements stating that measures taken in the war on 
terror must also be compatible with international human rights standards, the Lord 
Bingham held that the house has not been referred to any decision, resolution, 
agreement or advisory opinion suggesting that a confession or statement obtained by 
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torture is admissible in legal proceedings if the torture was inflicted without the 
participation of the state in whose jurisdiction the proceedings are held, or that 
evidence is admissible in proceedings related to terrorism.702  
 
On the issue relating to evidence of torture, Lords firstly unanimously agreed that it 
would be unfair to impose the burden on the appellants, therefore “the appellants 
would only have to point out that a statement had been or may have been provided 
by a foreign state suspected of practising torture, upon which the burden of proof 
would have been discharged, and the duty of investigation would fall on SIAC 
itself”. 703  However, the House split on whether evidence would be excluded in 
relation to cases in which there was only “a real risk” that it had been obtained by 
torture.704 The majority judgment on this issue as to standard of proof gives reasons 
for concern, by holding that exclusionary rule applied only if a statement could be 
proved to have been obtained by torture.705 On the contrary, Lord Bingham stated in 
his minority opinion that this is a test which, in the real world, can never be satisfied. 
“The foreign torturer does not boast of his trade”.706 The decision on the issue of 
standard of proof appears different from the approach under Article 6 of ECHR. For 
example, in case Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, it has been recognised that a 
state can violate Article 6 by extraditing a person to another State, if there is a real 
risk of a grossly unfair trial in the receiving state.707  
 
In A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2), joined in his 
dissent by Lords Nicholls and Hoffman, Lord Bingham argued that adopting “a real 
risk” standard of proof as required by Article 5(4) of ECHR was essential to maintain 
the overall fairness of the “very far from ordinary” s.25 proceedings, which were 
already heavily weighted against the appellants with an undoubtedly grave 
disadvantage.708 Therefore he advocated that if SIAC is unable to conclude that there 
is not a real risk that the evidence has been obtained by torture, it should refuse to 
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admit the evidence.709 However, the majority argued that the use of real risk standard 
in Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey by the European Court had been developed in 
order to assess the possibility of future violations. 710  On the contrary, the 
exclusionary rule under consideration related to past events, and it should be possible 
to establish what has happened in the past even if only on a balance of probabilities, 
as required by Article 15 of the UN CAT.711 In other word, if there was no more than 
a possibility that the statement was obtained by torture, then it would not have been 
established and the statement would be admissible.712 The majority also stated that 
they sought to devise a test that occupies high moral ground but at the same time 
serve the public interest and is practicable.713 Lord Hope implicitly acknowledged 
that the test he advocated may not be as fair as expected in terms of Article 5(4) and 
6(1) of EHCR, but that these obligations were to be balanced against the obligation 
to protect the right to life in Article 2.714  
 
Grief comments that the judgment is firmly rooted in the common law and makes a 
notable contribution to international law. 715  The unanimous judgment on the 
inadmissibility of the third-party torture evidence before SIAC was important in 
signalling that the use of torture is universally forbidden under all circumstances, and 
that states have positive duties to give effect to that prohibition, including by treating 
as inadmissible in any proceedings of evidence obtained through torture.716 However, 
the approach on the standard of proof in the judgment may not completely remove 
the possibility to seek admissibility of the evidence acquired through the use of 
torture. The UK test as to the standard of proof imposed on the individual may add 
another grave disadvantage to him. At the same time, as commented by Shah, “if the 
executive is able to use whatever information is necessary, this signals to ‘would-be’ 
torturers that there is a use for the information they will obtain and gives them no 
reason to stop their proscribed activities”.717 The UK domestic courts still seek to 
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strike a proper balance among different interests and rights. As regarded by 
Ashworth, it is precisely in the investigation of serious crime, where the pressures to 
obtain convictions are strongest, that protection of suspects’ rights and remedies 
against police impropriety are most needed.718 The government should do nothing to 
encourage torture. From the above cases it may found that the European Court has 
further made it clear that while the rise in organised crime requires appropriate 
measures, “the public interest cannot justify the use of evidence obtained as a result 
of police incitement”, right from the outset, the applicant was definitely deprived of a 
fair trial.719 Fairness is a fundamental value and, unlike the balancing process at the 
heart of the public policy discretion, is less amenable to trumping by countervailing 
considerations, such as the importance of bringing offenders charged with serious 
offences to justice and ensuring that reliable evidence is placed before the courts.720 
 
4.6 Time and Facilities to Run a Defence  
The European Court reiterates in its cases that the accused must have the opportunity 
to organise his defence in an appropriate way and without restriction as to the 
possibility to put all relevant defence arguments before the trial court and thus to 
influence the outcome of the proceedings.721 The following minimum guarantees for 
“everyone charged with a criminal offence” under Article 6(3), the adequate time and 
facilities required by Article 6(3)(b) related to the substantive defence activity on his 
behalf may comprise everything which is “necessary” to prepare the main trial.722 
The right to assistance of a counsel is usually closely connected with the right to 
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence. 723  Therefore, Article 
6(3)(b) and (c) may often be invoked together. For example, in respect of the 
assignment of a lawyer and in respect of the time allowed for such assignment, the 
European Court regarded that where it is obvious that a lawyer has not had adequate 
time to prepare the defence properly and familiarise himself with the case, the 
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domestic court should consider adjourning the case on its own motion.724 The role of 
Article 6(3)(b) and (c) in this regard is to achieve “equality of arms” between the 
prosecution and the defence, a principle also considered an element of fairness under 
the general fair trial guarantee of Article 6(1). The European Court reiterates that 
“Article 6 – especially paragraph 3 – may be relevant at the stage of the preliminary 
investigation in so far as the fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced 
by an initial failure to comply with its provisions”.725 Therefore, the requirements of 
Article 6(3) are to be seen as particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed 
by Article 6(1).726  
 
4.6.1 Adequate Time  
The time element of this guarantee acts as a safeguard to protect the accused against 
a hasty trial.727 Like the other guarantees as to timeliness under the Convention, 
Article 6(3)(b) applies from the moment the accused is arrested or is otherwise 
substantially affected or when he is given notice of charges against him.728 The issue 
of adequacy of time afforded to an accused must be assessed in the light of the 
circumstances of each particular case.729 For example, in the English courts, accused 
persons frequently meet their legal aid barrister for the first time only minutes before 
their trial, but in X v UK the Commission has decided that this is not a breach of 
Article 6(3)(b) unless the applicant can show “prejudice to his representation during 
the proceedings”.730 The later case Twalib v Greece adopts similar approach to this 
issue.731 The applicant in this case pointed out that as the applicant’s counsel did not 
appear at the hearing in the first-instance proceedings, his counsel had been 
appointed by the trial court during the hearing and had been given less than an hour 
to study his case file. Also, that lawyer was representing another co-accused whose 
interests were in conflict with him.732 However, the European Court observes that “it 
does not appear from the evidence that the applicant’s lawyer contended on appeal 
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that the conviction was unsafe and that a retrial should be ordered on account of the 
defects in the applicant’s representation at first instance; nor is there any clear 
indication that the appeal court could assume that there had been a defect in the first 
instance proceedings without being alerted to the matter”. 733 Under this situation, the 
European Court found that there has been no violation of Article 6(1) in conjunction 
with 3(b) in this case. 
 
In case Öcalan v. Turkey, the European Court considers that the restriction on the 
number and length of the applicant’s meetings with his lawyers was one of the 
factors that made the preparation of his defence difficult.734 The charges against the 
applicant included numerous acts of violence perpetrated by an illegal armed 
organisation and that he was alleged to be the leader of that organisation and the 
principal instigator of its acts. Therefore the European Court considered that the 
presentation of those highly complex charges generated an exceptionally voluminous 
case file. However, after the first two visits by his lawyers, which were 
approximately two weeks apart, contact between the applicant and his lawyers was 
restricted to two one-hour visits per week. The European Court considered that in 
order to prepare his defence the applicant required skilled legal assistance equal to 
the complex nature of the case.735 Since the restrictions imposed on the number and 
length of their visits made it impossible for the applicant’s lawyers to communicate 
the documents in the file to their client until late or to involve him in its examination 
and analysis, they found themselves in a situation that made the preparation of the 
defence case particularly difficult.736 Therefore the European Court concluded that 
the special circumstances of the case did not justify restricting the applicant to a 
rhythm of two one-hour meetings per week with his lawyers in order to prepare for a 
trial of that magnitude. 737  Also the Government have not explained why the 
authorities did not permit the lawyers to visit their client more often or why they 
failed to provide more adequate means of transport, thereby increasing the length of 
each individual visit, when such measures were called for as part of the “diligence” 
the Contracting States must exercise in order to ensure that the rights guaranteed by 
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Article 6 are enjoyed in an effective manner.738 The European Court reiterates that 
waiver of the exercise of a right guaranteed by the Convention must be established in 
“an unequivocal manner”.739  
 
In the recent case Galstyan v Armenia, the applicant submitted that the trial was not 
fair, that he was not given time to prepare his defence and that he was tricked into 
refusing legal assistance. 740  The applicant were arrested and examined in an 
expedited procedure after the applicant was kept at the police station for only a few 
hours, during which time the police record was signed by the applicant and therefore 
legal assistance were refused by the applicant. However, the European Court 
considered that the mere fact that the applicant signed a paper in which he stated that 
he did not wish to have a lawyer did not mean that he did not need adequate time and 
facilities to prepare himself effectively for trial.741 Nor did the fact that the applicant 
did not lodge any specific requests during the short pre-trial period necessarily imply 
that no further time was needed for him to be able to properly assess the charge 
against him and consider his defence in adequate conditions.742 The European Court 
noted that, during that time, the applicant was either in transit to the court or was 
being held at the police station without contact with the outside world. During his 
short stay at the police station, he was also questioned and searched. The European 
Court doubted that the circumstances in which the applicant’s trial was conducted 
enabled him to familiarise himself properly with and to assess adequately the charge 
and evidence against him, and to develop a viable legal strategy for his defence.743 
Therefore nothing suggested that his signing of the record pursued any other purpose 
to confirm that he was familiar with it and aware of his rights and the charge against 
him. The European Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 6(3) 
taken together with Article 6(1) according to all above situations.  
 
4.6.2 Adequate Facilities  
4.6.2.1 Access to Information 
The European Court regards the facilities which everyone charged with a criminal 
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offence should enjoy include the opportunity to acquaint himself for the purposes of 
preparing his defence with the results of investigations carried out throughout the 
proceedings.744 Hence, in order for the adversarial process to work effectively, as 
regard to the entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence which was discussed 
above, the European Court continues to issue strong statements that both the accused 
and their counsel must be granted access to appropriate information at all stages of 
proceedings.745 In practice, it appears that the parties should have the opportunity to 
make copies of the relevant documents from the court file.746 For exmaple, in Öcalan 
v. Turkey, the European Court noted that the applicant was not permitted to inspect 
personally the evidence produced by the prosecution against those complex charges 
until a very late stage in the proceedings. 747  Also, the applicant’s lawyers only 
received the large voluminous case documents approximately 2 weeks before the 
beginning of the trial.748 The fact that the applicant was given permission later to 
consult the case file under the supervision of two registrars did little to remedy that 
situation, in view of the considerable volume of documents concerned and the short 
time available to the applicant. 749  Moreover, the European Court found the 
applicant’s lawyers actually were not able to pass on to his client any documents 
before submitting their comments on the prosecution evidence. 750  Under this 
situation, the European assumed that, had he been permitted to study the prosecution 
evidence directly for a sufficient period, the applicant would have been able to 
identify arguments relevant to his defence other than those which his lawyers 
advanced without the benefit of his instructions.751 The European Court therefore 
holds that the fact that the applicant was not given proper access to any documents in 
the case file other than the bill of indictment also served to compound the difficulties 
encountered in the preparation of his defence. 
 
4.6.2.2 Right to Confidential Communication with Counsel 
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Another important issue considered under this head is the right to communications 
with a lawyer which is covered by Article 6(3)(b) and (c).752 As far as the ICCPR and 
the ECHR are concerned, Article 9 of ICCPR and Article 5 of ECHR, do not 
specifically provide for the access to a lawyer of persons arrested on remand.753 Both 
the HRC and the European Court have, however, relied for the purpose on the fair 
trial provisions of Article 14 of ICCPR and Article 6 of ECHR respectively, although 
in different ways and with partly different results.754 The European Court follows a 
more complex approach, which has been set out in the 1993 Imbrioscia v Switzerland 
judgment.755 The European Court regarded that “the right set out in paragraph (3)(c) 
of Article 6 is one element, amongst others, of the concept of a fair trial in criminal 
proceedings contained in paragraph (1)”.756 The European Court specifically pointed 
out that the domestic proceedings conducted in the case as a whole must be 
considered, including the special features of any pre-trial investigation and the facts 
of the case.757 Assigning a counsel does not in itself ensure the effectiveness of the 
assistance he may afford an accused.758  
 
In its Murray v UK judgment the European Court followed the above approach that 
the absence of legal representation during the preliminary investigation could in 
certain circumstances affect the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. 759   Mr 
Murray had been denied access to his solicitor for 48 hours while he was interviewed 
by police. The European Court observed that the scheme contained in the Criminal 
Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 was such that it was of paramount importance 
for the rights of the defence that an accused has access to a lawyer at the initial stages 
of police interrogation, as he was confronted with a fundamental dilemma relating to 
his defence.760  The applicant was undoubtedly directly affected by the denial of 
access and the ensuing interference with the rights of the defence. 761  In such 
circumstances Article 6 will normally require that the accused be allowed to benefit 
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from the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation.762 
Noticeably, in contrast with other provisions of Article 6 of ECHR, the applicant 
does not need to show that he has suffered actual prejudice as a result of the failure 
of the state to secure legal assistance for him.763 The standard appears much lower. 
As held in Artico v Italy, the European Court will ask merely whether it is plausible 
that a lawyer would have been of assistance but not nomination.764  
 
According to this approach, on the one hand, the applicant’s right of access to a 
lawyer during the first 48 hours had been extremely restricted. For example, in 
Magee v UK where the national legislation permitted to draw adverse inferences 
from the suspect’s silence at police questioning, the applicant was kept 
incommunicado by the police for the first 48 hours.765 The European Court observed 
that the austerity of the conditions of his detention and his exclusion from outside 
contact were intended to be psychologically coercive and conducive to breaking 
down any resolve he may have manifested at the beginning of his detention to remain 
silent.766 Having regard to these considerations, the European Court is of the opinion 
that the applicant, as a matter of procedural fairness, should have been given access 
to a solicitor at the initial stages of the interrogation as a counterweight to the 
intimidating atmosphere specifically devised to sap his will and make him confess to 
his interrogators.767 Also, the European Court observed that the applicant did opt to 
break his silence and began to confess before he was allowed to consult his 
lawyer.768 The European Court therefore noted that irrespective of the fact that the 
domestic court drew no adverse inferences under Article 3 of the 1988 Order, the 
Article 3 caution administered to the applicant was an element which heightened his 
vulnerability to the relentless rounds of interrogation on the first days of his 
detention.769 The European Court found a violation of Article 6 (1) in conjunction 
with Article 6(3)(c) thereof as regards the denial of access to a lawyer. Similarly, the 
European Court did find a breach of Article 6(3)(c) read with Article 6(1) in Averill v 
UK, where the applicant was denied access to a solicitor during the first 24 hours of 
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interrogation and his solicitor was not allowed to be present during subsequent 
interviews.770  
 
On the other hand, no violation was found in Brennan v UK where the denial of 
access to a lawyer had lasted 24 hours and during that period the applicant had not 
made incriminating admissions. 771  The applicant argued that in the absence of 
independent evidence of video or taped records of the police interviews, and the 
absence of the accused’s solicitor, there were considerable difficulties for an accused 
to convince a court, against the testimony of the police officers, that any oppression 
took place. In this respect, the European Court noted that the circumstances in which 
the confession evidence was obtained were subjected to strict scrutiny on the voir 
dire. 772  Also, the European Court considered that the adversarial procedure 
conducted before the trial court at which evidence was heard from the applicant, 
psychological experts, the various police officers involved in the interrogations and 
the police doctors who examined him during his detention, was capable of bringing 
to light any oppressive conduct by the police.773 In the circumstances, the lack of 
additional safeguards, such as the recording of interviews and the attendance of the 
suspect’s lawyer, has not been shown to render the applicant’s trial unfair. The 
European Court concluded, therefore, that there had been no violation of Article 6(1) 
or Article 6 (3)(c) regarding the police interviews.  
 
However, the accused must be allowed to receive a usefully and meaning fully visit 
from his lawyer in private in order to convey instructions or to pass or receive 
confidential information relating to the preparation of his defence. 774  This was 
particularly the case where the applicant was of pliable personality and low 
intelligence, subject to restrictions on access to legal advice and coercive 
interrogation sessions.775 Both Article 6(1) and (3)(c) may be invoked, for example, 
to complain that private access to a lawyer has been frustrated by the authorities. For 
instance, in Brennan v UK, the applicant also submitted that his right under Article 6 
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(3)(c) to be assisted by a lawyer was violated by the presence of a police officer 
attending within sight and hearing of the consultation. The European Court noticed 
that the presence of the police officer was a restriction of very limited duration, and 
may in that respect be distinguished from the breach found in the case of S v. 
Switzerland, where the restriction on consultations lasted for about eight months.776 
At the same time, the European Court regarded that while it is not necessary for the 
applicant to prove, assuming such were possible, that the restriction had a prejudicial 
effect on the course of the trial, the applicant must be able to be claim to have been 
directly affected by the restriction in the exercise of the rights of the defence.777  
 
However, the European Court noted that there is no compelling reason arising in case 
Brennan v UK for the imposition of the restriction, and both the applicant and the 
solicitor had been warned that no names should be mentioned and that the interview 
would be stopped if anything were said which was perceived as hindering the 
investigation.778 In particular, the European Court recognized that the importance to 
the rights of the defence of ensuring confidentiality in meetings between the accused 
and his lawyers has been affirmed in various international instruments, including 
European instruments.779 Therefore the European Court emphasized again that the 
presence of the police officer would have inevitably prevented the applicant from 
speaking frankly to his solicitor and given him reason to hesitate before broaching 
questions of potential significance to the case against him.780 Then the assistance 
from the lawyer would lose much of its usefulness, whereas the Convention is 
intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective.781 The European Court 
concluded that the presence of the police officer within hearing during the applicant’s 
first consultation with his solicitor infringed his right to an effective exercise of his 
defence rights and that there has been, in that respect, a violation of Article 6 (3)(c) 
of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 6 (1).  
 
Noticeably, in Murray v UK, the European Court also recognized that the right of 
access to a lawyer may be subject to restrictions for good cause and the question in 
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each case is whether the restriction, in the light of the entirety of the proceedings, has 
deprived the accused of a fair hearing.782 However, restrictions on lawyer’s visits 
must be justified in public interests such as prevention of escape or prevention of the 
obstruction of justice. In finding a violation of Article 6(3)(c) in S v Switzerland, the 
European Court considered that there is nothing extraordinary in a number of 
defence counsel collaborating with a view to co-ordinating their defence strategy.783 
According to the observation of the European Court, neither the professional ethics 
of the defence lawyer, nor the lawfulness of his conduct were at any time called into 
question of collusion and perjury in this case. The European Court therefore rejected 
the Government’s arguments that the possibility of collusion between defence and 
counsel could justify such interferences.784 It may be permissible for a lawyer to be 
restricted from discussing with his client information about the case that would 
disclose the name of an informer.785 Furthermore, the right to private access to the 
lawyer does not only apply to face to face meetings but also to other forms of 
communication. Here the right to respect for correspondence also applies and the 
problem arises as to whether the issue ought to be examined in the light of one or the 
other of the Articles, such as Article 8, or both together.786 For example, in case 
Zagaria v Italy, there is a genuine belief held on reasonable grounds that the 
discussion between the suspects and their lawyers would be listened to and inevitably 
inhibit a free discussion between them, and thus hamper the effectiveness of the 
assistance which the lawyer could provide.787 The European Court therefore held 
unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6(1) and 3(c) and that it was 
not necessary to examine whether there had also been a violation of Article 8 where 
there was interception of a private telephone conversation between an accused taking 
part in a hearing by video conference and his lawyer.788  
 
4.6.3 Defence through Free Legal Assistance 
Free legal assistance will only be required where the defendant has insufficient 
means to pay and where it is required in the interests of justice.789 However, problem 
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arises how Member States to determine whether the accused and the defendant are 
able to pay for legal representation or not. There is no definition of “sufficient 
means” in the Convention and no case law as to the factors to be taken into account 
in the means test to determine an award of legal aid. But the onus is on the applicant 
to demonstrate at least “some indications” that he lacks sufficient means to retain his 
own counsel and there is in the absence of clear indications to the contrary.790 The 
European Court has set out the applicable criteria for the concept of “interests of 
justice” in relation to the free legal assistance from its case law. It held that the 
assessment of what justice requires will depend upon the severity of the penalty, the 
ability of the accused to conduct or contribute to his own defence and the complexity 
of the case in question.791 Of these factors, the potential penalty is the most important. 
For instance, in Twalib v. Greece the Court first considered that in view of the 
seriousness of the offence for which the applicant was convicted in conjunction with 
the severity of the sentence imposed on him there can be no doubt that the interests 
of justice required that he received free legal assistance.792 An additional factor is the 
personal ability of the applicant and the nature of the proceedings. For instance, the 
need to develop appropriate arguments on complicated legal issues or procedure, as 
the Cassation procedure in Twalib v Greece, may necessitate that he be granted free 
legal assistance from the point of view of the interests of justice.793  Where the 
accused faces being deprived of his liberty, the interests of justice in principle require 
that free legal representation is provided.794 It should not matter that the accused has 
little prospect of success on appeal.795 Any decision to refuse legal aid should be 
periodically reviewed to examine whether circumstances have changed and the 
interests of justice require a different decision.796 
 
There is, however, a primary, indispensable requirement of the “interests of justice” 
that must be satisfied in each case, as European Court stated in R. D. v Poland.797 
That is the requirement of a fair procedure before courts, which, among other things, 
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imposes on the State authorities an obligation to offer an accused a realistic chance to 
defend himself throughout the entire trial.798 It means that member States are obliged 
to ensure that the legal assistance for accused persons is practical and effective, the 
mere “nomination” of a legal aid lawyer is not sufficient to discharge the 
government’s obligations.799 This means that there will be a breach of Article 6(3)(c) 
if official action has frustrated the ability of the lawyer to represent his client, such as 
the failure of the court to inform him of the date of a hearing as shown in Goddi v 
Italy.800  
 
Moreover, there is a general rule that the accused’s choice of lawyer should be 
respected.801 The Croissant v Germany case raised issues of the relationship between 
the choice of a lawyer and entitlement to free legal aid.802 In this case, the European 
Court recognised that a “court should, as a rule, endeavour to choose a lawyer in 
whom the defendant places confidence”. 803  Indeed, in this case, German law 
contemplates such a course for the applicant. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the 
importance of a relationship of confidence between lawyer and client, the European 
Court regarded that this right cannot be considered to be absolute. It is necessarily 
subject to certain limitations where free legal aid is concerned.804 When there are 
relevant and sufficient grounds, the accused’s choice of lawyer can be overridden by 
holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice. In the presence case, having 
considered all the facts, the European Court found that there was no evidence to 
show that the relationship between the applicant and the designated lawyer was so 
strained as to make a proper defence impossible.805 Instead, the grounds on which the 
national courts based their appointment of Mr Hauser and their rejection of the 
reasons advanced by the applicant in favour of its revocation are, in the European 
Court’s view, relevant and sufficient.806 Accordingly, the European Court found no 
violation of Article 6(3)(c) either in the appointment of multiple counsel nor in the 
appointment of counsel against the wishes of the defendant.   
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5. Conclusion 
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, a full comparable analysis of rights 
protection in criminal proceedings would have to include the European standards, on 
human rights protections for the suspects. As can be seen from the study contained in 
this chapter, while the UN standard will be used as a starting point to weigh the 
Chinese criminal justice law, the European mode will be used for reference to 
explore the relevant questions as to developing direction. As the world leading 
jurisprudence and approach, ECHR has become “a constitutional instrument of 
European public order in the field of human rights”.807 A growing case law not only 
confirms the importance of Article 3, 5 and 6 of ECHR in practice, but also 
demonstrates that it has a number of different facets. Perhaps most significantly for 
European mode, the European Court and Commission have always afforded 
themselves a degree of flexibility, considering the ECHR as “a living instrument”.808 
Thus the European Court is not bound by previous judgements. The dynamic 
interpretation embodies a willingness to re-examine the interpretation already given 
to a particular provision, ideas and values can re-evaluate in its decisions in the light 
of changing circumstances. By taking this approach the judicial bodies can continue 
to respond to the challenges faced by new as well as traditional forms of violation. 
 
More importantly, the jurisprudence of the European Court has had an enormous 
impact, not merely through the outcome of specific cases on the parties to the 
individual cases, but in a general symbolic, educative and preventive sense. 809 
Elaborated from its cases, the European Court intends to lay down certain minimum 
international standards, whilst a given judgment for guidance as to the compatibility 
of their own domestic law with the requirements of the Convention.810 It is prepared 
to intervene where they regard the procedure adopted as violating the essence of 
human rights protection. But definitely because of such as the “fourth instance” 
doctrine, the margin of appreciation, the process which an application will pass is 
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still likely to be lengthy, and inadequate enforcement in the Member State there are 
limitations to affect its ability to bring about change in the laws and practices of 
Member State.811 However, some of these lacunae are filled by other provisions in 
the Convention and Protocols, Article 1 of Protocol No. 7. In addition, the European 
Court has read procedural guarantees into some of the substantive rights under the 
Convention, for example, in accordance with Article 13, an effective domestic 
remedy must be provided in respect of all arguable breaches of the Convention.812  
 
Since ECHR is seeking to identify at most the minimum which a particular legal 
system should attain, recognising the diversity in the Contracting States, the domestic 
systems may have had much more extensive protection in the criminal justice system 
than the ECHR did. As Lord Hope pointed out in R v Director of Public 
Prosecutions ex parte Kebilene “the Convention should be seen as an expression of 
fundamental principles rather than as a set of mere rules”.813 The concepts used in the 
Convention are therefore to be understood in the context of the democratic societies 
of modern Europe.814 In light of the current situation, incorporation of the ECHR into 
domestic law is a step in the right direction. For example, the Human Right Act 1998 
in UK makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in any way that is incompatible 
with any of the Convention rights. This step represents a radical change in the way 
fundamental human rights is to be protected in the UK. Also since the Human Right 
Act has afforded the Convention further effect in UK law it would impose on the 
judicial authorities the duty to interpret the law in a way which is consistent with the 
international standard and allow any laws which do not comply a chance to be 
amended. ECHR creates an environment in which the legal cultures of other 
jurisdictions are of direct relevance for practising lawyers, increasing, rather than 
decreasing, the need for a knowledge of comparative law. 
 
Therefore, the latest jurisprudence and approach of the ECHR, with the important 
issues and legal developments in the member states regarding to the purpose of 
enhancing and maximizing the protection of individuals in this chapter, were used to 
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highlight the relevant principles in the ICCPR and can be a useful guidance for the 
Chinese criminal justice reform. It should be deeply concerned how those 
international human rights protection standards for the suspects can really been 
“brought home” in the Chinese legal reform. Although treaties such as the ECHR are 
not directly enforceable in the Chinese courts, they are increasingly likely to offer 
interpretative guidance to the Chinese legal reform and to inspire new developments 
in similar ways to those in which the Convention was used by the judiciary in the UK 
pre-HRA and Post-HRA. Furthermore it is expected that a culture of respect for 
human rights become embedded across the whole of Chinese society as discussion in 
next Chapter.  
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Chapter Four  
General Principles and Movement towards Meeting 
International Human Rights Standards  
 
1. Introduction  
After discussing the relevant international treaties in part one of this thesis, which 
include ICCPR and ECHR concerning human rights protection for suspects, this part 
therefore correspondingly, investigates the current situation, progress made and 
potential areas of difficulty in meeting international standards in four specific areas 
of Chinese criminal justice reform. Changes in legal ideology have opened up the 
way for changes in the legal system. This chapter attempts to provide an extensive 
analysis of the unique historical development of the ideology of CCPL which has 
followed a dramatically different course from that in the west. It will hopefully 
deepen the understanding of the difficulty for China in maintaining the rule of law 
and establishing the ideology of human rights protection for suspects. The important 
question concerning how to transplant and accommodate the modern legal ideology 
and concepts embraced in the International Covenants into the Chinese criminal 
justice system and the Chinese legal cultural heritage can also be effectively explored. 
An overview of the traditional Chinese legal culture and concepts of criminal 
procedure law prior to the reform of 1996 are taken as the starting point. Following 
this, the major changes in the basic ideologies are addressed and the problems and 
difficulties in their application in current practice in the reform of 1996 in order to 
comply with the relative stipulations and spirit of ICCPR are dealt with in detail. 
Suggestions reflecting upon the existing problems concerning the change of guiding 
ideology are offered for the coming CCPL reform.  
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A detailed and comprehensive historical examination of the Chinese traditional legal 
system and culture is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is important to note 
that the impact and influence of traditional law, especially the traditional legal culture 
on contemporary law, cannot be disregarded or underestimated, as Lubman states.1 
This should be taken into consideration in order to gain an insightful understanding 
of the relationship between law and other social factors, of the actual operation of the 
legal system in society, and of its future direction.2 Much of the story of China’s legal 
reform efforts concerns the struggle to adapt international norms to local conditions. 
It offers China a warning of the dangers of uncritical acceptance of simplistic 
comparisons between Chinese law and its parallel foreign law models while ignoring 
the profound influence of the traditional legal culture and the prevailing social 
situation. Despite the influences exerted by foreign legal norms, Chinese law remains 
currently dominated by its traditional legal culture. The influences of traditional legal 
norms greatly affect the acceptance of globalized legal norms in China.  
 
Potter has observed that the development of the Chinese legal system over the past 
twenty years has reflected a process of selective adaptation, by which borrowed 
foreign norms concerning law and legal institutions have been mediated by local 
legal culture.3 This process is particularly evident in the areas of criminal law and 
procedural human rights protection. Various levels of human rights have existed for 
centuries. In theory they can be traced to the liberal democratic tradition of Western 
Europe, which set the stage for wider recognition of human rights and freedoms.4 
While most of the legal forms, structure, and terminology currently used in China 
were derived from concepts of European and North American liberalism, their 
                                               
1
 See Stanley Lubman, “Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years”, (2000) NW.J.Int’l L. & BUS 
383, p. 405. 
2
 See Chengguang Wang and Xianchu Zhang (ed), Introduction to Chinese Law, (Hong Kong & Singapore: Sweet 
& Maxwell Asia, 1997), p.2. Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 11-13. 
3
 See Pitman B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System Globalization and Local Legal Culture, (Routledge: London & 
New York, 2001), p. 14. 
4
 See R.J.Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986),Chapter 2. 
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operation still reflects the influences of traditional legal culture on criminal justice. 
Internationalization brings legal systems into closer contact with each other than ever 
before. However, this cannot remove all the differences between them. Legal reform, 
even if carried out with greater support by government and the Chinese Communist 
Party (中国共产党，CCP), must contend with traditional Chinese attitudes towards 
law that have caused the populace to avoid and fear involvement with formal legal 
institutions.5  
 
China therefore needs to conduct a creative transfer of certain traditional judicial 
concepts. Several problems need to be considered. What are the values and ideology 
lying beneath the current CCPL? In what direction and manner will the coming 
CCPL amendment with Chinese characteristics take? Moreover, what has been the 
ultimate objective of the CCPL reform? While the reception and implementation of 
the new institutions and rules of criminal justice may depend on their 
accommodation to legal tradition, no deep and comprehensive reform process is 
likely to happen if its guiding ideology and values fail to truly reflect the social needs 
of the people and keep up with the pace of development in a modern society in the 
first place. It is necessary to define appropriately the basic ideology of guidance for 
the law before discussing the question of how to modify the law. This is not only 
vital for the civilized and rational progress of criminal justice, but is also important 
for unified society ruled by law.  
  
2. Historical Background of Chinese Criminal Procedure Law Prior 
to Reform in 1996 
2.1 Legal Traditions Affecting Legal Reform  
The judicial system developed gradually during the long process of China’s historical 
evolution, along with political, economic and other social systems. 6  In the last 
                                               
5
 See Stanley Lubman, op. cit., fn 1, pp. 405-407. 
6
 The development of Chinese legal system see general, Honglie Yang, The Development of Chinese Law, 2nd ed,  
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hundred years a great number of legal doctrines have been adopted from other 
countries but the current Chinese criminal justice system as a whole is the outcome 
of Chinese legal history and practical experience.7 Before the first decade of the 
twentieth century, China had maintained a unique legal system for more than two 
millennia. The term “law” was equated with “punishment” in ancient China, and the 
early statutes were mainly sketches of an elaborate system of punishment.8  It is no 
exaggeration to say that the backbone of the entire Chinese traditional law (pre-1911) 
is criminal law, as it is constructed on the basis of a comprehensive code that 
contains all types of rules with criminal punishments, even in what nowadays would 
be described as civil actions.9  The most striking characteristic is probably the lack of 
respect for individual rights and its emphasis on the prevention of crime and social 
control.10  
 
2.1.1 Lack of Protection of Individual Rights 
China lacks the tradition of emphasis on the rights of the individual in criminal 
justice.11 It is hard to find a concept in this legal tradition that is equivalent to what 
the West understands as human rights, a concept that undeniably formed the starting 
point for the international regime of human rights as it is today.12 The criminal justice 
system of the feudal period of China’s history is characterized by the “presumption 
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of guilt”.13 However, that does not mean Chinese legal culture does not recognise 
individuals and their dignity and value. Many legal provisions from the ancient codes 
of law can be found to support the assertion that certain elements of presumption of 
innocence existed in traditional China. For example, in an early statement on 
criminal procedure, LüXing described that in doubtful cases, if guilt is not conclusive, 
the court should not deal with the case.14 This notion running through the imperial 
era may to some degree have tempered the presumption of guilt in the trials of the 
ancient court. However, what has been emphasized is the fact that a person whose 
guilt could not be proved by the evidence was allowed to redeem his sentence in 
money or property if he could afford to do so in all the Codes and commentaries in 
ancient China. 15  The European Court found that this kind of judicial decision, 
implying that the accused is guilty, infringed the principle of presumption of 
innocence in Minelli v. Switzerland.16 More importantly, the forms of interrogation 
both before and during the formal trial in ancient China demonstrated that the 
defendant was assumed to be guilty as long as he could not prove his innocence.  
 
Firstly, suspects had to prove to the judge’s satisfaction during the course of the 
interrogation that they were innocent and had been falsely accused. Secondly, 
suspects had very low status in the criminal procedure. Torture was a lawful way of 
obtaining evidence in ancient China. For example, a common tool was the bastinado, 
applied to the buttocks and thighs. As discussed in Chapter Six, this use of torture 
has become endemic as a national chronic disease.17 Also, in order to ensure security 
and the smooth running of trials, all suspects were automatically detained in custody 
once arrested in ancient China. As discussed in Chapter Five, the compulsory 
measure system and practice in China has been profoundly influenced by this 
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 The feudal period in China is from 475 B.C. to A.D. 1840; See, e.g., Zipei Zhang, “Analysis of the Principle of 
the Presumption of Innocence”, (1980) 3 Legal Research p. 30. 
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 See the judicial interpretation of Five Penalties, ShangShu in LüXing, 尚书·吕刑，
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traditional practice.18  Thirdly, in the Chinese legal tradition, the court was quite 
adamant in prohibiting the practice of law as a profession. Those who provided legal 
advice for a living were called “litigation masters” (讼师).19 Instructing or assisting a 
third party in how to argue cases in court was a crime punishable by exile. Thus, no 
third party would be allowed to argue a case in court on behalf of a suspect. This has 
influenced the right to defence by lawyers in the CCPL now, which will be discussed 
in Chapter Seven.20 There will never be a real examination of the evidence in the 
presence of the suspects either before or after the confession. The accused was only a 
subject to be questioned and confess was assumed to be his obligations. It was up to 
the judges, officials at the Autumn Assizes Board, and ultimately, the Emperor to 
judge whether suspects were guilty and what kind of punishment convicted criminals 
would receive.  
 
Why are individual rights strictly limited, while in contrast, the power of the national 
authorities is emphasized and expanded in Chinese criminal proceedings? In Chinese 
traditional culture, individuals were subordinated to the group and had to serve the 
group first.21 The nation acts on behalf of all the individuals and it embodies the 
common good and long-term interests of the community. Therefore, the legislators 
do not find it difficult to believe that the individual rights of citizens are not of 
essential benefit to the nation. In a harmonious and collective culture, the 
investigative organs believe in collective duties and responsibilities while individual 
citizens also tend to think themselves as part of the war against crime.22 Where there 
is some contradiction or conflict between the public interest and the interest of an 
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individual, there should be some limits on the individual’s rights.23 In particular 
circumstances, the government and the law enforcement organs think that they can 
even sacrifice some individuals’ interests to protect the majority or the public as a 
whole. Acts of this kind were applauded as highly virtuous.24 With respect to the 
criminal proceedings they consider that during the criminal investigation, the public 
or national intererst will be contrary to the suspect’s individual rights. Any limitation 
on the authority to arrest and detain will damage the capacity of the investigation to 
detect crimes. To guarantee the capture of suspects and the punishment of criminals, 
they deem it necessary to grant enough authority to the investigative organs for them 
to take compulsory measures and limit the individual rights of the suspects. 
According to this tradition of presumption of guilt in criminal justice and the 
emphasis not on the right but the obligation of the individual in the whole of 
traditional society, suspects’ cooperation with law enforcement in criminal 
investigations is taken for granted in China. The concept of human rights failed to 
emerge and develop in Chinese history as it did in the west. Hence it was difficult for 
the modern concept of the presumption of innocence to take root.  
 
2.1.2 A Tradition of Disregarding Procedural Law and Due Process 
Confucianism helped to shape the communitarian foundation of Chinese society with 
its emphasis on a hierarchical social order, group orientation, and morale, rather than 
on legally-based behavioual principles.25 With regard to criminal justice, China has a 
tradition of emphasizing substantive law and disregarding procedural law, and of 
emphasizing crime control and disregarding due process. In ancient China, each 
dynasty had their own written statutes and customary laws comprising their criminal 
law.26 However, there was no separate code to regulate criminal procedure. Criminal 
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procedure was found in the Criminal Code. There were no independent judicial 
organs, while judicial power and administrative power were mixed.27 According to 
Chu Tongtsu’s description, the chief of a province or county was more than a judge.28 
They could try criminal cases in person. Although these chiefs were subject to the 
supervision of higher governments, with the local government they held absolute 
power and were beyond the supervision and check of any mechanism. They not only 
conducted hearings and made decisions, but also conducted investigations and 
inquests, and detected criminals. Therefore in terms of modern concepts, their duties 
combined those of judge, prosecutor, police chief, and even coroner. They comprised 
everything relating to the administration of justice in its broadest sense, and the 
failure to carry out any of these duties incurred disciplinary action and punishment, 
as defined in the many laws and regulations. 29 
 
As the central authority in ancient China, the Emperor had the supreme power. While 
the laws created by the Emperor were binding on all of his subjects, the same law did 
not bind the emperor. As the supreme judicial power, the Emperor could determine 
the guilt of accused individuals, dictate the penalty, or modify the judgments given 
by lower judicial authorities. From the perspective of establishing a modern judicial 
system, the most significant impact of this traditional model of a highly centralized 
government is that it prevented the knowledge and development of genuine judicial 
independence and an adequate legal profession. These are the important safeguards 
for a fair trial.30 These all hamper the effectiveness of the judicial review system and 
therefore the occurrences of violation of individual rights often exist to prevent 
crimes and maintain social stability as illustrated in the following chapters. 
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2.1.3 The Traditional View on Law as an Instrument of Rule 
Through the ages the Chinese government’s approach to law has been fundamentally 
instrumental.31  The traditional core value and purpose of criminal justice comes 
mainly from two schools of thought: Confucianism and Legalism.32 Confucianism in 
China is the ideology of obedience and the supremacy of sovereign interests. It 
promotes a well-ordered society and prefers the behavioral exemplification of the 
righteousness and selfless superior man’s moral virtue. This school of thought is 
deemed to be useful for crime prevention by building morality in society. On the 
other hand, legalism emphasizes control through formal laws.  It considers that in 
times of chaos, harsh laws are needed. Therefore law is only an instrument of the 
government, and the government is above the law. This approach to the role of law 
derives from a long tradition in Chinese history where law has been aimed primarily 
at achieving social control but also used in pursuit of economic goals.33 Therefore, 
firstly it was an important task for the governor to nurture obedience in the minds of 
the people.34 Ancient China is famous for strict laws and severe punishments. This is 
written into the language with phrases such as “kill one to warn hundreds” (杀一儆
百). Since the Qin dynasty, by the equivalent perspective of legalism, the governors 
must, first and foremost, concentrate on what needs to be done to maintain 
power.35 This means that laws and regulations are intended to be instrument of policy 
enforcement to achieve the immediate policy objectives of the regime.36 It has been 
incorporated in the ideologies of rule through recent Chinese history, whether 
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derived from the Confucianism of imperial China, the republicanism of China under 
the Kuomingtang (国民党, KMT), or the Marxist-Leninism of China after 1949.  
 
Thus it is a traditional concept that criminal proceedings are a tool to be used by the 
state to control society and for fighting against enemies and criminals, not as a 
bulwark for the individual against the state. The criminal procedure was mainly an 
educational experience for the individuals concerned. Restraint on imperial executive 
power relied more upon the ethical behaviour of the enlightened ruler rather than any 
checks and balances of power. Neither the legislator nor the judicial authority viewed 
criminal proceedings as a confrontation process between men and the state. As Xia 
Yong states, the most important social political principles in ancient China were the 
righteousness of benevolence, the golden mean and harmony rather than Western 
style fairness and justice connected with disputes over rights and obligations. 37 
Therefore there was no independent, neutral arbitrator between the government and 
men. The government itself was the arbitrator. The procedural justice value of the 
law was radically ignored. Therefore as to the confrontation between the government 
and men and a fair judgment by an independent court which does not take orders 
from the government, these effective means of restricting the abusive power of the 
state cannot be realized and tolerated. Even the general public were not particularly 
sympathetic to the plight of the suspects, although they also suffered from the 
arbitrariness and cruelty of the criminal process. Since the traditional teaching placed 
a high status on the social harmony, familial loyalties and gender differences, 
criminals were often excluded by their own communities and the harassment of a 
small number of individuals at the tough hands of the government was generally 
considered acceptable and worthwhile in order to maintain social stability and family 
reputations.  There is no doubt that this structure of the legal system is not reasonable 
from the viewpoint of modern law.  
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Throughout China’s history, the modern concept of law and the notion of the rule of 
law did not emerge in Chinese society until the late 1970s, when the PRC decided to 
rebuild and modernize its socialist legal system after the turmoil of lawlessness 
generated by ultra-leftist thought and especially by the “Cultural Revolution” (文化
大革命). However, even the decision to pursue legal reform was the result of a 
policy product by the CPP and government to build an institutional framework to 
support economic growth.38 For example, the policy towards the rule of law reflects 
an ambivalence that is sharply illustrated by President Jiang Zemin’s public address 
in February, 1996, when he pronounced a four-character slogan generally translated 
as “govern the country according to law”, which was given extensive publicity 
throughout China. However, this terminology formed part of a sentence in which his 
reference to law was counterbalanced by the phrase “protect the nation’s long-term 
peace and stability”. The term “stability” is often an indirect reference to preserving 
the leading role of the CCP in Chinese society. Therefore, law is still not a limit to 
state power under the policy of the CCP, but is meant to maintain public order, to 
help the government to better implement various policies and consolidate and 
strengthen the leadership in the reform program. The function of law has mainly 
shifted from being an “instrument of proletarian dictatorship” to being a mechanism 
exercised by the state to support economic development.  
 
One of the consequences of legal instrumentalism as practiced in China until now is 
that laws and regulations are intentionally ambiguous, so as to give both policy 
makers and implementing officers, significant flexibility in interpretation and 
implementation.39 According to Pitman, law is not only seen as a tool by which 
desired social, economic, and political goals can be attained but is also presumed to 
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be an effective tool for policy enforcement.40 However, many Chinese laws and 
regulations are intentionally drafted in “broad, indeterminate language” such as in 
the CCPL, which do not lend predictability or transparency to the regulatory 
process. 41  One may argue that this arises from the need to accommodate and 
harmonise different and complex situations in the country, but its result, in the view 
of many academics, is to increase the discretion of officials in interpreting the law. 
While this permits local implementing officials to use broad discretion in ensuring 
that regulatory enforcement satisfies policy objectives, it also makes uniform 
interpretation and enforcement difficult if not impossible to obtain. In criminal 
justice, this makes the standards by which the human rights protection system for the 
suspect is carried out, vary from place to place and person to person. The influence 
of legal instrumentalism on the criminal justice legal reform will be addressed during 
the analysis of the detailed problems in the following chapters.  
 
2.2 A Brief Historical Survey of the Development of Modern Criminal 
Procedure in China 
Chinese traditional legal culture has exerted a great deal of influence on 
contemporary society. In addition, the discussion and the development of the guiding 
ideologies behind Chinese criminal justice have also been closely related to the 
political climate.42 Furthermore, for reasons other than political ones, scholars have 
differing opinions on the guiding ideologies behind the CCPL during the years of 
development and reform. 
 
2.2.1 Stage of Transition of Traditional Law on Criminal Procedure towards 
Modernization 
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By the late 19th century, the traditional values and system were facing strong 
challenges and pressure for reform, from within and outside.43 The Qing government 
(1644-1911) was forced to reform its legal system, including the judicial system. The 
contemporary western doctrines of criminal law and procedure, which included the 
presumption of innocence, emerged and were introduced in China by a group of law 
reformers.44 The draft criminal procedure law of 1906 was informed by the basic 
proposition that a suspect was to be presumed innocent unless proven otherwise, and 
included the abolition of ill-treatment of defendants and the imposition of fixed 
limits on pre-trial detention. In 1910, the Qing government formulated the Qing 
Criminal Procedure Law. This was the first single criminal procedure code in 
Chinese history. In most of its contents, this law copied the German criminal 
procedure law patterns. Unfortunately, the legal reform failed in substance and 
actually the doctrine never came into force since this law was never implemented. 
The reasons for the failure were multiple. Wang Chengguang considered that one 
was the incompatibility of the newly-designed legal system with the old and 
obstinate social structure.45  The new legal regime was based on totally different 
social and economic structures which were opposed to Chinese traditional law and 
culture. But the reform had a significant impact on later reforms.  
 
In 1912 the Republic of China was founded as a result of Dr Sun Yat-sen’s 
democratic revolution. In 1928, the KMT government formulated another Criminal 
Procedural Law, which was a combination of Continental legal principles, Chinese 
tradition and the Nationalists’ political ideology in the 1920s and 1930s. It is worth 
mentioning that presumption of innocence was first codified by the KMT Criminal 
Procedure Code of 1935. But these laws were never effectively implemented 
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throughout the nation either, due to the failure of the government to unify the country 
and to make thorough social changes. This law is still valid in Taiwan today, 
although of course, it has been amended many times. At the same time, when the 
power of the Chinese Communists was concentrated in the countryside areas, 
presumption of innocence also existed in the legal documents in those areas. For 
example Article 32 of Trial Measures on the Summary Procedures for Hearing 
Cases in the District of Jinan states that criminals should be acquitted if the criminal 
facts cannot be proved.  
 
Regardless of its form and results, the legal reform scheme at this stage attempted to 
replace the Chinese legal tradition by introducing modern western types of law. 
However, the issue of developing traditional law into a modern one is more than a 
will. The nature of a law system was in many respects the outcome of a deep-rooted 
and long-standing historical tradition, cultural heritage, social customs and 
philosophy. As Wang Chengguang stated, law forms part of a particular society and 
is bound to be shaped, modified and transformed by the people of that society in the 
course of historical development.46 From the institutional to the ideological, there 
was no direct link between traditional law and contemporary law in China, whether it 
was in the legal system of Republican or Communists at that period. Therefore, 
despite the western style structures and concepts that have been adopted as guidance 
when China has been building a new legal system, in many ways tradition has 
remained strong sociologically and philosophically and lacks harmony with the state 
and society right up to the present day. 
 
In particular, traditional ideology was extremely difficult to displace merely by 
importing the guise of those western European legal concepts that began to arise in 
the late 19th century. Moreover, the new legal ideology might easily have been 
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gradually absorbed through a combination of doctrinal development and practical 
experience in a stable and united society. However, the period from late Qing until 
PRC and several periods after the establishment of PRC proved to be troublesome 
times for China. The trials were commonly engaged in the torture-induced 
confessions that had characterized the old imperial order in the course of their 
investigatory and judicial activities. Presumption of innocence apparently existed 
primarily on paper. The majority of the Chinese knew little of these legal codes. The 
ideology of presumption of guilt was sustained throughout the entire span of 
traditional Chinese law and has persisted obstinately until now. Therefore the 
traditional legal system is extinct, but the traditional legal culture continues to exert 
its influence on contemporary society.47 The transition is far from being completed to 
date.  
 
2.2.2 Stage of the Destruction of the Whole Legal System 
In 1949, the PRC was established. The legal history of the PRC begins with the 
abolition in 1949 of all the laws of the predecessor state, the Republic of China.48 At 
that time, neither the necessity of assimilating legal doctrines that were effectively 
part of the common cultural heritage, nor the danger involved in allowing a gap 
between abolition and re-establishment was clearly realized.49 This left a substantial 
legal vacuum that ultimately had to be filled by whatever authoritative materials the 
decision makers had available. These materials include Party newspaper editorials, 
policy documents, and leaders’ speeches. Moreover, there was, for many years, little 
need for a formal legal system in many areas of national life, since the economy was 
largely subject to state planning and conflicts that could thus be resolved without 
reference to legal rights and duties.  
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It was also believed in theory that Marxists should “smash” the existing “bourgeois 
State machinery”, including the whole legal system, which was presumed to be an 
instrument of the “bourgeois dictatorship”.50 Therefore, for many years the symbolic 
values of the westernised legal system, such as the presumption of innocence, were 
seen as “a bourgeois doctrine”. After the establishment of PRC, such ambiguity is 
apparent. As a bourgeois principle, it should be rejected by a socialist legal system, 
yet it has the positive and progressive elements that a socialist legal system should 
adopt. In the mid-1950s, China began to rehabilitate the legal system after the 
enactment of the Constitution in 1954 and the Organic Law of the People’s Court in 
1954. The government attempted to draft a criminal procedure law between 1957 and 
1963. However, such efforts were defeated by the national campaign against “Right 
Opportunism” (右倾), the national movement for “Four Clearances” (四清) and the 
“Cultural Revolution” (文化大革命).51 Anything representing the values or beliefs 
of capitalist society was sharply criticized and strictly forbidden. For example, some 
scholars were labelled “rightists”, simply because they had expressed a positive 
opinion on the principle of presumption of innocence in the 1950s. During the ten-
year “Cultural Revolution” from 1966 to 1976, the criminal justice system was 
almost destroyed with a political movement against spiritual pollution by ideas 
regarded as “bourgeois”. The principle of presumption of innocence had for a long 
period been a taboo subject together with many other questions of criminal procedure. 
Defendants were regarded as class enemies who had no right to protect themselves. 
Thus, from 1949 to 1978, China again did not have a separate criminal procedure law. 
Instead, the National People’s Congress (NPC), the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), 
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), the State Council, the Ministry of Justice 
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(MOJ), and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) produced a number of regulations 
on how to handle criminal cases.  
 
2.2.3 Reconstruction of the Criminal Procedure Law since 1979 
In the light of the experience of the previous 30 years, especially of the deeply 
painful experience of the “Cultural Revolution”, the Chinese government aimed to 
develop a legal system to restrain abuse by official authority and revolutionary 
excess.52 Immediately after the Cultural Revolution, a highly favourable analysis of 
the presumption of innocence appeared in 1979 in the official People’s Daily, 
concluding that this doctrine was preferable to the presumption of guilt in these 
circumstances and better embodied the spirit of “seeking the truth from facts” (实事
求是).53 Following that analysis, a great many law reviews appeared, and again, 
brought up the issue of whether all old laws, “bourgeois” laws and legal concepts had 
to be rejected without analysis by a socialist legal system; or whether these laws and 
concepts could be selectively adopted and adapted to meet the needs of developing 
the socialist system.54 For example, Zhao Hong and Dou Jixiang commented that 
presumption of innocence is a scientific principle that could inform and benefit the 
socialist legal system.55 
 
In 1982, the NPC adopted a new state constitution that emphasized the rule of law 
under which even party leaders are theoretically held accountable. In late 1978, an 
“Open Door and Reform” policy (改革开放) was introduced and the criminal justice 
system was reconstructed. In 1979, the CCPL was adopted. This was the first 
criminal procedure code since the foundation of the PRC. It laid a foundation for the 
Chinese criminal procedural system and was an important step in China’s transition 
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towards rule of law. It was recognised that the law of criminal procedure is not only a 
law of punishment, but is also a law of protection. The judicial organs began to 
handle criminal cases according to the law.  
 
2.2.3.1 Historical Limitations on the CCPL of 1979 
However, although it was supposed to be a comprehensive code following a 
continental legal model, the CCPL of 1979 was subject to unavoidable historical 
limitations, because it was adopted shortly after the end of the Cultural Revolution.56 
It is a nascent system emerging from the demise of the long-sustained Chinese 
traditional law. Jurisprudence was overshadowed by the political ideology of 
Communism. A number of aspects of this law at that time had distinctive Chinese 
characteristics. Legal principles were subordinated to political slogans. “Human 
rights” were still regarded as a concept of bourgeois legal theory and were to be 
avoided. Therefore, from a human right’s perspective, the state powers granted by 
the CCPL of 1997 were obviously much stronger than the rights granted to the 
individual. Many provisions were general and ambiguous, and fell far short of the 
minimum requirements for the administration of justice and the protection of human 
rights. 
 
Most strikingly, with a strong Soviet influence, Marxism was regarded as the highest 
guiding authority in all spheres after the CCP started governing China, including the 
area of criminal justice. The criminal justice system, therefore, was a tool for class 
dictatorship in this period. According to Article 1, in criminal procedure the accused 
persons were regarded as class enemies and the judicial authority was seen as the 
tool with which to punish them.57 During the Cultural Revolution, many innocent 
people were punished as enemies, so the CCPL of 1979 emphasized that the enemy 
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should be dealt with correctly. However, at that time, it was held that after the end of 
the violent revolution, the fiercest class struggle would be found in the area of 
criminal justice. It reflected vividly the Marxist theory of class struggle.  
 
Fundamentally, many important “fair trial” or in common law terms “due process” 
principles, such as the presumption of innocence, judicial independence, adequate 
right to legal counsel, etc., were absent from the CCPL of 1979. Regarding the 
presumption of innocence, some scholars such as Luo Xinmin held that presumption 
of innocence was illogical because there was not a sensible explanation for the 
following question: why were judicial organs entitled to arrest or detain the suspect, 
if he was intrinsically presumed innocent? In practice, most accused persons were 
found guilty.58 On the other hand, some scholars such as Long Zongzhi contended 
that failure to adopt presumption of innocence as a guiding ideology at all stages of 
criminal procedure had led to the presumption of guilt and to the view that the trial 
was a formality.59 Thus, after examining those arguments put forward in late 1979, 
some scholars drew the conclusion that the Chinese legal system does not “presume” 
anything and the Marxist principle of seeking truth from facts should be observed.60 
In criminal procedure, the true status of the suspect was that he was a dubious person. 
He should be presumed neither guilty nor innocent. This view was called the doctrine 
of “presuming neither guilt nor innocence”; Rather, the guiding principle at all stages 
of the process is “taking the facts as the basis and the law as the criterion”.61 Actually 
the CCPL of 1979 was produced under this ambiguous concept. The debates on the 
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presumption of innocence have continued along with the implementation of the 
CCPL of 1979.62 
 
2.2.3.2 The Implementation of the CCPL of 1979 
The deficiencies in the CCPL of 1979 law, both regarding its own provisions and in 
its actual practice, soon became apparent and, thus attracted severe criticism, 
particularly from international human rights organizations.63 It was made even worse 
by many decisions of the NPC’s Standing Committee, issued during various anti-
crime campaigns colloquially known as “Strike Hard” (严打). Together with the 
inability or unwillingness of the law enforcement organs to act within the law, the 
practical consequences for society were serious abuses of human rights, including  
the wide application of administrative, non-criminal sanctioning methods and 
disregard for procedural protection.64 In February 1980, one month after the CCPL of 
1979 came into effect, the NPC’s Standing Committee had authorized the Standing 
Committees at the provisional level to approve extensions of time limits for handling 
criminal cases as prescribed by the CCPL of 1979.65 Indeed, after that, the NPC’s 
Standing Committee had made no less than twenty revisions concerning criminal 
procedure matters in the form of Decisions and Supplementary Provisions alone by 
the end of 1995. Many of these provisions were internal inconsistencies and 
contradictions. While these rules were only binding on the institution which issued 
them, they contained the grounds of conflict that could only be reconciled through 
interpretation or revision at the NPC level. This chaos mostly arose from the notion 
of law as an instrument of rule, as mentioned above.  
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These series of interpretive or implementing rules issued by the police, procuratorate, 
courts and other bureaucracies also reflected a clear trend towards expanding the 
power of the police and judicial organs and striving to make investigation, 
prosecution, and adjudication more convenient while restricting the exercise of 
various rights by suspects.66  This trend is typically shown in the “Strike Hard” 
campaigns.67 At the heart of the different “Strike Hard” campaigns is the requirement 
for speedy justice and harsh punishment. For example, in the 1983 “Strike Hard” 
campaign, for violent offences such as murder, rape and armed robbery which “were 
punishable by death”, the NPC deleted the CCPL of 1979’s requirement of at least 
seven days’ advance notice of trial, thus effectively denying the accused any 
opportunity to prepare a defence. It also reduced the period in which defendants in 
such cases could appeal against their sentences from ten days to three.68 Under the 
combined influence of “Strike Hard” and continued complaints that the time limits in 
the CCPL of 1979 were unrealistically strict, in 1984 the NPC permanently extended 
the periods during which suspects could be held in custody during the investigation, 
trial and appeal of certain “major or complicated” cases. In cases where suspects 
were subjected to less severe restrictions known as “granting of bail and awaiting 
trial” (取保候审 ) and “supervised residence” (监视居住 ) or had to undergo 
psychiatric evaluation, the time limits in the CCPL could be waived altogether.69 
 
2.2.4 Early Stage of the CCPL Reform since the 1990’s 
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Chinese academia began to discuss how to improve the CCPL in the early 1990s.70 
From 1979 to 1991, dramatic changes took place in China. Chinese society was 
opening up, especially with the planned economy being transformed into a market 
economy. The Chinese recognised that Marxism could not provide the answer to 
every question in society. Chinese scholars and officials soon recognised that 
China’s economic reforms required the Chinese legal system to conform more to the 
international system.71 They looked increasingly to Europe and North America for 
inspiration and began to rethink the question of what the foundation stones of the 
legal system should be. The PRC Government did attempt to build a society based on 
the rule of law, which, of course, must be the “rule of law” as understood by the CCP. 
Reform has brought a fundamental new orientation towards governing China, in 
which formal legislation has become the major framework for the organization and 
operation of the Chinese government. 72  The Chinese legal system is constantly 
changing, in response to domestic conditions such as socio-economic and political 
change, and in reaction to external factors such as WTO membership. There is 
evidence that the combination of economic reform, social change, and government-
promoted mass legal education has stimulated greater rights consciousness among 
many Chinese citizens.73  
  
In the area of criminal justice, increased attention to individual rights has permitted 
the development of human rights and criminal law and procedure inspired by foreign 
models.74 As familiarity with the outside world has increased, the significant gap 
existing between the CCPL and internationally accepted practice has become more 
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and more evident. The theory of class struggle should obviously not be applied to 
criminal justice any more; if the accused is regarded as a class enemy, his rights are 
most likely not respected and protected. It has been an important stimulant to 
domestic efforts to revise the CCPL in order to bring the Chinese criminal justice 
system in line with the rest of the world.75 International pressure has also served to 
reinforce domestic reform efforts. Over the last twenty years, international human 
rights NGOs have produced a series of analyses of the Chinese criminal justice 
system and shown the ways in which the Chinese legal system, including key statutes 
such as the CCPL, either implicitly condones practices of human rights violation or 
fails to provide adequate safeguards against them. 76  Reference to international 
standards has become a legitimate form of argumentation employed within China, 
particularly among legal academics and officials, to promote greater respect for the 
rights of criminal suspects and defendants.  
 
It gradually became accepted among legal academics that a reorientation of the 
guiding ideology and a change to some contents of the CCPL were necessary. The 
change in guiding ideology brought a need for revision of the provisions in the law of 
1979. In 1989, the SPC published a judicial explanation, stating that suspects in 
doubtful and difficult cases should be treated as not guilty. 77  It also wrote 
presumption of innocence into the basic laws that would govern the administration of 
justice in Hong Kong and Macao after they reverted to Chinese sovereignty.78 From 
1991 to 1996, the reform of the CCPL was the central topic of discussion at the 
annual conferences held by the Research Association for Procedural Law, a 
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subordinate conference to the Chinese Law Society.79 In 1993, the Director of the 
Legislative Affairs Committee, Mr. Gu Angran, officially announced that a formal 
decision had been made by the Standing Committee to include the revision of the 
CCPL in the legislative agenda of the NPC. 80  In October 1993, the Legislative 
Affairs Commission of the NPC entrusted Professor Chen Guangzhong with the 
responsibility for drafting a new Criminal Procedure Code. 81   Professor Chen 
organized a group of experts to draft the new law and this group produced a 
preliminary draft in 1994, which turned out to be a good basis for the revision of the 
CCPL.  
 
When the preliminary draft was prepared, it was held that a balance between 
punishing crimes and protecting human rights should be pursued. In particular, 
expanding suspects’ rights should be an important aim in reforming the CCPL. It was 
regarded as important to respect international standards and norms for protecting 
human rights, because those standards and norms express the common values of 
mankind. Due to the legal tradition in China described above, whether under the 
feudal autocratic society or under the planned economic regime, the previous CCPL 
pays a great deal of attention to the necessity of fighting crime without taking the 
protection of the rights of the suspects into account.82  Therefore, most scholars 
suggested that the revised CCPL should include the principle of presumption of 
innocence.83 According to the old principle of “seeking truth from facts”, a dubious 
criminal should be treated neither as guilty nor as not guilty. In such a situation, the 
judicial organ will release the defendant, but he will remain a suspect. He is no 
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longer regarded as a normal citizen in society. Scholars consider that the suspect 
being presumed innocent in law is totally different from his being innocent. The 
purpose of establishing the principle of presumption of innocence was to change the 
old situation in which the suspects were presumed guilty and had no fair trial rights.84 
Under the principle of presumption of innocence, a dubious criminal should be 
treated as not guilty. Chen Guangzhong also pointed out that the CCPL should 
require the state to gather all the evidence proving guilt or innocence and that a guilty 
verdict cannot be reached solely on the basis of the defendant’s confession.85 In 1996, 
the NPC discussed the Draft Amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law and 
adopted the Decision to Revise the Criminal Procedure Law. It is the view of Chen 
Jianfu that the revision of the CCPL is a modest step towards improving the criminal 
justice system in China, but the outcome is mainly a result of major compromises 
with opposing views and arguments among scholars, officials and different forces in 
the Chinese legal system.86  
 
3. Major Positive Changes of the CCPL in 1996  
The amendment of the CCPL in 1996 was intended to make it a code that tallied with 
the requirements of a modern democratic country under the rule of law, links up with 
international criminal justice rules, and accords with the situation of the country.87 
For this, particular trends in the reform progress are the change in core values to 
strengthen the protection of human rights and due process. The change in guiding 
ideology can be seen in the contrast between the aims set in the opening of the old 
law and those in the new law. Comparing the old provisions with the new ones, in 
Article 1 of the 1996 CCPL, there are no provisions with the terms “taking Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as a guide”, “the People’s Democratic Dictatorship”, 
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or “striking the enemy”.88 In Article 2 of the 1996 CCPL, there is no provision for a 
“socialist revolution”.89  It can be concluded that the guiding ideology has been 
changed and the aim of the CCPL in 1996 is seeking to combine the discovery of the 
truth, punishment of crimes and the protection of citizens’ rights and the realizing of 
judicial impartiality through due process.90 This change is beneficial for protecting 
human rights for suspects in criminal justice according to international standards. In 
December 2004, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted that the 
official Chinese statements on the importance of human rights represented a positive 
development.91 Senior Chinese officials also publicized efforts to crack down on 
corruption and abuses in the criminal justice system and stressed the need to balance 
“Strike Hard” efforts and the protection of suspects’ rights.92 There are calls for the 
campaign to continue even now.  
 
3.1 Observation on Positive Development of Presumption of Innocence 
The importance of the principle, presumption of innocence, in criminal proceedings 
hardly needs further comment and explanation. As illustrated in Chapter Two, the 
HRC has identified this as one of the non-derogable aspects of the right to a fair 
trial.93 When amending the CCPL, the legislature came to accept the basic tenor of 
presumption of innocence. Looking at the CCPL of 1996, Article 12, a newly added 
clause, says that no one shall be found guilty without a verdict according to law by a 
people’s court. This reform weakened the implication that all persons subject to 
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arrest are guilty.94 For the first time, the reform appears to partially institute the 
principle of presumption of innocence, a key building block of a fair legal system. 
This implied incorporation of the concept of the presumption of innocence in Article 
12 of the 1996 CCPL has been injected into the criminal justice system in China as 
an important element signalling the right direction, which all the recent legal reforms 
have taken, to change the previous Chinese legal ideology and to contribute towards 
the protection of human rights. 
 
3.1.1 New Terminology   
The amended CCPL does make an important symbolic change in language to show 
the positive signal that the presumption of innocence contained in Article 14(2) of 
ICCPR is recognised and accepted in China. In the former CCPL, the two terms 
“defendant” (被告) and “offender” (罪犯) were used to designate the accused at all 
stages of the criminal process. In the revised CCPL, the terms “defendant” and 
“offender” are replaced by “suspect” (嫌疑人) and “defendant” (被告). “Suspect” is 
used to designate the accused before he is prosecuted; “defendant” is used to 
designate him after he is prosecuted. This change reflects the intention to prevent law 
enforcement officials from presuming the accused guilty before he or she is found 
guilty by a court.95  As will be discussed later, certain procedural rights usually 
associated with the presumption of innocence are strengthened, particularly the right 
to defence such as the fact that lawyers are allowed to be involved in the 
investigation.96 In order to avoid indefinite pre-trial detention, the mechanism called 
“Shelter and Investigation” (收容审查) used by the police to bypass the formal 
criminal procedure has been abolished.97  
 
3.1.2 Abolition of Exemption from Prosecution 
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Under the former CCPL, the prosecutor was allowed to make a decision called 
“Exemption from Prosecution” (免予起诉), in which the suspect was found guilty 
and the case was dropped without going through any judicial process.98 The revised 
CCPL abolished this practice and removed the prosecutor’s power to determine guilt. 
One reason is that according to the principle of presumption of innocence, public 
authorities, particularly prosecutors and police, should not make statements about the 
guilt or innocence of an accused before the outcome of the trial. 99  Only the 
competent court has the power to pronounce a citizen guilty, as illustrated in Allenet 
de Ribemont v France.100 Another reason is that in practice, the prosecuting authority 
used this power arbitrarily. This power had a dual function for the prosecuting 
authority: On the one hand, if prosecutors felt that a case would be hard to win in 
court, the prosecuting authority could use this power to reach a guilty verdict even 
when the evidence was insufficient without going through the trial process. On the 
other hand, the prosecuting authority could also allow individuals who had 
committed crimes to escape punishment. In some special cases, if they went through 
the trial process, the suspects would probably receive fixed-term imprisonment. In 
this situation, prosecutors could use this power to help suspects avoid punishment. 
The prosecuting authority often used this power to resolve sensitive and controversial 
cases, including cases of corruption.  
 
Legal scholars were eager to abolish “Exemption from Prosecution”, but the 
prosecuting authority was vigorously opposed to its abolition.101  In the end, the 
People’s Congress adopted the opinion of the legal scholars.102 Under the revised 
CCPL, only the courts have the power to find the accused guilty, and no other state 
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organ is entitled to the same power. If the procuratorate believes that the evidence 
provided by the supplementary investigation is inadequate and that the case does not 
comply with the prosecution requirements, it may decide not to prosecute. 103 
Moreover, the standards of proof for a verdict of guilty shall be of the evidence being 
reliable and sufficient. “Reliable” means that all the evidence is based on facts; 
“sufficient” means that the evidence gathered is adequate enough in quantity to prove 
that the defendant has committed a criminal act, and that there is no room for 
doubt. 104  According to Article 162 of the revised CCPL, if the evidence is 
insufficient, the defendant shall be pronounced innocent. 105  This means that a 
dubious suspect shall be treated as innocent, which complies with the requirement of 
principle of presumption that the suspect has benefit of doubt.106 It provides a way of 
closure to cases which that had previously remained unresolved for extended periods 
of time, much to the detriment of the accused. Therefore this provision helps to 
provide better protection for the suspects against over eager prosecutors or police 
officials who would otherwise find it easier to intimidate the accused on the basis of 
presumption of guilt. 
 
3.1.3 The Reform of “Supplementary Investigation” 
Xiong Qiuhong considered the “Supplementary Investigation” (退回补充侦查 ) 
measure as one of the biggest loopholes in the CCPL of 1979.107 This formal law 
gave the procuratorate the power to return to the police for supplementary 
investigation cases it felt were not ready for trial, that is, where the evidence was 
insufficient to warrant a conviction.108 It also allowed courts to return cases to the 
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prosecuting authorities by an order for supplementary investigation.109 This request 
from the court was a sign of presumption of guilt, because when the court issued an 
order for supplementary investigation, it would have to assume that the defendant 
was guilty, even if the evidence presented to the court was insufficient. This decision 
obviously contravenes the requirement of the presumption of innocence, cf. the 
ruling in Minelli v Switzerland.110 
 
According to the revised CCPL, prosecutors can only send a case back to the police 
for supplementary investigation twice and the judge cannot use the measure at all.111 
The removal of the court's power to order a supplementary investigation in this 
reform is in itself welcome. According to Article 140 of CCPL, the prosecutor may 
decide not to initiate a prosecution if the evidence is insufficient with respect to a 
case for which supplementary investigation has been conducted and the case does not 
meet the conditions for initiation of a prosecution.112 If the judge holds that the 
evidence is insufficient after a case is tried, he should declare the defendant innocent, 
as stated in Article 162(3) of 1996 CCPL.113 It is the first time that the CCPL of 1996 
included limits to the number of times a case can be sent back to a previous agency 
for “supplementary investigation”. It ends the cycle of supplementary investigation 
and seemed to bring China closer to recognizing that where the state could not carry 
its burden of proof, the case should be resolved in favour of the defendant, as Article 
14(2) of ICCPR required.114 The spirit of the change shows the courts have attempted 
to be more neutral in the criminal process and it is a good step forward to fully 
incorporating the presumption of innocence in China and to clearly affirming the 
international standard set in ICCPR.  
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3.1.4 The Increasing Consciousness of Human Rights 
Along with the widening of the reform of criminal justice in China, the concept of 
human rights protection has gradually taken root in the mind of the government and 
the public. On March 10, 2004, Xiao Yang, president of the SPC, delivered an annual 
Work Report at the Second Meeting of the 10th NPC, very unusually giving top 
priority to human rights protection. In this report, Xiao proposed that efforts should 
be made in practice to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the public, by 
implementation of the policy of “justice for the people” in a profound way.115 On the 
same occasion, Jia Chunwang, president of the SPP, delivered an annual Work 
Report, emphasizing that efforts would be made to seriously investigate cases of 
violation of the personal rights and democratic rights of citizens.116  
 
The SPC, SPP and MPS issued administrative instructions in the form of “notice” (通
知) and “official and written replies” (答复) to rectify and stop extended custody and 
confessions obtained under torture. 117  At the same time, given that the rules of 
evidence in the CCPL are too simple to ensure fair play between accuser and accused, 
and that disorder prevails in the application of evidence, the Chinese legislature, with 
the support of jurisprudential circles, started to work on a criminal evidence law.118 
Efforts have also been concentrated on the formulation of rules concerning the right 
to silence, disclosure of evidence, the appearance of witnesses in court and the 
exclusion of illegal evidence. 119  Chinese judicial officials announced ambitious 
reform goals in 2005 that would address structural problems affecting the Chinese 
judiciary. These included changes to court adjudication committees, the system of 
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people’s assessors, and a judicial review of death penalty cases. 120  There were 
numerous reforms made to the CCPL of 1996 and the judiciary system in China.121  
 
The public call for revision came when the Chinese media and the masses frequently 
exposed cases of injustice, including such cases these of men named She Xianglin 
and Nie Shubin.122 These cases elicited a strong reaction in the Chinese news media 
and prompted public scrutiny and discussions of the salient problems in the criminal 
justice system. Not only did it demonstrate the country’s improved democratic 
atmosphere but also pushed forward the country’s judicial reform, especially the 
widening ideology of presumption of innocence throughout the country. For example, 
the She Xianglin case is known to almost every household in China after the media’s 
extensive reporting on his grievances.123 After this unjust case was highlighted, a 
slew of wrongly-tried cases related to the extortion of confession by torture were 
exposed. Official newspaper, Xinhua News and the People’s Daily noted that Mr 
She’s case had “exposed some holes in the judicial system” and prompted a 
“reconsidering” of human rights protection. 124   Chinese scholars and journalists, 
invoking many wrongful conviction cases, published detailed critiques on many 
problems in the criminal justice system.125 These discussions offered new insights 
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into China’s criminal justice system and shaped the debate over criminal justice 
reforms. There are many voices protesting that the law enforcement organs have 
failed to follow the principle of presumption of innocence and this principle should 
be written into the CCPL in order not to impede its implementation in reality.  
 
3.2 The Significance of Laying Stress on Procedural Justice in China Today 
Constantly strengthening the ideology and measures for human rights protection in 
criminal legislation and justice administration can not only prevent the state from 
violating citizens’ rights, but also ensure the implementation of due process, 
especially procedural justice, in China. There are two kinds of justice in legal 
systems: substantive justice and procedural justice. 126 The principle of due process, 
or fair trial, is widely recognised by international human rights treaties as a 
fundamental principle to protect individuals from the unlawful and arbitrary 
deprivation of other basic rights and freedoms, as illustrated in Part One. 127 
Nowadays, the ideas of respecting the principle of due process and guaranteeing the 
right to fair trial have both been reflected in China’s academic research and official 
documents. For example, many scholars in China, such as Chen Weidong, considered 
that “the substantive justice requests judicial organs to manifest the spirit of justness 
in trial results. The essence of it lies in an accurate trial result. While procedural 
justice requests judicial organs in the entire process to exercise fairness and equality 
and to strictly and justly observe procedural principles in carrying out judicial 
activities. The essence of it lies in the rightness of the process.” 128 Also, according to 
the Order of Further Handling Cases in Strict Accordance with the Law and 
Ensuring the Quality of Death Penalty Cases which was jointly issued in 2007 by the 
SPC, the SPP, the MPS, and the MOJ, a correct substantive result of a case and fair 
and lawful criminal procedure shall both be guaranteed. China has gradually 
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recognised and adopted procedural justice, which has its own independent value in 
that it is an essential component of social justice. 
 
In particular, due process requires that the statutory procedures be strictly observed 
in criminal proceedings. Article 3(2) in the CCPL of 1996 provides that in criminal 
procedures, the people’s court, people’s procuratorate and public security organ shall 
comply with the relevant provisions of this law and other laws. Such a provision of 
guiding ideology in the CCPL of 1996 is an implicit embodiment of the principle of 
due process. This shows a trend towards greater concern for the real equality of the 
parties, and therefore enhances the protection of the suspect and guarantees justice in 
criminal proceedings from which both claims and an effective defence can be put 
forward while participating in proceedings. It is a step forward to ensuring a fair trial 
for suspects and to fulfilling the obligation of Article 14(1) of ICCPR.129 Under this 
guiding ideology, several reforms in the CCPL on concrete issues pave the way for 
China to fully respect international standards on fair trial in criminal justice and some 
of these will be discussed in the coming chapters, including some restrictions on the 
power of judicial authorities in the pre-trial compulsory measures, the efforts to 
suppress illegally obtained evidence through torture and the expansion of a suspect’s 
right to access to legal counsel. 130 
 
4. Problems and Difficulties at the Stage of Further Reform 
In China, with the introduction of a human rights provision into the Constitution and 
a growing acknowledgement of the relevant ideologies of international human rights 
in criminal justice, the change of the guiding ideologies to the CCPL is a logical 
further development. The change has had an influence that has affected the reform in 
criminal procedures, and has particularly promoted greater respect for the rights of 
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suspects in China, as shown above. However, the CCPL of 1996 is still stringent 
towards suspects as illustrated below. It does not seem easy to reach a simple 
conclusion as to what kind of guiding ideology can be given full acceptance in future 
reforms. However, some problems and difficulties related to the changing of the 
guiding ideology and its implementation needs to be addressed in more depth. 
 
4.1 Contradictions between Fighting Crime and Human Rights Protection 
China boasts one of the fastest growing economies in history. There is broad public 
support for reforms in many other areas of law, whether they are commercial, family, 
environmental, or administrative. Citizens see reforms in all of these areas as 
promoting or at least not harming their own interests. In contrast, because the 
average expects person never to run foul of the law, they can not understand what 
they are able to benefit from criminal justice reforms. On the contrary, great 
opposition to proposals to enhance human rights protection for the suspect in 
criminal justice can be expected from the law enforcement authorities and the 
majority of the Chinese public. Most of them believe such reforms are likely to harm 
their interests by eliminating the powers of investigation and allowing criminals to 
escape punishment and engage in further crime or by sending the wrong message to 
would-be criminals who then turn to crime.131 There is an inherent tension between 
the combined desire of the state and the public to punish crime and to protect the 
human rights of suspects. This is a primary obstacle for the CCPL reform. 
  
4.1.1 Great Pressure on Crime Control  
Along with the speedy economic development and social transformation in the 
country’s complex situation, China faces three gaps: the development gap between 
urban and rural areas, the gap between rich and poor, and the gap between eastern 
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area and western area.132 This has all resulted in a social environment that lacks 
stability while crime rates in China have generally been on the rise in recent years.133 
As it moves towards a socialist free market economy China is also experiencing new 
types of crimes that did not exist under the more totalitarian communist rule. Public 
corruption, economic crime, computer crime, narcotics trafficking, robbery, and 
murder are all more prevalent than they were 30 years ago. Recently, the Chinese 
government has put forward the policy of “building a harmonious society” in the 
country during this social and economic transitional period.134 The task is to maintain 
smooth economic growth, to sustain steady social development and to preserve the 
well-being of the country. Therefore, the Chinese criminal justice system is burdened 
with the dual challenges of increased crime rates and the need to modernize the 
whole system, to be fully compatible with the spirit of human rights.  
 
While officials published a few statistics reflecting positive trends, such as a drop in 
some violent crimes in 2006, 135  leadership statements, public surveys ranking 
security as a major concern and regional complaints about increases in petty crime 
were all pointing to a growing crime problem.136 To address this problem, the first of 
China’s “Strike Hard” campaigns took place from August 1983 to January 1987; the 
second campaign was launched in April 1996. Law enforcement and judicial officials 
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have continued this trend over the past years. The current campaign, which was 
officially launched in April 2001, appears to have evolved from periodic and intense 
national crackdowns into a lower-intensity but permanent feature of the political 
landscape. Within this evolving “Strike Hard” framework, public security agencies 
have continued to launch frequent, small-scale anti-crime campaigns targeting 
particular regions or crimes.137 In the years leading up to the revision of the CCPL, 
law enforcement officials continually pressed home the argument that they needed 
more latitude, particularly with regard to arrest and detention, to deal with the 
growing threat to public order. Even under the current political context of building a 
“harmonious society”, the strike hard policy is still emphasized by Chinese criminal 
policy makers as the harsh side of the new criminal policy  
“combining leniency and harshness” (严宽相济).138 
 
Stone has mentioned that what is more difficult is to maintain respect for freedoms 
when a society is facing serious challenges while at the same time ensuring that any 
restriction of those freedoms is at the minimum level necessary for the situation.139 
Public complaints about police inefficiency and the handling of several notable 
criminal cases in the past years have suggested that a significant level of popular 
dissatisfaction with the performance of law enforcement agencies and courts. The 
targets selected for “Strike Hard” campaigns reflect public anxieties over rising 
crime and the incidence of specific offences. As an important criminal policy in 
China, it has played a certain positive role in particular historical periods. Its 
implementation often results in immediate effects by reducing committing of crimes 
and maintaining public order. For example, the MPS announced in August 2006 that 
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violent crimes such as murder, rape, arson and explosions caused by criminal 
negligence, dropped by 14.9%, 6.3%, 17.5% and 18.3% in the first half of this year 
respectively compared to the same period in the previous year.140 The decline is 
generally attributed to a series of ongoing national crackdowns.  
 
Therefore, while there is broad public support for the government’s efforts to fight 
crime, the public seems to have a limited appetite for or understanding of the need 
for procedural protections that would result in lenient treatment of criminals.141 This 
is also greatly influenced by the legal traditions, as mentioned above.142 For example, 
in 2003, a Shenyang court commuted the death sentence of the notorious mafia boss 
Liu Yong after finding that the confession of a key government witness had been 
coerced.143 In response to a flood of public outrage over the decision, the SPC retried 
the case and reinstated the death sentence, which was carried out immediately.144 It is 
the first time the SPC has retried an ordinary criminal case, and overturned the 
previous ruling of the second-instance trial. This situation obviously contradicted the 
principle of presumption of innocence, which requires that prejudicial publicity 
concerning suspects should not influence his conviction, as in Ensslin, Bader & 
Raspe v German. 145  Legal scholars lamented that “Liu Yong was killed by the 
media”,146  and the case had “set reform of the criminal justice system back 10 
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years”.147 However, numerous polls suggest that the general public rates security as a 
major concern and supports tough measures to address crime. 148  Thus, the 
government perceives the “Strike Hard” campaigns as a necessary measure to satisfy 
popular demand for strong action and therefore to maintain social stability and state 
power.149 
 
However, China has carried out the “Strike Hard” struggle for over 26 years, but the 
number of serious criminal cases still increases constantly. Many criminals might 
simply wait for the periodic campaign to end and then resume their activities. Even 
during the campaign, the overall crime rates continued to rise in China in 2008, 
according to official statistics and regional reports. 150  Prosecutors brought 4.69 
million persons to court from 2003 to 2008, which is an increase of more than 32.8% 
over the previous 5 years.151 This experience is enough to demonstrate that “Strike 
Hard” campaigns have done little to stem the rising tide of crime and there has been 
no fundamental improvement in social order in the long term. Moreover, the side-
effects of excessive use of “strike hard” should not be underestimated. All possible 
safeguards generally required for suspects by international standards, such as the 
presumption of innocence, the right to a fair and public hearing and the right to have 
adequate time and facilities to prepare the defence, are unavailable or inadequately 
guaranteed, apparently not only during “Strike Hard” campaigns but also as long-
standing issues in the present Chinese justice system. There has been widespread 
international and Chinese criticism of “Strike Hard” campaigns.152 China is being 
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urged to respect for the law during the crackdown and warned against violations of 
the law when dealing with criminals harshly and speedily. 
 
4.1.2 Room for Improvement in the Presumption of Innocence 
4.1.2.1 Imprecision of Article 12 
In China the presumption of innocence is an old, serious and difficult problem.153 
There is a continued debate on whether Article 12 does in fact state the principle of 
presumption of innocence along with the implementation of the revised CCPL. Some 
scholars hold that Article 12 concerns presumption of innocence. For example, Cao 
Jianming stated at the 3rd Asian Law Institute Conference that the CCPL of 1996 sets 
the principle of presumption of innocence.154 However, most other scholars think it 
may be said to contain the basic concepts of presumption of innocence but not 
necessarily to be a standard statement of presumption of innocence.155At present, 
after more than 10 years of implementation, it is possible to say that Article 12 in the 
CCPL of 1996 comes close to establishing the presumption of innocence but has not 
reached international standards such as Article 14(2) of ICCPR yet.  
 
One reason is that the vague expression of the principle of presumption of innocence 
in Article 12 itself has not yet met the demand of Article 14(2) of ICCPR. Compared 
with Article 14(2) of ICCPR and Article 6(2) of ECHR, Article 12 in the CCPL of 
1996 does not speak directly of “presumed innocent” or “decide innocent”. 156 It only 
states no one shall be decided guilty. Furthermore, according to the second paragraph 
of Article 142 in the CCPL of 1996, which states, “with respect to a case that is 
minor, and the offender needs not be given criminal punishment or needs to be 
exempted from it according to the Criminal Law, the People’s Procuratorate may 
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decide not to initiate a prosecution”. 157  In other words, it seems to follow the 
principle of presumption of innocence. However, in practice, this provision will be 
applied while the procuratorate announces that the suspect is guilty. In the final legal 
decision, the suspect is not innocent although he has not been prosecuted. Therefore, 
even though the original meaning of this provision is to save the cost of judiciary and 
avoid heavy social burden created by the litigation, its practical implementation of 
Article 142 in the CCPL of 1996 has indeed violated the idea of presumption of 
innocence before the final trial of the court, as ruled in Minelli v. Switzerland and 
Allenet de Ribemont v France.158  
 
Another reason is the legislative authority’s attitude to this question. In the legislative 
interpretations of the 1996 CCPL, the provision in Article 12 is not definitely 
regarded as the presumption of innocence. This provision is mainly concentrated on 
the power of the court to try a case, which is incompatible with the requirements of 
the principle itself.159 Moreover, due to traditional ideology, budgetary and resource 
constraints, public security and procurator organs still tend to focus on evidence that 
has incriminated the suspects in a criminal investigation and to attach insufficient 
importance to extenuating evidence or evidence that has supported a suspect’s 
innocence.160 As discussed in the following chapters, together with the absence or 
limitation of other key rights or measures such as the exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence and an effective supervision system for the pre-trail compulsory measures, 
it obviously leaves China still far from fully accepting presumption of innocence. 161 
 
4.1.2.2 Aims for the CCPL 
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As mentioned above, it is a specific tradition that underwrites the lack of protection 
for the suspect and defendant’s rights in the Chinese legal system where the law is 
understood to be a tool.162 Under this stubborn traditional ideology, for many law 
enforcement officials, “to protect the people” and “to protect the citizen’s right” in 
the text of the CCPL of 1996 is still today understood as a concept for protecting the 
“people’s democratic dictatorship” in China. As a result, the criminal is still in a 
sense regarded as an enemy. The effect of this ideology threatens the rights of 
suspects. Enemies and suspects are two different kinds of concepts. While “suspect” 
is a legal concept, “enemy” is a political concept. The concept of the enemy stresses 
the political viewpoint, opposition, and class interest, while the concept of the 
suspect implies that a person is suspected of having committed a crime described by 
law. “Enemy” cannot equal “suspect”. Political concepts and standards should not 
take the place of legal ones.  
 
For example, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, almost every suspect is still held 
in custody regarded as a guilty person to be punished.163 The power of police and 
judicial organs are not effectively restricted when it comes to detention of 
suspects.164 The suspect is the one who is just assumed to have committed a criminal 
offence. Even though a person is suspected by the investigative organ, and there is 
sufficient evidence against him or her, he or she is not guilty until the court makes 
that judgement, as interpreted in Matijašević v. Serbia. 165  According to official 
national statistics, the conviction rate for all crimes for the five years from 2003 to 
2007 was 99.7%. 166  An almost “perfect” conviction rate is rather a troubling 
phenomenon in the context of factors demonstrated in this document. Factors include 
                                               
162
 See 2.1.3, pp.218-221. 
163
 see Chap5, 3.1.2, pp.287.  
164
 See Chap5, 3.2 and 3.3, pp.289-302. 
165
 See Matijašević v. Serbia  Chap3, 4.4.2, p.174. 
166
 See SPC Work Report, on 10/03/08; The SPC reports that between 2003 and 2007, a total of 760,000 criminals 
were sentenced to death, life imprisonment, or more than five years in prison, accounting for 18.18% of all 
criminals having been sentenced. And 14,000 were found innocent. The report offers no statistics on the success 
or failure rates of appeals.  
252 
 
such things as increased detentions and arrests, torture to extort confessions, 
restricted access to legal representation, extreme pressure on the police, procuratorate 
and courts to secure convictions particularly during “Strike Hard” campaigns, and 
courts passing guilty verdicts through a sense of political obligation and a desire to 
maintain resolve rather than rigour. A breach might be found in Article 14 read with 
Article 7 and 9 of ICCPR on the basis that it firstly infringes the presumption of 
innocence under Article 14(2).  Under such intense circumstances, rights abuses and 
miscarriages of justice are inevitable while it is possible that people are executed “in 
error” on an almost daily basis.167  
 
4.1.2.3 The Retention of the “Supplementary Investigation” 
For the same reasons as discussed above, the continuance of the “Supplementary 
Investigation” has made it apparent that the principle of presumption of innocence 
has not been firmly acknowledged in China, which breaches Article 14(2) of 
ICCPR.168 The procuratorate may decide not to institute proceedings if the evidence 
gathered after the supplementary investigation is deemed insufficient, as mentioned 
above.169 However, on the other hand, Article 35 in the revised law, retained from 
the 1979 CCPL, states that the responsibility of a suspect is, on the basis of the facts 
and the law, to present material evidence and opinion proving that the suspect is 
innocent, or that his crime is minor, or that he should receive a more lenient 
punishment or be exempted from criminal responsibility.170 This provision appears to 
place the burden of proof on the party of defence, overtly broad and without any 
compelling reason. This might contradict the principle of presumption of innocence. 
Where the law has imposed a burden of proof on a suspect may be not necessarily a 
violation of the principle of presumption of innocence, as in Salabiaku v France and 
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X v UK.171  However, as illustrated in Chapter Three, the latest approach to the 
reversal of the burden of proof under the ECHR shows that in a manner compatible 
with the presumption of innocence, the reverse onus clauses has to fall within 
reasonable limits and be directed by a legitimate objection, and that it was 
proportionate.172  
 
The presumed innocence of the suspects should be the starting point. Its essence is 
that the prosecution should bear the burden of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant committed the offence charged. Therefore, mere reference to the great 
pressure of crime control in China does not suffice to justify the provision to shift the 
burden of proof to the suspects, as a number of UK cases demonstrated in Chapter 
Three.173 Strong and specific reasons for various proper compulsory measures that 
may be taken against the suspect are required. Article 35 of CCPL of 1996 indicated 
that the suspect is required to establish a special defence or exception, but the burden 
it placed on a suspect is not restrictively worded and appears beyond reasonable 
limits and arbitrary. Instead of being used in the context of the particular offence, the 
means employed is commonly used in China to extend the detention period, as 
discussed in Chapter Five.174 In Chinese textbooks of criminal procedure law, it is 
argued that Article 35 has never been intended as placing the burden of proof on the 
defence. It only states the function of a defender or the way in which a lawyer should 
defend the accused. The revisions of the trial process reinforce the prosecution’s duty 
to gather and produce all relevant evidence. The burden of proof is put on the 
prosecutor in CCPL.175 However, while this provision can be read and interpreted in 
various ways, the law does not clearly express that the overall burden of proof 
remains with the prosecution. Therefore, it can be also interpreted that the law still 
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does not explicitly confirm the obligation to give suspects the benefit of the doubt in 
the light of the principle of presumption of innocence.  
 
4.2 Excessive Emphasis on Substantive Justice and Truth Finding 
The issue of facts in judicial judgment is one of the long-standing and most difficult 
problems in pursuing trial justice in Chinese criminal justice. 176  Since China 
customarily pays much more attention to comprehensively controlling and 
maintaining social order, it therefore follows a principle of cracking down on crimes 
to prevent criminal activities by eradicating their root cause.177 Lawful punishment of 
criminals is a necessary and important method of crime prevention and social 
harmony. However, it generally believes that regardless of how the procedure was 
handled, as long as the result is correct, the judicature can be said to be fair. It can be 
seen that criminal justice in China stresses the objective truth without demanding 
anything concerning the legality of fact finding. This one-sided pursuance of 
substantive justice shows the great impact of the traditional procedural instrumental 
value on law.178  
 
This view was not only thoroughly reflected in the CCPL of 1979 but can also to a 
great extent be found in the amended CCPL. As discussed above, the standard of 
proof in criminal cases, “based on facts and taking law as the criterion” is always 
followed in China.179 For instance, Article 2 in the CCPL of 1996 rested on this 
ideology. The meaning of these “facts” refers to objective facts.180 If “the facts are 
clear and the evidence is reliable and sufficient” in Article 162(1), the court is further 
required to clarify the “objective truth” in the process of criminal adjudication. Chen 
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Guangzhong considered that this requirement obviously exceeds the standard of 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” applied in common law countries like the UK.181 Also 
it requires judicial officers to apply all their talent and ability and to be in full 
possession of all necessary materials. Even in setting the standard for filing a case 
which is somewhat vague and general, the CCPL proceeds on the assumption that it 
is possible, even at this earliest stage, to ascertain whether “there are the facts of a 
crime”.182 Any rule that promotes conflict or detracts from the tribunal’s ability to 
render an uncontested verdict is discouraged. This bedrock principle colours every 
facet of Chinese criminal justice relevant to human rights protection for suspects as 
discussed in the following chapters. 
 
However, in a system that sacrifices procedural justice for the sake of substantive 
justice, the danger of arbitrary government power and the threat to individual liberty 
will be too great. Eventually, that system will lead to substantive injustice as well. 
For instance, if the principle of “basing on facts” were overlooked, common practice 
in the fact-finding stage of investigation would easily result in paying sole attention 
to confession, or stressing circumstances unfavourable to the suspect, rather than 
collecting all the relative evidence, which contrary to the requirement of a fair 
procedure.183 Also, the failure to follow the principle of due process has reflected on 
the practice that the courts are reluctant to exclude the illegally obtained evidence if 
such evidences can prove the truth of the case is the most typical example, as 
discussed in Chapter Six later.184 Therefore the police have been prone to extort 
confessions through torture in order to improve their rate of criminal case solutions. 
As Chen Guangzhong stated, experience of China’s judicial practice proves that all 
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miscarriage of justice cases are the results of simply overemphasizing obtaining the 
actual facts of the case from the confession of the suspect.185 
 
The procedure has its own independent value in that it is an essential component of 
social justice, representing democracy, rule of law, human rights and civilization, and 
directly influences the acceptability of the result of a case; in other words, how a 
person is treated is as important as the substantive result he or she receives in a 
trial.186 When the criminal procedure only concentrates on substantive justice, other 
interests and demands of society, such as the importance of efficiency in the legal 
proceedings, will not usually have been taken into account and may even have been 
ommitted. An adjudication delay might bring an uncertain future for the suspects. As 
the international standard discussed in previous chapters, justice without efficiency 
cannot be justice. Therefore it would be difficult to apply laws correctly and 
challenge human rights protection. Besides Article 14(2) of ICCPR, it might also 
have an impact on those concrete measures during the criminal proceedings which 
contradict Article 9(3), Article 9(4) and Article 14(3) of ICCPR, as discussed in the 
coming chapters.187 Moderating the relation between justice and efficiency to achieve 
a balance between them is the problem that has to be faced in Chinese criminal 
procedural reform. 
 
5. Suggestions for Further Reform 
China is considering a further revision of its CCPL to pave the way for ratification of 
the ICCPR. Following the above analysis, it is time to change the ideology and look 
for other more effective ways of preventing crime and protecting human rights. 
During China’s rapid social-economic transformation era, it is vital and necessary to 
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review and update those guiding ideologies for the CCPL and its practice first of all, 
in order to ensure the implementation of the new law, to facilitate the legal cultural 
change in the whole society concerning human right protection and due process and 
to fall into line with the spirit and rules of the ICCPR. A further revision of the 
CCPL should deal with the following major tasks: to further balance the relationship 
between judicial fairness and procedural efficiency, and between combating crimes 
and protecting human rights; to properly handle the relationship between the effects 
of domestic laws and international conventions.  
 
5.1 Combining Crime Control and Guaranteeing Human Rights  
Countries around the world have established fighting crime as the basic principle of 
their criminal justice system for a long time. With the steady progress of human 
civilization, the guidelines for the procedure governing a suspect underwent huge 
and significant changes in the developmental process of criminal procedure. In every 
modern country conditions for a suspect have greatly improved from his being 
punished without due process to being able to enjoy his fully protected right. 
However, as criminal acts committed by criminals always endanger national and 
social security, social order, personal rights, property rights, democratic rights and 
other rights of citizens, they actually infringe human rights either directly or 
indirectly. In this regard, human rights protection cannot be guaranteed without the 
effective punishment of crime. In order to effectively punish crime, the state has 
entrusted judicial organs with many compulsory measures sometimes including 
detention and arrest to limit or remove an individual’s rights and liberties. These 
measures can forcefully crack down on crime and therefore may facilitate a 
guarantee of state security and social stability, but only if they are applied 
appropriately and on particular occasions.  
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Therefore whenever there is a clear conflict between human rights and security needs, 
the balance usually falls in favour of security.188 Law enforcement authorities are 
subject to pressure from political entities and the public to be tough on crime. 
Suspects are therefore particularly at risk of losing their personal freedom and being 
detained in vulnerable positions where they may be subject to torture.189 In a sense, 
stressing the punishment of crime unilaterally and ignoring the protection of the 
lawful rights of citizens will lead to the abuse of judicial power and cases of 
miscarriage of justice. This has produced an implication that is even worse than the 
criminal act with regard to the violation of human rights. Suspects are in need of a 
legal system that takes their rights seriously. But it must be admitted that the national 
and public interests are not abstract. There is no national benefit separate from 
individual rights. It can be expressed through any individual right. Although in order 
to protect the rights of all citizens, human rights must be everyone’s rights and this 
also includes the rights of suspects.  Because of the uncertainty of social life and of 
precise recognition, no one can be absolutely sure not to be taken as a suspect under 
certain circumstances in judicial practice.190 This means that every citizen faces the 
possibility of becoming a suspect if there is something suspicious going on around 
him or her. So from another perspective, suspects, in a particular way, act as 
representative on behalf of the common interest of the citizens in the whole of 
society in criminal procedures. For these reasons, in criminal proceedings, not only 
the punishment of crime but also the protection of human rights should be 
emphasized.  
 
In the UK, for example, as discussed in previous chapters, there are considerable 
tensions between the operations of the criminal justice system and the protection of 
human rights.191 It is a balancing act between two different goals. A fear of rising 
                                               
188
 See Chap3, 3.5.5.2, pp.140-141. 
189
 See Chap3, 2.4.2, pp.105-108; also see Jalloh v. Germany Chap3, 4.5, pp.187-188.  
190
 See 4.1, pp.245-249.  
191
 e.g. Chap3, 3.5.5.2, pp.140-145. 
259 
 
crimes, such as “terrorism”, has led to measures restricting suspects’ rights and 
extending the scope of criminal law. Meanwhile, this has also raised questions about 
human rights compliance and fairness. So far the UK government has sought to “deal 
with the threat of terrorism by imposing restraints on the freedom of those (who) the 
executive suspects, but cannot prove, are involved in terrorism”.192 For example, the 
case of A v Secretary of State for the Home Office which was found to be 
incompatible with Article 5 of ECHR is a typical example of this balancing act.193 
Fenwick condemns the expanding definition of terrorism laid down in the Terrorism 
Act of 2000 as “immensely broad and imprecise”.194 Also Parliament agreed that 
recent cases have not given cause to introduce a lengthier detention period.195  
 
However, even the restrictions did not prevent the 2005 attach and later terrorism 
attacks. Terrorism is not just a series of attacks, but is spawned by ideology and is an 
on-going conflict. To secure the country against current threats and future atrocities 
the government ought to consider a two-fold strategy of short-term prevention of 
imminent attacks and long-term protection by securing the end of the ideological 
conflict. The significance of human rights as one of the underlying causes of 
terrorism has been recognised for a long time. Human rights standards constitute the 
bare minimum of standards necessary to protect the safety and integrity of 
individuals from abuse of power.196 The abuse of human rights helps to sustain and 
increase terrorism.197 From this reason it follows that the robust protection of human 
rights within counter-terrorism is fundamental to ensuring the flames of conflict are 
not fanned, thus helping to fulfil the long-term security aims of protecting the 
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country against terrorism. Stones considered that individual freedom should only be 
restricted when there is a real and pressing need to do so, not simply when it might 
be regarded as helpful to the police and security services.198 Therefore the protection 
of individual rights is central to ensuring security and protecting the whole of society 
from terrorist attacks. Individual rights and state security are mutually dependent. 
 
Therefore, such measures to prevent crime should be implemented within a 
framework of protection for all human rights. This principle can also be applied to 
China today when it faces the great pressure of crime control during this time of 
social development. According to the Order of Further Handling Cases in Strict 
Accordance with the Law and Ensuring the Quality of Death Penalty Cases, 
“adherence to the combination of crime punishment and human rights protection” 
was clearly listed as a significant principle for handling criminal cases. In the process 
of further amending the CCPL, according to the current limitations of the traditional 
guiding ideology on criminal procedure, the value of human rights protection should 
continue to be emphasized and thus the demands that the coming CCPL should pay 
full attention to those principles to protect the suspect’s rights. Some of the 
difficulties and tensions faced by the Chinese are found in developing a criminal 
procedure theory and system that can meet the local practical, sociological and 
ideological needs of the country. For example, it can well be expected that the 
presumption of innocence will continue to be controversial in China.  
 
However, further moves should definitely be made towards the direction of full 
acceptance of the presumption of innocence. Firstly the presumption of innocence 
should be openly stated according to the language in Article 14(2) of ICCPR.199 This 
would avoid the divergence of opinions regarding implementation. The public 
interest in combating prevalent and serious crimes might ultimately be addressed by 
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the resources applied to detection and prevention and the substantive statutory 
provisions establishing criminality and penalties. Denial of the right to be presumed 
innocent in respect of such crimes would undermine the right enacted as a minimum 
standard. The presumption of innocence serves not only to protect a particular 
individual on trial but also to maintain public confidence in the enduring integrity 
and security of the legal system. Secondly, indeed, appropriately matched measures 
should also be modified or adopted to ensure the implementation of the presumption 
of innocence. For example, in order to cover all the subjects of human rights 
protection, the terms “protecting the people” can be replaced by “safeguarding 
human rights”; the terms “to protect the citizen’s personal rights” can be replaced by 
“to protect the legal rights of individuals and units”. Complete elimination of the 
“Supplementary Investigation” measure should be considered in the coming revision. 
The lawfulness of the limitations and the deprivations imposed on the suspects 
before trial and the relevant concrete measures to effectively prevent the abuse of 
authority to damage the implementation of human rights should be well established 
as discussed in the following chapters. 
 
Certainly, China should avoid shifting from one extreme to the other. Criminal 
justice carries out the functions of fighting and preventing crime, maintaining social 
order and protecting public lives and properly. Therefore, criminal justice in China 
should combine fighting crime and protecting human rights. Unilaterally stressing 
the protection of human rights and the ineffective punishment of crime by the 
judicial organs would allow criminals to go unpunished and encourage them to 
commit crime; thus human rights would not be guaranteed. Therefore, law 
enforcement officials have to continue to stress the need for both greater efficiency 
and more accountability. However, while the past judicial concept of emphasizing 
crime control but not protection should be rectified, there must be a balance between 
protecting suspects and ensuring that those who commit crimes are caught, 
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investigated and convicted. This ideology should be insisted on all through the 
reform. 
 
5.2 Towards Integration of Justice, Due Process and Efficiency  
With the increasing awareness of the value of human rights protection and the 
gradual establishment of the modern concept of criminal justice, the view on due 
process and the efficiency of legal proceedings cannot be neglected. During the legal 
system reform there has been a great deal of controversy in China about how to 
balance the commitment to accurate fact-finding and the commitment to fair conflict 
resolution in the criminal procedure. The core of this discussion is focused on how to 
bring about rational fact finding and enhance the credibility of evidence. Whether the 
legal facts and the objective facts can be kept consistent at the maximum degree is 
the basic symbol to measure whether the evidence rules are successful or not. Many 
scholars such as Chen Guangzhong and Zhang Jianwei have maintained that whether 
or not someone has committed a crime is a matter of ascertainable fact, which is 
substantive truth. 200   The rules of criminal procedure are a means to disclose those 
objective facts and make the judge aware of the case. The guiding function of 
substantive truth should not be replaced by procedural truth.201  
 
In contrast, some scholars such as Chen Ruihua suggest denying the guiding function 
of objective truth and assert the value of procedural justness.202 According to their 
views, the court should demonstrate the facts of a case with evidence being offered 
by both the investigative organs and the suspects, or from those collected by the 
courts themselves. The process by which the judicial officers deal with cases is 
actually the process in which they can realize something of the true circumstance of 
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the case according to the evidence presented.203 As Kong Xiangjun stated, generally, 
although legal facts are consistent with the objective facts of the case, they are not 
equal and can never be identical. It should be acknowledged that inconsistency is 
inevitable for various reasons such as the inherent weakness of human beings to 
ascertain objective truth. 204  The pursuit of legal facts for the objective facts is 
realized through a series of system design in evidence law. In most cases, judicial 
decisions are made according to the facts confirmed within the scope of legality and 
supported by certain evidence, namely legal facts. Whether the facts of the cases are 
clear and definite can only be considered in the premise of procedural justice. Due 
process is one of the judiciary’s primary safeguards against the full range of errors in 
the generation of evidence. The goal of the criminal system should be to create a 
value of legal reality and a set of rules that will help it to determine the truth as close 
as possible.  
 
Therefore it makes sense to emphasize the priority of due process in China todays. 
Crime prevention and security should be compatible with democratic values and due 
process. Without fair and just procedures, there is no guarantee that the end result 
will be just. Procedural justice requires the law enforcement organs to conform to 
just stages and proper means in seeking for the reality of the case. This may lead to 
the sacrifice of part of the substantive justice to ensure the role of procedural justice. 
But it is the necessary cost for guaranteeing justice in general and on the whole. In a 
system that pays attention to procedural justice, arbitrary government power will be 
checked and constrained, individual liberty will be protected, and substantive justice 
will be preserved in the long term. As Selznick puts it, legality has to do mainly with 
how policies and rules are made and applied rather than with their contents.205 In 
                                               
203
 See Ruihua Chen, ibid., p.22. 
204
 See Xiangjun Kong, “Discussion on Legal Facts and Objective Facts”, (2002) 5 Tribune of Political Science 
and Law, pp.94-95. 
205
 See P. Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969) cited from 
Yuanyuan Shen “Conceptions and Receptions of Legality: Understanding the Complexity of the Law Reform in 
China”, in The Limit of the Rule of Law in China, ed. Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman and R. Kent Guy, 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), p.30. 
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other words, as long as the process is fair, transparent and consistent, justice is 
obtained and legality is achieved. Such procedural justice is seen as a necessary 
condition for substantive justice. Also the pursuance of procedural justice can reduce 
and limit the time and cost of crime investigation and prosecution.  
 
Procedural justice or efficiency could surely not be pursued unilaterally. Again, the 
importance of rights protection for the suspects could not be partially emphasized. 
The goal of criminal procedure is to realize justice by uncovering the substantive 
truth. This given fact emphasizes exact and accurate fact finding, which is required 
as a premise for impartial criminal justice. The general relationship between legal 
facts and objective facts is that objective facts are the basis of legal facts, and legal 
facts are the recurrence or reaction of objective facts. Legal truth must take objective 
truth as the final goal to be pursued. The pursuit of legal facts is realized through 
evidence law with a series of measures. The facts are confirmed under the strict 
limitation of the procedural law. No doubt it will take a long time for China to 
comprehensively establish a new truth-finding concept.  
 
It is feasible to combine substantive justice with procedural justice for truth finding 
in criminal procedure in China. The current design of the criminal procedure in 
China should also give priority to justice with due consideration to efficiency. 
Therefore the criminal procedure should be justly implemented. There should be an 
attempt to keep legal facts and objective facts consistent to the greatest possible 
degree. The punishment of criminals should be impartial. The rules stated in the 
CCPL should guide the court appropriately to recognise the degree of accurate and 
the credibility of the evidence. For example, all the terms presenting the aims of the 
CCPL which only stress the traditional view of emphasising substantive justice but 
neglecting procedural justice should be changed to the new perspective of integration 
of crime control, justice and efficiency.  
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6. Conclusion  
The brief description of historical and current Chinese legal ideology regarding 
criminal procedure law presented above should suffice to illustrate the unique and 
dynamic legal reform process of criminal procedure law. China’s legal traditions 
have been evolving within a continuous civilization for more than two thousand 
years. The emphasis of law is on the protection of government powers and social 
interests rather than on the protection of individual rights and due process. Law has 
been, and continues to be, an instrument of government to change its policies for 
social and political control. The CCPL used to pay a great deal of attention to the 
needs of fighting crime without taking into account the protection of the rights of 
suspects. At the same time, rising crime rates have united the general populace with 
the government in their desire to strike hard at crime. It is not an easy task for China 
to establish a human rights protection system for suspects in criminal justice.  
 
The primary purpose of the CCPL reform in China today is to live up to its promises 
with respect to human rights and fair trial protection for suspects. It is necessary to 
define appropriately the guiding ideology when discussing the question of how to 
modify the CCPL. Some reforms in 1996 have already made a significant mark on 
the guiding ideology of the criminal justice system as discussed above. Most 
strikingly, the amended CCPL even seems to have made a tentative step towards the 
recognition of the presumption of innocence. The change of ideology can be shown 
in the contrast between the old and new terminology, the abolition of the “Exemption 
from Prosecution”, the reform of the “Supplementary Investigation” and the rise of 
human rights consciousness in the country. The amended CCPL has also tried to 
embody the principle of due process. It should be acknowledged that the guiding 
ideology of the 1996 CCPL attached greater importance to the protection of human 
rights than its previous versions, making remarkable headway in this respect. 
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However, the comparative analysis of relevant provisions in the CCPL of 1996 with 
international guidelines undertaken above has pointed out the ways in which the 
ideology behind the law has not completely conformed to the aim of the reform and 
international human rights protection standards. Under the complex phenomenon of 
increasing crime rates in China, both the government and the public favoured 
combating crime with a strong hand. This might entail abuses against suspects, 
especially in a country that has a history of lack of respect to individual rights in the 
criminal justice system. The notion of human rights protection still needs to be 
strengthened in the minds of the public and the law enforcement officials. The 
principle of presumption of innocence has not been firmly acknowledged and 
implemented, as shown in the statement of Article 12 in the CCPL of 1996, the aims 
of the law still carry political colour, and the “Supplementary Investigation” remains 
in the CCPL of 1996. Therefore it has been viewed as inconsistent with relevant 
ICCPR standards, Article 14(2) of ICCPR particularly. Moreover, due process can be 
sacrificed under the justification of crime control. Therefore the safeguards for 
suspects set by the law can be avoided or infringed by operating entirely outside the 
legal schemes. The guarantee for suspects can be marginalised. The task of 
deepening and broadening their reach for universal fundamental human rights 
concepts continues to face critical difficulties arising from new values and new 
forces unleashed by the economic reforms, long-term dominant political ideology 
and widely-held traditional Chinese legal culture. 
 
China continues undergoing rapid social and economical transformation that 
threatens to undermine social stability and hence inflates crime rates. Traditional law 
has its contribution and value, including its rich experience of legal practice, the 
stable function of the law in maintaining social harmony and the emphasis on the 
educational function of the law. To establish a modern criminal procedural system, 
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traditional ideology for the CCPL needs to be creatively updated and transformed as 
suggested above. The forthcoming reform of the CCPL should purposefully and 
selectively overcome those traditional ideas, values, beliefs and ideologies, such as 
emphasizing punishment and substance, belittling human rights protection and 
ignoring due process, which contradict the modern judicial idea of law. Instead, a 
series of modern judicial ideas, such as combining the punishment of crimes and 
guaranteeing human rights protection, emphasizing substantive justice and 
procedural justice, to embody the spirit of “human rights” in the amendment to the 
Constitution. The legal system therefore can be brought more into line with those 
embraced in international standards such as ICCPR and ECHR discussed in previous 
chapters. Primarily, the principle of presumption of innocence should be fully 
accepted and established in the CCPL according to the requirement in Article 14(2) 
of ICCPR 
 
In the following chapters the thesis will examine some recent steps concerning the 
measures taken in China towards providing a better system of justice for suspects 
while considering the effectiveness of these reforms in practical terms. Prohibition of 
torture and illegally obtained evidence, guarantees of lawyers’ rights, improvement 
of the compulsory measure and so forth are the main priorities of the amendments. 
All the analysis will be a detailed comparison with the relevant ICCPR standard in 
order to demonstrate the need for China to adopt further reforms, to provide suspects 
with more protection and to bring China’s criminal procedure closer to international 
standards regarding fair trial and human rights. 
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Chapter Five   
Pre-trial Compulsory Measures System in CCPL and 
Movement towards Meeting ICCPR Standards 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the most criticized aspects of the CCPL of 1996 is still the enormous 
discretion vested in officials to detain suspects without genuine and independent 
judicial review.1 In criminal justice, protection of human rights has two aspects: 
protecting the individual’s rights and limiting state powers. The course of pre-trial 
investigation is an important stage of recognition of human rights protection for 
suspects and the application of compulsory measures in this stage directly concerns 
the personal liberty and safety of suspects.2 Because of this severe character, as 
discussed in Part One, the ICCPR and ECHR pay close attention to compulsory 
measures in criminal cases which should be properly used.3 The avoidance of the 
abuse of compulsory measures during the pre-trial procedure in China not only 
concerns the smoothly process of the criminal proceedings, but also concerns the 
issues of guarantee the human rights in criminal proceedings. 
 
Therefore the aim of this chapter is to address how criminal compulsory measures 
can be better controlled in order to reduce the abuse of pre-trial detention and arrest 
and protect the legal rights of suspects under the current situation in China, according 
to the international standard, particularly Article 9 of ICCPR, which contains the 
principle which pre-trial detention is an exception.4 This chapter will firstly examine 
the current CCPL for pre-trial compulsory measures with certain major reforms that 
are already ongoing in terms of the new procedural safeguards afforded to suspects 
and of the new restrictions placed on the police; secondly it will consider several 
                                                       
1
 Guanagzhong Chen, “Overcome the Difficulties, Promote the Re-amendment of the Criminal Procedure Law”, 
(2007) 23 People’s Procuratorial Semimonthly, p.6. 
2
 See De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium Chap3, 3.2, p.111. 
3
 See Article 9 of ICCPR, chap2, 5.1, pp.45-47; Article 5 of ECHR, Chap3, 3, pp.109-111. 
4
 See Chap2, 5.5, pp.61-62; Chap3, 3.5.2, p.129. 
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respects in which the current system fails to adhere to the ICCPR, and various 
difficulties faced in trying to bring about reform to ensure compliance with those 
international standards; thirdly, it will consider the further reforms that would be 
necessary in order to ensure such compliance. The last part will close the chapter by 
concluding how close is the pre-trial compulsory measure systems to meet the 
ICCPR standards and re-emphasizing the direction for the coming reform. 
 
Regarding the forms on deprivation of liberty, the compulsory measure system in the 
CCPL of 1996 includes five measures, namely, “compulsory summon” (拘传), 
“granting of bail and awaiting trial” (取保候审), “residential surveillance” (监视居
住), detention (拘留) and arrest (逮捕).5 These compulsory measures are considered 
be investigative techniques.6  They can be further divided into two categories: 
custodial detention and non-custodial detention. As the ECHR approach illustrates, 
the distinction of the means on deprivation of liberty is a matter of degree and 
intensity and the actual deprivation of liberty.7 It is clear that the custodial detention 
constitutes deprivation of liberty of Article 9 of ICCPR and Article 5 of ECHR. 
However, in practice, the law enforcement authorities adopt and use the pre-trial 
compulsory measures to dissolve all the risks under the circumstances that the 
criminal evidence is not sufficient while it is difficult to judge suspects guilty or not. 
With this intention, the non-custodial detention is not a kind of right to guarantee the 
personal liberty of suspects pending trial.8 This phenomenon reflects the principle of 
presumption of innocence has not been accepted generally indeed.9 Therefore, the 
non-custodial coercive measures defined in the CCPL also fall under the category of 
deprivation of liberty and should be viewed accordingly. 
 
2. Current Improvement on the Compulsory Measures in the CCPL 
                                                       
5
 See CCPL 1996, Chapter VI ‘Compulsory Measures’,. 
6
 Ibid., Article 82. 
7
 See Chap3, 3.2.1, pp.111-112.  
8
 See W. Delgado Páez v. Colombia, Chap2, 5.1, pp 46-47; X v Germany and X v Austria, Chap3, 3.2.1, 
pp.112-113. 
9
 See Chap4, 4.1.2, pp.249-254. 
270 
 
of 1996  
Article 37 of the Constitution of PRC says that the personal liberty of citizen shall 
not be infringed.10 Any citizens will not be arrested unless being ratified by the 
procuratorate or decided by the court and enforced by the police organs. It is 
forbidden to illegally detain or any other methods to deprive or limit the citizen’s 
personal liberty and forbidden to illegally forage about the citizen’s body. Article 59 
of the 1996 CCPL reiterates the regulations in the Constitution. A number of 
important revisions to the CCPL in 1996 set limits to the power of the public security 
organs and the prosecuting authorities, therefore apparently brought China closer to 
eliminating arbitrary detention in its criminal process according to Article 9 of 
ICCPR. 
 
2.1 1996 Reform to Measure of the “Shelter and Investigation” 
“Shelter and Investigation” (收容审查) was originally initiated by the police as a 
way to control transient population, namely, people who failed to register their 
residence with the police as required by the household registration law.11 It was a 
kind of administrative measure provided by No. 56 State Council document in 1982, 
neither the scope nor the executing procedures are clearly defined.12 The former 
CCPL did not provide this measure. But in practice it was widely used and abused by 
the Chinese police to unilaterally detain people suspected of “minor acts of 
law-infringement or crime” whose identities and addresses were not clear, or of 
“having moved from place to place to commit crimes”, or of forming criminal gangs 
for extended periods with little or no access to the outside world.13 Although the 
police supposedly should have used the measure only in cases where a suspect’s 
                                                       
10
 See Constitution of People’s Republic of China (4th Amendment),15/03/99, Article 37. 
11
 See generally, Hualin Fu, “A case for abolishing shelter for examination: Judicial review and police powers in 
China”, (1994) Police Studies, 17(4), pp.41–60; More research on Administrative Detention in China see 
generally, e.g. Randall Peerenboom, “Out of the Pan and into the Fire: Well-intentioned but Misguided 
Recommendations to Eliminate All Forms of Administrative Detention in China”, (2004) 3 Nw. U.L. Rev. Vol. 98, 
pp.991-1104; Sarah Biddulph, Legal Reform and Administrative Detention Powers in China,(New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
12
 See The Shelter and Repatriation Measures of Beggars and Homeless People Living in Cities, No. 56 
Document issued by the State Council, 12/05/82 (Repeal).  
13
 Ibid, Article 2. Also see Yan Wang, “Several Problems on Detention, Arrest and Shelter and Investigation”, 
(1994) 2 Modern Law Science, p.81. 
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identity was unknown, in practice they used the measure to detain people with 
known identity as well.14 The abuse of the measure was especially manifested in the 
police’s use of the measure to circumvent the time limits set in the CCPL of 1979.  
 
A distinctive feature of the CCPL in 1979 is that though it granted the police broad 
power to make the initial detention decision, it set strict restrictions on the period of 
detention. According Article 48 of the 1979 CCPL, the police are permitted to detain 
a suspect only for 3 days; within 3 days, they must either submit a request for arrest 
to the Procuratorate or release the suspect from custody; If the police believes that 
the suspect should be arrested they must gather sufficient evidence within those 3 
days, they may apply the Procuratorate for an extension of another 1 to 4 days; the 
maximum time allowance for the police to make their case for arrest is therefore 7 
days; the procuratorate have to make the decision on the application of arrest within 
3 days.15 The legislative intent for the relatively short detention period was to 
prevent the police from detaining a suspect for too long at this initial stage of 
criminal investigation. The short detention period became a main source of police 
complaints against the old CCPL. They complained that the seven-day period was far 
too short for them to collect sufficient evidence to support a request for arrest.  
 
In order to avoid the short detention period in the CCPL of 1979, the police turned to 
a more flexible way know as “shelter and investigation” to expand their power.16 
Whenever the officers felt that they could not collect sufficient evidence to support a 
request for arrest within 7 days, they would conveniently detain a suspect under 
“shelter and investigation”, thus avoiding the seven-day time limits. As Zhou G. J. 
Observed, the public security organs could hold people under “shelter and 
investigation” without any judicial review for as long as three months, and possibly 
                                                       
14
 See Shimin Zhao, “The Shelter and Investigation Measure should be Improved”, (1990) 8 Law Science, p.28. 
15
 See CCPL 1979, Article 48. 
16
 Several serious problems on Shelter and Investigation were identified and discussed widely by the Chinese 
scholars. Detailed analyses See, e.g. Xinxin Wang, “Shelter and Investigation should be Abolished: A discussion 
with Chen Weidong and Zhang Tao”, (1993) 3 Legal Science in China, pp.112-113. Also see Weidong Chen and 
Tao Zhang “A Further Talk on Why Shelter and Investigation Should Not Be Abolised: An Answer to Comrade 
Wang Xinxin”, (1993) 3 Legal Science in China, p.113. 
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longer.17 Sometimes suspects could be detained for several years. The use of the 
“shelter and investigation” clause was almost totally unsupervised by any other 
agency and the police tended to use it arbitrarily. The police can use torture to extract 
confessions in the detention centers. The cases of detainee’s escape and suicide were 
frequently reported.18 This measure seriously violated ICCPR, particularly every 
aspect of Article 9 of ICCPR, and was long criticized by international human rights 
groups.19 
 
Therefore one of the encouraging revisions with respect to pre-trial detention in the 
CCPL of 1996 is the incorporation of “Shelter and Investigation”, a type of indefinite 
administrative detention, into legislative forms.20 This is a step towards the lawful 
deprivation of liberty which requires the arrest and detention must have been carried 
out according to the procedural and substantive rules of national law, as the European 
Court has emphasized in the recent cases.21 On August 1 2003, the No.56 document 
in 1982 had been repealed and replaced by new regulations, The Assistance and 
Management Measures of Beggars and Homeless People Living in Cities, which is a 
relief system with relief centers instead of Custody centers.22 This significance 
change effectively and officially abolished the administrative detention “Shelter and 
Investigation”. However, it is interesting to note that the time limits for various forms 
of detention were actually increased in the CCPL of 1996 which will be discussed 
below.23 It was seen as a trade off for the elimination of “Shelter and Investigation”. 
In his explanatory speech on the draft amended CCPL to the Fourth Meeting of the 
Eighth NPC, Gu Angran stated that the draft has absorbed the contents of “Shelter 
and Investigation” needed in practice for the struggle against crime into the CCPL by 
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 Guojun Zhou, “On Whether Shelter and Investigation Should Be Abolished”, (1989) 1 Forum of Politics and 
Law, pp.39-40. 
18
 Ibid.,p.40; also see Hualing Fu, op.cit., fn 11, pp. 41-60. 
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 See e.g., Human Rights in China, “Detained at Official Pleasure”, (New York, 1993); Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights, “Criminal Justice with Chinese Characteristics”, (New York, 1993). 
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 See Guanghua Guo, “Higher Requirement: The Revision on the Criminal Procedure Law”, (1996) 6 People’s 
Police, p7; Zhongcheng Li, “The Reform of the Compulsory Measure System and its Significance”, (1996) 3 
Peiking University Law Journal, pp.36-37.  
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 See The Assistance and Management Measures of Beggars and Homeless People Living in Cities, No. 381, 
State Council, 23/06/03, Article 18. 
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 See 3.2.2.1, pp292-297. 
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supplementing and amending the relevant criminal coercive measures.24 Therefore, 
he proclaimed that the administrative compulsory measure of detention for 
investigation should not be retained.25 Also, an internal document issued by the MPS 
in 1996 requires public security organs at all levels to cease using “Shelter and 
Investigation” by the end of October of that year. In form, “Shelter and 
Investigation” was abolished after the amended CCPL came into effect. The law is 
getting closer to Article 9 (1) of ICCPR, which provides that deprivation of liberty 
must be in accordance with domestic substantive and procedural law.26  
 
2.2 Clarified the Conditions for the Detention 
Article 61 of the 1996 CCPL provides conditions that must be met before a suspect 
may be detained.27 In China, the system of non-custodial detention was originally 
intended to those suspects or defendants who are not suitable for detention but has 
certain social danger and may probably disturb the smooth implementation of 
litigation activities. There was no provision in the CCPL of 1979 pertaining 
specifically to define the suspect’s designated place to stay on non-custodial 
detention.28 Therefore, supervised residence was often been using as means of 
holding suspects under conditions as those being arrested, usually in Public 
Security’s guest houses, under old CCPL. The insufficiently precise provision, as 
considered in the European case Steel and others v UK and Baranowski v Poland, 
breached the requirement as to “the prohibition on arbitrariness”.29  According 
Article 56 and 57 of the 1996 CCPL, suspects who were at “granting of bail and 
awaiting trial” are not to leave their city or county of residence without police 
permission. Those under residential surveillance are restricted to their homes or, if 
they have no fixed abode, to a designated location.30 Since most suspects will 
presumably have a usual place of residence, the new provision in the CCPL of 1996 
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 Angran Gu, “Explanatory Speech on the Draft Amended Criminal Procedure Law”, the Fourth Session of the 
Eighth National People's Congress, 12/03/96. 
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 See Chap2, 5.1, pp.47-52.  
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 CCPL 1996, Article 61. 
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 See CCPL 1979, Article 38.  
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suggests the intention to cure the prior practice by setting those standards for an 
initiation of the detention. It gives the impression that the detention of suspects is less 
than automatic and seems to be founded on a specific and accessible rule in China. 
The reform tries to comply with Article 9(1) of ICCPR that the grounds for a 
deprivation of liberty must be clearly and precisely established by law.31  
 
2.3 Clearer Time Limits in Detention 
Under the CCPL of 1996, in order to avoid that a person being charged, to be 
remained too long in a state of uncertainty about his fate, pretrial detention was 
reformed with better time limits and more clearly defined in procedures in some 
respects. It is an elementary step to achieve the requirement of Article 9(3) that 
everyone detained shall be entitled to trial in a reasonable time or to release pending 
trial.32 It has been reported that the central authorities in China have strengthened 
supervision of detention exceeding time limits, and have ordered administrative 
discipline for local leaders who have allowed detention beyond stipulated time 
limits.33 Since 2005, the MPS has amended the Procedural Provisions for the 
Handling of Administrative Cases by Public Security Organs and the Procedural 
Provisions for the Handling of Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs, 
formulated the regulations on the length of detention for criminal cases applicable to 
public security organs and other regulations. 
 
The first compulsory measure addressed by the CCPL of 1996 is summons to compel 
appearance. Prior to the 1996 reforms, the time limit for holding a suspect for the 
first interrogation was 24 hours. However, the police routinely initiated a new 
24-hour period as soon as the previous one expired, rendering the time limit 
meaningless and permitting unlimited interrogation. In 1996, the reform provided 
that a criminal shall not be detained under the disguise of successive summons.34 
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 See Clifford McLawrence v. Jamaica Chap2, 5.1, p.47.  
32
 See Chap2, 5.4, pp.58-59; Chap3, 3.5.3, p.130. 
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Once a case file is opened, authorities may forcibly take in a suspect for up to 12 
hours of questioning.35 All judicial authorities may apply this measure.36 Thus 
under current law if the police choose to hold a suspect beyond the initial 12 hour 
period they must use another compulsory measure, bail, residential surveillance or 
detention. This new time frame and limited measure on non-custodial detention 
brings the CCPL closer to the requirement of “promptly” in Article 9(3) of ICCPR.37 
 
Even more significant, for the first time the CCPL of 1996 imposes limits on the 
duration of the non-custodial detention. “Granting of bail and awaiting trial” is not to 
exceed 1 year and residential surveillance is limited to 6 months.38 These new 
provisions show that the CCPL of 1996 intends to get closer to the standard as 
Article 9(3) of ICCPR requires right to trial in a reasonable time.39 After a suspect is 
arrested and taken into custody, an immediate concern for the suspect is how long it 
will take for the police to complete the investigation so that the case can be brought 
to trial. Article 72 of the 1996 CCPL obligates the police to interrogate a suspect 
within 24 hours of the arrest.40 The original purpose of this timely interrogation is 
not for the purpose of facilitating the police to obtain confession but to obligate the 
police to re-examine whether the arrest is indeed properly made. The law further 
requires that the police release the arrested person immediately if they find the arrest 
is inappropriately made after the interrogation.41 This is tied to the principle of 
presumption of innocence set by Article 14(2) of ICCPR and specifically complied 
with the term “promptly” required by Article 9(3) of ICCPR.42 
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To prevent prolonged post-arrest detention, Article 124 of the 1996 CCPL provides 
that in ordinary cases the police must complete their investigation within 2 months. If 
a case is complicated and the police cannot complete the investigation within 2 
months, with the approval of the procuratorate at a higher level, they may extend the 
investigative detention for another month. In normal cases, the CCPL of 1996 
therefore allows the police to detain a suspect for a maximum of 3 months while 
conducting the investigation.43 The setup of time frame for the investigation tries to 
bring suspects to trial in a reasonable time as required by Article 9(3) of ICCPR.44 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the revisions removed or restricted the ability of the 
court, prosecutor and the police to repeatedly invoke a need for “Supplementary 
Investigation”. 45  The “Supplementary Investigation” remanded to the police is 
compelled to conclude within one month.46 Before this restriction is being placed, in 
practice, some suspects could remain in detention indefinitely while the case passed 
back and forth between the judicial authorities. Because there were no restrictions on 
how often this measure could be used, the clock could restart for the relevant time 
limits of detention whenever this measure was requested. Its implement was found to 
have seriously breached the requirements on the reasonable time limits of the 
detention in Article 9 (3) of ICCPR.47 Therefore the new requirements at least help 
to reduce the prolonged detention and drive the reform in a positive direction to fulfil 
the international obligation under Article 9(3), and also Article 14(2) of ICCPR as 
discussed in Chapter Four.48  
 
There is one more new measure under the reform to control the time limits for the 
pre-trail detention. According to Article 52, the suspect in custody and his legal 
representatives or near relatives shall have the right to apply for their release upon 
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bail pending trial.49 As this right previously only applied to pre-arrest detention in 
the CCPL of 1979, the revisions extended it to all five forms of pre-trial compulsory 
measures. This legitimate claim for release in exchange for bail has started to follow 
the safeguards set out in Article 9(3) of ICCPR, that pre-trial detention shall not be 
the general rule.50 Moreover, according to Article 75 of 1996 CCPL, suspects, his 
legal representative and near relatives shall have the right to demand cancellation of 
the compulsory measures that exceeds the time limits.51 As observed from these 
provisions literally, it is for certain that they are at least, roughly, going to offer a 
chance for a suspect to review the detention according to law. It shows a will to 
attain the requirement of Article 9(4) of ICCPR to create procedures for challenging 
the lawfulness of detention and obtaining release if the detention is unlawful.52 
 
2.4 Restriction on the Police Power to Arrest 
The CCPL of 1996 tries to make a distinction between the police power to arrest and 
to detain through separating the decision power and implementing power of the 
arrest measure, which is aimed to establish a restrict system on arrest. According to 
Article 59 of 1996 CCPL, to make an arrest, the police must, in all cases, seek 
approval from the procuratorate or decision by the court.53 A suspect can be arrested 
without delay “when there is evidence to support the facts of a crime and the criminal 
suspect or defendant could be sentenced to a punishment of not less than 
imprisonment, and if such measures as allowing him to obtain a guarantor pending 
trial or placing him under residential surveillance would be insufficient to prevent the 
occurrence of danger to society”.54 Therefore, there are the necessity of an arrest 
should be based on consideration of three requirements. Firstly, the law implies that 
only those whose offenses are verified by evidence shall be arrested. In 2006, SPP 
further specified that “the evidence to prove the facts of a crime” means that there is 
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evidence to prove the facts that a crime has committed.55 Secondly, in order to 
ensure the suspect’s appearance at trial, the law presumes that a fixed term 
imprisonment is one of the conditions to for arrest because the suspect is more 
dangerous or more likely to flee. Thirdly, the decision to arrest must be based on 
consideration whether there are risks presenting that the suspect is a danger to the 
community or he is likely to flee and there is no other measures exist to avoid them. 
Therefore, the law implies that if a fix-term imprisonment is presumed, a suspect 
may still be allowed a guarantor pending trial or be placed under house surveillance. 
 
To ensure that a decision to arrest is made in a timely fashion, the CCPL of 1996 
provides that if the public security authority deems it is necessary to arrest a detainee, 
it shall, within 3 days after the detention, submit written request of approval of arrest 
together with the case file and evidence to the Procuratorate or the court to testify the 
necessity and lawfulness of the arrest.56 Once the police submit to the procuratorate 
a request for arrest, the procuratorate will examine the application of arrest and must 
make a decision whether or not to authorize arrest, within 7 days if a suspect is 
already detained by the police, or within 15 days if a suspect is not detained.57 If 
approval is denied, the police may seek review but the detainee must be released.58 
This new restriction placed on the police seeks to strengthen the legal supervisions of 
the procedures for arrest and to afford better protections to suspects being properly 
implemented by the police. Therefore it is a positive sign of real progress in the 
direction to guarantee the right to be brought before a judge or other judicial officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power, as it is spelt out in clear terms under 
Article 9(3) of ICCPR.59 
 
2.5 Effort against Illegally Prolonged Detention 
Unlawful extension of detention is a kind of “stubborn disease” that is difficult to 
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cure in judicial practice in the country.60 It has great interference on the liberty of a 
person who is presumed to be innocence. The phenomenon has long caused great 
concerns and drawn sharp criticisms in and outside China. With numbers of cases on 
the list, there are three forms of extended detentions in China: extended by public 
security authorities during the period of criminal police investigation, extended by 
public prosecution authorities during the period of processing cases and extended by 
judicial authorities during the period of court investigation. According to statistics 
released by SPP, at the end of 2002, there were 43,438 suspects endured illegally 
prolonged detention.61 From 1987 to 2001, the SPC, SPP and the MPS issued as 
many as 20 official documents on settlement of the problem of unlawful extension of 
detention and tried to meet the requirement of Article 9 and Article 14(2) and 14(3)(c) 
of the ICCPR as to the reasonableness of the period of pre-trial detention. For 
example, in 1998, the SPC, the SPP and the MPS Jointly issued the Notice on 
Resolute Settlement of the Problem of Unlawful Extension of Detention in Strict 
Implementation of the Provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law for the Time Limit 
of Detention of Criminal Suspects and Defendants (Notice on Resolute Settlement), 
which is still valid today.  
 
Since late 2002, the MPS, the SPP and the SPC have coordinated efforts with one 
another in investigating cases of extended detention accordance with the law. In May 
2003, the Chinese police, prosecution and judicial authorities jointly launched a 
campaign to solve the problem of extended detention further. It is a popular 
campaign for the realization of “sunshine custody” (阳光羁押) named by the 
academic.62 Later, the Notice on Practical Prevention and Correction of Cases of 
Extended Detention in Strict Compliance with the Criminal Procedure Law was 
jointly issued by the MPS, the SPP and the SPC on November 12, 2003. Obviously, 
                                                       
60
 See Leiming Wang and Huanqing Wu, “A Look into Extended detention – How Far Away We Are Form 
Sunshine Custody”,Xinhua News, 10/11/03, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1063/2179276.html; Genju 
Liu and Lixin Yang, “Judicial Review Concerning the Compulsory Measure Issued by Investigative Authorities”, 
(2002) 4 Criminal Science, p.70. 
61
 This number was revealed by SPP at the 12th Procuratorate National Working Conference, 29/06/06, see 
Zhiyong Pei, “The Prosecution Authority has Strengthened Judicial Supervision and 3 Million People had been 
Prosecuted in Last 3 Years”, People’s Daily, 30/06/06, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/4545809.html.  
62
 See Leiming Wang and Huanqing Wu, op.cit., fn 58; also see China’s human right net.  
280 
 
this notice made an effort to fundamentally put an end to the occurrence of cases of 
extended. It tried to attach equal importance to both the substantive law and 
procedural law, to emphasize correct application of the 1996 CCPL on the basis of 
respecting human dignity and safeguarding human rights, and to establish the 
concept that any extension of the period of detention for trial means violation of law.  
 
During these years, Chinese courts applied administrative or disciplinary sanctions to 
a large number of their functionaries who were found to have violated relevant legal 
provisions for the time limit of the processing cases. Those were found to have 
committed acts constituting crime would be investigated to establish their criminal 
responsibilities.63 Noticeably, in August 2003 the system of public supervisors (人民
监督员) was introduced, in which procuratorate authority invites people from all 
walks of life to act as “public supervisors” for better monitoring of the work of 
judicial departments on unlawfully prolonged custody involving suspects, aiming to 
ensure justice and curb wrong verdicts.64 The pilot scheme of instituting people’s 
supervisors is proceeding smoothly and has yielded good results. Until 2007, the 
range of the experiment has been extended, involving 86 percent of procuratorates 
throughout the country.65 The SPP urges to institutionalize and improve this measure 
to better regulate law enforcement behaviour.66  
 
The SPP also adopted the Several Provisions from the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate Regarding the Prevention and Correction of Extended Detention in 
Procuratorial Work at a meeting held on September 24, 2003, which was 
promulgated and became effective on November 24, 2003 as well. The requirements 
in this regulation to the procuratorates at each level include: to ensure the procedures 
on arrest and other compulsory measures being applied correctly accordance with the 
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relevant provisions of the CCPL, to implement and improve the system of hearing 
and notification and to put into effect the system of sharing information about the 
status of a detention. 67  The procuratorates are also demanded to establish a 
mechanism for complaining and correcting unlawful extension of detention.68 The 
system for strict investigation and prosecution to the relevant personnel liabilities 
with extended detentions shall be further strengthen and carried out. 69  The 
regulations are intended to guide the practical work of public prosecution authorities 
at lower levels and spell out specific measures to prevent unlawful extension of 
detention. Moreover, public hotlines to hear reports of job-related human rights 
violations, including unlawfully extended detentions, have been established by the 
SPP.70 It can be able to provide important clues for tracking down illegal prolonged 
custody.  
 
At the same time, in order to fundamentally solve the longstanding problem of 
extending detention, particularly during the period of investigation, Xiao Yang, the 
President of the SPC, explicitly proposed the principle of bringing whoever is found 
guilty to justice and releasing whoever is innocent.71 The initiation of this principle 
designed to practically prevent and redress unlawful extension of detention according 
to the principle of the presumption of innocence under Article 14(2) of ICCPR is yet 
another major progress in the reform of China’s legal system. It contributes to 
fundamentally negating the mentality of presumption of guilt, and is based on 
safeguarding the human rights of suspects and respecting the principle of fair trial.72 
Moreover, the SPC promulgated on December 1, 2003 the Notice on the 
Implementation of Ten Systems to Practically Prevent the Occurrence of New Cases 
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of Extended Detention. The implementation of the ten systems prescribed by this 
notice is intended to provide a mechanism to strictly prevent any extension of 
detention in judicial work in an effort to regularize and institutionalize the law 
enforcement in China. China may genuinely succeed in fundamentally solving the 
problem of unlawful extension of detention only by earnestly implanting the 
principle of the presumption of innocence into the minds of the personnel with the 
law enforcement authorities at all levels and enabling them to implement it in their 
practical work. This Regulation shows a major embodiment of positive development 
of China’s legal system towards the international common minimum standard of 
criminal justice. 
 
A promising development is that many of such reforms are currently kept on being 
discussed and debated on China. For example, in the autumn of 2003, an 
international conference in Shanghai addressed the problems facing criminal defence 
lawyers in China, including the lack of access to detained clients and other issues 
relating to pretrial detention.73 They suggested that the adoption of the right to 
remain silent and the presumption of innocence, which have been the hot topics in 
Chinese legal circles for quite a while, would remove the incentives which the police 
currently have to hold suspects for as long as it takes to extract a confession.74 
Moreover, there is a discussion, which will be addressed below, of the need for 
independent judicial review of arrest and detention, and the right for a detainee to 
challenge the lawfulness of his detention through a habeas corpus-type provision.75 
In July 2006, another international symposium on comparative criminal justice was 
held in Beijing.  
 
According to official statistics, the SPP only received 85 hotline reports in 2005 on 
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extended custody, compared with the figure as 1,991 in the year of 2002.76 The SPC 
pronounced in March 2005 that they had cleared all cases of illegal extended 
detention.77 China will step up fight against unlawful extension of detention by 
implementing more stringent monitoring system across the country, the SPP 
announced in September 2006.78 The SPP’s 2007 Report to the NPC focused on the 
increased level of effort it has been devoting to improving the criminal justice system 
by concentrating on “strengthening legal supervision and safeguarding fairness and 
justice”, which are the central themes of the SPP’s ongoing procuratorial reform 
process.79 In the same year, the MPS constructed The Provisions on the Application 
of the Term of Criminal Custody by Public Security Organs for preventing any injury 
on the legitimate rights and interests of criminal suspects due to overdue custody. 
There were at total of 85 people endured illegally prolonged detention and the cases 
have been corrected by the procuratorial organs in 2007, while the same type of 
figures stood at 24,921 in 2003.80  
 
3. Existing Problems in the Current System  
Despite several positive steps carrying on, the revised provisions of the CCPL on 
pre-trial compulsory measures system and their applications are still far from a 
system that a deprivation of liberty must in all cases be carried out in accordance 
with the law and not be arbitrary, as the requirement in international standards, which 
mainly are Article 9 of ICCPR. An overwhelming majority of people awaiting trial in 
China are still detained in custody before trial.81 Contrasting the requirement of 
Article 9(3) of ICCPR, detention may still be the general rule for the suspects in 
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China.82 The widespread use of illegal or extra-judicial measures to detain suspects 
even allows law implementation agencies severely to circumvent the minimal 
safeguards for the rights of suspects contained in the CCPL of 1996. 83  The 
discussion below will mainly focus on some relative parts under CCPL. 
 
3.1 Limitations on the Notions of the Pre-trial Detention 
Lubman mentioned that as a part of the criterion for society, law is tightly connected 
with especially history, the structure of society, and cultural tradition. 84 
Internationally accepted human rights standards, especially international criminal 
human rights norms, help protect the individuals from arbitrary detention in the 
context of domestic criminal justice. But most of the law enforcement authorities and 
the general public in China lack of human right education and therefore also lack of 
the knowledge and understanding the essence of the right to liberty in the criminal 
justice. While it is laudable that the criminal procedure law in China is gradually in 
place and trying to require liberty deprivations to be made in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed law, the underlying ideologies safeguarding the fundamental 
right of liberty for suspects have not been widely aware and accepted within society 
due to the persisting of the pre-existing dominant ideologies.85 Particularly, as 
illustrated in Chapter Four, the principles of fair trial and the presumption of 
innocence have not yet been genuinely accepted in China. 86  A mentality of 
“protecting the interests of the majority of people is the maximum impartiality” is 
actually a deep-rooted legal tradition in practice instead. 87  These dominant 
ideologies clearly still have strongly impacted and reflected on both the attitude and 
behaviour of both the authorities and the general public to the criminal justice, and 
particularly to the human right protection for suspects. Therefore, these influences 
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have firstly been shown on both the legislations of the criminal procedure and its 
comprehension and implementations. It is likely that the gap between the law and 
practice will actually grow wider in China’s criminal justice system if the legal 
culture in the society has not been well-developed.88  
 
3.1.1 The Rare Use of Alternative Preventive Measures 
According Article 50 in the CCPL of 1996, the courts, the procuratorates and the 
police may, depending on the circumstances of a case, issue a warrant to compel the 
appearance of the criminal suspect or defendant, order him to obtain a guarantor 
pending trial or subject him to residential surveillance. However, deeply influenced 
by the crime-control oriented ideology as discussed in Chapter Four, in common 
practice suspects normally are regarded as danger to the society in China.89 Once the 
investigative organs suspect some citizen, he will be required to afford the 
responsibility of cooperating to punish crimes. In practice, there is a common view in 
the Chinese criminal justice regarding that suspects concerned should passively 
sacrifice their personal freedom to wait for the postponed completion of work by law 
enforcement authorities that should have been completed in time. Therefore, there is 
no intentions or even in passing considerations concerning the possibility of applying 
other preventive measures, such as bail or release under residential surveillance, to 
secure the conduct of the trial in the law and practice. A consideration of the 
justification of the detention as required in ECHR therefore is commonly be ignored 
in China.90 As a result, the proportion of application of “granting of bail and 
awaiting trial” or “residential surveillance” to avoid the custodial detention is very 
small, whether at the initial or at a later stage of the criminal proceeding.91 The right 
to a provisional release once the continuing detention ceases to be reasonable cannot 
be guaranteed.92  The provisions and their implement concerning non-custodial 
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detention in China contravene Article 9(3) of ICCPR that pre-trial detention in 
custody shall be used as a means of “last resort” in criminal proceedings.  
 
In all the decisions on the implementation of the compulsory measures in China, the 
authorities usually relied on the abstract reasons of public interests, such as the 
time-consuming in investigation and collection of evidence related to severe crimes 
or uncertain identity, risk of flight, the interference with the course of justice prior to 
trial, and the need to maintain public order and protection of suspects. With all these 
reasons, the investigative organs were provided with sufficient power to prolong the 
detention in the CCPL of 1996. However, there is no requirement in the law to 
ascertain whether such ground is sufficient and relevant, or exists a genuine public 
interest to justify a departure from the fundamental rule of respect for individual 
liberty. The reasons to use and extend the detention have seldom been substantiated 
in each case while these factors cannot justify the detention pending trial in each 
case.93 Firstly, in practice, the police and procuratorate may decide the continued 
detention merely in an identical form of words and therefore the detention may 
exceed the reasonable-time requirement, as shown in Sarban v. Moldova and Solmaz 
v. Turkey.94 Secondly, the continued detention might not be justified solely on either 
of those grounds set in the law, as reflected in Chraidi v. Germany.95 The lack of a 
sufficient explanation on how the formalistic grounds provided by law applied to the 
accused’s case for the allowance of arrest and detention in China is not an accidental 
or short-term omission, but become a rather customary way of dealing with 
applications for the release pending trial in practice.96  The implementation of the 
continuing detention in China might be viewed as unjustified on a person presumed 
to be innocent before trial. This is inconsistent with Article 14(2) and Article 9(3) of 
ICCPR, which respectively guarantee presumption of innocence and the right to 
presumption of release pending trial.97 
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3.1.2 No Separation between Detention and Arrest 
The setup of China’s arrest procedure considered little function of that the arrest 
should have to be prevented from depriving the personal liberty at will. There are 
different conceptions of detention and arrest between China and the international 
routine practice.98 There is no separation between arrest and pre-trial custodial 
detention in China. Firstly, in order to prevent a suspect to escape from the detection, 
litigation and judgment and avoid social danger in Chinese criminal justice, both 
detention and arrest are the compulsory system of depriving the personal liberty of a 
suspect and detaining him or her for a certain period on the basis of the law adopted 
by the police, procuratorate and court. Secondly, the arrest and detention thus have 
also become important detection methods in the Chinese criminal proceedings. The 
investigative organs take it for granted that the term in which a suspect is held in 
custody is the best timing for information gathering or to obtain the confession of the 
suspect so that the phenomena of inquisition by torture and overtime detention 
happen frequently even though numerous rules on prohibition of torture.99 Thirdly, 
while a crime-control approach to criminal procedure and the whole legal culture still 
prevails in legal practice, as Yan Youyi regards, arrest and detention is also to be used 
by the law enforcement as punishment to appease victims and the pubic in China, 
though the CCPL was not deliberately designed to this effect.100  
 
Therefore, the arrest mostly means certain period of custodial detention. Detention 
House Rules of China stipulates that the accused should be detained in the detention 
house governed by the police.101 This makes the accused to become the object for 
detection and inquisition, and be totally controlled by the detection organs. To meet 
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the needs of their own work, the compulsory measure, especially detention and arrest, 
is widely used to limit suspects’ liberty more than the factual requirements of the 
situation in case would call for. Arrest is the most severe custodial detention in the 
compulsory measures of criminal proceedings, which not only deprives the personal 
liberty of the suspect at the time when the action conducts but usually also keeps 
them in the custody till the court’s judgment came into effect.102  
 
As shown above, the CCPL 1996 sets restrictions on the power of arrest.103 Some 
scholars, such as Chen Weidong, are criticizing the legal prescriptions for arrest as 
too strict and the standards for pre-trial detention as too high, which is not sufficient 
to strike criminals speedily.104 Nevertheless, the standard for approval of arrest has 
been further relaxed indeed, compared with the CCPL of 1979. Firstly, the three legal 
requirements for arrest in Article 60 are not implemented firmly in practice.105 The 
condition of fix-term imprisonment and the consideration of alternative measures are 
usually disregarded once behaviour constitutes a crime. Instead of considering those 
three requirements together, the judicial interpretation suggests that where one of the 
requirements is met, the suspect can be arrested. 106 There is no standard of proof 
necessarily to demonstrate whether there is any risk of the suspect’s flight or 
corresponding danger to society. 107  Secondly, instead of having to produce 
clarification on the principal facts of the crime that required under Article 40 of the 
1979 CCPL, arrest can be authorized just if there is evidence to prove the facts of the 
crime under Article 60 in the CCPL of 1996.108 Though the high level of suspicion 
might not be required at this stage, as shown in Brogan v UK and Murray v UK, it 
may satisfy the requirement of the “reasonable suspicion”.109 However, research into 
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the widely use of arrest in China is shown that the concept of “evidence” to prove the 
facts of crime is interpreted very flexibly by the police officers in practice. 
Sometimes, the national authorities have not fulfilled the obligation to furnish some 
facts or information objectively to show that the arrested person was reasonably 
suspected of having committed alleged offence.110 The suspects can be being held in 
custody as long as they can even just by neglecting the law under the excuse of 
tracing the truth.111 The arrest and detention discretion in Chinese criminal justice 
therefore may not exercised in accordance with “reasonable grounds” for suspicion 
as required in Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK.112 This practice should never be in 
conformity with the important principles expressed or implied in Article 9(1) and 
14(2) of ICCPR. 
 
3.2 Problems with the Length of the Time Limits 
Despite the improvements on the time limit for the compulsory measures made in the 
new CCPL as discussed above, the length of permissible investigatory detention is 
not easily gleaned from the CCPL of 1996. The time limits on pretrial compulsory 
measures prescribed in the CCPL of 1996 still fall short of the substantial standards 
articulated in the ICCPR and other international documents completely.113 Detention 
exceeding time limit was described as the “longstanding difficult problem” (老大难
问题 ) between construction of a socialist legal system and an enforcement 
practice.114 The challenges have been huge as discussed below. 
 
3.2.1 Defects concerning Non-custodial Detention 
Besides the bias of the legislative concept as illustrated above, the laws have 
leakages in its time frame regarding the non-custodial detention as well. For 
summons, the CCPL of 1996 does not limit the number of times that summons may 
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be used, nor does it specify how long authorities must wait between the uses of 
consecutive summonses. According to some reports, some police repeatedly applied 
the summons measure to the same person without discontinuing questioning.115 
Furthermore, a similar administrative form of detention, called “taking in for 
questioning” (留置盘问) and defined in the People’s Police Law, stipulates that the 
police have the power to detain people for questioning for as long as 24 hours, with a 
possible extension of an extra 24 hours.116 Actually there is no apparent legal 
differentiation between this form of questioning and summons in terms of crime 
investigation in practice. Therefore, these two methods can be conveniently 
manipulated or abused by officials. It suggests that officials have employed these two 
measures in turn as a means to hold suspects in custody pending trial for a longer 
time period if they cannot attain enough evidence to arrest the suspects.117 In contrast, 
even though the threat posed to Britain by terrorism from Northern Ireland in 1988, 
British provisions which authorized the detention without judicial oversight of a 
person suspected of terrorism offences for 102 hours were found to breach the 
equivalent of Article 5(3) in Brogan v UK.118 Therefore the deficiency of the 
provision as to the time limits for summons and its implementation in China would 
seriously contravene the “promptness” in Article 9(3) of ICCPR.119   
 
Also the practical application on time limit of the “residential surveillance” and 
“granting of bail and awaiting trial” is chaotic. Article 58 of 1996 CCPL stipulates 
that the maximum period for suspects or defendants shall not exceed 12 months and 
that of residential surveillance shall not exceed 6 months. However, the 
implementing regulations stipulated by public security, procuratorate and the courts 
respectively, which stipulates that each of the organs can re-calculate the period for 
those two measures. This leads to some unusual phenomena, for example, repeatedly 
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carried “granting of bail and awaiting trial” on the same person under the same 
reason of the existence of a suspicion. 120  The total period of “residential 
surveillance” in China can be 18 months without any judicial control. The total 
period of “granting of bail and awaiting trial” can be as long as 3 years. This makes 
the originally slight compulsory measure to become a severe measure that restricts 
the personal liberty for a rather long period without any judicial control.121 Either the 
18 months or the 3 years period might be considered as an “extremely long period” 
by HRC if the national authorities have not displayed “special diligence” in the 
proceedings’ conduct. 122  Obviously the restriction imposed by this kind of 
non-custodial detention is intensive as a deprivation of liberty to suspects rather than 
a way to release pending trial.123 Therefore, a prolong period of the “residential 
surveillance” and “granting of bail and awaiting trial” without judicial control in 
practice may also greatly conflict with Article 9(3) that the accused is brought 
promptly before a judge.  
 
3.2.2 Limitation on Custodial Detention 
3.2.2.1 Prior to Arrest 
Compared with the CCPL of 1979, the CCPL of 1996 substantially extends the 
custodial detention period in several circumstances. Firstly, according to Article 69 in 
the CCPL of 1996, under special circumstances, the time limit for submitting a 
request for examination and approval of arrest may be extended by 1 to 4 days.124 
Moreover, in the final version of the CCPL of 1996 passed by the NPC, the public 
security organs had managed to claw back more power to sufficiently enforce their 
investigation function than the discussion draft would have allowed, in effect 
incorporating many aspects of “Shelter and Investigation” into the CCPL. Most 
noticeably, according to Article 61 of the 1996 CCPL, the condition to initiate a 
pretrial custodial detention have been expanded to when a suspect refuses to tell his 
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name or address, and his identity cannot be established; and when the police suspect 
that the person is a transient criminal repeated offender, or an offender who has 
committed crimes in conspiracy with other.125 The latter two circumstances are 
exactly the same as the categories of persons under which “Shelter and 
Investigation” was meant for. Under these circumstances, the time limit for 
submitting a request for examination and approval may be extended to 30 days.126 
 
Therefore, as indicated above, since the amended CCPL legally provides the police 
with the enhanced power to detain when they deal with cases under these additional 
“circumstances”, such as transient criminals, repeated offenders, and criminal 
conspirators, issue that arises naturally is how to determine whether a particular 
offender falls within the statutorily specified categories. Some definitions, however, 
are provided in Regulation on the Procedures of Handling Criminal Cases by Public 
Security Agencies subsequently issued by the MPS in 1998 which revised in 2007. 
According to this regulation, transient criminals are those who commit crimes 
repeatedly by crossing city or county borders; repeated offenders are those who have 
committed more than three crimes; and offenders who conspire with others to 
commit crimes are those who commit crimes with one or more other offenders.127 
However, these definitions are obviously vague and broad.128 The CCPL of 1996 
itself contains no definitions of those named offender categories.129 Therefore, the 
claim under Article 9(1) of ICCPR might succeed, as the HRC has consistently 
requires that all law should be sufficiently precise to allow the citizen to foresee with 
appropriate advice, to a degree that is reasonable in all circumstances, as found in 
Van Alphen v the Netherlands.130  
 
Furthermore, scholars have noted that even those current definitions from MPS for 
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those “circumstances” are often ignored by the police in practice.131 When the CCPL 
of 1996 allows the police to detain suspects under those circumstances for 30 days, 
some officers seem to feel justified in detaining all suspects up to that limit without 
any judicial control.132 This practice has not achieved the promptness requirement to 
be brought before a judicial body, following Salov v. Ukraine.133 Under this situation, 
although the police must seek the procuratorate’s approval of arrest within 3 days of 
the initial detention according to Article 69, it is a fairly common practice that 
officers would detain a suspect for more than 3 days even though the case they 
handle does not fall within the statutorily specified categories. In other words, before 
the approval be obtained from the prosecutor for formal arrest, the police on their 
own authority without any opportunity for review by a judge can easily subject 
anyone to incarceration for up to 37 days, which has obviously exceeded much 
longer than “a few days” as accepted by Article 9(3) of ICCPR.134 Moreover, 
comparing with Article 46 of the 1979 CCPL, the period within which the 
procuratorate must make its decision even has been lengthened in the CCPL of 1996 
to 7 days, hence a time limit for legal detention might be a maximum of 44 days.135 
This pre-trial detention can be excessively long to suspects without valid reasons for 
holding them in custody for the whole period in question.  
 
Noticeably, the MPS also issued some departmental notice and rules interpreting 
police-related provisions of the 1996 CCPL which further expanded the calculation 
of the time limits for detention of suspects who were targets of the former “Shelter 
and Investigation”. 136  In particular, these interpretations asserted that where a 
criminal suspect’s identity is not able to establish within 30 days, after receipt of 
approval from the responsible person in the public security organs at county level or 
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above, the time limits for detention will not commence until there is clarification of 
the name, address and background of the detainee.137 Moreover, according to the 
departmental rules initiated by the SPP, if a case is complicated or involved serious 
crimes, the procuratorate is permitted to make a decision no later than 20 days after 
receiving the police request.138 Then the period of detention can be extended much 
longer than 44 days and indeed it would be easier for the previous measure “Shelter 
and Investigation” to remain unchanged in practice. All these provisions related with 
the time limits of custodial detention in the CCPL of 1996 facilitate prolonged 
detention and severely contradict the right to a prompt appearance before a judge.  
Therefore, their practical implement may not be in conformity with China’s 
obligations under Article 9(3) of ICCPR.  
 
This vastly extended detention period seems be justified in China due to the very 
nature and characteristics of the crimes committed by suspects.139 The releasing of 
the labour and commodity markets has brought tens of millions of people from rural 
areas to cities and coastal areas in search of work. This free movement of people has 
created a sizable “floating population” (流动人口).140 These groups move from city 
to city in search of work, but with little education and no residency cards, it can find 
only menial and seasonal labour. According to the Asia Times, 120 million Chinese 
live below the poverty line and an additional 150 million are seasonal migrant 
worker.141 This represents a serious threat to social stability. Taking advantage of the 
weakened police control over the people in large municipal areas, criminals began to 
use the “floating population” to conceal their activity.142 They travel from one city to 
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another, not in search of work but in search of opportunities to commit crime. The 
police may need more time and energy to control these suspects and collect evidence 
to support a request for arrest. The emergence of transient criminals poses a serious 
challenge to the police. Available statistics indicated that transient criminals were 
responsible for a large number of violent and serious property crimes.143 Therefore 
the CCPL reformed in 1996 still provides the police with broadened power to detain 
in order to protect and keep the community harmony as a whole from the urgent 
desire to control crime at this stage in China. The complexity and special 
characteristics of the investigations may be acceptable grounds to extend the 
detention, following some ECHR cases.144 
 
However, firstly, the long detention without any judicial control in China are not 
acceptable, because the complexity of a case can never be taken to the point of 
impairing the very essence of the right to be brought before a judge or judicial officer 
promptly, as interpreted in Brogan and Others v. the UK and Murray v UK.145 
Secondly, as mentioned above, the reasons given for the suspect’s continued 
detention on remand usually cannot justify the length of the detention in custody.146 
Even under the state of emergency, the government has a corresponding duty to 
ensure that counter-terrorism measures are fully compatible with its obligations 
under human rights law, as explained in Brannigan and McBride v UK and Aksoy v 
Turkey.147 For example, under the very controversial provision of Terrorism Act 
2006 in the UK the detention is then reviewed by a judicial authority for an initial 
period of 48 hours.148 So the fact that arrests and detentions are only inspired by the 
legitimate aim of controlling the crime appears not sufficient enough to ensure that 
there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest. 149 
Therefore a conflict with Article 9(3) of ICCPR in conjunction with Article 9(1), 
                                                       
143
 See e.g. SPC Work Report of 2005; Guixin Wang and Yiyun Liu, “Analysis on Character and Reason of the 
Crime Committed by the Floating Population in Shanghai”, (2006) 3 Population Journal, pp45-46. 
144
 See Wemhoff v Germany, W v Switzerland, Chap3, 3.5.3, p132; Chap2, 5.4, p.59-60. 
145
 See Brogan and Others v. the UK, Chap3, 3.5.5.1, pp.138-139. 
146
 See 3.1.1 pp. 286-287. 
147
 See Brannigan and McBride v UK and Aksoy v Turkey, Chap3, 3.5.5.2, pp141 and 145 
148
 See Terrorism Act 2006, Section 23(7). 
149
 See Chap3, 3.5.1, p123. 
296 
 
which is belong to the fundamental human rights for suspects, might arise. With the 
UK’s experience on anti-terrorism, especially as A(FC) and others v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department illustrated, further revision for balancing the powers 
of the police and the rights of suspects is necessary for the criminal justice in 
China.150 
 
3.2.2.2 after Arrest 
Articles 125, 126 and 127 in the CCPL of 1996 contain several exceptions to the 
general three-month requirement to complete the investigation of a case after the 
approval of arrest for up to 4 months. It provides that in cases which involve crimes 
being committed in outlying areas to which transportation is inconvenient, in cases 
which involve organized crime, and in cases which involve serious crimes being 
committed by transient criminals, if the police cannot complete the investigation 
within 3 months, they may apply to the procuratorate at the provincial level to have 
the investigation period extended for another 2 months.151 If the police are unable to 
complete the investigation even after the two-month extension and if they believe 
that a suspect could be sentenced to more than 10 years of imprisonment if convicted, 
they may apply to the procuratorate at the provincial level to have the investigative 
period extended for another 2 months.152 The police thus in cases with exceptional 
circumstances may detain a suspect for as long as 7 months without being brought 
before a judge. This possibility is certainly an unwelcoming prospect for suspects 
and it might constitute violation to Article 9(3) of ICCPR, since the HRC has implied 
that a six-month limit on pre-trial detention is already too long to be compatible, 
although “reasonable time” is subject to interpretation.153  
 
But a more uncertain prospect for suspects is the circumstance under which the 
police may extend the detention without even seeking the approval of any other 
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competent legal authorities, which is related to the issue of judicial approval and 
review on the pre-trial compulsory measure as discussed below.154 According to 
Article 128 of CCPL of 1996, the police have the discretion to determine when the 
time limit of an investigative detention may re-commence under two circumstances. 
It first provides that while conducting an investigation, if the police find that the 
suspect has committed a new major crime other than the one under investigation, 
they may re-calculate the time limit of the detention from the date they discovered 
the new crime. Second, after a suspect’s arrest, if the police cannot establish the 
suspect’s identity because of his refusal to reveal details such as his name and 
address, the police may decide that the time limit of the detention does not 
commence until after they can establish the identity of the suspect.155  
 
Again, the definitions on these additional circumstances to justify the continued 
detention in Article 128 are abstract and vacuous. Meanwhile, there is no relative 
requirement on the number of times it can be applied while the longest time for 
custody is not clarified in that law or related ordinances. With the same reason as 
discussed above, the requirement in Article 9(1) of ICCPR as to appropriateness and 
predictability of the laws and their application would be technically evaded by 
Article 128 and therefore the essence of the safeguard would be impaired.156 For 
instance, there are no details given in the present CCPL on what may constitute the 
“new major crimes”. How to define the major crime also remains vague. Therefore a 
tactic often used by the police to prolong a suspect’s detention in multiple-offense 
cases is that when the “new major crimes” are the same as the crimes originally 
charged, but only involve different “circumstances” officials, the detention can be 
“reset the clock”. Even though the police already know that a suspect has committed 
more than one crime, they would submit the request for arrest on the basis of only 
one. After the suspect is arrested and detained, at the point when the time limit for 
the detention is about to run out, they would declare that the suspect is responsible 
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for another crime. There is no requirement set in the CCPL that the police need to be 
able to demonstrate the arrested person had been reasonably suspected for having 
committed a new offence, as required in Fox, Campbell and Hartley or Lukanov v 
Bulgaria.157 The police then may re-calculate the time limit of the detention from the 
time when they “discovered” the new crime. However, even though there is 
reasonable suspicion of the involvement of the person concerned in a serious and 
complex offences, while constitutes sufficient and relevant factor, it alone might not 
justify to continue being detained, as in Solmaz v. Turkey.158  
 
Similarly, taking advantage of the provision that permits the investigative officers to 
calculate the length of detention from the time they can establish a suspect’s identity 
if a suspect’s identify is not readily known, the police in many cases simply pretend 
that they cannot establish a suspect’s identity to accomplish the end of detaining a 
suspect beyond the legally permitted limit. Furthermore, if the procuratorate decides 
that “for a given reason, the case is unfit for adjudication” for a relatively long period, 
Article 125 stipulates that with special approval by Standing Committee of the NPC, 
the time limit on the detention may be extended indefinitely upon request from the 
SPP.159 This measure is obviously aimed at dealing with sensitive cases, such as 
high-profile cases involving dissidents or high-ranking officials. To sum up, a 
detainee can therefore now effectively be “investigated” for considerably longer than 
7 months before formal trial begin, without violating the flexible time limits 
stipulated in the CCPL of 1996.160 Again, there is a continuing obligation on the 
authorities in charge of detention throughout the period of the detention to consider 
whether its continuation is really justified and if not to release the person concerned 
there and then, as established in Wemhoff v Germany.161 However, failing to do so 
and even expanding the power to extend the detention by using the procedural 
deficiencies, China appears to severely undermine the obligation to Article 9(3) in 
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conjunction with Article 9(1) of ICCPR.162 Noticeably, following Aksoy v Turkey, 
long periods of unsupervised detention, together with the lack of effective safeguards 
provided for the protection of suspects as discussed in the coming chapters, 
facilitated the greater the risk of practice of torture or other arbitrary treatments.163 
 
3.3 Phenomenon of Unlawfully Prolonged Detention 
Promulgation of laws alone is far from sufficient to assure that officers would follow 
the procedures required by the law. The CCPL of 1996 contains an open statement on 
the conditions and the time limits to the pre-trial compulsory measures in the CCPL 
to comply with Article 9 of ICCPR. But Chen Xinliang points out that in practice 
there is actually no limit to the holding of suspects in custody in China because it can 
be prolonged limitlessly.164 Although the official reports all claimed that a large 
number of cases which contain problems of overly long detention had been 
collectively liquidated and corrected as mentioned above, the phenomena of holding 
suspects in custody illegally and holding suspects in custody by police, prosecution 
or judicial authorities beyond the legal time limits in fact has never been 
fundamentally eliminated in law enforcement.165 Such claims that all the illegal 
prolonged detention cases have been cleared up are impossible to verify. Even if 
many such cases have been cleared, only to launch a major campaign, “sunshine 
custody” as mentioned above, actually cannot put an end to the problem of illegal 
prolonged detention nationwide immediately and permanently. Observed from the 
official statistic data in recent years, new cases of illegal prolonged detention have 
still occurred constantly shortly after or even while redressing the old cases.166 The 
phenomena of maintaining detention without trial due to reasons, such as the 
shortage of the resources and the disputes of the criminal jurisdiction, have not been 
effectively curbed. It is still far from achieving a final success in uprooting this 
“chronic disease”.  
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On the one hand, in China, it has already become an ordinary fact that most of 
suspects are held in long term custody awaiting investigation, prosecution and trial in 
China.167 But most suspects, no matter detained legally or beyond legal time limits, 
will usually be found guilty by court later after trial. According to Article 41, 44, and 
47 of CCL of 1997, the duration of custody can be calculated into the duration of 
imprisonment sentenced by the court. Seen from the imprisonment’s perspective, 
there may not make too much of differences for the suspect how long they are being 
held in custody in the course of the investigation, if his final destiny is to be confined 
in prison after being found guilty. But the harm is obvious. Mainly the suspect’s 
rights to be presumed innocent until proved guilty guaranteed by Article 14(2) is 
ignored.168 Moreover, that will lead to the loss of the dignity and value of the rule of 
law. Behind endless detention of suspects is the loss of responsibility for final 
judgment on the part of courts.169 For example, it can easily be happening in practice 
that if suspects should be sentenced to a shorter term of imprisonment than the term 
they have been held in custody indeed because of the fact of their crimes, there will 
be some form of national compensation responsibility to their loss. So these suspects 
usually are being sentenced for a longer term of imprisonment which can match the 
time of their being held in custody indeed. This phenomenon does undermine the 
spirit of fair trial as enshrined in the ICCPR, particularly of Article 9 and 14. 
 
On the other hand, in the CCPL’s implementation, crime investigation authorities, 
especially public security departments, always complain that restrictions on 
compulsory measures prescribed in the CCPL have impeded crime investigation. A 
tendency is therefore undeniable that some police, prosecution and judicial 
authorities remain hostile to the newly enacted limitations on their powers. Certainly, 
the investigative organs can manipulate those vague terms in the law to confuse the 
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time limit for detention. They may be doing everything possible to find “loopholes” 
and “dead corners” of the CCPL, trying to formulate “counter-strategies” just in 
order to fulfil their work duties assigned by higher authorities, giving rise to the 
political guidance of “putting the fulfilment of work duties above anything else” or 
“putting political achievements first”.170 Failing to carry out the procedural rules 
appears to engage in the violation of the right to liberty, as in Voskuil v. the 
Netherlands.171 As HRC stated, this long period of incommunicado detention also 
may violate Article 7 of ICCPR.172 
 
The hostile attitude to the suspect’s right to liberty exist even in the context of those 
departmental regulations proposed by the law enforcement and judicial authorities on 
settlement of the problem of unlawful prolonged detention. As mentioned above, it 
can be noticed that “shall” is a term frequently used in the judicial Notice and 
interpretations to order correction upon discovery of unlawful extension of detention. 
However, there is the absence of specific measures following the term “shall”.173 
Namely, the Notice has not assumed any specific responsibility for the relevant law 
enforcement authorities and their staff members who directly held liabilities for not 
carrying on the investigation and correction of the cases about unlawful extended 
detention.174 Besides, “in a timely manner” is another frequently used vague term in 
these new reform measures. The Notice has no definition on whether “in a timely 
manner” refers to one day, one week or even one month. It shows an indecisive and 
weak-kneed attitude in the reform to control the police discretion on detention, and 
the implementation of these pre-trial compulsory measures in China, as shown in 
Menesheva v Russia, obviously is arbitrary and unlawful 175 All these provisions on 
time limits in the CCPL of 1996, those relevant departmental interpretations and new 
rules to cure the unlawful detention particularly have not been attained the demand of 
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Article 9(1) of ICCPR which requires the law for deprivation of liberty must be 
manifestly proportional, just or predictable.176  
 
The essence of the safeguard afforded by Article 9(1) has not been secured in China 
yet. It is obvious that the systemic design of compulsory measures under the 
influence of the traditional ideologies about the criminal procedure law has led to the 
danger of losing the incentive of the investigative organs to protect suspects’ legal 
rights. Therefore China must be fully aware that those in-depth causes resulting in 
illegal prolonged detention have not been eradicated, that the system against illegal 
prolonged detention is yet to be improved, and that the existing legislation to this 
effect is still defective. Judicial reform in China for the compulsory system, and also 
for all the issues under reform which include the two are to be discussed in the 
following chapters, involves not only the changing of the criminal justice system 
itself, but also social adjustment, reconstruction of state management, alteration of 
social consciousness and of the people’s fashion of thought, as addressed in Chapter 
Four. In particular, the way of thinking on the part of law enforcement personnel, 
needs to be further renewed and promoted.  
 
3.4 No Judicial Approval and Review concerning Compulsory Measures 
As discussed above, a number of important revisions to the CCPL of 1996 apparently 
brought China closer to eliminating arbitrary detention in its criminal process as 
required by ICCPR. However, large evidence available from the official information 
have already indicated that the continuing and widespread abuses of power in law 
enforcement, especially in the pre-trial stage of the criminal procedure, remains as a 
serious problem in Chinese criminal justice, including illegal extended detentions 
and torture.177 For example, in February 2006, the MPS announced that it had 
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suspended a total of 10,034 police officers since 1997 for breaches of discipline.178 
These kinds of announcements acknowledged the problem of the police’s misconduct 
and expressed a high-level commitment to confront the problem while improving the 
image of the police. At the same time, it also confirmed that local police in some 
areas openly collude with criminals, without fear of reprisal.179  
 
As observed above, the CCPL of 1996 obviously invested investigative organs with 
huge discretion to the compulsory measure. In the course of investigation in China, 
the power of investigation, the power of judgment and detention power are not 
separated, and are all authorized to the investigative organs. While they have to make 
a thorough investigation, the investigative organs have rights to examine the facts of 
the criminal case. The judicial rights cannot get involved in the proceedings and it is 
almost only the authorities of police and procuratorates, which decide, execute, 
prolong and change the compulsory measures. Therefore there is still a strong 
administrative character in the pretrial compulsory measures system under the CCPL 
of 1996, which conflicts to the requirement of Article 9 of ICCPR that no one shall 
be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention.180  
 
Noticeably, there are some confused ideas about the concept of judicial organs in 
China’s judicial practice, even in the considerations of legislators. As stipulated in 
Article 94 of the CCL of 1997, judicial personnel includes the staff who have the 
authorities of investigation, prosecution, trial, and prison management. Therefore the 
investigative organs, including the procuratorates, are considered as judicial organs 
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in line with the courts in China.181 Also according to the Constitution Law and the 
CCPL of 1996, the procuratorate is a judicial organ with special legal supervisory 
function and therefore has the authority to supervise all the pre-trial compulsory 
measures.182 Therefore some Chinese official reports and research have tried to 
resort this domestic reference to conclude that the national judicial authority with 
supervisory function, namely the procuratorates, is of compatibility with the 
requirement as to judge and judicial officer in Article 9(3) and (4) of ICCPR to 
guarantee prompt appearance before a court and speed review of the detention.183 
However, as indicated in previous chapters, the meaning of the requirements and 
phrases in Article 9 is determined by the Covenant and the HRC, not by those 
references to the domestic law.184 It could be said that all the provisions in the CCPL 
of 1996, concerning compulsory measures before the criminal trial, had clear failed 
to achieve requirement as to judicial control under Article 9(3) and (4) of ICCPR, as 
illustrated below. 
 
3.4.1 No Approval of Detention  
As shown above, there is no judicial examination for implementing detention to 
protect the individual against arbitrary interferences by the state with his right to 
liberty. According to the CCPL, the police have the right to directly issue and execute 
orders with respect to compulsory investigations without outside approval, such as 
search, collect evidence and capture, detention and wanted order that involve 
personal property, privacy, freedom and other interests. With respect to compulsory 
measure, arrest is the only compulsory measure, which requires review and approval 
by the procuratorates other than the police. Prior to arrest, police officers dominate 
the decision-making and executing process by themselves to impose the different 
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forms of detention, which is obviously not compatible with Article 9(3) of ICCPR.185 
The state’s duty to have the accused’s detention examined and approved by a judge 
or “other officer authorized by law” to exercise judicial power at an early stage, as 
emphasised in Schiesser v Switzerland, has been completely excluded in the criminal 
proceedings in China.186  
 
Also under the current notification system in the CCPL of 1996, the accused is easily 
held incommunicado, and Article 9(2), Article 9(3) and Article 9(4) of ICCPR appear 
not to be satisfied.187 According to Article 96 of the 1996 CCPL, during the first 
interrogation up to 12 hours, the suspect has no right to consult with anyone. After 
the initial police interrogation, then the suspect should be notified of his right to 
contact a legal representative and his family.188 Article 64 and Article 71 of the 1997 
CCPL also prescribes that within 24 hours of detaining and arrest, the family or the 
unit to which the suspect belongs shall be notified of the reasons for detention or 
arrest and the place of custody.189 From the day on which compulsory measures are 
adopted against the suspect or after the first time interrogation, if the suspect has a 
legal representative, the police have a duty to notify that representative.190 However, 
a more subtle technique frequently used by police and prosecutors to defeat a defence 
right to be notification is simply to exploit an exception also stating in Article 64 and 
Article 71 of the CCPL. The investigation organs need not to notify the family or 
legal representative of suspects, in their own opinion and discretion, if “this 
notification hinders the investigation of the crimes or cases”, or there is no way of 
notification.191 These exceptions are vaguely and broadly defined. In most cases the 
only reason that notification might interfere with the investigation is that it might 
lead the family or employer to retain counsel to meet the detainee in accordance with 
the CCPL in order to explain the nature of the offense suspected, relevant procedures 
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and the rights of the detainee.192 The right to be notified in Article 9(2) has been 
always ignored easily. 
 
Under such exception, in most cases, throughout the investigation of a case by police, 
suspects are detained without any notification to anybody even members of their 
immediate families are not allowed to see or have contact with them.193 However, 
the risk that the communication between lawyers and their clients would “hinders the 
investigation of the crimes or cases” may not justify the restriction on the right to 
access to legal advice, as found in S v Switzerland.194 The right under Article 75 to 
appoint a lawyer or contact with somebody and file petition or complaints on his 
behalf has not been effectively available in practice.195 It is therefore actually no 
chance for them to obtain a guarantor pending trial under Article 52 in China. Lack 
of access to a lawyer in detention has been found to fall within Article 9(3) of ICCPR, 
as indicated in D. Wolf.196 One commentator claimed that to his knowledge not a 
single application for bailing out suspects had been granted by the people’s 
procuratorates since the 1996 reforms.197 On the contrary, the provisions and their 
implementation in the CCPL 1996 effectively barred from promptly challenging his 
arrest and detention protected by 9(4) of ICCPR, following series cases in Uruguay 
and Jamaica.198 Furthermore, under this circumstance of incommunicado detention, 
Article 7 of ICCPR might be engaged where condition of detention itself was found 
to amount to inhuman treatment owing to inadequate provision for external contacts, 
as discussed in Chapter Six.199  
 
3.4.2 The Approval of the Arrest 
As mentioned above, comparing with other compulsory measures, the CCPL imposes 
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strict restrictions on the police power to arrest.200 However, the safeguard for the 
suspects against arrest arbitrarily in Article 60 appears to be inadequate for satisfying 
the objective nature of the reasonable suspicion as discussed above.201 Then there is 
an essential problem following up which needs to be discussed, namely whether the 
measures of examination and approval of arrest by procuratorates is an effective 
judicial control of the holding of suspects in custody when the standard for approval 
of arrest is loose. The limitation of the procuratorial supervision in China can be 
observed from the implementation of this measure.  
 
3.4.2.1 Current Procuratorial Supervision on the Approval of Arrest 
As mentioned above, the procuratorates are seen as the judicial organs in line with 
the courts and granted a kind of judicial right, an authority of judgment under current 
Chinese criminal justice system.202 Therefore, at the first glance, under Chinese law, 
there is a judicial organ with judicial power, the procuratorates or the court, 
conducting supervisory function and exercising some external examination of the 
arrest. A fact cannot be denied that in the current legal system the Procuratorates 
have worked hard in their capacity of deciding on arrest.203 Some legal experts think 
that the legal control of the criminal compulsory measures should be maintained at 
the current status. They analyzed that if the court is to exercise the authority of 
decision on arrest, it will involve a conflict of interests and bias for the judge upon 
the judgment before the trial. In the cases where the suspect is detained or arrested, 
the courts are bound not to adjudicate for the suspect acquittal. Therefore these 
academics believe that if there is a judicial review system in the procedure before the 
trial it will easily lead to a prejudgment on the judges’ behalf. For instance, Zhang 
Zhihui regards that compared with the authority of decision on arrest exercised by 
the courts or other judicial organs, the authority of decision on and approval of arrest 
exercised by the procuratorates is more suitable, and that it is the best way of 
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authority distribution.204  
 
Hodgson noticed that in some civil-law countries, including France and Switzerland, 
prosecutors rather than judges review the decision to arrest and detain.205 Fairchild 
and Dammer observed that in general, civil law systems tend to allow longer periods 
of detention while the investigation is being carried out.206 Given the cultural 
preference on social stability and the facts on the rising crime rates and the large 
“floating populations” as shown above, China is all the more likely to use 
compulsory measures to control suspects.207 This mode of investigation based on the 
theory of procuratorial supervision has really had good effects on punishing crimes 
and directing investigations, and it has had a positive function for a certain period. 
Therefore, in certain circumstances, this kind of supervision might even be consistent 
with Article 5(3) of the ECHR, which requires that a person arrested or detained be 
brought immediately before a judge empowered to exercise judicial functions, as 
shown in Schiesser v Switzerland.208 There are many scholars in China contend that 
in order to get in line with the international standard while keeping the basic legal 
system steady, it would be an improvement if the procuratorate of a higher level is 
empowered to review the self-investigation cases of the prosecution service and 
approve the arrests of those cases.209  
 
3.4.2.2 Lack of Independent Examination on the Application of Arrest  
It is hard to ensure that the prosecutors taking the approval of arrest be requisite truly 
independent according to the finding in Schiesser v Switzerland under the current 
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legal and political systems in China.210 The effectiveness of the current procuratorial 
supervision in control and examining the application of arrests is limited. For 
instance, as discussed above, there are still many incidents of holding suspects in 
custody beyond the legal time limit and the abuse of compulsory measures happens 
uninterruptedly. The status and role of the prosecutors in China are quite similar to 
those of the prosecutors in some eastern European Countries such as Hungary and 
Ukraine. Consequently, any understanding and analysis of the role of the 
procuratorates in the context of Article 9(3) have to be taken into account and be 
subject to the interpretation of the Committee in this respect, as indicated in case 
Vladimir Kulomin v Hungary.211  
 
Firstly, in addition to the reason indicated above concerning the different conceptions 
of detention and arrest, under the CCPL of 1996, it is primarily the procurator that is 
in charge of the prosecution, who later makes the decision to arrest in China. Courts 
in China do not have a power of judicial review at the stage of investigation in the 
criminal procedure on the ground that courts do not enter a criminal case until after 
indictment. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention regards that this is a 
clear breach the independence of an officer authorized by law to exercise judicial 
power within the meaning of Article 9(3) of ICCPR.212 The examination of the arrest 
by prosecutors who could intervene in subsequent proceedings as a representative of 
the prosecuting authority is totally a unilateral authority action, as suggested in 
Assenov v Bulgaria.213 The result is unchecked discretion for the investigators and 
total frustrations for suspects and their lawyers. In practice, during the investigation 
stage, the law enforcement authorities do not consider the necessity of detention.214 
They incline to decide whether or not to detain the suspect according to the needs of 
the investigation.  
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According to Article 7 of the CCPL of 1996, the consistency of prosecution interests 
of the procuratorate authorities and police and their legal mutual cooperation 
relationship in China decide that it is not easy at all for the procuratorate authorities 
to keep the objective, neutral and transcendent attitudes on whether or not to arrest or 
detain suspects.215 Influenced by the traditional repression thought and crime control 
ideology as observed in Chapter Four, in practice, the prosecution organs and the 
police, regardless of the positions they have in the criminal proceedings, frequently 
attach more importance to evidence or make decisions which are disadvantage to 
suspects, but are beneficial to their own work.216 The requirement in Article 43 of 
the 1996 CCPL for the police and the procuratorates to respect the facts of the cases 
and collect various kinds of evidence in accordance with law is usually implemented 
incompletely. For example, the “Supplementary Investigation” measure still remains 
in the CCPL of 1996 and is widely used in practice to collect more evidence not 
beneficial to suspects.217 Even if the procuratorates exercise the responsibility of 
legal supervision to control all forms of detention according to the law, they often 
stand in a position of tracing the criminal case effectively, and seldom do it from the 
angle of the protection to suspects. Without the purpose to do any collection of 
evidence which can benefit the suspect in the investigation, it is almost impossible 
for the police to submit any evidence to prove that the arrest of the suspect is 
unnecessary, provided the arrest measure has been applied. The police can even take 
unnecessary compulsory measures against suspects with the purpose of increasing 
the proportion of solved criminal cases. The substantive requirement which imposes 
the obligation on the procuratorates in reviewing whether there are reasons to justify 
detention and of ordering release if there are no such reasons, fails to achieve.218  
 
Secondly, it should be noted that the CCPL of 1996 is silent on whether the suspect 
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has to be brought before the procurator for the purpose of the approval of the 
extension of the detention. As a practical rule, the suspect who is supposed to be 
arrested has no right to stand in front of the procurator and argue about the crime he 
is suspected of and whether the arrest imposed on him is appropriate. The procurator 
is not under the obligation himself, of hearing the individual brought before him. 
While the procuratorate and the court ratify or decide the arrest, they are only 
required to check up the written materials in relation to a case and no need to hear the 
suspect’s opinions. This might breach the procedural requirement on the effective 
control of a judicial or other authority to detention as set in Schiesser v 
Switzerland.219 The defence lawyer can do nothing during the period of examination 
but wait for the result quietly in his own office.220  
 
Therefore, under the current system, the Chinese procuratorates do not appear to be 
the kind of genuine independent judicial authorities in examination of the application 
of arrest as the “officer” required in Schiesser v Switzerland.221 But similar to the 
situation in case Salov v Ukraine, the prosecution authorities in China not only 
belong to the executive branch of the state, but they also concurrently perform 
investigative and prosecution functions in all the criminal proceedings according to 
Article 3 of the 1996 CCPL.222 Obviously this function of procuratorates to trace 
crimes and to be in charge of prosecuting criminal cases always conflicts with the 
implementation of legal supervision in practice. 223  Under the current state 
management, the procuratorates are even less likely to intervene in an investigation 
by either the MPS or the MSS, whose investigators generally outrank their 
procuratorate counterparts in the Communist Party’s political pecking order. It will 
put the suspect in a real disadvantageous position. Furthermore according to Section 
10 of Chapter Two in the CCPL of 1996, the procuratorates have been given power 
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to arrest in the cases that they carry on the investigation directly.224  For the 
investigation of cases that are directly accepted by the procuratorates, the decisions 
to arrest or detain suspects are also made by the procuratorates themselves.225 Under 
this situation, the procuratorates obviously appear without incentive to self-monitor 
their own investigations in China following the finding in Niedbala v Poland.226  
 
The proposition mentioned above that the power of arrest approval rests with the 
procuratorate cannot ultimately repair the limitation of the unbalance and uncheck 
problem on the approval of arrest in China under the influence of the traditional legal 
culture and current social situation. The real purpose and meaning of Article 9(3) 
should be fully understood and achieved in Chinese criminal justice. The 
procuratorial power and legal supervision power are two species of different power 
states in nature. The legal supervision power should be a kind of transcendent and 
independent State power. This disposition stresses the importance of judicial review 
after execution. It guarantees that the authorities of law enforcement implement 
independently and therefore to safeguard and prevent violations of the accused’s 
fundamental rights. Since the purpose of the judicial review in the course of 
investigation are to assess whether sufficient legal reason exists for the arrest or 
detention and whether the detention before trial is necessary, the object of 
supervision should include the procuratorial power. Therefore the law supervision 
power and the procuratorial power are not possible to be on the same one level. Chen 
Ruihua regards it is like a fairy tale to make a national organ, which is in charge of 
criminal prosecution, supervise and guarantee the implementation of law and the 
correct behaviour of other national organs, when their activities are not legal.227 The 
current setup and the implementation of the approval of arrest from the prosecution 
authorities in China’s criminal procedure indeed conflict to Article 9(3) of ICCPR 
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which requires an impartial and independent judicial body to safeguard the right to 
liberty from arbitrary compulsory measures. 
 
3.4.3 No Judicial Review after the Execution of the Compulsory Measures 
As mentioned above, once the suspect is arrested, most possibly he will be detained 
for a long time. However, more importantly, except the general description in Article 
75 mentioned above, there is no formal and effective judicial review on the 
lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty after it has been executed to the detained 
person in the CCPL of 1996.228 In particular, some suspects know that the police are 
flouting the statutorily stipulated time limits. They try to redress the situation during 
the course of investigation. However, once the suspect is detained on remand, due to 
the typical and long-term existing problem of incommunicado detention in China as 
illustrated in the following chapters, there is no effective way for them to complain 
the unlawful deprivation of liberty.229 This appears to be considered as severely 
hampering the secure set for the detained person’s right to effectively challenge the 
lawfulness of his detention after some time, following De Jong, Baljet and can der 
Brink v Netherlands.230 Therefore a violation of Article 9(4) of ICCPR has also 
occurred.231 
 
During the period of detention, there is also no concrete scheme for the courts in 
China to start some adversarial hearing to the procedural problems of the detention or 
arrest before the substantive trial, or even to give some legal orders regarding those 
compulsory measures, which are limiting the liberty of citizens. There is no formal 
and express law even for the procuratorial authority which is claimed to take 
supervisory function in the legal system to carry out the review of legality of the 
detention. Moreover, the decision to initiate an extension of detention is entirely at 
the discretion of the investigative organs Under the CCPL of 1996. None of those 
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exceptions for extension of detention mentioned above is subject to any judicial 
review, which could examine if there is reason to justify the continued detention.232 
Detailed rules on implementing the CCPL of 1996 issued by the SPC and the SPP 
also contain no procedure to review the legality of time limit extensions either before 
or after they have been initiated. The detainee’s right to have a regular judicial 
review of the lawfulness of his detention, as required in the De Wilde, Ooms and 
Versyp v Belgium, has completely been excluded from the Chinese criminal 
justice.233 A breach of Article 9(4) of ICCPR on such aspect is found.234 Even the 
prosecutor carries out its supervisory duty to redress the unlawful detention under the 
current legal system, such situation still appears to fall out of the requirement on a 
court with judicial character for judicial review, based on Vodenicarov v Slovakia and 
Varbanov v Bulgaria.235  
 
The sole restriction on the use of detention is the internal check among the 
investigative organs. Before investigators implement some compulsory measures, 
they must obtain an approval from the chief of police and a permission order signed 
by the chief police officer. It is doubtful whether the self-policing scheme can be able 
to serve as an effective means to assure the legality of police action.236 The internal 
examination procedure tends to be administrative. In most criminal cases the suspect 
is denied the application of “granting of bail and awaiting trial”, again a decision 
made by the investigating agency alone. Since the initial request for detention is 
made by the police, after the procuratorate examines the evidence forwarded by the 
police and determines that the police have sufficient evidence to make the arrest, it is 
highly unlikely that the police would later come to the conclusion that there is no 
sufficient evidence to detain. Thus this internal supervision on the lawfulness of the 
detention under the CCPL of 1996 could be viewed completely incompatible of 
Article 9(4) of ICCPR, bearing Torres v Finland in mind as HRC made sure to 
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require the body reviewing the lawfulness of detention must be a court in order to 
ensure a high degree of objectivity and independence.237 The lack of judicial review 
for the victims for the police violations probably has seriously contributed to the 
problem of unlawful extension of post-arrest detention as mentioned above.238 
 
3.4.4 Difficulties in Obtaining a Remedy 
Since the right to challenge the lawfulness of one’s deprivation of liberty is not 
effectively available as illustrated above, the right to compensation under Article 9(5) 
of ICCPR has thus also been strictly restricted.239 Under Chinese domestic law 
suspects are vulnerable in obtaining any remedy for the breach of the right to liberty, 
whether or not the detention was unlawful under national law.240 The Chinese 
authorities are failing to fulfil its obligation to provide a compensation for wrongful 
detention, as reiterated by both ECHR and HRC.241 For example, for the first time in 
the history of the PRC the State Compensation Law, which was enacted in 1994, 
provides citizens with the right to sue the police for violation of their rights and to be 
recovered by monetary damages. However, only those who have been detained 
wrongly, arrested wrongly, or held in custody but judged innocent will get 
compensation form the national authorities.242 Similar to the situation in Harkmann v. 
Estonia, a person whose suffered unlawful prolonged detention has not been entitle a 
right to compensation under the current law.243 This narrowly defined circumstance 
has left no judicial remedy under any relevant provisions of the Chinese domestic 
law for the suspects who are lawfully arrested, but unlawfully detained by the police. 
Thus it is not compatible with Article 9(5) of ICCPR. 
 
It might be argued that in China, detention decisions may be challenged through 
several other channels, including administrative litigation in a court before a judge, 
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administrative reconsideration, administrative supervision, and through the system of 
letters and visits whereby disgruntled citizens write letters to or visit judges, 
government officials, people’s congress delegates, or virtually anyone else the 
citizens think may assist them, including party officials.244 But any attempt to obtain 
administrative reconsideration of investigators’ decisions by their higher authority is 
usually fruitless. The authorities have attempted to respond to this concern by 
strengthening administrative reconsideration of the decisions from the judicial 
authorities. New regulations, effective January 1, 2003, clarify the rights to challenge 
the public security decisions for the detainees and others who disagree with the 
decisions. 245  The regulations clarify a number of evidentiary issues, such as 
confirming that the public security may not obtain or rely on additional evidence not 
available at the time the initial decision was made. The rules also deal with the 
problem of local protectionism and possible retaliation to some extent by allowing 
detainees to appeal to a higher-level public security organ and then to appeal that 
decision to the next highest level and, if still not satisfied, to challenge the decision in 
court pursuant to administrative litigation.  
 
However, critics keep on arguing that these channels are not substitutes for a prompt 
review, or that they are not very effective as judged by the number of reversals.246 
The reasons are mainly because on one side, the administrators tend to side with their 
colleagues; on the other side, detainees are often ignorant of their rights and not told 
their rights by authorities. Moreover, many of the detainees may lack the financial 
means to pursue these various legal channels for challenging the decision.247 There 
is no clear data on the success rates of challenges by persons subject to the various 
forms of detention. Also there is no figure on how many cases are correctly charged 
or conversely how many should result in the detainee being released. These so called 
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remedies in China could not show with a sufficient degree of certainty and therefore 
the situations of obtaining compensation for the unlawful detention could not satisfy 
the guarantee of an effectively available remedy to the victims, as required in Ciulla 
v Italy. 248  Even when successful, administrative litigation is usually a time 
consuming process and does not ensure a prompt hearing before judge. This will not 
necessarily remove the immediate threats from officials seeking to intimidate 
detainees from exercising their rights, or to retaliate against those persons who tried 
to challenge the law enforcement authorities. The victims of wrongful detention in 
China are still suffering a violation of Article 9(5) of ICCPR.  
 
4. Further Reform  
In meeting with the relevant minimum requirements of international standards, China 
shall keep an eye on the existing compulsory measures in the CCPL of 1996 with the 
emergence of new situations in the society. This existing compulsory measures 
should be examined and those found in conflict with international standards as 
analysed above should be revised, so that the country can better prepared to ratify the 
ICCPR and fulfil its obligation to guarantee their people’s human rights. Meanwhile 
China shall take active actions on formulating legislatures on new measures for 
better protection of the rights of security and liberty and fair trial for the suspects in 
pre-trial proceedings. Under the discussion of this chapter, the further reform mainly 
according to Article 7, 9 and 14 of ICCPR shall be focused on the following aspects: 
 
4.1 Redefinition of the Compulsory Measures 
The litigation concept should be reformed to at most keeping up with the basic 
demand of Article 9 and Article 14. The law should clearly state that all the pre-trail 
compulsory measures should be established by law and using the extra-judicial 
measures to detain suspects as a criminal investigation technique should be widely 
opposed, as required by Article 9(1) of ICCPR. 249 The situation concerning the 
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non-custodial detention should be more clearly defined and limited in order to 
distinguish different conditions for different non-custodial detention measure, such as 
summon, “residential surveillance” and “granting of bail and awaiting trial”. The 
power for the police to detain suspects in China has to be reduced and restricted. The 
law must define openly that when the suspect waits for trial, they are free in principle, 
as required by Article 9(3) and Article 14(2) of ICCPR.250 Furthermore, it is 
necessary to prohibiting the suspect who has been imposed pre-trial compulsory 
measure without being brought before the competent judicial officer, also as required 
by Article 9(3) of ICCPR.251 Therefore the judiciary needs to meet the criteria of 
independence and impartiality. The role of the procuratorate needs to be reconsidered 
while the law should at least, also be make clear that other local regulations cannot 
impose additional restrictions on personal freedom beyond those imposed by national 
laws.  
 
4.1.1 Compulsory Summon 
Firstly, the measure “taking in for questioning” in Police Law should be incorporated 
into the CCPL.252 To comply with Article 9(1) of ICCPR, this power should be 
carefully and properly determined in the law.253 The police may stop and question a 
person if there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that he has committed an 
offence.254  For example, the investigators may temporarily forbid the relevant 
persons to leave and question them because a crime has been committed nearby and 
the investigators are looking for someone that may fit the description. The police 
officer must have a good reason for questioning. The person should not be stopped or 
questioned only because of some arbitrary reasons such as his race, colour, religion 
or he has committed a crime in the past.255 In order to establish a judicial control 
over all the pretrial compulsory measures, for the necessity of investigating the 
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involvement of a suspect in a crime and collecting relevant evidence, a summon shall 
be issued by the court for the appearance of a suspect. In case of emergency, the 
prosecutor or the police may take necessary actions, provided that the same request 
shall be referred immediately to the court concerned for approval. The law should 
also clearly spell out these emergent circumstances. They might include the 
situations, such as if the suspect is strongly suspected of having committed an 
offense while if he has no fixed domicile or residence; or if he has absconded, 
destroy and forge the evidence or there are facts sufficiently to justify an 
apprehension that he may do that; or if he has committed an offense punishable with 
death penalty or life imprisonment, or with a minimum punishment of imprisonment 
for no less than 3 years. 
 
4.1.2 Arrest 
In order to perfect the arrest system and to decrease the abuse of the arrest under the 
CCPL, the on-going efforts are encouraged to separate the concept of arrest and 
detention in China. The original concept of arrest might be changed into detention in 
custody. It would bring the legal system more in line with international standards, 
Article 9(1) and 9(3) of ICCPR, by providing a new concept of arrest in China’s 
criminal justice. The new concept of arrest might be clearly described as only when 
there is reliable evidence to show the strong suspicion of committing a crime by the 
suspect, and the suspect could be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of no less 
than three years, and he fails to appear without good reason after a summon had been 
legally served, thus necessitating his arrest, the suspect shall be immediately arrested 
according to law.256 The power of arrest should be described clearly in the CCPL. In 
order to set up an efficient judicial supervision on police power, normally the police 
and the investigative organs have powers to arrest under warrant. A written request 
for approval of arrest together with the case file and evidence should be submit to the 
court when a suspect is believed to meet the conditions of an arrest.257 To comply 
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with Article 9(3) of ICCPR, if the court found that the suspect should not have been 
arrested, he must be immediately released and issued a release certificate.258 
 
In order to circumvent Article 9(3) of ICCPR, when examining an arrest, the court 
should interrogate the suspect and heed the opinions of his legal representative.259 
The decision made by court should accord to the circumstances of the case either to 
approve the arrest or disapprove the arrest. The police should execute the decision 
that approve the arrest immediately and inform the court about the result without 
delay. If the court disapproves the arrest, reason should be given. If the police 
consider the decision to disapprove an arrest to be incorrect, it may request 
reconsideration with the immediately release of the accused. To achieve the 
requirement in Article 9(4) of ICCPR, if the arrested person, his legal representative 
or family refuses to accept the approval of the arrest, they may present a petition to 
the court of the next level against the court that approves the arrest.260 If the petition 
is presented, the court should hold hearings to heed the opinion of the procuratorate, 
the arrested person and his legal representatives and make an order in light of 
different situations speedily, for example, within 3 days.261 When necessary, the 
court may inform the witnesses to appear in court and give testimonies. But the 
petition and the hearings shall not affect the execution of the arrest. If the 
compulsory measures adopted against a suspect are found inappropriate, such 
measures should be cancelled or modified without delay.262 The heavy workload of 
the courts in China should not be used as an excuse to delay or even avoid the 
judicial review, as shown in Bezicheri v Italy.263 If a police releases an arrested 
person or substitute the measure of arrest with a different measure, it should notify 
the court that has approved the arrest. 
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The powers to arrest may be carried out without warrant by either police or any other 
person but have been restricted.264 For example, a person in flagrante delicto may be 
arrested without a warrant by any person. A person is considered to be in flagrante 
delicto if a person who is discovered about to commit an offence, or in the act of 
committing an offense or has committed an offence. For example, if the suspect is 
pursued with cries that he is an offender or he is found in possession of a weapon, 
stolen property, or other items sufficient to warrant a suspicion that he is an offender 
or his body, clothes and the like show traces of the commission of an offense 
sufficient to warrant such suspicion. Therefore the CCPL can regulate that the 
powers to arrests without warrant may only be used if it is necessary to the grounds 
such as to ascertain the person’s name or address; to prevent the person causing 
physical injury to himself or any other person, suffering physical injury, causing loss 
of or damage to property, causing an unlawful obstruction to the public place; to 
protect children or other vulnerable person form the person; to allow prompt and 
effective investigation of the offences if there are facts sufficient; or to prevent the 
disappearance of the person if he is in the execution of detention, or is strongly 
suspected of having committed an offense by facts sufficient in themselves. 
 
The performance of this power by the police also affects anyone whom the police 
constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be about to commit an offence, or 
be committing an offence, or have committed an offence; anyone who is implicated 
to be a co-offender by someone in flagrante delicto and there are facts sufficient to 
warrant the strong implication; anyone who is strongly suspected of having 
committed an offense punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment, or with 
minimum punishment of imprisonment for not less than 3 years. If the arrest is 
executed by a police, it may be made without a warrant only when the circumstance 
is too urgent to report to the court; an application for the issuance of an arrest warrant 
shall be made to the court immediately after the arrest. If the court rejects to issue a 
warrant, the arrestee shall be released immediately. 
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4.1.3 Establishment of a Formal Bail System  
As many scholars suggested, the reform of bail system in China should be promoted 
gradually and with the Chinese characteristics to give real efficacy to Article 9(3) of 
ICCPR.265 However, whether it would result in much relief for those detained is 
highly questionable. As mentioned above, there is no evidence that Chinese judges 
secure more just results. On contrary, as observed by Peerenboom, the vast majority 
of people in China is likely to share the prevailing and wide society belief in the need 
to be tough on criminals. 266  Even in some other developed countries, the 
authorization for detention is granted routinely unless there is clearly no legal basis 
for arrest.267 However, the low percentage of refusals does not mean that the bail 
system is entirely useless or ineffective in practice. The fact that such a procedure 
exists may at least send a signal to prosecutors that arbitrary arrests are unacceptable 
and thus may lead to a change in norms and behaviours, including self-restraint on 
the part of prosecutors. Some of the worst abuses might be caught, especially when 
the authorities are detaining someone on the suspicion without adequate evidence.268 
Those were initially detained upon approval of the judge should then be afforded 
basic procedural rights.269 
 
Then, in order to improve the current system of “granting of bail and awaiting trial” 
in China, the bail condition, bail category, an effective bail application procedure, 
bail judicial examination system and remedy system should be provided in detail in 
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the CCPL.270 For example, the bail conditions should be clearly defined. The law 
should state openly in what kind of circumstance the court definitely should or 
should not grant a bail to a suspect if he has applied. The circumstances that a 
suspect should be granted a bail might include if the suspect is under the age of 18 
unless the crime charged is especially serious; or if the maximum punishment for the 
offense charged is imprisonment for a period of less than three years, detention, or a 
fine and he would not endanger society if a bail is granted; or the suspect has been 
pregnant or are breast-feeding her own baby; or the suspect is ill and it appears that 
cure will be difficult unless he is released for medical treatment. The circumstances 
that a suspect should not be granted a bail might include if he may be punished by 
life imprisonment or the death penalty; or if he has or if he is a recidivist, or a person 
who makes the commission of crime a habit or occupation, a person who commits a 
crime during the period of a previous bail, or a person detained under the certain 
crime charged according to the law; or if he is attempting to escape or injure or 
disable himself, or there are facts sufficient to justify he may do that, or if he has 
destroyed, forge, or alter evidence or conspire with a co-offender or witness or there 
are facts sufficient to justify an apprehension that suspects may do that.271 The 
suspect or the persons who may act as his representative may, at any time, apply to 
the court for the suspension of detention of the suspect on bail.272 During the 
investigation stage the prosecutor may apply to the court for the suspension of 
detention of the suspect on bail.  
 
4.1.4 Residential Surveillance 
Also custodial detention of a suspect may be suspended without bail with limitation 
on his residence imposed. If a suspect, who should be custodial detained according to 
the crime charged, is not suitable for custodial detention, and has no fixed domicile, 
the court may subject him to residential surveillance. Residential surveillance shall 
be executed by the organ that applies it. The rights and obligations for the suspect 
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who are under residential surveillance should also be specifically stated clearly in 
law to avoid the violation of Article 9(1).  
 
4.1.5 Custodial Detention 
To cover the requirement of Article 9 of ICCPR, the pre-trial custodial detention 
should remain exception in China.273 The law should openly state that unless a 
detention order has been applied to the court the suspect shall be released after the 
interrogation immediately. When the investigative organ believe that a suspect meets 
the conditions of custodial detention, it should submit a written request for detention 
order together with the case file and evidence to the court for examination and 
approval promptly, such as within 2 days. 274  When a judge is making the 
examination, the prosecutor may present and state the reason for applying detention 
order and present necessary evidence.275 After examining the accused, despite the 
existence of the circumstances as specified below, the judge may nonetheless order to 
release the accused on bail, or with a limitation on his residence if the detention is 
deemed unnecessary.276 
 
The suspect may be detained in custody after he has been examined by a judge and is 
strongly suspected of having committed an offense, due to the existence of some 
circumstances it is apparent that there will be difficulties in investigation, prosecution, 
trial or execution of sentence and if such non-custodial detention would be 
insufficient to prevent the occurrence of danger to society. Some offense may be 
regarded as practically endanger society such as the offense of constructive arson, 
rape, and terrorism.277 All the circumstances for detention should be specially 
declared in the CCPL.  They might include that a suspect is attempts to commit 
suicide or has absconded, or there are facts sufficient to justify an apprehension that 
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he may abscond;278 or there are facts sufficient to justify an apprehension that he 
may destroy, forge, or alter evidence, or conspire with a co-offender or witness;279 or 
the suspect under non-custodial detention is strongly suspected of committing crimes 
intentionally from one place to another, repeatedly, or in a gang, or if there are facts 
sufficient to justify an apprehension that he may re-commit the same offense;280 or 
the suspect has committed an offense punishable with the death penalty, life 
imprisonment, or a minimum punishment of imprisonment for no less than 3 years; 
and if he violates the obligations prescribed by the law, he may be detained.  
 
The law should also clearly state that within 24 hours after detaining of a suspect, the 
police should notify the court in a written form. Provided that if it is necessary to 
continue the measure, the court may, prior to the expiration of the period, extend 
such period by a ruling after examining the suspect with all those specific 
circumstances as mentioned above.281 If no prosecution has been initiated or no 
judgment has been rendered at the expiration of the detention period, the detention 
shall be deemed cancelled, and the accused should be released. When the accused is 
released by the police or the prosecutor, the court shall be immediately notified. If 
the suspect, his legal representative or family refuses to accept the detention order, 
they may present a petition to the court in the next level. The court should hold 
hearings within 3 days after receiving the petition to heed the opinion of the 
procuratorate, the suspect and his legal representatives or defenders, and make an 
order in court in light of the different situations quickly.282   
 
4.2 Shorten and Firmly Implement the Time Limits 
Although the number of unlawful extension of detention cases has dropped to a 
historical record low, more is needed to resolve the problem while a long-term 
prevention system is still required to eliminate such cases in the future to comply 
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with Article 9(3), Article 9(4) and Article 14(2) of ICCPR. Another regulation on the 
prevention and redressing of unlawful extension of detention drafted by the SPP is 
expected to be publicized after further discussion with the SPC and the MPS.283 It 
remains to be seen, of course, how many of these and other reforms aimed at dealing 
with the problem of unlawful detention actually make it into the next revision of the 
CCPL, and even if written into law, how effective its implementation will be. 
Scholars such as Chen Guangzhong and Song Yinghui have strongly advocated 
limits on the time period of the compulsory measures.284 All the time limits should 
be set in line with the international standard of time limits for the pre-trial 
compulsory measure. Those periods for making such a measure should be clearly 
prescribed. Time period should be specifically calculated by hours, days and weeks. 
No extension of the time period of the compulsory measure should be allowed due to 
a holiday. For example, a suspect who is under the pre-compulsory measures shall be 
examined immediately, unless there are unavoidable circumstances that make such 
examination impossible. The law could states that at the stage of investigation, if an 
arrest or detention in custody is deemed necessary after the interrogation of the 
suspect, an examination and approval should be applied within 24 hours from the 
time of executing the measure.285 The court should make the related decision within 
3 days from the date of receiving the written request. Under some special 
circumstances the time limit for submitting a request for examination and approval 
may be extended by 1 to 3 days. The court should make the decision thereon within 1 
to 7 days. 
 
The administrative form of detention, “taking in for questioning”, should be strictly 
used in the circumstances prescribed by law and it should not be used as an 
alternative as summon. The time limit for the summon shall be cut to no exceed 4 
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hours at most. A minimum of 24-hour break should be set between two summonses. 
The period granted by public security organ for residential surveillance shall not 
more than 4 weeks. An extension of 8 weeks may be allowed with the approval of the 
court. The total period for residential surveillance implementing by all the 
enforcement authorities is 12 weeks. Furthermore the law should clearly prescribe 
that the total periods for “granting of bail and awaiting trial” implementing by all the 
enforcement authorities are 48 weeks. The time period for detention of a suspect may 
not exceed 8 weeks during the stage of investigation, 6 weeks during the stage of 
prosecution before first trial. 286  When necessary, application for a ruling for 
extension of the detention period during the stage of investigation shall be made by 
the public prosecutor with reasons and submitted to the court no later than 5 days 
prior to the expiration of the period. The ruling made shall, unless pronounced in 
court, be effective upon serving a true copy on the accused prior to the expiration of 
the custodial detention period and the period shall be extended accordingly. If the 
ruling has not been legally served by the expiration of the detention period, the 
detention shall be deemed cancelled. The extension of the detention period, during 
the investigation stage, may not exceed 4 weeks and normally only two extensions 
are allowed. The extension period shall not exceed 4 weeks in the prosecution stage 
and normally only 1 extension is allowed. 287   
 
In the CCPL it should contain all the clear definitions concerning the categories of 
the suspects who may be extended the time limit for pre-trial compulsory measures, 
such as the condition of a complicated case, serious crimes and inconvenient 
transportation.288 The law should clearly stipulate that all the time limits concerning 
the compulsory measures could be reset only under the approval of the court under 
certain circumstances. These circumstances include such as a new major crime being 
discovered or a suspect of uncertain identity; a major suspect involved in crimes 
committed from one place to another, repeatedly, or in a gang; the grave and complex 
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cases in outlying areas where traffic is most inconvenient; the grave and complex 
cases involving various quarters and for which it is difficult to obtain evidence. 
These conditions should be carefully set and stated in detail in the law.289  
 
4.3 Establish a formal System of Notification 
In keeping with Article 9(2) and 9(4) of ICCPR, a more legal binding system of 
notification, especially by the way of warrants, should be established in the CCPL.290 
The law should require when interrogating a suspect, the police, the procurator and 
the court should promptly inform him of the nature of the crime charged and the 
reasons for the compulsory measures as well as the related rights for suspects, 
including the right to defence, the right not be subject to torture or ill-treatment, and 
the right to make charges against the illicit conduct of investigators to the court and 
the right to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed in court. The same should 
also be stated in the record of the interrogations. Once the compulsory measure has 
begun, the executing organ should also notify the family member or someone 
requested by the suspect who is under the compulsory measures the same 
information, and inform the suspect concerning the result of the notification.  
 
Therefore the warrant shall consist of three slips, and in making a compulsory 
measure one slip thereof shall be handed to the accused, and one slip thereof shall be 
handed to the members of his family, or someone requested by the suspect. In the 
execution of a writ of detention, the writ shall be sent to the prosecutor, the accused, 
the detention house, the defence attorney, and the family or someone requested by 
the accused. The notice to appear for interrogation shall be signed by the head of the 
judicial police office. A warrant of non-custodial detention shall be signed by a 
prosecutor who is only in charge of the case filing during the stage of investigation or 
by a judge during the stage of trial. A warrant of arrest and custodial detention 
should be signed by a judge. The suspect should be presented a written decision with 
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statement of the reasons if the residential surveillance is decided to subject on him. 
When executing an arrest, the police must produce the warrant of arrest. A writ of 
detention is necessary to detain an accused and shall be signed by a judge.  
 
4.4 Establish a Judicial Review System concerning Pre-trial Compulsory 
Measures in China 
As Lyons said, all pain is punishment.291 Even though there are obvious diversities 
in judicial systems and criminal proceeding models among different countries, 
obviously the painful process of pre-trial detention serve being measures with a 
similar effect as a punishment. The pre-trial compulsory measures should generally 
be put aside if there is not enough sufficient evidence which testifies to the necessity 
to keep a person in detention, in accordance with the principle of presumption of 
innocence enshrined in all the human rights international covenants. 292  The 
forthcoming judicial reform should firstly ensure the enforcement of the 
investigation can be effectively supervised. The most significant safeguards available 
for the right to against the arbitrary compulsory measures include such as a formal 
system of notification as mentioned above, the right to silent as discussed in Chapter 
Six, and the right to access to the outside world, especially the legal counsel as 
discussed in Chapter Seven. Also as Sun Changyong regards, the existence of a 
judicial review system offers an opportunity to individuals to relief their rights and 
an occasion for individuals to resist national authorities effectively and equally.293 
The judicial review system of the compulsory measures in criminal proceedings is 
the inevitable outcome of the development of procedure justice.294  
 
Since the methods in the respect of judicial review for the compulsory measures 
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offered by existing criminal justice system are too general or even blank at all as 
mentioned above, China should provide an available and effectively mechanism for 
the people who seek to challenge the lawfulness of the compulsory measure to attain 
the requirement of Article 9(4) of ICCPR.295 From the historical perspective, it is 
obvious that the modern judicial review system is so fresh to China where it needs 
more attention and support to be established smoothly. Judicial reform involves not 
only the changing of the power arrangement of judicial and law enforcement organs 
on criminal justice system, but also the whole social adjustment, reconstruction of 
state management, alteration of social consciousness and of the people’s fashion of 
thoughts. It is for sure not a handy project, some important directions for the further 
reform on the judicial review system in China could be as shown below. 
 
4.4.1 Further Clarified the Legal Responsibility for the Judicial Officers   
In conducting pre-trial compulsory measures, the court, procuratorate and the police 
must strictly observe the CCPL and should not exceed the authorities prescribed in 
the law in order to keep up with Article 9 of ICCPR.296 The officers in charge of the 
criminal justice should ensure that the implementing the pre-trial compulsory 
measures to suspects are duly and within an attitude that respects and safeguards the 
human rights. More importantly, in respect to the judicial acts against the statutory 
procedure, in accordance with the degree of the wrongful acts and the consequence 
thereof, the system should clearly identify different liabilities of the public officers 
and the state. If the a judicial organ or its personnel, while illegal executing its duties, 
infringes the lawful rights and interests of a citizen or legal person and causes 
damages, it shall bear civil liability. The criminal liability that a state organ or its 
personnel must bear, after it severely encroaches upon the lawful rights and interests 
of a citizen or legal person and causes damages has been or will be stipulated by the 
CCL of 1997.297 Compensatory schemes should be adopted to provide an effective 
remedy for the victim of the unlawful measures to be in fact able to recover 
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compensation as required by Article 9(5) of ICCPR.298 
 
4.4.2 Proper National Organs Authorized to Exercise Judicial Review in China 
In accordance with Article 9(4) of ICCPR, the mode of having the procuratorial 
authority as supervisory authority under current CCPL should be modified. In 
accordance with the international standard, there should be no doubt that none other 
than courts are competent to exercise judicial review of detention and arrest during 
the procedure of criminal investigation.299 The claim that judges will be involved in 
the conflict of interests of the judgment before trial can be avoided.300 There should 
be different judges to approve the compulsory measures and to try the case. There are 
already successful examples in the judicial practice in many countries such as the UK, 
and the judges are exercising their judicial authority with respect and independence 
in so far as the different stages in the criminal case. It seems to be more reasonable 
that the investigative organs are only in charge of the investigation, and that 
detention and arrest are to be decided on by courts. This will guarantee the impartial 
forward motion of the investigation.  
 
However, as long as the provision that the procuratorial organs are state organs of 
legal supervision and enjoyed equal status as courts in the Chinese Constitution 
remains unchanged as discussed above, it seems very difficult to remove the 
supervisory power from the procuratorial organs and to implement the judicial 
review of compulsory measures solely by the Courts overnight. With such 
constitutional constraint, the construction of the relevant systems takes a period of 
time and is a gradual procedure. But in the long run, the courts should be the sole 
legitimate organs to exercise judicial review of each major step in the pre-trial 
proceedings. This is the ultimate aim of the reform concerning establishment of an 
effective judicial review system. A special section of the court for judicial review 
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should be set up and authorized to implement judicial review in the course of 
investigation. It may offer the benefit of neutralizing the advantages enjoyed by the 
prosecution through the use of an impartial adjudicator and an adversarial hearing. 
For doing this, the court definitely needs sufficient power and status to remain 
unaffected by the procuratorate. In order to change the approach and channel the 
majority of pre-trial procedural issues to the province of the courts, at this stage, the 
earlier judicial involvement can be introduced into the criminal justice. Such a 
provision may be added: if a suspect raises an objection to the procuratorial organ’s 
approval of arrest, he may apply to the court for reviewing the approval of arrest and 
if the court after hearing holds that the arrest is improper, the court has the right to 
rule to release the suspect. In addition, there has to be an efficient mechanism to 
enforce and monitor prompt compliance with the court’s orders so as to remedy the 
procedural violations efficiently and to create proper deterrence for future violations. 
 
4.4.3 The way to implement Judicial Review in China  
There are two ways of judicial examination that may be used in the judicial review of 
compulsory measures, written review and oral review. Zhang Kun regards that the 
advantage of the written review is its high efficiency because the judge does not need 
to spend much time hearing the statements of the investigative organs, the suspect, 
and the lawyer.301 But at the same time, comparing to the written review, oral review 
can provide more reasonable access to human rights protection in the course of 
investigation through presenting oral argument at the hearing. Certainly, more time 
and judicial resources are needed for the oral review, which may delay the 
investigation to some extent and burden the whole judicial organs. As discussed 
above, in the current legal system, the authority of approving arrest is exercised by 
the procuratorates with the use of written examination in China.302  
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If written review keeps being widely implemented in China, since the legal culture 
changes slowly, the current situation concerning lack of effective judicial review will 
not possibly be changed. It seems be a better choice to use oral review in the course 
of approval of a warrant of arrest, and also to use for all the judicial review of the 
holding suspects in custody in Chinese criminal procedure, in order to expand the 
space for the suspect to seek the legal protection for their right to liberty. But if the 
oral review is adopted, there will be some repetition of procedures in the judicial 
review system. Before the arrest, the investigative organ will take the suspect to court 
to participate in the hearing about whether or not to arrest. After the suspect is 
arrested, within 24 hours, the suspect will be brought to court again to decide on the 
lawfulness of the arrest and whether or not to hold the suspect in custody for a 
certain period of time. It can be expected that needs a huge of judicial resources. In 
addition, judges would have to review hundreds of thousands of decisions as to 
administrative detention. Judges and others in the criminal justice system already 
complain that they lack the resources to handle the ever increasing number of 
criminal cases, at least in some jurisdictions. Therefore, from a fundamental basis, 
there some economic questions whether it makes much sense to devote so much of 
China’s limited legal resources to formalizing a process in which the vast majority of 
the cases involve a minor offense and in which the facts and law are likely to be 
clear. 
 
Thus as to the judicial review procedure itself, in principle the judicial review after 
arrest should be held by oral review in order to completely satisfy Article 9(4) of 
ICCPR. If detainees are to be provided more procedural protections, it seems more 
reasonable to stipulate that the arrest warrant can be signed by a judge after written 
review of the material on the case submitted by the investigative organ. Also it 
should be combined with some form of summary procedures for those who admitted 
their guilt. The UN working group on Arbitrary Detention has suggested that review 
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by a single judge according to a simplified procedure could be acceptable.303 In 
response to the rising number of criminal cases and the heavy burden imposed on 
criminal judges, the SPC, SPP, and the MOJ jointly issued regulations in early 2003 
that provide for summary procedures and streamline the process in regular criminal 
cases.304 At the same time, the SPC, SPP, and MOJ jointly issue regulations that 
streamline the procedures in ordinary criminal cases.305  These two regulations 
attempt to address efficiency problems without going so far as to accept an 
American-style plea bargaining system.  
 
5. Conclusion 
From the above discussion, some positive changes to the current regulation of the 
pre-trial detention powers. The gap between international human rights law 
requirements for pre-trial compulsory measures and the current law and practice in 
China is getting narrow. Yet this gap is still not to be underestimated. The revised 
rules and relevant practice concerning pre-trial compulsory measures in China still 
have not been up to international standards, mainly according to Article 9 of ICCPR 
and Article 5 of ECHR as discussed in this chapter. Most notably, contradict to 
Article 9(1) and (3) of ICCPR, detention remains as not the exception but general 
rule in practice. As suggested in Chapter Four, significant reasons for the abuse of 
pre-trial compulsory measure are the prevalence of crime-control oriented values, the 
neglect of right protection for the individuals and the ignorance of the due process in 
China. Beyond these, the direct cause of the enormous latitude of the authorities to 
detain people for as long as they see fit is the extensive loopholes contained in the 
CCPL itself and in the interpretations issued by the law implementation organs. As 
illustrated above, this reflects the vagueness of the provisions and the lack of certain 
procedural rights required by international standards, which is not compatible with 
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Article 9(1) of ICCPR. 
 
The misuse and abuse of the pre-trial compulsory measure is also exacerbated by the 
malfunction of checks and balances in the criminal judicial system. This core 
deficiency leads to a unilateral investigation implemented by the investigative organs 
solely, which is directed against the suspect. Detention exceeding stipulated time 
limits merits serious attention. The requirement to immediately informing the suspect 
about the reasons for arrest or detention and their rights and to notify detainees’ 
families of their whereabouts as required by Article 9(2) of ICCPR can be easily 
waived if, in the view of the police, this might hinder their investigation. Article 9(3) 
and (4) of ICCPR are not qualified, since periods of pre-trial detention without 
judicial approval are long and subject to extension at the discretion of police and 
prosecutors. Detainees have no right of habeas corpus and no right to bail. Of the 
five forms of pre-trial compulsory measures authorized under the CCPL, the only 
one subject to external check is arrest, which must be approved by the prosecutor. 
The status of the public prosecutor called to approve arrest pending investigation 
does not fulfils the requirement towards the independence of an officer authorized by 
law to exercise judicial power within the meaning of Article 9(4) of the ICCPR. The 
Chinese courts play no role in issuing or reviewing detention orders. Even if suspects 
and their lawyers apply for obtaining a guarantor pending trial, they have no way of 
forwarding the application to courts. There is no actual judicial review system or 
authorizing system implemented by impartial and independent judicial organs now in 
China. A breach of Article 9(5) of ICCPR is found on the basic that there are only 
limited remedies to the detainees if their detention exceeds the legal time periods. 
Also officials in charge of the crime investigations have yet to suffer any legal 
consequences for holding people beyond the legally mandated time limits. 
 
Therefore the reform of the pre-trial compulsory measures under the CCPL at present 
certainly is not enough to arrive at the aim of controlling and decreasing the amount 
of compulsory measures being taken and the holding of suspects in custody, and the 
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realization of right to liberty and fair trial as guaranteed by ICCPR. Many relevant 
systems should be perfected in order to address and coordinate the whole criminal 
investigative procedure to reach the ICCPR standard, including those presented 
above as clarification of the scope of offenses subject to compulsory measures, the 
application of bail during the course of investigation, and the establishment of an 
independent and impartial judicial review system in the investigative procedure. Also 
arguably, during the time of detention, suspects ought to be entitled with the full set 
of procedural rights as required by the ICCPR, which some of these rights would be 
addressed specifically in relevant chapters later.  
 
However, the reform to provide more safeguards to the suspects being detained 
before trial in China is controversial, with wide variations in legal systems. Also, as 
having been seen, even the existing rights provided under the CCPL of 1996 have not 
been of much use in practice due to the crime control approach of criminal procedure 
and the misunderstanding of the law. While those new procedural rights should not 
be expected to produce a dramatic reduction in the number of people being detained 
or released after investigation immediately, they are still obviously important for 
those who would be released. Ironically, under the influence of the crime control 
ideology, the impact of providing these additional rights is likely to be limited and 
may actually make it easier to persuade the MOJ, SPP, and MPS to accept such 
changes. Once they review the empirical studies of their impact on criminal 
investigation and conviction rates elsewhere, the opponents of greater rights for the 
accused may not feel so threatened.  
 
Meanwhile the reform of the judicial system should keep promoting, particularly the 
system of the courts. It should manage to take practical measures to establish an 
independent and impartial judicial mechanism to strictly guard the legality of a 
criminal pre-trial compulsory measure. At present, like the procurataorate and the 
police organs, the court as it operates within china’s current legal system is also an 
instrument for crime control based on the traditional thoughts and the party’s policy 
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that social stability overwhelms everything.306 Cooperation in the fight against crime 
is over emphasized to the detriment of rights safeguards. Moreover, neither the 
judicial organs nor the judicial personnel can exert their authorities based on full 
independence and impartial as international standard required. 307 Particularly, the 
courts are all controlled by the corresponding level administrative authorities while 
they have to recognise the leadership role of the CCP in all facets of government and 
society. As Sun Changyong suggested, the interference with the independence of 
justice practice poses a great obstacle for the operation of the check and balance in 
the pre-trial process in China.308 Therefore in order to achieve the international 
minimum judicial independence standard, the future judicial reform of the system of 
the court should be on the basis of the realities in China to ensure the overall 
independence of the court and the individual independence of the judge. Above all, at 
this stage, reduction of the abuse of pre-trial compulsory measures will entail the 
clarification of the legal conditions for pre-trial compulsory measures, the gradual 
establishment of a proper judicial review system, and thereby the achievement of 
gradual dominant ideological change on the implementation of the compulsory 
measures before trial. 
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Chapter Six  
Prohibition of Torture and Ill-treatment to Obtain Evidence 
in CCPL and Movement towards Meeting ICCPR 
Standards 
 
1. Introduction 
Whether to reinforce the law and implement the rule of law, or to recognize and 
strengthen human rights protection, it is imperative to fight against and prevent all 
forms of torture and other acts of ill-treatment in modern China today. Apart from the 
signing of ICCPR in 1998, China signed and ratified the UN CAT and other related 
international documents as early as 1988, and the Chinese domestic law strictly 
prohibits torture and acts of torture of all kinds.1 That is to say, China has the 
obligation to implement the Convention’s provision against torture. However, 
nowadays, extorting confessions by torture during the pre-trial phase is the most 
prevalent manifestation of torture in China, and it still exists to a serious extent.2 
This has led to great unfairness in the protection of the rights of suspects. Therefore, 
the main focus of this chapter is on the prevention of torture and ill-treatment to 
obtain evidence in the CCPL according to the international standard, particularly 
Articles 7 and 14 of ICCPR.3  
 
This chapter will first illustrate the situation that torture continues to be a tool used in 
China’s criminal investigations to extract “confessions” under the CCPL of 1996 
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through presenting a typical torture case in China and also some important official 
and NGO figures. In order to better understand what is so special about the Chinese 
situation on prohibition of torture and ill-treatment in criminal justice, the chapter is 
going to explore the roots of the frequent occurrence of torture and illegally obtained 
evidence in China. This will be based on an assessment of traditional Chinese legal 
culture. The chapter will also investigate and highlight several aspects of the current 
criminal procedure law which fail to adhere to the ICCPR and ECHR standards. 
Recent steps in the legal and regulatory framework in China, which were intended to 
prevent the use of torture to extract confessions, will be explored and evaluated. 
Reflecting upon the existing problems, the paper will present recommendations to 
China for what needs to be done to further prevent the use of torture during criminal 
procedure and thus facilitate China gradually, but sufficiently, to meet its obligations 
under the ICCPR with regard to the human rights protection for suspects under its 
own special situation of the country.  
 
1.1 The Case of SHE Xianglin 
In October 1994, SHE Xianglin was sentenced to death by the Jingzhou Intermediate 
People’s Court for murdering his wife Zhang Zaiyu who had disappeared from their 
home in January 1994. He appealed to the Higher People’s Court of Hubei Province, 
which found the evidence insufficient and the facts unclear and sent the case back to 
be retried. In June 1998, the Jingshan County People’s Court in the province 
subsequently convicted SHE of murder and sentenced him to 15 years in prison. On 
April 13, 2005, SHE appeared in court in Jingshan, Hubei Province, for the third 
time on charges of murdering his wife.4 Unlike the previous two trials 11 years 
before, the purpose of this one was to pronounce SHE not guilty and immediately 
release him from jail. The reason was that the wife, SHE had allegedly murdered had 
shown up alive in his hometown on March 28, 2005. Obviously, SHE had been 
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falsely convicted. The key evidence that linked SHE to the crime was a female 
corpse that no family members had viewed, but which the police declared to be 
SHE’s missing wife, based on body height and a state of decay matching the time of 
her disappearance. There were no DNA tests or even blood tests. Though Zhang’s 
family subsequently asked for a further examination; either, the police did not take 
the use of a forensic examination seriously, or, as the police replied to the family, 
they did not have the funds to do so. As a result, the reliability of the evidence was 
greatly in doubt.  
 
The other vital piece of evidence was SHE’s confession that he had murdered his 
wife. What made him confess? SHE subsequently claimed that police had extracted it 
from him after repeatedly beating him and denying him sleep and water for 10 
consecutive days. His legs were seriously injured and his fingers and toes were 
broken. It is difficult to prove that he was tortured by the police after so many years. 
Nevertheless, there is a strong reason to believe that torture was the main cause of his 
confession as, clearly, a person would not normally confess to something that he had 
not done.5 The lower court convicted SHE of murder based on his oral testimony 
and the investigation report of the police. On appeal, the higher court found the 
initial conviction questionable and remanded the case to the trial court for further 
fact-finding. On remand, after mediation by the Communist Party’s Political and 
Legal Committee, the lower court affirmed SHE’s guilt but reduced the sentence to 
15 years imprisonment in light of three unresolved queries raised by the higher court. 
Further appeal by SHE was denied. After exhausting all channels of appeal, SHE’s 
family members began petitioning the government, attempting to rectify the injustice. 
As a result of the family’s incessant petitioning, the authorities detained SHE’s 
mother for several months, and she died shortly after release; SHE’s brother was also 
detained for 40 days and was warned by the authorities against further petition 
attempts. Had SHE’s wife not reappeared, SHE would have had to serve out his 
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sentence for a crime that he not only did not commit, but which never even took 
place.  
 
This SHE case is, sadly enough, not unique but typical in the Chinese criminal 
proceedings. It exhibits certain characteristics that are common to many torture cases 
in China, which will be discussed below. It was published in the media and triggered 
a debate on miscarriages of justice, which continues with more and more vigor until 
the present day, as observed below. Prompted in part by public outrage over the 
famous SHE Xianglin wrongful conviction case, the Chinese news media and 
scholars also published reports indicating that the widespread coerced confessions by 
torture and other ill-treatment continue, highlighting individual cases of torture and 
abuse, and trying to examine the roots of the torture problem.6 
 
1.2 Torture Exists in the Chinese Criminal Procedure 
For obvious reasons it is not possible to judge the extent of the problem. According 
to China’s official statistics, the fourth report from the Chinese government to the 
Committee Against Torture states that concerning extortion of confessions, the 
number of sentences fell from 143 cases convicting 178 persons in 1999, to 53 cases 
convicting 82 persons in 2004.7 However, even considering the narrow definition of 
torture currently adopted by the Chinese law, and comparing it with that in Article 1 
of CAT as examined below, the official figures probably represented only the tip of 
the iceberg. Most torture cases had not been reported or prosecuted until some of 
them resulted in death or other serious consequences. This analysis was supported by 
at least one authoritative source, which indicated that in 1988, the procuratorates 
received 1,048 complaints about torture to coerce a statement, but only 170 were 
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filed for investigations.8 Recently published statistics from the SPP on criminal 
cases of confessions obtained through torture in 2006 has shown that there were 110 
cases filed for investigations. But it also indicates that there are 598 torture-related 
cases which are in need of redress.9 Also, there are some cases in which families 
believe that persons who died in custody were tortured to death, but such cases were 
seldom filed for investigations.  
 
The international communities, or the key institutions within, have long observed and 
documented the situation of torture in China. The UN Special Rapporteur (SR) on 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment report was 
published 10 March 2006, with the conclusion that torture has remained widespread 
in China.10 At the same time, the report took notice of the willingness of the 
government to address the problem and undertake measures to combat torture and 
ill-treatment while expressed the opinion that the use of torture has declined in recent 
years. The 2006 report from Amnesty International said that torture and ill-treatment 
continued to be reported in a wide variety of state institutions and other international 
organizations, and an unacceptably high rate of miscarriages of justice in the Chinese 
legal system was also pointed out by the academic research, especially with the aim 
of extracting confessions.11 In general, a big gap between law and practice still 
exists in Chinese society.12 
 
2. The Reasons in Traditional Legal Culture for the Frequent 
Occurrence of Torture and Ill-treatment to Obtain Evidence in 
Current China  
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There are many reasons for the frequent occurrence of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to obtain evidence in China today. 
From Marc Galanter to Hong Lu, socio-legal scholars have long recognized that legal 
decisions and outcomes are affected and shaped by the prevailing legal structure and 
cultural context in which they take place.13 It is a historically inevitable result of the 
composite effects of new conflicts and problems on a number of social, institutional, 
and legal factors in a transforming society, as discussed in Chapter Four and some of 
which are to be illustrated below. But it is obvious that this phenomenon of the 
frequent occurrence of using torture and ill-treatment in the criminal justice is in 
themselves unreasonable. Today in China, not only the national legislative body and 
other government officers, especially the judiciary, but also the public of the whole 
country have begun to vehemently oppose such phenomena and, as a united front, 
have sought to abolish them.  
 
2.1 Remorse and Cooperation  
Confession in China is more likely to be interpreted and expected as the offenders’ 
morals awaken, i.e. their readiness to submit to legal authorities, to cooperate with 
social groups, and to seek reconciliation with the victim and the larger community.14 
As noted in Chapter Four, there is little tradition of respect for individual rights in 
China, and suspects were viewed as guilty.15 Thus, the strong inclination in the 
Chinese society towards submission to authorities by individuals, rather than 
insistence on one’s rights, may lie in the Confucian cultural influence that stressed a 
group-oriented, hierarchically, and morally ordered society.16 Braithwaite considers 
that the high levels of social integration in communitarian societies allow legal 
responses to wrongdoing to be more re-integrative, rather than stigmatizing, in regard 
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to their social condemnation.17 By viewing a criminal as a “whole person” who may 
be reintegrated back into the community, criminal punishments in China may be 
more responsive to the degree of contrition. A genuine, non-coerced confession with 
sincere remorse in Chinese society is not only the best confirmation that the party is 
in fact guilty, but demonstrates the criminal’s awareness and acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing, and arguably their willingness to be rehabilitated into the society. 18 
 
Therefore, traditionally, both the legal structure and the wider Chinese culture have 
actively encouraged defendants to confess to criminal wrongdoings. Confessors of 
criminal wrongdoing in communitarian societies who exhibit remorse for their 
actions would be treated with greater leniency. For example, the Tang code specified 
the timing of a legal confession and recognized that offenders who confessed to 
victims should receive the same legal benefits as those who confessed to authorities. 
Also, influenced by the above legal tradition, suspects do not formally have the right 
to silence according to the CCPL of 1996. 19  The stress on coercion and 
transformation of the individuals lends legitimacy to a culture of violence conducive 
to torture, as Manfred Nowak also points out in his report summary.20 The report 
refers to political prisoners, but in the view of Nowak, the analysis applies just as 
much for other suspects and convicts.21  
 
2.2 Maintaining the Investigative Capability to Anti-crime 
Confession coerced by torture is a product of deeply held values which unilaterally 
emphasis the importance of social stability and the need to strike hard at crime. As 
mentioned in Chapter Four, the political ideology has had a profound effect on legal 
principles, and the law is often used as a tool to achieve political ends in China.22 In 
ancient China, to solidify the emperor’s ruling position, he would issue severe laws 
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to restrict the people’s behaviors and maintain social order.23 The highly-centralized 
political and social management systems in China have less tolerance with the idea 
of putting an individual’s interest above the state’s need to punish crimes. One 
important principle of traditional Chinese criminal justice was that a person could not 
be convicted of a crime without a confession. The collection of physical evidence, 
especially forensic evidence, were not taken seriously or were even been neglected, 
as shown in the case SHE.24 Once a suspect gave an oral confession, his confession 
would be adopted and believed either true or false. In part, this reflects the traditional 
concern for substantive justice, rehabilitation, and restoration of social harmony as 
explained in Chapter Four.25 Confession is, of course, extremely functional for 
increasing the efficiency of criminal processing. The judges therefore relied heavily 
on the questioning of the accused.26 In order to obtain the confession, the person on 
a criminal charge could even be sacrificed to cruel interrogation by torture.  
 
Today, when the political leadership and social stability is threatened by some kinds 
of criminal activities which are so rampant, police are under pressure to solve crimes, 
and the general public is willing to turn a blind eye to coercive interrogation tactics if 
it allows police to crack cases and lock up criminals, as illustrated in Chapter Four.27 
This suggests that the absolute and non-derogable nature of the prohibition of any 
forms of torture and ill-treatment, as well-adopted by international treaties such as 
Article 7 of ICCPR and Article 3 of ECHR, is commonly not recognized in China.28 
For example, during periodic “Strike Hard” anti-crime campaigns, police are 
encouraged to use every means possible to show quick results in cracking down on 
specific crimes, which contrasts with the decision made in Soering v UK.29 Lu Hong 
observes that certain clauses within the substantive and procedural criminal laws in 
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China may be suspended, and offenders were given major incentives, beyond the 
stipulation of the law, to voluntarily confess to the authorities allowing them to 
accommodate the need of suppressing these criminal activities.30 It is considered 
even more intolerable for suspects, who have already been restrained by state power, 
to be able to challenge or escape from the state power. This frequently leads to the 
increased use of torture and an upsurge in violence. Obviously these concepts and 
ideologies are contrary to that demonstrated in Soering and Chahal, which require an 
absolute guarantee for the individual’s freedom from torture and ill-treatment, even 
during a state of immense disorder or emergency.31 The problem is exacerbated by 
the widely spread discriminatory beliefs that migrant workers and criminals are 
socially inferior, as mentioned in Chapter Five.32 
 
After the 1996 reform of the CCPL, the greater cultural acceptance of individuals’ 
human rights, the growth in legal protections for defendants, and the increased legal 
formalism may have produced a socio-legal context in which a confession may be 
less prevalent and less influential on legal decisions.33 However, because of those 
conflicting social conditions, the basic concepts on the fair trial principles, 
particularly the principle of presumption of innocence, contained in international 
standards are not yet ingrained in the minds of either the legal personnel or the 
general public at large in China, as examined in Chapter Four.34 Therefore little 
change in the nature and consequences of confessions in the last decades has 
occurred under the impact of social and legal changes. On the contrary, old values 
that encourage confessions have persisted as strong cultural imperatives in China. 
The legal reform may be more indicative of symbolic reform than actual formal 
changes in legal culture and law in criminal justice.  
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The legislative, executive and judicial authorities have not responded to the new 
ideology promptly. Instead, they have continuously harboured ambitions of limiting 
and stepping on individual rights with the intention to keep their own interests.35 
Therefore, whether consciously or unconsciously, the law enforcers employ measures 
aimed at dealing with a small number of actual criminals who acted against the 
interests of the vast majority of the general public. In this sense every suspect is 
presumed guilty and torture is taken as a form of punishment for criminals.36 Police 
officers who torture suspects believe that people will tell the truth when they are 
tortured. In order to avoid greater suffering in the interrogations, the suspects usually 
make groundless confessions. However, what is more likely to occur is that in the 
midst of their pain, suspects admit to doing whatever the interrogators want, even 
confessing to a crime that they did not commit, as in SHE’s case and many other 
cases in which torture has led to false convictions.37 As a result the facts cannot be 
clarified and a fair judgment cannot be reached. This shows that the notion of the 
presumption of innocence guaranteed under Article 14(2) of ICCPR is still weak 
among the law enforcers as evaluated in Chapter Four.38  
 
At the same time, the funding, facilities and training of police officers to conduct 
forensic investigations has not been able to keep-up with the new situation of social 
security in China. Therefore, this situation reinforces the use of torture to obtain 
evidence. From the socio-economical perspective, it must be understood that the 
Chinese investigative institutions are understaffed and facing budget constraints. 
Police receive low pay and bear strong working pressures. Despite efforts on 
improvement, overall, police, prosecutors and judges remain poorly trained. Also, 
police lack the resources and sophisticated forensic tools such as national computer 
systems, electronic tracking and monitoring devices, and DNA analysis labs which 
are available to their counterparts in more economically advanced countries. The lack 
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of real monitoring mechanisms adds to the possibilities of torturing persons in 
custody and getting away with it, as discussed below. Therefore the police commonly 
use dictatorial measures on anyone who resists them. During the process of the 
criminal justice reform, the police surely seek for wider discretion on the means of 
social control and hinder the reform to protect its own interests.  
 
3. A Weak Legal Framework against Torture to Force Confessions 
Besides these traditional factors which are against safeguarding the rights of suspects, 
China lacks specific legislation to ban the use of torture during the criminal 
procedure. The role of the defence party in the criminal procedure is also still rather 
weak. At the beginning of 1999, in order to prevent abuses, including the use of 
torture to obtain confessions, the SPP issued implementation rules stating that 
prosecutors should routinely read suspects under interrogation their rights. 39 
However, these rules are too simple and impractical. They do not spell out, either 
what specific kind of warning is required, or the legal consequences, if any, of 
interrogating a suspect without such a warning. Thus, a reading of rights may not 
explain very much to the suspects, which breaches Article 9(2) of ICCPR as 
suggested in Chapter Five and Article 14(3)(b) as will also be discussed in Chapter 
Seven.40 The lack of a presumption of innocence and relevant guaranteed procedures 
further devalues any warning prior to interrogation, as discussed below. The CCPL of 
1996 effectively puts suspects at a greater risk of torture and ill-treatment to extract 
confessions. 
 
3.1 A Narrow Concept of Torture 
The first factor concerns the concept of torture. Legally, China has passed the 
legislation to prohibit torture in criminal justice. However, Chinese text rarely refer 
to “torture” in discussions of the domestic context.41 The CCL of 1997 contains the 
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offence and punishment of torture in the special provisions, Article 247 and 248, on 
“infringing upon the rights of the person”.42 Article 247 is directed against the 
general situation of torture and other inhuman treatment and states that any justice or 
law-enforcement personnel who extort a confession or evidence from a criminal 
suspect or a defendant by torture or violent force shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years of criminal detention.43 If the offender 
causes injury and disability or death to a person, he shall be given a heavier 
punishment according to the provisions of Articles 232 and 234.44 Additionally, 
Article 248 particularly stipulates the punishment for violence against prisoners or 
detainees. Article 43 of the 1996 CCPL regulated the process of collecting evidence 
by the law-enforcement personnel, stating that “extorting confessions by torture” is 
strictly forbidden, and “threat, enticement, deceit or other unlawful means” are not 
permitted. The same provision can be found in the SPP’s Rules on Implementation of 
the Criminal Procedure Law. There are works regarding the prevention of torture as 
basically being equivalent to the prohibition of physical torture or extortion of 
confession by means of torture.45 Therefore, in understanding Article 7 of ICCPR, 
some scholars believe that Article 274 and 248 in the CCL of 1997 have already 
sufficiently prohibited torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.46 However, an argument could be raised that China might have set the 
threshold for torture too low and it is not sufficient to prohibit torture or make it a 
crime for the following reasons.  
 
3.1.1 Restricted Perpetrator 
The current narrow definition as to the perpetrators is incompatible with the state 
responsibilities in Article 7 of ICCPR. This is because China fails to set up a 
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framework that enables both public officials and private parties to be punished for 
treatment.47 In China, according to Article 247 and Article 248 of CCL of 1997, 
torture is either perpetrated by certain particular authorities, which are courts, 
prosecutions and the public security agencies, or specific individuals who work as 
judges, prosecutors and investigators, and implement these acts on behalf of those 
authorities. That means only these specific groups are responsible and should face 
the corresponding legal consequences. Any other kind of harm inflicted on citizens 
or individuals by non-particular state agencies or civil servants whose duties and 
responsibilities are not related to state criminal judicial activities, is not normally 
called torture. Even physical or mental harm or suffering inflicted upon citizens or 
individuals by state judicial agencies and judicial personnel can not be regarded as 
“torture” when not committed in connection with a criminal case. In practice, certain 
kinds of torture outside the regular judicial process, such as torture in administrative 
detention and in non-custodial situations, have usually been committed with 
complete impunity. It would appear that the authorities have not taken adequate 
measures to prevent torture and ill-treatment, or any disciplinary measures following 
such incidents, as confirmed in Ireland v UK and Cyprus v Turkey.48  
 
3.1.2 Limited Scope and Forms 
As discussed above, specific criminal investigations or trial activities and procedures 
used to be regarded as a necessary precondition for torture and ill-treatment, whether 
according to the law or the concept of the public. Of course, this is only one of the 
narrow understandings of torture and ill-treatment, since torture and ill-treatment 
involve a wide range of acts and situations according to international standards.49 
Many acts of torture and ill-treatment remain unacknowledged and many 
perpetrators unpunished. However, even within the criminal justice system, 
compared with the standards set in CAT and Article 7 of ICCPR, the scope and 
forms of torture under Chinese domestic law continues to fall short of the 
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international definition in the following points.50 Thus the domestic courts in China 
are not able to provide sufficient protections for the people who are in the risk of 
Article 7 treatment.51  
 
Firstly, in Chinese law or corresponding judicial interpretations made with respect to 
the amendments of relevant Chinese laws, there is no clear mention of psychological 
torture contained in Article 7 of ICCPR and Article 1 of CAT.52 Torture under 
Article 274 and 248 tends to be regarded in China as a short term for a cruel 
punishment and an extreme or special form of penalty implemented to the body, 
which causes great physical agony. This may exclude certain cases of torture that do 
not result in serious physical injury. The construct of torture is, in reality, based on 
the degree of physical pain or suffering.53 There is no doubt about this, given the 
definition of torture in such a limited manner, torture and ill-treatment is rarely 
prosecuted in China. In particular, physical or psychological torture that leaves no 
physical trace is nearly impossible to punish with the appropriate penalties. 
Nowadays, particularly in those developed provinces in China, the enforcers of law 
during the interrogation will try to avoid using those classic physical torture methods. 
However, special forms of unbearable mental persecution have been implemented 
instead to force the suspects to confess. These tactics include deprivation of food, 
noise and sleep, continuous interrogations, stress positions, threatening to hurt family 
members, as well as all kinds of psychological manipulations. Such practices might 
violate the freedom from torture and ill-treatment, as in Ireland v UK and Bati and 
Others v. Turkey, since they may cause permanent or severe injuries, death or other 
serious consequences at the end of the interrogations.54 Needless to say, situations 
such as property damage during the investigation or the threat of extreme violence 
risked a violation, similar to Selcuk and Asker v Turkey and Thompson and Venables 
v News Group Newspapers, have never been counted, or been proposal to be 
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considered, as a violation belonging to the protection of torture and ill-treatment in 
China.55 The family members of the detainees, like SHE’s mother and brother, have 
also never been taken into consideration as the victims of Article 7 treatment as in 
case Quinteros v Uruguay by the Chinese law.56 While providing impunity for 
officials who use ill-treatment as discussed below, this reality effectively encourages 
many law enforcement officials to rely on confession, rather than on proper 
investigative techniques, to break cases.  
 
Secondly, torture is still solely an intentional act of punishment in China according to 
Article 247 and 248. It means that the perpetrator is fully aware of the consequences 
of a cruel act committed with a purpose to inflict physical pain upon persons accused 
or suspected of a criminal offence, or persons under surveillance. In practice, as to 
general acts of violence directed at the human body, the victims of violence are 
occasionally injured unexpectedly to a serious extent. These results are sometimes 
completely unintentional and are purely accidental. These kinds of acts do not belong 
to the sphere of prohibition of torture according to the understanding of the current 
law. However, torture can be distinguished by the severity of suffering and the 
purpose for which the suffering was inflicted, as confirmed in Bati and Others v. 
Turkey.57 The scope of torture defined in China appears be much narrower than that 
of Article 7 of ICCPR and Article 3 of ECHR, for what constitutes torture and 
ill-treatment depends on all the circumstances of the case, as reiterated in Ireland v 
UK and Wainwright v. the UK. 58 Furthermore, as emphasized in many cases, to be 
prohibited, an ill-treatment must primarily attain a minimum level of severity rather 
than purpose.59 Therefore it is suggested that such limited scope of torture and 
ill-treatment still leaves a great deal of leeway for the Chinese officers, during the 
criminal investigation activities or in the course of a criminal trial, to use those 
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measures which could reach the level of severity regarded as torture or ill-treatment. 
 
Thirdly, it is difficult to know exactly what constitutes a degree of severity according 
to the Chinese domestic law in the assessment of torture and ill-treatment. There is 
no corresponding Chinese law that protects those suffering from an act which fails to 
reach the severity of torture but would still engage in cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment established in CAT and Article 7 of ICCPR. 60  In 
determining the degree of severity, people, authorities, and areas may differ greatly 
in China. The perpetrator of torture and ill-treatment may well find a pretext or an 
excuse for his behaviour. The Chinese authorities would then fail to adhere to their 
obligations under the ICCPR and CAT, which requires States parties to take measures 
for the prevention of torture and to punish every act of torture with appropriate 
serious penalties.61 
 
3.2 Evidence Obtained Through Torture Still Admissible at Trial 
3.2.1 Lack of Exclusionary Rules  
The second factor concerns the evidence. On close examination of the provisions of 
the current CCPL, it leaves open the issue of the admissibility of illegal evidence. 
None of these Chinese domestic laws expressly prohibits the use of confessions 
obtained by torture from being admitted as evidence in court.62 This sheds some 
light on the limited effectiveness in eliminating the practice of coercing confessions. 
Many scholars agree that the lack of an exclusionary rule is one of the principal 
reasons for the prevalence of torture in China.63 For example, Article 43 of the 
CCPL of 1996 only states that the use of torture to coerce statements and the 
gathering of evidence by threats, enticement, deception, or other unlawful methods is 
strictly prohibited. However, according to Cui Ming, using very large amounts of 
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evidence derived from torture and other illegal means, especially the accused 
person’s confession, remains a principal basis for proving cases as before.64 As long 
as illegally-obtained evidence is admissible, the clause “extorting confessions by 
torture is strictly forbidden” essentially exists only in name.65 
 
Also the provisions used in those departmental rules on the interpretation of the 
CCPL have not clearly and expressly excluded the evidence obtained through torture 
from admission at trial. According to Article 61 of Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on several Issues about the Implementation of the Criminal 
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China of 1998 (SPC Interpretation 1998), 
collecting evidence through illegal means is strictly prohibited. If statements from 
witnesses or victims, or confessions from defendants are proved to have been 
obtained through tortures, threats, inducements or deceptions, such statements shall 
not be used as a basis for convictions.66 Supreme People’s Procuratorate Rules on 
the Criminal Process for People’s Procuratorates (SPP Rules 1999) has similar 
provisions.67 According to the Rules (Trial) of Supreme People’s Procuratorate for 
Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law enacted in 1997, “physical or 
documentary evidence, if verified as being able to prove the truth of a case, may be 
used as legal evidence to prosecute a crime”.68  SPP Rules 1999, which is a 
replacement for the 1997 Trial Rules, leaves out this paragraph, but it continually, 
leaves the door open for illegal evidence. Regulation of Ministry of Public Security 
on the Procedures of Handling Criminal Cases by Public Security Agencies of 2007 
(MPS Regulations 2007) on the issue concerning evidence admission are even 
vaguer than the SPP Rules 1999.69 It remains silent on the validity of illegally 
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obtained confessions and other evidence, only generally prohibiting the use of torture 
in the course of collecting evidence.70 
 
Additionally, while both the SPC and SPP interpretations officially ban the use of 
tortured confession or statements, the tortured confession or statement may be legally 
“recollected” as evidence at trial.71 Once a confession has been extracted through 
torture, the law enforcement officer can request that the suspect repeat his or her 
statement, this time without the use of torture, and if the suspect complies, the 
confession may be admissible.72 These judicial interpretations also failed to spell out 
under what circumstances the authorities may reinvestigate and recollect statements, 
and thereby cure the illegality. Moreover, evidence derived from the tortured 
confession or statement is admissible, creating a situation where the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” is deemed bona fide evidence in the Chinese judicial system. The 
CCPL stipulates that there are seven categories of evidence.73 The Chinese judiciary 
divides those types of evidence into two general categories: statements and other 
evidence. The term “illegally obtained evidence” includes extortion of confessions 
by torture, but also search without a warrant, etc. However, Article 43 of the CCPL 
and Article 247 of the CCL of 1997 address only the tortured confession, not other 
kinds of evidence obtained through torture. The judicial interpretations, such as 
Article 61 of the SPC Interpretation 1998, are also only applicable to oral evidence, 
not other forms of evidence. As for the documentary, material evidence and 
audio-visual materials collected by police and prosecutors, though obtained through 
means such as illegal search detention and even eavesdropping, the court cannot 
refuse to take it as the basis for deciding case. Furthermore, it can be seen that the 
judicial interpretations only aim at collecting evidence by illegal means such as 
extorting confession by torture which gravely infringes upon the personal right of the 
citizen. However, they do not mention too much about the evidence obtained through 
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means of violating the right to privacy of the citizens, as protected by Article 8 of 
ECHR.74  
 
China obviously has not established formal and effective exclusionary rules.75 
Scholars have seriously criticized the intentional omission on the admissibility of 
illegally-obtained confessions and other evidence by the CCPL of 1996 and these 
judicial interpretations and have suggested that the ambiguity of the interpretations 
on this question may result in inconsistencies while handling illegal evidence 
between different branches of the law implementation apparatus.76  Also, such 
interpretations would arguably encourage some law enforcement officers to use 
torture as a means to extract clues about evidence, since they have been given an 
impression that they may not be able to rely on the oral evidence, but admission of 
the derivative evidence at trial will be secured.77 Indeed, many individuals have been 
convicted of heinous crimes based on “confessions” obtained through torture, 
coercion or the use of force, as vividly demonstrated in the SHE case. This practice 
certainly amounts to Article 7 of ICCPR acts and breaches Article 15 of UN CAT 
and 14(3)(g) of ICCPR which excludes the evidence elicited as a result of torture or 
other coercion by the accused, as also well-presented in A and others v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department (No.2) and Soering v UK.78 
 
There has been a heated debate on whether evidence gathered through illegal means, 
including coerced confessions, statements, documents and physical evidence, should 
be admissible at trial, in particular, when the use of the illegal-obtained evidence are 
supported by other prosecution evidence such as physical evidence or evidence of 
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another confession.79 Opinions among legal scholars on the matter can be divided 
into five camps.80 Firstly, there were some legal scholars insisting that any evidence, 
either legally or illegally collected, may be measured and used at trial as long as it 
can be verified as true.81 Secondly, some scholars in China believe in the primacy of 
legal evidence and argue that all types of illegal evidence should be banned no matter 
how crucial they are for the case.82 Thirdly, there are works which suggest that 
illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in trial after being legally gathered again 
or it may be used as a clue to attain other admitting evidence.83 Fourthly, there are 
works with an opinion that all illegally-obtained verbal evidence should be banned 
while physical evidence may be measured and used at trial as long as it can be 
verified as true.84 A recent authoritative book written by a senior prosecutor, Chen 
Guoqing, also expressly claims that physical evidence, if verified as being able to 
prove the truth of a case, may be used for prosecuting crimes. Since the physical 
evidence is irreplaceable and irreproducible and it will not be changed or caused to 
change in character or composition by the way and procedure of collection, as a 
method of fighting crime, it should not be excluded simply because those evidence 
were obtained through illegal means.85 Fifthly, there is a group of scholars maintain 
that all illegal evidence, regardless of illegally-obtained confession or physical 
evidence, should be banned with a number of exceptions under which a compelling 
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public interest necessitates the use of the evidence in question.86 These scholars, 
such as Sun Xiaofu, cited other legal systems, such as the Public Safety exception 
under the Miranda Rule of the United States, to justify such exceptions.87 
 
Obviously, there is a major concern on the issue of crime control in the majority of 
works, no matter which are trying to propose or against exclusionary rules for the 
criminal justice system in China. Owing to the poor capability of many prosecutors 
and the police, the confession and statement is still the main source of the evidence 
in criminal procedure, or, at least, it is the main technique of proof. While giving a 
confession, a suspect can help investigation agencies to develop and obtain 
additional case evidence of his role in the crime that corroborates his conviction. 
Conversely, if a suspect’s account is wrong about crime scene facts that should have 
been known by the perpetrator, the suspect is revealing the kind of lack of knowledge 
that would be consistent with a false confession. Therefore those academics and 
practitioners who are against exclusionary rule have insisted that tortured confessions 
could be a necessary weapon in the fight against crime in practice. For example, a 
police investigation scholar argued that an exclusionary rule is impractical and 
inappropriate for China, since it would permit too many criminals to escape legal 
sanctions and hamper efforts to crack down on crime.88 As a result of four years of 
research and study on criminal investigation work, Du Jingji believes that in 
contemporary judicial practice, the number of real crimes solved through the illegal 
criminal practice of tortured confession is far greater than the number of false cases it 
creates.89 This may be objective for true confessions that the facts the suspects 
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contributed are accurate and matches the objective evidence of the crime.  
 
However, these arguments may not justify the use of evidence obtained by torture or 
ill-treatment in criminal proceedings, since the absolute character of prohibition of 
torture and ill-treatment enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic 
societies. The right not to be tortured and ill-treatment cannot be suspended or 
weighed against competing interests even in the event of a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation, as emphasized in many cases such as Khan v UK 
and Jalloh v. Germany.90 This situation might also raises serious issues as to the 
right to a fair trial, as there is no doubt in mind that torture easily leads to false 
information. It might be incompatible with the requirement to the State to avoid 
creating the risk of an unfair trial as a whole by admitting a evidence has been 
extracted by torture, regardless of any consideration, as the situation and findings 
reiterated Harutyunyan v Armenia.91  
 
3.2.2 Lack of the Duty to Investigate the Allegations of Torture in Detention 
Current CCPL and relevant departmental rules set up a further hurdle for those 
alleging torture during detention. The law and the practice have undermined the spirit 
of “absolute guarantee” in Article 7 of ICCPR in China. For example, the SPC 
Interpretations set up that the suspects must prove both that the torture occurred and 
that the confession was a result of the torture. This standard of proof required by the 
court in practice appears much stricter than the one under the European Court, which 
is “beyond reasonable doubt”, as presented in Martinez Sala and Others v Spain.92 
As mentioned above, due to the influence of the traditional ideological “presumption 
of guilty”, in practice many judges and prosecutors in China regard a claim of torture 
to be an excuse to withdraw a confession.93 The authorities in China have no 
specific legal responsibility to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation on 
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how the accused’s suffering was not caused by their actions, as required in Kmetty v 
Hungary.94 Unless the defence and his lawyer can bring the evidence, such as, in the 
form of medical reports of injuries and witness statements, to prove that the victim 
has severe and visible physical injuries or other grievous consequences, the domestic 
judicial authorities may deny the suspects a reasonable opportunity to establish the 
matters of which they complained without a good explanation. However, it is often 
difficult for the suspects to prove that they were victims of Article 7 treatment, since 
the violation might take place long ago and the wounds of torture have already been 
healed.95 
 
Moreover, it is difficult or even unrealistic to gather the evidence for the alleged 
torture and ill-treatment by the lawyers of the accused. This is because the 
investigative agencies are given huge powers without impartial judicial review, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, to completely block a suspect’s access to legal counsel 
and family in the pre-trial stage for investigation.96 Such a vulnerable condition in 
itself is being seen as a breach of Article 7 treatment as HRC stated.97 Moreover, as 
the suspects normally experience a long period of detention in police custody, a 
greater chance of suspects is being tortured, as shown in Aksoy v Turkey.98 This 
practice clearly violates Article 7 in conjunction with Article 9 of ICCPR.99 Article 
14(3)(b) of ICCPR could also be considered in this issue, which deals with issues 
such as the lawyer’s right to properly defence which will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Seven. With only their word against that of the prosecution, torture victims 
are unlikely to have their claims accepted while evidence are almost never rendered 
inadmissible based on such a claim. 
 
All these shortcomings in the proceedings deprived the accused of any opportunity to 
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challenge the version of the events from the alleged torture perpetrators. Commonly, 
only when brought to court for trial does a suspect have an opportunity to tell the 
judges about the torture they have experienced in detention. However, without 
specific evidence law and clear criminal evidence rules, as discussed above, the 
judge in fact freely undertakes the task of evaluating the evidence produced by the 
suspects, whether the torture indeed existed and whether it was sufficiently serious to 
reach the threshold of severity. As considered in Kmetty v Hungary and Aksoy v 
Turkey, a violation of Article 7 might occur.100 It is arguable that the Chinese 
authorities reacted ineffectively to the complaints and the investigation appears to 
commence too late. It is both inappropriate and unreasonable to place the burden of 
proof on the accused to produce solid evidence of torture without having visible 
physical injuries, as shown in Khudoyorov v Russia and Salman v Turkey, when the 
accused is completely within the control of the police in custody.101 Once the 
detainee has shown that he was free of the injury or harm in question before arrest, 
the State will then bear the burden of providing a plausible explanation which is 
consistent with the evidence. Strong presumptions of fact on the use of torture will 
arise in respect of any injury or hurt occurring during such detention.102 As a result, 
although China has laws prohibiting torture, such as Articles 247 and 248 of the CCL 
of 1997, they cannot be implemented effectively. China has not fulfilled the duty to 
pass and enforce the effective legislation to prohibit the torture and ill-treatment 
under Article 7 of ICCPR. 
 
3.3 Debate on the Right to Silence in China  
As concluded from Chapter Four, CCPL contains no clear provision that fully 
recognizes the presumption of innocence as stated in Article 14(2) of ICCPR.103 
Indeed, the principles of presumption of innocence are undermined by some 
provisions of CCPL contrary to the international standard, Article 93 particularly. 
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This facilitates the use of tortured confessions by requiring the criminal suspect to 
answer the investigator’s questions that are truthfully relevant to the case. The 
Chinese legislature established the law in this way to serve the objective stipulated in 
Article 2 of CCPL, namely to guarantee the accurate and timely clarification of the 
facts of crimes, to apply the law correctly, and to punish criminal elements to 
safeguard innocent people from criminal prosecution. According to Article 93, 
suspects do not formally have the right to silence, but may only decline to answer 
questions unrelated to the case.104 Some officials defend the current system, saying 
that it does not require a subject to answer all the questions but instead requires only 
that any response to be truthful. However, if the responsibility is placed on the 
prosecution to prove the guilt of a person, it follows that the accused should not be 
forced to assist the prosecution by being forced to speak according to the law. 
Consideration of the judgment in Saunders v UK reveals that this view may 
completely infringe the presumption of innocence and the right to freedom from 
self-incrimination.105  
 
Moreover, the argument that the suspect is not required to answer all the questions 
under Article 93 is not consistent with the practice of criminal justice in China. This 
is because reasons for the suspect to refuse answering questions are not clearly stated 
in the law. In fact, the suspect may never know what is truly irrelevant during an 
interrogation. But the police could define what is relevant to the case. It means that 
the suspect is forced to help the prosecutor in proving the charges against him and a 
conflict with principle of presumption of innocence would arise.106 Noticeably, 
Article 93 of CCPL requires that before interrogation, the police must give the 
suspect an opportunity to make a statement regarding his or her guilt or innocence. It 
might argue that the procedure is designed to prevent the police from proceeding on 
the premise that the suspect is guilty of the suspected crime. Despite the good 
intentions of the legislation, it indicates that the police often ignore the procedural 
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requirement in practice. Not only that they do not allow suspects to make a statement 
to profess their guilt or innocence, the police, in many cases, also apply 
psychological pressures to make suspects confess or force them to explain away their 
alleged involvement in a crime. An often-used improper tactic is to tell the suspect 
that the officer has solid evidence against him or her and that it would be in his or her 
best interest to confess under Article 20 and 37 of CCL of 1997 and the policy of 
“lenient punishment for confessions” (坦白从宽).107  
 
In light of the traditional background explained above, Article 93 of the CCPL comes 
as no surprise. 108  This legal duty to honestly answer questions during the 
interrogations is originated from the traditional concepts as mentioned above, 
“leniency towards those who would acknowledge their crimes while severely 
punishes those who stubbornly refuse to do so” (坦白从宽，抗拒从严), which 
developed as a well-known criminal justice policy in modern China.109 Though no 
legal penalty stated in law is imposed if the suspects refuse to answer questions, this 
impressive policy is still stressed to all suspects. Based on this traditional policy, the 
CCL of 1997 also provides that whether the suspect confesses guilt or not, his or her 
attitude towards the accusation will be regarded as an important circumstance in the 
process of conviction. It stipulates a possibly lighter sentence and/or a mitigated 
sentence within the sentence range for voluntary confessions.110 Although judges 
and juries cannot draw the conclusion of guilty only on the basis that the suspect 
remains silent when questioned during the investigation in any case, the investigator 
will file the attitude towards the investigation with the suspect’s record.  
 
These provisions in the CCL of 1997 only specify that persons who confess with 
sincere remorse, or before the police detect the crime, will be given a more lenient 
sentence. However, the degree or amount of leniency is not explicitly defined. 
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Neither is there such explicit provision in the CCPL of 1996. Apparently, the rule of 
truthful statement is only taken as an obligation which does not bear absolute legal 
responsibility, and confession in most cases does not, in fact, guarantee a concession. 
In practice, however, a suspect who does not perform this obligation will be under 
heavy psychological pressure and face the danger of being punished severely. This is 
because, if the court has convicted the defendant after hearing the case, the fact that 
the suspect refused to confess guilt but gave a false statement or remained silent in 
the record before trial, will be directly taken as the basis of facts for the court to give 
a more severe penalty to the suspect. Therefore, suspects are forced to answer 
questions due to the threat of being punished for remaining silent.111 Thus the law 
and the policy with regard to the truthful statement will not only deprive the suspect 
of their right to defence, but also make them lose their right to free choice.112 Most 
suspects in the criminal proceedings will, at least in the period of investigation, 
actively make a confession of guilt instead of defending their innocence. It may be 
concluded that Article 93 of CCPL and its practice contradicts with Article 12 of the 
1996 CCPL to force the suspect to answer questions and incriminate himself due to 
the threatened imposition of a penalty for remaining silent.113 This provision and its 
practice clearly contravenes not only the fairness of a trial, but it also appears to 
easily cause Article 7 treatment when law enforcement officials have not obtained 
satisfied evidence.114 
 
With China’s documented participation in international covenants and commissions 
on human rights and fair trial, and preliminary recognition of the principle of 
presumption of innocence, the CCPL, however, still delays acceptance of the 
extension of legal rules guaranteeing the right to fair trial to a right to silence. Such a 
“natural extension” in many other countries and under Article 14 of ICCPR as well 
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as Article 6 of ECHR may not be as natural when viewed through the Chinese 
perspective. A number of cultural barriers in relation to the adoption of a right 
against torture and also a right to silence were discussed earlier in this chapter. There 
may be other factors to look at, which may be less culturally specific and more easily 
understood. These can be theoretical arguments familiar to scholars, but there are 
also realistic arguments that make sense to everyone. Scholars remain divided on 
whether China should establish the right to remain silent. Both sides have considered 
appropriate measures to help eliminate forced confessions. 
 
3.3.1 Opinions from the Opposition 
There are a number of arguments that have been used to resist the right to silence in 
China.115 It should be noted that these arguments are aware of the many special 
social and legal situations in China, and overcome the unrealistically high 
expectation to the right of silence. Many of these arguments believe that the 
requirement for suspects to answer questions is suitable for China’s national special 
circumstances.116 A review of these arguments leads to a better understanding where 
the difficulties lie and where opposition to change may come from. 
 
Firstly, one of the main arguments to resist the right to silence in China is that a 
silent suspect in a criminal investigation is a hindrance to effective detective work. 
The rate of solving cases will drop substantially and the cost of the criminal process 
will be significantly increased. This is an obvious worry, as He Jiahong observed, 
that will exist at least until the process of retraining investigators, prosecutors and 
judges is complete.117 As is the case in many nations, there are concerns about rising 
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crime rates and the ability of the national instruments in place to control crime not 
being able to cope with such increases. If a right to silence is introduced into an 
existing system that relies on interrogations and confessions, the existing criminal 
and punitive systems will not be able to cope with the expected upswing in crime. 
Some scholars also maintain that the confession is the “king of all evidence”.118 It is 
argued that the right to silence when questioned by police is exploited by guilty 
suspects. 119  By remaining silent, the suspects impede the investigations, the 
prosecutions and even convictions, particularly in relation to crimes which heavily 
rely on admissions of the confessions to prove all the necessary elements, such as 
possession offences and sexual offences.  
 
Therefore, to force a confession from a person, the investigation officers often 
intentionally use torture, such as in the case SHE. As Lin Zhaohui regarded, 
confession through torture can enhance the efficiency of crime control in a certain 
sense.120 He further illustrated that in most cases, the consumption of time and 
resources for crime investigation can be significantly reduced by extracting 
confessions through torture and forcing some real criminals to confess what really 
happened when they committed crimes. Sometimes, it is impossible to crack cases 
without confessions.121 Moreover, scholars argue that criminal interrogation not only 
cracks down on crime, but it provides valuable information on analyzing a crime, 
preventing it, and in the reformation of criminals.122 A right to silence it is argued 
would be counter to the understanding of “the mind of the criminals” by effectively 
cutting off an important source of information: the criminal suspect’s confession. 
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The goals that are promoted in these arguments are the study of crime and 
re-education of criminals, done through the information that flows directly from 
information that is gained through criminal interrogation. So confession should still 
be a key factor for deciding criminal punishment in a Chinese criminal court, if not 
the most important piece.123 
 
The presumption here is that the effective and complete investigation outweighs the 
concern for the rights of the suspects. However, this view might be contrasted with 
the decision in Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland.124 Some real criminals might 
escape punishment after application of the presumption of innocence and right to 
silence, but that is the price the judicial system will have to pay in protection of 
innocent people in the legal reform and social transition period. Public interest 
concerns cannot justify measures, which extinguish the very essence of an 
individual’s defence rights, even in the situation of striking terrorism. Practically, the 
available empirical data suggests that reliance on the right to silence does not reduce 
the likelihood of charges being laid against suspects, the likelihood of suspects 
pleading not guilty, or acquittal at trial.125 Those suspects who exercise the right to 
silence are more likely to be charged than other suspects, or if not, are as other 
suspects to be found guilty in court.126 Some research studies suggest that the 
likelihood of a suspect being charged and convicted increases where the suspect 
exercises the right to silence.127 It has been contended that, for the minority of 
criminals who could be classed as “professional” and who exercise silence in a 
calculating manner, changes in the law would be unlikely to alter their practice, 
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especially the case relying upon the confessions. For them, the benefits of remaining 
silent would be likely to continue to outweigh the possible disadvantages.128  
 
The lack or the under-development of sciences and technologies in investigations to 
attain evidence, other than confessions, should not be an excuse to prevent the right 
protections for the suspects. On the contrary, to “revolutionise” police investigations 
for the better human rights protection has required the development of science and 
technology. A research shows that instead of improving the ability of obtaining 
different kinds of evidence in the last twenty years, although there is change of the 
structure of the physical evidence, the ratio of the quantity of the confession to the 
quantity of the physical evidence has no obvious change in the criminal case.129 
Therefore, this means that the law enforcement officials still heavily rely on the 
confession for the crime investigation.130 The right to silence developed in the 
western countries at a time when the investigation technologies and facilities were 
far behind of that in China today. The police will then have two alternatives to the 
use of the right to silence. Either they can do nothing and allow crimes to go 
unsolved, or they will be forced to develop new investigative techniques and skills to 
solve crime and keep the crime rates down. Not only relying on the confessions, but 
upgrading the police equipments and improving the investigation technologies also 
need to play a vanguard role and to become a strategic priority in cracking crime. 
The use of modern scientific evidence has therefore become indispensable for proof. 
So the efficiency of police investigations should and would be improved by the 
approval of the right to silence.  
 
Secondly, there are some arguments that the right to silence would be able to resolve 
current problems in judicial practice entirely. For example, the reasons for extorting 
confessions by torture are certainly complicated. Therefore some scholars, such as 
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Xiong xiaosong and He Jiahong, argued that the system of right to silence should not 
be brought in carelessly because it is not the only way to eliminate the use of torture 
to extract confession.131 There is no doubt that the key measure to prevent the 
extortion of confessions by torture should be the exclusion rules of illegally-obtained 
evidence. 132  It can be imagined that if the admissibility of illegally obtained 
confessions, illegally-obtained or adverse comments at trial on silence during the 
investigation and in court were permitted, or if there were no related evidence rules 
to regulate the collection of the evidence, then the right to silence will become an 
empty promise even if it is set up explicitly in law. 
 
However, as an obligation under Article 7 of ICCPR, the authorities must enhance 
and promote enough effective human rights protection systems for the suspect to 
ensure that confessions are made by free will.133 The right to silence has both 
symbolic and practical importance. Symbolically, it defines the nature of the 
relationship between the individual and the state. It is universally recognized that the 
right to silence reflects the respect for the human beings’ dignity and spiritual 
freedom. In practice, the right to silence application is obviously believed to be 
included as one of the most important and efficient measures for the vulnerable not 
to be compelled to provide self-incriminating evidence and prevent wrongful 
convictions. If the accused has the right to keep silent, oral confessions and verdicts 
would have lost their assumed connection. There is no incentive or purpose to use 
torture or other illegal methods to extract confessions in criminal investigations. It, 
therefore, reduces cases of unjust charge. 
 
The importance of the right to silence in China is that it ensures an efficient and 
thorough investigation into a crime before initiating a prosecution, rather than only 
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relying on confession evidence. Currently, Article 93 forces the suspects to act as the 
witnesses for the prosecution and to explain his innocence, especially when the 
evidence for the prosecution was extremely weak. The burden of proof is therefore 
shifted from the prosecution to the defence.134 Therefore the suspects fail to receive 
a fair trial, giving rise to a violation of Article 14(3)(g) read with Article 14(2).135 
Bearing Murray, Telfne and Condron in mind, failing to guarantee the right not to 
incriminate oneself could be of relevance if the general burden of proof has not 
remained with the prosecution who has to establish a prima facie case before the 
inference.136 The principles of evidence that a person should be charged only if the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to ensure a conviction, and that the burden of 
proving the guilt of suspects rests on the prosecution, are so fundamental to the 
criminal justice system, as set out in the classic English decision in Woolmington v. 
DPP and confirmed in number of cases.137 Otherwise there will be frivolous charges 
in the hope that perhaps the accused will incriminate himself or herself, and give true 
or false confession by torture. If merely because a charge is filed and the accused has 
to reveal his defence, the police and prosecutors will take more chances with their 
cases, instead of respecting the principle of the presumption of innocence. Then the 
concept and culture of presumption of guilt will remain unchanged in China.  
 
It must also be noted that in the social circumstances of China, the opportunities for 
the accused to get effective legal advice, or any legal advice at all, before making a 
defence, still fail to achieve the requirement of Article 14(3)(d) of ICCPR as which is 
to be discussed in Chapter Seven.138 Both poverty and ignorance obstruct such 
opportunities. Through fear and other reasons an accused may put forward what he 
thinks is a better defence than the truth. Then the prosecutors can demolish the 
defence and expose the person as a liar. Given the complex nature of human 
responses when faced with fear of strong state agencies, personal insecurity of life 
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and liberty and potential punishments, it is very dangerous to demand a person to 
give a precise defence without any legal advice at the initial stages of police 
interrogation, as suggested in Magee v UK and Averill v UK.139  
 
Thirdly, it is argued that the side effects of the right to silence are many. There are a 
number of debates and modifications of the right to silence in countries which the 
right to silence had set up.140 Therefore China should not act rashly. As discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three, in 1966, at the time the ICCPR was drafted, the right to 
silence was not explicitly mentioned in any international instrument. However, 
recent developments on the issue of right to silence, including the jurisprudence from 
the ICCPR, ECHR and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, appear 
to have firmly established this right as an international standard.141 For example, the 
most recent articulation of this right in the Rome Statute provides for a broad 
interpretation in that silence may not be used as evidence to prove guilt and no 
adverse consequences may be drawn from the exercise of the right to remain silent. 
Similarly, while not being explicit in the ECHR, the European Court also interprets 
Article 6 that the right to silence was an inherent element of a fair trial and that the 
right to a fair trial would be violated if the defendant were convicted solely or mainly 
on the basis of his exercise of the right to silence, as the value attached in Condron v 
UK.142 The majority of countries have firmly implemented the system of the right to 
silence.  
 
From examining the international and regional human rights and instruments and the 
implementation practice in various domestic jurisdictions, it would appear that the 
question is not whether there is a right to silence, but rather what is the precise nature 
of this right. For example, the European Court accepted that the right to silence was 
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not an absolute right. In a number of cases, it has been used as the starting point for 
analysing the affirmation of the implicit right to silence in the convention.143 
Adverse inference could be drawn if certain safeguards were in place, including the 
right to counsel, providing a caution in clear terms and ensuring that the accused 
understood the possible consequences of their decision, as rested in Murray v UK.144 
However, with careful emphasis on the fact that it was dealing with the particular 
facts of each case, the European Court constantly stressed in different situations that 
the right to silence is fundamental to the principle of presumption of innocence. It is 
for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and due to this obligation, an accused person must be free to remain silent.145 
 
The legislative modifications of the right are in constant debate in both domestic 
Member state courts and the ECHR. In the UK, for example, there have been a 
number of reviews by various Committees and Royal Commissions dating back to 
1968 on whether to abolish, retain or modify the right to silence.146 However, the 
majority of these reviews recommended retaining the right to silence, as it was 
defined in Halsbury.147 The UK jurisdictions have insisted on recognizing the right 
to silence both at trial and during investigation. These debates depend upon the 
importance placed on this right while balancing the use of drawing adverse 
inferences with the presumption of silence and the right not to be compelled to testify 
against oneself.148 Also, in 1995, the HRC reviewed the fourth periodic report of the 
UK and found that the modification of the right to remain silent in allowing the judge 
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and jury to draw adverse inferences in certain situations violates various provisions 
of Article 14 of the Covenant, despite a range of safeguards built into the legislation 
and the rules enacted thereunder.149 Recent cases of the European Court give further 
indication of how the English courts should apply the right to silence and balance 
drawing adverse inferences, as in O’halloran and Francis v UK.150 However, no 
questions were raised about the retention of the right of silence. The right to silence 
is now being accepted as an international human right associated with a fair criminal 
proceeding, with nations around the world increasingly agreeing that state power 
should not be used to compel self-incrimination.151   
 
3.3.2 Opinions from the Supporters 
On the other hand, the advocates recommended that the right of silence should be 
incorporated in the soon-to-come revisions of the CCPL.152 The real problem for 
establishing the right to silence in China may be best described as one of the 
presumption of innocence versus the suspicion of guilt. As discussed above, the right 
to silence can release the suspect from the obligation of making confession, and rids 
them of the disadvantageous position of being targets of inquisition or litigation 
objects. Instead the right to silence makes it possible for them to become litigation 
subjects who can actively exercise their defence functions, which is helpful for 
realizing the equal adversary between prosecution and defence.153 The right to 
silence is one of basic rights for the suspects as defined in international law as 
discussed above. Its establishment into the CCPL will further recognise the principle 
of presumption of innocence in Chinese criminal justice since 1996 and bring the 
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Chinese legal system into compliance with ICCPR.154 The Chinese general public 
and government have called for close studies on human rights issues and they are 
learning to think of everything from the angle of human rights and are taking actions 
in line with fair trial and anti-torture practice and conception universally applied in 
the world. China should also abide by and implement the various standards that were 
endorsed by the member states of the UN.  
 
As Koh regarded, most nations observe most principles of international law and most 
their obligations in most of the time.155 It has been said that the right to silence 
consists of a cluster of procedural rules that protect against self-incrimination.156 In 
reality, it presents more questions than answers. As mentioned above, however, for 
the fundamental differences in the legal evolution of such concepts as a right to 
silence in China, there may be bigger hurdles to overcome. But if China is going to 
establish the right, what mode should be used? Attempting to force Miranda-like 
rules into a thoroughly different cultural system of laws could be likened to trying to 
force the proverbial square peg into a round hole. An international law model may or 
may not be more effective in China. However, that does not mean that looking, for 
example, to UK domestic law for some form of guidance in this area is unacceptable. 
On the contrary, it may be possible to borrow from, or refer to, UK experiences on 
the construction of the right to silence in order to reform the existing Chinese legal 
system.  
 
3.4 Lack of Independent Monitoring Mechanisms to Prevent Torture 
Besides the weaknesses in criminal procedures and a tradition of coercion, the lack 
of effective monitoring mechanisms adds to the possibilities of torture taking place 
unchecked during criminal procedure. The state obligation under Article 7 and the 
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safeguards of Article 9 and 14 of ICCPR are unlikely to be guaranteed under China’s 
criminal justice system, as discussed in detail below. 
 
3.4.1 Lack of a Proper Supervisory Body to Deal with Complaints 
At the intermediary level, the ruling party CPP, different national executive bodies of 
supervision such as Ministry of Supervision, Supervision Bureau and Discipline 
Inspection Group, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the police 
agencies, the procuratorial and judicial agencies, together with the general public, the 
social organizations and the media, all play an important role, in varying degrees, in 
the supervision of the execution of powers and the prevention of torture and other 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. It should be acknowledged 
that a great deal of work has been done in investigating and dealing with the cases 
and handing them over to the relevant judicial agencies. However, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, there are no independent and impartial authorities to which people are 
able to make complaints against the police at the pre-trial stage.157 For instance, 
presently the court does not play any role in supervising the practices of the police 
during their criminal investigations. It can also be argued that the state obligation 
fails to comply with Article 7 of ICCPR since the effective supervision and methods 
to prevent torture are lacking as shown in the following aspects. 
 
3.4.1.1 A Superficial External Supervision 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the function of the procuratorial supervision is very 
limited.158 Generally, the supervision from the prosecution agencies will begin from 
the application for the approval of arrest by the police, but not from the beginning of 
the case filed by the police for investigation. In addition, prosecutors only check the 
files of the cases and they do not usually interview the suspects, which limits the 
supervision to paperwork only without any practical sense.159 There is no clear 
procedure stipulated in CCPL to be followed by the police and the procuratorate as to 
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how the supervision should be carried out.160 Before the investigation is complete, 
malpractice by the police is rarely found. Therefore the current prosecution 
supervision on the police investigation work can hardly reduce torture and inhuman 
treatment cases significantly from its roots. For example, in SHE’s case, the 
procuratorate obviously did not fulfill its duties to its fullest extent. The China 
authorities appeared to have failed on adhering to their obligation to protect the 
individuals and exposed the suspects to a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment, as the value found in the ruling of Soering v UK.161 Article 7 of 
ICCPR has been breached.  
 
The involvement of the prosecution supervision is mandated by its internal 
documents issued by the SPC. As a result, police officers are sometimes unwilling to 
accept prosecutors’ involvements because there is no similar instruction given by the 
MPS. Therefore as a routine practice, involvements of the prosecution supervision in 
criminal investigation shall start after cases are moved to the prosecution service for 
arrest approvals. After that, the case will be moved back once again to police, then 
the prosecution service will know nothing about its progress until the investigation 
finishes and is transferred to the prosecution service to examine whether or not to 
prosecute. The prosecution supervision has hardly any control during the 
investigation process. Procuratorates’ supervision can only be realized when they 
successfully persuade the police on the grounds that both sides are jointly responsible 
for providing admissible evidence for court trials, therefore, they need to cooperate 
to make sure that evidence are collected properly. While the police has been 
supervised by the prosecution according to law, how to deal with torture and 
inhuman treatment with respect to cases under jurisdiction of the prosecution service 
remains an issue, even though the number of reported violation cases of the 
procuratorates is not as big as that of the police. Nonetheless, cases of malpractice 
occur from time to time. This leads to the following discussion. 
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3.4.1.2 A Weak Internal Check 
A conflict with Article 7 of ICCPR might arise, since there is also no effective 
mechanism of inter-checks or other similar supervisory systems to monitor the police 
behaviors during the investigation at present in China, as indicated in Chapter 
Five.162 It appears that China has not taken appropriate actions to discipline those 
officers responsible or to ensure there is no repetition of those ill-treatment, as 
required in Cyprus v Turkey.163 As Chen Yunsheng observed, for a long time, some 
aspects of China’s fight against torture and the related theories have become a 
substitute for the practical work and the theoretical study of the CCP’s disciplinary 
inspection department and the State administrative supervision agency. 164  The 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the relevant political 
organizations are becoming increasingly important in supervising the national 
judicial agencies and judicial officers. Some serious cases that had been concealed 
from investigation were brought to trial by those political forces. Many pubic 
officials of all kinds of state agencies at all levels, especially some of the 
administrative senior officials, are Party members. Most chief public officials usually 
hold concurrent posts in the Party and the state agency, even though the Party’s 
discipline inspection organizations are separated from the State administrative 
supervision organizations. Because of China’s special political system, any behaviour 
which violates the Party’s discipline and the state administrative discipline will also 
be dealt with through the Party’s discipline inspection department and the state 
administrative supervision agency in the name of the Party’s discipline and state 
administrative discipline.  
 
Therefore, in China, if the Party cadres of the leading organizations of the Party or 
the state agencies of all kinds and at all levels, or party public officials or non-Party 
public officials happen to violate discipline or the law, the procedure is such that the 
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cases will first be jointly dealt with by the Party’s discipline inspection organizations 
and the State administrative supervision organizations to request an explanation of 
the matter involved at the stipulated time and place. 165  Corresponding Party 
disciplinary sanctions or state political disciplinary sanctions will be imposed either 
separately or combined depending on the specific circumstances and its seriousness. 
The investigation and prosecution of cases of torture in China are applied to these 
discipline inspections and administrative proceedings. If the circumstances of a case 
do not cause serious consequences under the judgement of the investigators, the 
perpertrators are punished by the ruling party’s discipline inspection department 
and/or the state administrative supervision agency. Thus the case is settled in the 
form of the party’s discipline and/or the state administrative discipline agency. Cases 
involving circumstances serious enough as to violation of the criminal law will be 
transferred to the state judicial department and punished through trial proceedings. 
Therefore, almost all the related cases of torture, whether serious or not, which 
require punishment according to the Party’s discipline or the state authority, will 
placed on file for investigation and judged by the discipline inspection department 
the state administrative inspection agency of the CCP, before being transferred to 
procuratorial authorities. 
 
A prompt response by the authorities in effective investigating the alleged torture or 
ill-treatment may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence 
in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in 
or tolerance of unlawful acts. Attempts have been made to improve these internal 
supervisions and their effectiveness. However, this kind of so called Chinese 
quasi-judicial proceedings would not qualify with the demand of conducting a 
prompt and impartial investigation of all allegations of torture, as required by Article 
7 read with Article 2 of ICCPR.166 Strictly speaking, they are not legal conducts. 
Such intervention leaves people with the impression that it is the function and duty of 
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the ruling party’s discipline inspection department and state administrative 
supervision agency to investigate and prosecute cases of torture and other related 
bodily harm and to formulate and implement corresponding policies and regulations, 
instead of judicial authorities. There are no other authorities that could participate in 
the handling of the cases at such stage. This has already conflicted with the China’s 
Constitution, which sets forth that no organization or individual is privileged to be 
beyond the Constitution or the law.167 If a person’s behaviour constitutes a crime, 
such as torture to obtain evidence, they should be dealt with according to relevant 
criminal laws. If a person does not violate the law, he should not be deprived of 
freedom and be forced to make a confession at a stipulated time and place. 
 
Under this supervision system, the investigative authorities are enabled to have the 
absolute power to operate the investigation and the power to decide whether to deal 
with a subject leniently or with severe punishment according to their will, without 
due process. For example, the duration of these investigations depends on the need 
for disciplinary supervision work and will last until the subject explains the problem 
clearly.168 A situation exacerbated that persons acting in an official capacity who 
tortured and ill-treated others in violation of the international standard generally did 
so with impunity, as the government has failed to establish effective investigation to 
hold them accountable and prevent such abuse. Therefore none of these 
investigations is compatible with Ognyanova and Choban v Bulgaria, which assert 
that the complaints of torture must be processed or forwarded to the impartial 
authorities promptly. 169  Also the authorities have not taken reasonable steps 
available to the potential victims to secure the evidence concerning the incident, 
including eyewitness testimony and an objective analysis of clinical findings, as 
considered in Kmetty v Hungary. 170  Any of these deficiencies within the 
investigation of alleged torture or ill-treatment will undermine its ability to identify 
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and punish those responsible. The jurisdiction and operation procedure of the 
supervisory system have severely lacked clear and explicit standards. Furthermore, 
there are new infringements of citizen’s rights and violation of ICCPR under this 
supervisory system, including arbitrary deprivation of liberty and the possibility of 
new torture and ill-treatment. Article 7, 9 and 14 arguments are likely to be raised in 
any case under the current internal supervision system. 
 
Therefore, there is a lack of mandatory power of law, and no clear legal procedure 
established to deal with complaints concerning torture. While the “oversight” system 
(监督制度) has recently been set up and strengthened, ostensibly to oversee the 
conduct of police officials, it is unclear whether the mandate of this new mechanism 
covers cases of torture and ill-treatment, and if so, in what status and procedure it can 
deal with those cases. There is no actual measure provided on how detainees may 
access the oversight police. The campaign in China against torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment has tended to focus excessively on 
the means of internal supervision, while little has been done in terms of researching 
other aspects of the problem and making the necessary changes to the system. This 
may be another reason why torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment persists in China.  
 
3.4.2 Limited Media Monitor  
Public opinion and the media have also become increasingly useful in a supervisory 
context, since the Chinese government is permitting more reporting on torture, and 
publicly exposing more torture-related cases. Media coverage today is much more 
varied and dynamic than before. This has been particularly apparent since reform and 
opening in China in 1978. The state and society have gradually changed the ideology 
and values and a more tolerant attitude towards all kinds of criticisms appears to be 
adopted by the government and the whole Chinese community. In recent years, when 
a case which someone wanted to conceal would be disclosed to the public by the 
media, the local government or the central department involved in the case would 
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immediately publicize its attitude that the case should be investigated and dealt with 
strictly and thoroughly to satisfy the masses.  
 
But still there is no true freedom of expression in China. Restrictions on the 
publication of information about cases involving torture mean that reports of cases 
may frequently be suppressed when the authorities, whether local or national, so 
choose. Under the Chinese traditional principle of benevolence and the concept of 
harmony and social stability as discussed in Chapter Four, the rulers in China always 
try to hide the discussions or criticisms of those social malpractices and dark aspects 
from the public.171 Since ancient times, numerous records in Chinese history have 
revealed that civilians, scholars and officials were slaughtered as a result of pointing 
out these kinds of problems in their society. For instance, during the disastrous 
Cultural Revolution innumerable innocent scholars and officials were inhumanly 
persecuted, imprisoned or killed, simply because of some words or deeds that were 
regarded as anti-Party, anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary. Many people, 
especially intellectuals and the media, find it hard to avoid the mentality of fear, 
especially when it comes to tackling current sensitive issues as it is difficult to tell if 
they are courting trouble.  
 
Torture and other inhuman forms of treatment or punishment are surely prominent 
expressions of the negative and corrupt phenomena among some state authorities, 
especially some law enforcement and judicial authorities and personnel. Some 
authorities and public officials, due to their own departmental or personal interests 
such as concerns for reputation or promotion, are not ready to reveal to the outside 
world, details of events concerning torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Even if a special investigation is conducted, it is done only 
perfunctorily, or is even rejected. Problems can be brought to light and can also, in 
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special instances lead to policy changes, but the norm is that in the end the 
government decides what people shall know and what they shall not be told. Cases 
reported in the domestic media appear to be selected to show that the authorities are 
taking a strong line on halting and punishing police misbehavior. However, data on 
the actual situation where these problems occurred were difficult to obtain. This is 
also one of the main reasons why it is difficult to study practical problems like 
torture, thoroughly and comprehensively.  
 
Therefore in fact, as a result of local or departmental protectionism, the use of torture 
and ill-treatment may be covered up and the situation is more serious than the official 
statistics have revealed. Some officials in the criminal proceedings view it as quite 
common to extort confessions using torture. This might be because the severe harm 
that is caused by extortion has not been fully understood as indicated above. There is 
even a mistaken belief that it is part of the job to extort a confession. If a mistake 
occurs, then it is considered an unfortunate part of the job for it is done with good 
intentions. Even if the results are serious and violate the law, it is done in the line of 
duty. The perpetrators try all sorts of means to absolve themselves from guilt or 
blame. Therefore only a small number of cases that have already caused serious 
consequences or other exceptional cases of extortion are ever placed on file by the 
legal procuratorial agencies. For example, SHE’s case has created such a strong 
public reaction and has shown that the entire criminal procedure system concealed a 
whole range of abusive and corruptive practices. 
 
3.4.3 Lack of Other Valid Methods of Complaining 
The availability of effective complaint mechanisms will have wide implications for 
the prevention and punishment of torture as well as for remedies and reparation, 
since the complaint is a trigger for the competent authorities to begin an investigation 
into the alleged acts with a view to holding the perpetrators accountable as part of 
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criminal proceedings.172 Besides lodging complaints to the judicial authorities, there 
are other existing ways of complaining of torture or ill-treatment in China.173 For 
example, all public institutions, such as universities, local Political and Legal Affairs 
Commission and some social organizations, like the Women’s Federation and 
registered Trade Union, have the so-called Complaint Letters and Request Handling 
Office (信访办公室), where everyone can go and lodge a complaint.174 Cases could 
be reported to the police for prosecution through this mechanism. Regulations of 
Legal Aid from 2003 oblige local governments to set up local legal aid centers where 
poor people can be advised for free and even get a defence lawyer in a criminal case 
if they meet certain criteria.175 
 
However, this mechanism appears to be ineffective while resources and funds are 
scarce. The Complaint Letters and Request Handling Office only receive complaints 
and have the mandate to forward complaints to the relevant state agencies, but 
without having the power to conduct independent investigations or the ability to 
follow up on the cases.176 The legal aid centres are not well known to the general 
public, the criteria for getting a case accepted are strict and limited, and the lawyers 
on duty there are not guaranteed to be competent.177 The basic problem is, on the 
one hand, the government invests too little, both money and political muscle, in 
establishing effective mechanisms to report torture cases and obtain remedies. On the 
other hand, reporting and monitoring of the cases are normally restricted for political 
reasons or for reasons that are grounded in local protectionism and the officers or 
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department’s own interests as mentioned above.178 Therefore, the effectiveness of 
these complaining methods is uncertain, hence the obligation to investigate the 
alleged torture or ill-treatment might be affected. A breach of Article 7 read in 
connection with Article 2(3) of ICCPR would not be satisfied.179 
 
4. Great Efforts Made against the Use of Torture to Obtain Evidence  
In order to meet the UN standards, China has adopted a series of important measures 
to ban and eliminate all kinds of torture and ill-treatment during the criminal 
proceedings, and has achieved tremendous progress during the past two decades. 
Some important and relevant areas of this topic will be analysed in the following 
section, to look at how far these reforms still need to move in order to accommodate 
the requirements of ICCPR. 
 
4.1 Strengthen the Cooperation and Dialogue with International Society  
China has adopted an active and voluntary attitude in step with the international 
society, manifesting in particular by having signed a series of relevant international 
conventions, and by its strengthened cooperation with the international society in the 
common fight against all forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. China delivered its fourth periodic report under the CAT in 
Feb 2006. The various periodic reports enumerate legislative and educational 
measures taken against the practice of torture and demonstrate how the number of 
cases of forced confessions has allegedly declined. From 1993 the SR on torture has 
repeatedly requested an invitation from the Chinese government to visit China in 
subsequent years. In November 2005, Professor Manfred Nowak visited China with 
an agreement by the Chinese government as the first SR on torture to do so. China 
has also carried out exchanges and cooperation with UN human rights agencies, 
foreign human rights organizations and specialists through discussions, seminars, 
projects and training courses on torture prevention. For example the European Union 
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funded a three-year program with the aim of collecting data on the overall situation 
of forced confessions and exploring practical models of torture prevention in 
China.180 These actions mean that China has shown a will to fulfill its commitment 
to the eradication of torture, and its attitude in this respect has been positive and firm 
on the whole. 
 
4.2 Improvement on Relevant Domestic Legislation  
China has also constantly improved domestic legislations, stressing human rights 
protections and the prohibition of torture in order to comply with its duty under 
Article 7 of ICCPR. The current Chinese Constitution includes a specific chapter on 
Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens in which the prohibition of torture is 
expressed or implied in some of the articles.181 For example, Article 38 states that 
the personal dignity of citizens of the PRC is inviolable. Insult, libel, false accusation 
or false incrimination directed against citizens by any means is prohibited.182 These 
rules laid the foundation for China’s fundamental laws on the protection of human 
rights and the prohibition of torture. Torture is explicitly forbidden, though not 
well-defined as mentioned above.183 Faced with the current reality of extorting 
confessions by torture as the main form of torture in China, specific articles to 
regulate and prohibit this problem have been included in the CCL of 1997.184 
 
There is a particular emphasis on the prohibition of torture in separate laws for the 
judicial personnel and the state enforcers of the law, including the Judges Law, the 
Public Procurators Law, and the People’s Police Law.185 The stipulations of the 
Administrative Procedure Law and the State Compensation Law have shown that the 
state determines to prohibit the torture and has taken the responsibility for its 
compensation after the damages. Also, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
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Administrative Penalty in 1996 makes it possible to charge the perpetrators.186 
Furthermore, a whole range of administrative regulations, circulars and judicial 
interpretations have been promulgated to control the behaviour of public security 
personnel and other involved authorities. Finally, a net of legal aid institutions is 
under construction within the Ministry of Justice in which victims can get legal 
counsel free of charge.187 
 
4.2.1 Generally Strengthening the Protection for the Suspects’ Right to against 
Torture  
As compared to the CCPL before the 1996 amendment, the reform in 1996 further 
strengthens the guarantees against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment with regard to suspects in different stages of criminal 
proceedings through different measures to ensure compliance with international 
standards. Firstly, for example, as discussed in Chapter Five, the amended CCPL 
provides the time limit for arrests and detention, which set more restrictive standards 
for police behaviour since the police are the frequent targets of accusations of torture 
or ill-treatment.188 Secondly, as indicated in Chapter Four, the establishment of 
Article 12 of the revised CCPL means that no suspect or defendant at any stage of 
criminal proceedings can be treated as a criminal.189 Thirdly, time frame for lawyers’ 
involvement in criminal proceedings is brought forward to an earlier stage, which 
safeguards the right to defence for the suspects and defendants. Especially the early 
intervention of a lawyer in the criminal trial is trying to be confirmed.190 This issue 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.191 Fourthly, the procedures of criminal 
adjudication have been reformed, replacing those characterized by interrogations by 
judges with means of hearing prosecution and defence arguments.192 This reform has 
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the effect of making a trial more open and more just, which also tends to elevate the 
position of the accused in a trial and lessen the likelihood of physical abuse.193  
 
4.2.2 Evidence Rules Reform 
As emphasized in Chapter Four, in the criminal proceedings, the relationship of 
punishment of crimes and protection of human rights form the unity of opposites, 
and these two aims are mutually conditional and neither will work without taking 
consideration of each other.194 Some Chinese scholars, such as Hu Xiqing, regard 
that the key question to the unity of effectively punishing crimes and protecting 
human rights proved by the judicial experience of China is to persist in accuracy in 
the criminal proceedings. 195  This includes ascertaining facts about a crime, 
collecting evidence and cognizing suspects in an accurate manner. Both sides of the 
principle, which are basing on facts and taking law as the criterion, should always be 
mutually related with and interdependent on each other as discussed in Chapter 
Four.196 Therefore, it is a top priority to uphold the principle of emphasizing on 
evidence, investigations and studies, not simply relying on confessions. The arbitrary 
arrests, over-reliance on extracting confession, evidence through torture and 
ill-treatment, and the wrongful conviction cases were, in part, the product of poor 
and inadequate investigations and interview skills. Responding to criticisms, the 
MPS reportedly launched a nationwide campaign to improve investigative 
capacity.197 The requirement for proving the case in China’s criminal proceeding is 
that the facts about the case should be clear, and the evidence should be true, reliable 
and sufficient. The conclusion based on the evidence should be affirmative, sole and 
exclusive. Noticeably, in August 24 2006, the MPS promulgated the Procedural 
Regulations on the Processing of Administrative Cases by Public Security Authorities, 
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which specifically provides that evidence obtained through torture to coerce 
confession during the detention cannot be used as basis for the determination of 
cases.198 
 
Also the government at different levels is taking steps to enact an exclusionary rule 
barring all evidence obtained through torture from use at trial to address the problem. 
For example, on April 12 2005, the Sichuan Province High Court, Procuratorate and 
Public Security Bureau issued a joint opinion entitled, Certain Opinions on 
Standardizing Criminal Evidence Work to be Implemented on A Trial Basis, which 
clearly stipulates that confessions obtained through coercion may not be used as 
evidence, and details other circumstances under which confessions and statements 
are inadmissible as evidence. This joint opinion was implemented on trial basis as of 
May 1 2005. According to reports, this is the first time that a Chinese provincial 
public security agency, procuratorial agency and court have jointly issued a 
regulation standardizing criminal evidence work. Professor Long Zongzhi believes 
that this joint opinion sums up practical experiences, is based on expert opinion and 
lays equal stress on combating crimes and safeguarding human rights as well as on 
substantive correctness and procedural fairness.199 Also, this regulation keeps pace 
with advancements in the administration of criminal justice, plays a significant role 
in standardizing and raising the quality of case-handling procedures, and has a 
positive impact on China’s evidentiary legislation and judicial practice. 
 
For example, the joint opinion stipulates where a defendant changes his confession or 
statement during the stage of trial because investigative agencies have extracted a 
confession through torture or used threats, enticement, fraud or other illegal means to 
collect evidence, a confession or statement made before the hearing may not by itself 
be used as evidence to prove that the charge has been established, provided several 
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circumstances is applicable. These circumstances include that investigative agencies 
cannot provide a reasonable explanation for the concrete facts of illegal evidence 
collection raised by the defendant or witness; the procuratorates or public security 
agencies are unable to rule out the possibility of illegal evidence collection because 
they refuse to investigate and verify it. Before this joint opinion, the judiciary had the 
discretion to dismiss evidence that was suspected of having been obtained through 
torture. However, that was not written formally into law while this latest judicial 
interpretation provides a legal basis for supporting those defendants who withdraw a 
confession obtained through coercion. 
 
The joint opinion also stipulates that in situations where evidence is insufficient to 
determine guilt or innocence or the extent of culpability, the defendant should be 
presumed innocent or less culpable. Where evidence clearly indicates innocence or 
reduced culpability, but public security and procuratorial agencies have no way of 
verifying the evidence or refuse to produce the results of their investigations, the 
remaining circumstances of the overall case can be synthesized into a presumption in 
favor of the defendant. This provision applies the legal principle of giving the 
accused the benefit of the doubt. In the past, due to budgetary and resource 
constraints, public security and procuratorial agencies tended to focus on evidence 
that incriminated suspects in a criminal investigation, and to attach insufficient 
importance to extenuating evidence or evidence that supported a suspect’ s innocence. 
Thus, there was obviously insufficient protection of the rights of the accused. The 
joint opinion stipulates that if public security agencies and the procuratorate make 
several appraisals prior to trial and reach different conclusions, all of the conclusions 
must be submitted to the court with the reasons behind them. At the same time, a 
judicial appraisal can only express an opinion regarding a technical question related 
to a case while inferences about the facts of a case or legal applicability cannot be 
used as evidence.  
 
4.2.3 “Zero Confession” System 
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Despite some opposition as described above, a majority of legal scholars now believe 
that China should incorporate the right to remain silence into law basing their views 
on the ICCPR, which requires a suspect not be compelled to confess being guilty.200 
Scholars have cited that the international instruments such as the Beijing Rules, a set 
of standards on juvenile justice adopted by the UN in 1985,201 to justify adopting the 
right to remain silent.202 The government is also taking important steps to combat 
the old concepts held by the vast majority of the officers performing the criminal 
investigation, which is that confessions obtained by torture are a legitimate and 
necessary weapon in the fight against crime.203 Some specific actions have been 
taken to further combat ill-treatment in the criminal justice and to incorporate the 
right for suspects to remain silent into China’s criminal procedure law. 
 
Noticeably, during recent years, several local jurisdictions have been experimenting 
with a general right to remain silent or an absence of confession in the conviction of 
crimes to echo public concerns. It is intended to eliminate reliance upon confessions 
in criminal investigations and requires the investigators to search for other evidence. 
For example, in 1999 police in Qingshan district, Wuhan removed the policy slogan, 
“leniency toward those who acknowledge their crimes but severe punishment of 
those who stubbornly refuse to do so” from every interrogation room to demonstrate 
their commitment to the right to silence.204 In 2000 police in Dalian and Shenyang, 
Liaoning province introduced a notification system to promote the right to silence. 
The public was told that “if you have not first been informed of your rights, you have 
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the right to remain silent”. Also Shuncheng District Procuratorate in Fushun, 
Liaoning province, first issued a detailed rule in August 2000.205 Suspects are 
allowed to keep silent when interrogated by prosecutors according to this rule.206 
Under this very limited rule, which did not apply to cases of manslaughter, murder, 
corruption, or those where there were no witnesses to the crime, a defendant’s 
confession of guilt is not a considered evidence, but the prosecutor may include a 
defendant’s defence in his/her file.207 This rule essentially renders confessions 
irrelevant in determining whether or not to prosecute a particular crime. This practice 
was called “zero statement rule” (零口供) and characterized as a rule for prosecutors, 
directing them not to depend on confessions to a greater extent then other forms of 
evidence. It was also hailed by academic and media as the first step in establishing 
the right to remain silent.208  
 
There has been debate as to whether a rule from a small area in China could prove to 
be a driving force for change in the nation as a whole.209 However, in the eyes of 
reformers, for better or worse, the momentum for change has been slight to 
non-existent.210 Subsequently, many cases have been cited from different presses as 
the first examples of an absence of confession case. For example, Beijing Evening 
News reported that the former director of the science and technology department of 
the bank's Beijing branch, Mengjie Wen, was sentenced to death by Beijing High 
People’s Court for accepting bribes and embezzling public funds. All the primary 
evidence in this case, which was one of biggest bribery cases in Beijing, was 
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obtained without suspect’s confession.211 Unfortunately, the extensive reporting of 
this experiment reflected “the hopes of scholars and the media”, according to Antony 
Kuhn, rather than a real shift in official thinking.212 
 
Despite official endorsement of the right to silence in these local jurisdictions, it 
appears that the police, prosecution and the courts were not given training and 
suspects were not warned of any implications of remaining silent during 
interrogation. Reviews of those cases in which the suspect has asserted his right to 
silence indicates that the courts view the defendant’s silence during interrogations as 
an admission of guilt, and that reluctance to speak is taken to demonstrate a negative 
attitude to repent and likely to result in a harsher punishment. The right to silence 
and the absence of confession are not interchangeable concepts and on their own in 
the short term can hardly challenge traditional Chinese criminal practice. Also it 
seems that the police did not rush to adopt the “zero statement rule”. An interesting 
reason for the delay of acceptance is the debate over whether it is the role of the 
police to adopt such a rule, or it technically bind only the prosecutor in a role 
separate from police criminal investigation. A more concrete reason is that the officer 
enforcing this law would naturally dislike this rule, as it may take away the powerful 
tool of confession in a criminal trial, thus they would have strong incentives to stop 
its appliance. Some scholars also questioned the legality of “Zero Statement,” 
arguing that it violated the CCPL by excluding the voluntary confessions the law 
allow, not to mention the interests of victims.213 The “Zero Statement” rule was 
eventually withdrawn because higher authorities were “dissatisfied”, according to a 
Shuncheng prosecutor.214  
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All these national laws and regulations will be conducive to further ensuring the 
legitimate rights of suspects and defendants and reducing the incidence of torture. 
Thus, on paper, many safeguards exist and even comply with the international 
obligations under relevant treaties, as it is also reflected in the periodic state reports. 
In reality, however, suspects in China are often without effective protections against 
abuse of power, most often at the hands of police officers. The issue concerning 
prevention of torture and right to remain silence were always listed as discussion 
topic in different conferences.215 Many scholars and lawyers are pressing for a 
change in criminal procedure law to give criminal suspects the right to silence during 
questioning, a rule similar as the Miranda Rule in the United States that obliges the 
police to read suspects their rights and provides for the right against 
self-incrimination and for suspects to be represented by a lawyer after their arrest, in 
the hope of promoting human rights and improving openness and fairness in the 
judicial process through the adoption of such a rule. This may be a singular effort 
however, as there is no evidence of a widespread push for such a rule. 
 
4.3 Strengthen the Supervision of Law Enforcement Agencies 
Law enforcement agencies claim to address the torture issue through increasing 
transparency of law enforcements, strengthening the investigative training, and 
improving mechanism of supervision.216 In practice, the occurrence of torture is for 
the most attributable to the individual behaviour and illegal doings of the judicial 
personnel and the law enforcers. Various forms of internal disciplinary agencies have 
been set up in different national authorities to regulate and bind the conduct of 
judicial agencies and officials. Through self-investigating and self-correcting, such 
internal systems play an important role for the prohibition of torture in China today, 
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particularly when there is still no formal judicial supervision.217 Since 2005, in order 
to clarify and fulfil the individual responsibility in law enforcement, the State 
Council has promoted nation-wide administrative law enforcement responsibility 
system.218 Particularly, the discipline inspection agencies of the CCP in cooperation 
with the administrative supervision agencies of the State keep dealing with party 
cadres and state personnel who have committed torture according to their rank as 
discussed above. 219  As mentioned in Chapter Five, the procuratorial agencies 
established their agencies in many detention facilities, through which detainees have 
the chance to make face-to-face meeting to raise complaints.220 Public security 
agencies continue the practice of law enforcement evaluation and use the method of 
“veto with one vote” in annual evaluation in cases of death or serious injury caused 
by torture, beating, physical punishment, maltreatment, and misuse of firearms.221 If 
a public security agency receives such a veto in its annual evaluation, this means that 
its performance is below standard; if it gets voted twice, its leader shall resign or be 
removed from the post.222 The large scale of self-check and self rectify campaigns 
carried out during these years among all levels, and all kinds of judicial agencies and 
law enforcement agencies have also produced great results.223 
 
Since August 2003, the MPS has issued a set of unified regulations on the 
standardization of law enforcement procedures for public security institutions 
entitled Regulations on the Procedures for Handling Administrative Cases.224 This 
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regulation include procedures defining police powers in respect of time limits for 
confiscation of property, legal means for gathering evidence, time limits on 
investigation and examination of suspects, etc. In 2004, the MPS issued regulations 
prohibiting the use of torture and threats to gain confessions and initiated a 
nationwide campaign to improve policemen’s criminal investigation capacity.225 
Since 2006, the MPS has enhanced the nation-wide system of full audio and video 
coverage of interrogation of murder cases and those involving underworld 
organizations step by step.226 The SPP launched a nationwide campaign to crack 
down on officials who abuse their powers in 2004. Later, the SPP announced in May 
2005 that eliminating interrogation through torture was a priority of its work agenda 
and has instructed procurators that confessions obtained as a result of torture cannot 
form a basis for the formal approval of arrests and that prosecutors must work to 
eliminate illegally obtained evidence.227 It officially reported the prosecution of 930 
officials for torture, illegal detention, and other violations of human rights in 2006.228 
The SPP rolled out a piloting system of audio and video recording in interrogation 
rooms in 2005 and issued two regulations in 2006 on how to videotape the suspects 
in job-related criminal cases when they are interrogated. Until 2007, 2171 
procuratorial agencies were implemented this system.229  
 
The various levels of law enforcement and judicial agencies increased their efforts in 
dealing with the torture cases by experimenting with pilot projects equivalent to the 
right to silence. For example, in April 2005, Sichuan province prohibited the use of 
evidence acquired through illegal means and introduced an experimental program 
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that requires interrogations in “major cases” to be taped. Under the new rule, courts 
must exclude coerced statements and confessions unless police provide a reasonable 
explanation for the alleged coercion or agree to investigate allegations of abuse.230 
In May 2005, Chinese news media reported that three district public security bureaus 
in Beijing, Gansu and Henan were taking part in an experimental program under 
which suspects may request either the presence of a lawyer during interrogation or 
the taping of the interrogation.231 Following the UN SR’s December 2005 visit, the 
SR learned that the Hebei provincial procuratorate, high court, and public security 
bureau issued a joint opinion prohibiting the use of torture to obtain evidence against 
a criminal suspect.232  
 
4.4 Strengthen the Supervision by the General Public 
Also, in recent years the mass media have greatly increased their supervisory role 
and have continuously published reports about vile situations and torture cases with 
particularly serious consequences in the newspapers and on television. This has 
provoked a considerable public reaction and attracted the attention of the relevant 
authorities and departments. Those responsible for committing torture and similar 
acts have been severely dealt with and there has been an overall educational effect on 
society at large. The supervisory role of the general public and public opinion in 
these kinds of cases have had a great impact and are welcomed by the people, and the 
state leaders have encouraged the mass media to increase their supervisory role in 
this area, as this kind of reports is good for stability of the society. 
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5. Further Reform to Curb the Use of Torture 
Several of the local experiments described above correspond to proposed 
amendments to the CCPL, suggesting that the government is testing reforms at a 
local level before implementing them nationwide. However, some Chinese legal 
scholars have expressed concern that the rules set in those experiments did not go far 
enough, and there are still a lot of problems in this process.233 As shown above, 
some Chinese legal experts stressed that to prevent torture and ill-treatment during 
the stage of investigations in practice, reforms should include enhanced the rights for 
defence lawyers, a right to remain silent, an evidence exclusion rule that would bar 
all illegally obtained evidence from criminal trials, and more vigorous prosecution of 
officials who resort to torture. At the same time, reports and comments in the media 
or conferences on the resistance to the local experiments from some public securities 
indicated that the scholarly expectations appears to be too “idealistic”, law 
enforcement agencies may habitually resist broad rights enhancement for suspects. 
Indeed, in reality the Chinese general public’s legal awareness is still weak, and thus 
both the local protectionism and departmental protectionism still exist. The measures 
that China has taken are still vague, unspecific and are not effective to combat torture 
in criminal proceedings, lacking either concrete implementation procedures 
altogether or detailed legal consequences if the measures fail to be carried on that 
diminish their utility. Moreover, the great majority of miscarriage of justice in 
Chinese judicial practice was concluded to be dependent on evidence obtained from 
inquisition by torture. This observable occurrence has helped further forging a 
consensus among scholars and officials in making the prevention of torture a priority 
in upcoming amendments to the CCPL.234 In order to continue preventing torture in 
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China, the further revision of the CCPL should systematically address the issue of 
inquisition by torture to bring them into compliance with the International Standard, 
and the following aspects should be considered. 
 
5.1 Strengthening the Enforcement of the Law on Suppression of Torture 
After setting up the legal basis on suppression of torture, strict enforcement of the 
law is the most important guarantee for decreasing and eliminating torture. China 
should make more efforts in this aspect. Currently in China, the existence of torture 
cannot be only attributed to an incomplete legal structure or legal basis of the country, 
neither can it be said that the Party in power, the state authorities and the public are 
not willing to oppose torture. The cause also lies in the enforcement of the law, 
which does not strictly abide the law. Therefore in order to prevent and eliminate 
Article 7 treatment, a principle must be upheld that every law must be adhered to. 
Violations of the law must be punished and the enforcements of law must be strict in 
the whole country and society. This is especially important for the judicial and law 
enforcement agencies. If the judicial personnel and the law enforcers cannot 
recognise the concept of rule of law and principles of human rights protections with 
fairness and justice as the core value of their work, it will not only be impossible to 
punish all crimes effectively, including the crimes of extorting a confession by 
torture, illegal imprisonment and other crimes which seriously violate the citizens’ 
personal rights and rights of reputation. However, it will also have a very negative 
impact on legal authorities in the Chinese society. Other government officials, social 
groups, and even the public will have this negative impression that they do not need 
to respect the law and act according to law because the judicial acency cannot 
comply with the law. 
 
For the same reason, local and departmental protectionism are quite harmful rather 
than being helpful to maintain the reputations of judicial agency, officials and the 
social stability and harmony. What these law enforcement departments or local 
authorities protect is a small number of offenders of torture. But it is precisely the 
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conduct of these offenders impairing the reputation of the law enforcement and 
judicial officials. People will also misunderstand that such conduct is tacitly 
permitted by the leaders, or that no disciplinary will be taken against torture. China 
has put a great deal of effort into constructing a system of rule of law. It is irrational 
and unreasonable to provide protection to such perpetrators of torture. Therefore 
those perpetrators of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment must shoulder the relevant legal responsibilities. Not only should the 
offenders themselves be punished and educated, but other judicial officials should 
also be reminded not to follow the example of such offenders. This would be very 
important and helpful for the prohibition and punishment of Article 7 treatment. 
 
Because of the low regard the Chinese have traditionally held for law, promulgation 
of laws alone is not enough to bring the police operation within the purview of the 
law. Therefore China needs to attach great efforts to improve the professionalism of 
the law enforcement enforcers. In the perspective of the overall criminal justice work 
in China, one of the reasons for low efficiency and existence of unjust or wrong 
cases is that many officials are not qualified and do not receive strict and systematic, 
or even fundamental, education and training before taking up their posts. The 
occurrence of torture is partially or mainly caused by this fact. It is observed that 
torture tends to happen at the basic level authorities. The basic law enforcement 
authorities and officials are to be found throughout urban and rural areas. They are 
engaged in strenuous judicial work such as maintaining the local social order, 
keeping the public safety, and inspecting and punishing illegal conduct and crimes. 
They have made great contributions to the crime control and protection of the rights 
and interests of the country and the people. But of those who receive special legal 
training and high education in law only few would be sent to work at the basic level 
law enforcement and judicial authorities. Also many judicial officials lack the 
necessary knowledge and understanding in the regard of protection of human right 
and against torture. 
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Therefore it should become a principle in China that law enforcers and judicial 
personnel should be well trained and qualified before starting work. Adequate 
resources, specialized trainings and educations for all levels of the law enforcement 
officials are a basic condition for ensuring the effective implementations of the 
safeguards against torture and ill-treatment during the criminal procedure. Raising 
levels of professionalism requires law enforcers and the judicial personnel’s training 
should always be based on human rights standards and aimed at ensuring the highest 
standards of professional conduct. The current out-dated and unpractical contents of 
all the courses and trainings should be up-to-date contents, especially contents that 
concern human rights protection and prohibition of torture. In order to avoid reliance 
upon the confession, the officials should develop a capacity to build a case in an 
efficient manner by professional training on collection, analysis and preservation of 
evidence, techniques of interviewing and taking statements from suspects and 
witnesses, and other aspects of the investigation of alleged crimes. More resources 
should be allocated for forensic facilities and training police to use it in 
investigations. Police officers, particularly at senior level, should raise these issues 
with their administrative superiors at both the local and national level, to ensure that 
the criminal justice is provided with the necessary resources to carry out its works in 
a professional manner and in line with international human rights standards.  
 
After China’s entries into a series of international conventions and agreements, the 
Chinese government and people should accept the relevant international standard and 
responsibilities for protecting human rights, including prohibition of torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Therefore adding such 
contents to the relevant courses and providing systematic and formal educations on 
the requirements of the international human rights standards against torture are 
crucial steps for the judicial officials to develop a proper understanding and attitude 
about the problem of torture and the human rights protection. For example, in the 
course of training, particular attentions should be given to the principle that the 
prohibition of torture is absolute and police officers have a duty to disobey orders 
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from a superior to commit torture. The level of awareness and capacity of law 
enforcement officials should be raised in terms of civilized and standardized 
enforcement and protection of citizens’ legitimate rights and interests.  
 
5.2 Perfecting the Legal System against Torture and the Use of Illegal Evidence 
Apart from educating officers about the importance of enforcing the law within the 
bounds of laws, detailed and clear legal provisions of the CCPL are also needed. One 
of the major reasons of the continuation of the use of torture and the abuse of illegal 
evidence in criminal justice is the lack of key safeguards to prevent it. In order to 
ensure that the prohibition against torture is respected, it is essential that China 
formally recognises presumption of innocence and grants suspects the protection 
against self-incrimination. It urges the authorities to introduce series safeguards 
without delay, in line with China’s obligation as a state party to the UN ICCPR and 
CAT. These safeguards should be part of a comprehensive framework of effective 
legislative, judicial and other measures to prevent torture. 
 
5.2.1 Define the Concept of Torture under International Standards 
To reduce torture and to wipe it out eventually, the law should broaden the current 
interpretation of means of inquisition by torture. First of all, it should make a 
definition of torture according to the provision of Article 1, the UN Convention 
against Torture. The provision on inquisition by torture in the existing CCPL is in 
fact only limited to the body. Pursuant to Article 1(1) of the UN CAT, torture means 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person. Namely, inquisition by torture means not only 
violence inflicted on the body but also mental anguish of a person. Next, it is 
necessary to add special regulations regarding a number of concrete actions with a 
way of listing in the CCPL for the prohibition of torture. Particularly, with regard to 
the other cruel or ill-treatment acts that do not amount to torture yet violated Article 7 
of ICCPR, the CCPL should also be stipulated. This illustration of the basic and most 
common kinds of torture and ill-treatment and their form of manifestation in China 
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will make the law more clear and predictable as required by Article 7 of ICCPR. 
Therefore, it will be effective to investigate and punish the perpetrators of torture 
according to the law. Meanwhile, the status of the perpetrator of torture should be 
provided definitely. The CCL should also be revised to incorporate the crime of 
torture as defined in the CAT, including explicitly recognizing that all persons acting 
in an official capacity may be subject to prosecution for this crime, incorporating the 
concept of mental torture, and establishing clear standards for prosecution and 
punishment of torture cases that recognize the severity of this crime.  
 
5.2.2 Unity of Criminal Punishment and Human Rights Protection by 
Establishing the Exclusionary Rule of Illegally Obtained Evidence 
There are growing calls in China to revise the legal provisions in the CCPL to 
include a clear exclusionary rule barring the admission of all illegally-obtained 
evidence at trial, including evidence arising out of tortured confessions. 
Commentators argued that, without it, efforts to eradicate torture would have little 
hope of lasting success while real justice cannot ultimately be achieved.235 The 
majority of countries not only rule out evidence obtained by torture, but also exclude 
the evidence obtained indirectly in illegal ways. Most countries adopt the 
exclusionary rule of illegally obtained evidence to strike a balance between finding 
the truth and protecting the due process.236 For example, in the UK, a comparative 
exclusionary principle has been adopted, i.e. not all evidence obtained in ways that 
constitute general misdemeanors is excluded, while evidence obtained through 
torture is excluded with exception. At present stage, the exception rule of the 
exclusionary rule shall be set up on the basis of taking into account of certain special 
circumstances. In this regard, some major issues should be involved in the further 
revisions of the CCPL this time. 
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Firstly, Article 42 of the 1996 CCPL should confirm that the facts of an offense shall 
not be established in the absence of evidence. Evidence shall be relevant to the facts 
of a case and tend to prove the facts of a case. Evidence of the defendant’s infamous 
character and previous conduct similar to the present offence charged are not 
admissible as evidence to prove that he or she is guilty. Article 46 should also states 
firmly that confession of an accused, or a co-offender, shall not be used as the sole 
basis of conviction and other necessary evidence shall still be investigated to see if 
the confession is consistent with facts. Where an accused has made no confession nor 
has there been any evidence, his guilt shall not be presumed merely because of his 
refusal to make a statement or remaining silent. 
 
Secondly, Article 43 of the 1996 CCPL should be revised. All evidence, no matter 
whether it is affidavit or material evidence, obtained by torture should be excluded in 
general. That means it is strictly forbidden to collect statements of a suspect, 
defendant, or victim and witness testimony with the following means: torture or other 
means by which severe pain may be inflicted on the person; intimidating or cheating; 
keeping the person suffering from fatigue, hunger or thirst; using medicine or 
hypnosis; and other cruel, inhuman or degrading means. Evidence obtained with the 
illegal means mentioned above shall not be accepted as evidence to initiate a public 
prosecution and to convict. Also it should be strictly forbidden to collect material 
evidence, documentary evidence, and audio-visual materials with the means of 
illegal search, seizure and illegal entering citizen’s house or other unlawful means. It 
is strictly forbidden to inquest and inspect in violation of the statutory procedure. The 
admission of the evidence obtained with illegal means mentioned above is on 
discretion of the court according to the degree of illegal means and other 
circumstances of the case. Many commentators strongly suggested that chopping 
down the “poisonous tree” to get rid of the use of its “fruit” as evidence in court.237 
But there should be some exceptions provided by law for the exclusion of the 
evidence for those criminal actions that seriously endanger the state security and the 
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social public interests. In principle, the reason for eliminating illegal evidence is to 
ensure the litigation participant’s right, to restrict the action of obtaining evidence via 
illegal channel and to establish the image of judicial justice. Therefore the 
elimination of exception is based on the consideration of balancing value between 
the protection of human rights and the preservation of public interests. 
 
Thirdly, on the burden of proof and standard of proof of evidence illegally obtained, 
the defending party should first present reasonable clue of torture, then, the burden of 
proof is shifted to the prosecuting party. This means that if the suspect raises 
concerns over the possibility that his confession was extracted by improper means, 
his confession shall be investigated prior to the investigation of other evidence; if the 
said confession is presented by the public prosecutor, the court shall order the public 
prosecutor to indicate the method to prove that the confession is obtained under the 
free will of the suspects, otherwise the evidence will be excluded. The UN SR on 
Torture has recommended that where allegations of torture are raised by a defendant 
during trial, the burden of proof should shift to the prosecution to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the confessions was not obtained by unlawful means, including 
torture and ill-treatment.238 There should also be a fair and transparent procedure 
established in the CCPL for accused persons to apply to have such evidence excluded, 
and provisions should be made for appropriately trained doctors to gather appropriate 
medical evidence. The establishment of such a system of burden of proof bears great 
influence on curbing the practice of extortion of confessions by torture and Article 7 
and Article 14(2) of ICCPR might be satisfied. 
 
5.2.3 Entitle the Right to Silence for Suspects 
It is the time for China’s judicial system to officially adopt right to silence for 
suspects, marking the country’s progress in protection of human rights and freedom 
of the people. With those debates of the relevance of the right to silence, the system 
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cannot be just copied from the mode of other countries on the right to silence. But it 
must be well designed for China. The advantages of the right to silence are able to 
continuously improve such as different procedural and evidential rules, the 
investigation technology and the professional qualities of the judicial personnel. On 
contrary, these factors will also provide more favorable conditions for the setup and 
implementation of the right to silence in China. Some local courts or procuratorates 
continue to experiment with devices allowing a limited right to remain silent for 
suspects. Three principles are necessary in order to set up the right to silence in 
China. Firstly, the legislations should concentrate on the setup of the right to silence 
as it is fundamental to a fair trial and protection of human dignity.239 Secondly, the 
legislations should balance the individual rights and the public interests. 240 
According to the complicated public situation in China, the conditions for the 
obligation to tell the truth have to be clearly defined. Thirdly, the law should be 
regulated at least according to the basic international standard. According to the 
present situation of China, the system can be designed as below. 
 
First, Article 93 should be revised. The CCPL should guarantee the people's right to 
keep silence and entitle suspects to defend himself against accusations or keep 
silence during a criminal interrogation. Therefore, the requirement that the suspect 
shall truthfully answer the questions raised by the investigation personnel should be 
deleted. Once there is concrete evidence indicating that a suspect is likely to have 
been involved in a crime, the suspect becomes an accused person, and the police are 
required to inform a person of his or her right to silence and counsel as soon as the 
person becomes an accused person, regardless of whether he or she is taken into 
police custody. A suspect must be informed of his or her rights when he or she is 
questioned for the first time at different stages of the criminal process. Specific 
provisions should be contained in the CCPL as to when the caution on the rights to 
silence and counsel must be repeated, such as after every break during the course of 
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interrogation. But the suspect cannot end the interrogation. The person must also be 
given an opportunity to explain any suspicion against him or her. If the charge is 
changed after a suspect has been informed of the offence charged, he or she shall be 
informed of such change. The suspect should be informed that he or she has the right 
to demand the police and the prosecutor to take exonerating evidence. Interference 
with a suspect’s effort to seek legal advice may lead to exclusion of the confession 
obtained. The scope of the right to counsel, however, differs depending on whether 
he or she is questioned by a police officer or by a judge or a prosecutor. This issue 
will be discussed in the coming chapters.  
 
Second, the principle of privilege against self-incrimination should be stated in the 
CCPL according to the language in the ICCPR as well.241 Article 139 and Article 
155 of the 1996 CCPL should be revised. The requirements in Article 139 stated that 
when examining a case, the procuratorate shall interrogate the suspect should be 
changed as follows: the procuratorate shall hear the suspect’s opinions and the 
suspect may refuse to answer questions or testify at trial. Similarly in Article 155 the 
right for the procuratorate to interrogate the suspect in trial should be abolished. The 
procuratorate shall question the suspect if he or she is willing to answer. If the 
suspect refuses to answer the questions, the procuratorate should present the 
evidence of the suspected crime to court for the prosecution. To harmonize the 
traditional culture, the policy that grants leniency to those who confess their crimes 
and severity to those who refuse to shall change into leniency to those who confess 
their crimes but not severity to those who refuse to. The adverse comments or 
inferences should not be drawn from the complete silence of the accused in any stage 
of the criminal proceedings. However, it may allow to draw conclusions if the 
accused remains silent only to certain questions about the same crime.242 
 
Third, a separate regime for the investigations and prosecutions of serious and 
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complex offences should be operated. The special regime is empowered to 
investigate any suspected offence which can be reasonably believed to involve 
serious or complex offence such as terrorism, serious fraud and serious organized 
crimes.243 Anyone under investigation or any person that are reasonably believed to 
have information relevant to an investigation can be compelled to answer questions. 
Non-compliance is an offence unless the person has a reasonable excuse.244 However, 
witnesses are protected by an immunity which provides that their answers may only 
be used in evidence, if they are charged with making a false statement during an 
investigation, or if they are charged with an offence and give evidence at trial which 
is inconsistent with the answer given to investigative officer. 
 
5.2.4 Establish Effective and Independent Mechanisms for Discovering, 
Receiving Complaints and Investigating and Prosecuting Torture Cases 
The prevention of torture and ultimate improvement of justice and human rights 
protection during the criminal investigation period also depends on bettering the 
channel for complaints by those affected parties. Firstly, strengthening the 
supervision of judicial agency and officials plays a key role in prevention. China has 
established an elementary supervision system against torture as mentioned above.245 
However, it still does not function effectively to prevent and punish torture due to the 
lack of an independent judicial system of checking power, relevant enforcement 
mechanisms and specified working procedures. If the prosecution service and police 
combine their investigation functions together to handle all criminal cases, courts 
should be empowered to hear cases concerning any possible malpractice of these two 
institutions. As observed in Chapter Five, an effective judicial review system is 
essential for effective protection of human rights in China.246 Moreover, media 
should be offered proper freedom to carry out reporting on cases and issues relating 
to torture and ill-treatment in China. The public condemnation of torture can have a 
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significant preventative impact.247 Secondly, it is, therefore, vital to take concrete 
procedural measures to ensure that all torture victims are able to exercise their rights 
to complain without fear of retaliation. Every case of torture may be impartially 
investigated and tried, and perpetrators of Article 7 treatment receive penalties 
according with the seriousness of their crimes, as well as every victims may receive 
proper compensation and rehabilitations. These measures for the coming reforms can 
be as follow. 
 
First, the whole course of interrogation of a suspect should be visual or audio 
recorded. This idea originated in the UK, and later was adopted in the Chinese Hong 
Kong region and some states in the US. Under such system, the duties of detention 
and delivery of suspects for interrogation are carried out by two different 
departments. Two copies of the tapes and videotapes are made, with one given to the 
suspects. The police are required to keep a record of all interviews with the suspects. 
Recording interviews starts once the suspects are examined and continued non-stop 
throughout the process, and if necessary, shall be videotaped. Provided that in case of 
an emergency, after clearly stated in the record, the rule may not be followed. Except 
for the circumstances prescribed in the Proviso of the preceding section of 
aforementioned measure, if there is an inconsistency between the content of the 
record and that of the audio or video record regarding the statements made by the 
accused, the said portion of the statement shall not be used as evidence.  
 
In consideration of China’s vast territory and imbalance of economic growth, at the 
progressive practice of the system, if the lack of funding, the investigative authorities 
may first audio record the whole course. The scope of the locations for usual 
interviews should be well defined and the police are advised to interview a suspect at 
such locations whenever possible. The rules to deal with the tape recording of the 
interviews with suspects and to govern the means of preservation of the record 
should be prescribed in a strict and detail manner. At the end of interrogation, the 
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person being interviewed must be shown the record and given an opportunity to 
comment on it. Failure to comply with the recording requirements may lead to 
exclusion of the confession obtained if the record-keeping deficiencies make it hard 
for the police to establish the reliability of the confession. It is of great significance 
for ensuring the transparency of interrogation and protecting the legal rights and 
interests of suspects.  
 
Second, the standards for treatment of detainees contained in China’s laws and 
regulations and in international human rights instruments, including providing 
adequate foods, medical care and living conditions to all those in custody should be 
strictly enforced. As discussed in Chapter Five, the current CCPL does not provide 
for detainees a right to be brought before a judge promptly after they are taken in 
custody, and in most cases detainees do not have access to a judge until their trial, 
which may be months, or even years in some cases, after detention.248 Allowing 
early access would give judges the chances to take action about allegations of torture 
at an early stage of the criminal process. The authorities should also consider 
introducing a pre-trial procedure for assessing claims that confessions and other 
statements have been obtained through torture or ill-treatment, so that evidence 
obtained through illegal means does not come before the court to make a final 
determination of guilt or innocence. This would constitute an important step in the 
prevention of torture. During this stage, the experience of many countries shows that 
guaranteed access to lawyers and legal representative is one of the strongest 
protections against torture for any detainee. Lawyers must be present when the 
investigative agencies interrogate the suspect. Oral confessions obtained without a 
lawyer present can be viewed as illegal evidence and ruled out by the courts. This 
issue related to the system of earlier participation of lawyers in the criminal 
proceedings would be discussed specifically in Chapter Seven. 
 
5.3 Strengthening the Construction of Legal Culture against Torture 
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Because of the traditional culture and history of the nation, many people in China 
lack consciousness of “international law” and protection of “human rights”, and do 
not know that torture is an international crime. In order to raise public awareness of 
this matter, the Chinese government may take all kinds medias, including newspaper, 
broadcast, television and Internet, to promote legal consciousness of suppression of 
torture and human rights protection on the suspects. Also by strengthening the public 
legal education on the problem of torture and international and regional norms 
involving the combating torture and ill-treatment and, the happening of torture can be 
better monitored and prevented. Moreover, the academics should be encouraged to 
continue researching on the problem of torture and figure out the effective 
countermeasures for China to implement the international obligations.  
 
In particular, improving the culture of policing is crucial. The Chinese officers in 
criminal justice primarily face the challenge of establishing a culture of respect for 
the law and the consciousness of prevention and suppression of torture. Indeed, as 
Moore regarded, probably the biggest obstacle facing anyone who would implement 
a new strategy of policing is the difficulty of changing the ongoing culture of 
policing.249 In order to eradicate the common tradition of extorting confessions by 
torture during criminal investigation, the government has taken various kinds of 
measures, including laws or regulations. Today there is no doubt that the attempts to 
change the ill-culture of policing have made great progress. But the culture is deeply 
entrenched in the minds and souls of people doing the work.250 So it is impossible 
for the government to uproot the problem of obtaining evidence through torture and 
ill-treatment within a short time. However, it may feasible to change it as soon as 
possible, provided that China stands firm and makes sustained efforts to oppose 
torture. Therefore, apart from the legal measures, the Chinese government should 
continue to reinforce its endeavour in the culture educations, social policies and 
promoting human rights consciousness in a view to make new progress in its efforts 
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against torture. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
The root causes for the high number of torture instances in the Chinese legal system 
can be found in a blend of various historical, ideological and systemic causes. 
Basically the traditional belief that tortured confessions are necessary in crime 
control and maintaining social stability still has strong influence on the current 
criminal justice. But in this regard, it must be emphasized again that such acts are 
neither rational nor legal in China. The reform policy initiated from the beginning of 
the 1980s necessitated a legal system compatible with the rest of the world. 
According to what has been discussed above, the CCPL of 1996 and relevant 
legislations have been trying hard to prevent torture and the use of illegally evidence 
in criminal justice, at least showing from the reform of the relative legislations and 
mechanisms. But lack of concrete provision of laws to implement the procedures 
diminishes its effectiveness. The legal deficiencies that were examined above, such 
as the narrow concept of torture, lack of effective complaints procedures, the absence 
of an exclusionary rule barring the admission of evidence obtained through illegal 
means, the lack of an unambiguous presumption of innocence, a right to remain 
silent, barriers to access to legal counsel, and lack of independent monitoring, all 
undermine China’s compliance with the international obligations under Article 7 of 
ICCPR and CAT. Again there is virtually no information about how complaints 
procedures or mechanisms for gaining redress may be accessed, and to what extent 
victims of torture or ill-treatment actually make use of such procedures or 
mechanisms. 
 
Moreover, China lacks anti-torture education and the Convention on Torture has not 
been known among either law enforcement officials or ordinary citizens. Funding for 
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re-education of legal professionals will be needed, and time will also be needed for 
both the political and legal communities, as well as the general public, to accept the 
new norms. Once the general rules regarding the ban against torture to extract 
confessions are more strictly enforced, investigators will have to be retrained to adapt 
to the new legal environment. Therefore, it will be possible to better the legal culture 
in China for the suppression of torture and strengthen the reforms against torture 
during criminal procedure to gradually adapt international standards under the 
country’s own situation with the modern rule of law and the ideology of human 
rights protection as a point of departure, and by changing and adjusting the 
conception of torture, by further efficient and stronger measures to fight torture to 
perfect the legal system for implement the ICCPR and CAT more effectively, and by 
adopting the same or adjusted actions against torture as the international society. The 
burden is heavy and the road is long until the new principles and concepts are 
integrated into the minds of Chinese citizens and the structures of Chinese society. 
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Chapter Seven  
The Right to Defence by a Lawyer in the Chinese Pre-trial 
Proceedings and Movement towards Meeting ICCPR 
Standards 
 
1. Introduction 
Justice demands that individuals accused of criminal activity have the right to defend 
themselves before the law. The right to defence is contained in the Chinese 
Constitution, the CCPL and the Law of PRC on Lawyers, which openly states that 
“the suspect has the right to defence”.1 Since the revisions of the criminal procedure 
law are intended to offer more protections for the rights of the suspects, lawyers 
therefore are expected to play a more active and meaningful role in criminal defence 
under the CCPL of 1996.2 However, as described in Chapter One, one of the 
deficiencies of the CCPL of 1996 is that lawyers continue to experience difficulties 
in preparing a proper defence.3 On particular, the early involvement of defence 
lawyers in the charging process has not translated into effective trial preparations 
during this period. Without adequate preparation on the defence before trial, it is 
possible to greatly affect the right to defence and whole fairness of the trial. It seems 
likely that the gap between the general situation of the right to defence in China and 
the relevant international standards has actually grown wider. The aim of this paper is 
to analyze different aspects of the revised law in order to support this claim and to 
offer comments about changes to the criminal justice system that would help to bring 
the Chinese defence system up to international standards. Its main focus is directed at 
observations on the position of lawyers in China, its aim to implement the right to 
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defence in the coming amendment of the CCPL in line with the ICCPR standard, 
mainly Article 14(1) and (3) of ICCPR.4  
 
Therefore this chapter will start by reviewing the impact of legal tradition on the role 
of lawyers in China to provide a useful perspective on the historical and national 
conditions to facilitate a better understanding of the development and the reforms of 
the right to defence in China, which varies a great deal from country to country. Then 
the general situation regarding the right to defence by a defence lawyer, and the 
characteristics of the status and functions of defence lawyers in the Chinese pre-trial 
criminal proceedings will be examined by a comparative analysis with international 
standards. It will also address the critical issues of the lawyer’s difficulties and risks 
in handling a criminal case after the revision of the CCPL and the relevant domestic 
law. Finally, it is necessary to discuss concrete measures and actions which could be 
undertaken in order to enhance lawyer defence in the pre-trial proceedings and 
further facilitate the promotion of the human rights protection for the suspects in the 
pre-trial proceedings in China. In doing this, it may be possible to achieve the most 
favourable outcome in the implementation of the laws and to bring the Chinese legal 
system into compliance with internationally recognized standards.  
 
To what extent the person charged with a criminal offence actually has the right to 
defence varies between countries. But the basic conditions and requirements for 
effective defence to which the suspect is entitled has been ascertained in Article 14 
(3)(b) and (d) of the ICCPR, and Article 6 (3)(b) and (d) of the ECHR reaffirmed 
these rights, as explained in Chapter 2 and 3.5 The Basic Principles on the Role of 
Lawyers adopted by the Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders in 1990, has detailed provisions for such rights. Thereupon 
an integrated minimum international standard on criminal defence systems came into 
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 See discussion on Article 14(1) of ICCPR at Chap2, 6.1, pp.71-72; also see discussion on Article 6(1) of ECHR 
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being. Of all these guarantees on criminal defence systems, ensuring assistance from 
a lawyer before trial is the most important, as the person charged with the penal 
offence is in a disadvantaged position and condition, when facing the power of the 
state public powers. This is also because modern litigation is a very complicated 
process, requiring specialized knowledge and skills. Therefore, because of the 
lawyer’s specialist knowledge and skills, the regulation on professional ethics, and 
the unique right to carry out the investigation, collect evidence and take part in 
litigation, a lawyer is essential and the best defence for a person charged with a penal 
offense to exercise fully his right to defence on “an equal footing” with those placing 
the charges.6 This is why international human rights documents put on a par the 
right to defence and the help of lawyers. To recognise and ensure the lawyer’s right 
to carry out the investigation and collect evidence, and ensure that the judge will pay 
full attention to the defence in the litigation process, may lead to a final judgment 
based on listening to both sides and thus the right to have a fair trial will be better 
secured.  
 
2. The Impact of Legal Tradition on the Criminal Defence and the 
Role of Defence Lawyers in China 
In his famous quote, John Wigmore said to the effect that the adversarial system, or 
the right of cross examination, seems to be “by far the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth”.7 But this system needs application in China. 
Before entirely understanding the fundamental ideologies dominating criminal 
defence in criminal proceedings in China, the significance of some changes to the 
technical rules of the system of criminal defence by lawyers before trial should not 
be overestimated. The defence phenomenon has existed in China from ancient 
times.8 However, when issues concerning the right to defence and lawyers have been 
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considered, ideologies such as human rights protection, procedural justice from a 
spiritual perspective are undoubtedly logical and have often been mentioned as 
supporting materials for some related opinions or proposals. These are deeply rooted 
in Western political culture and the construction of the modern legal system. China 
treats the establishment of a rule-by-law country as the aim of the development of 
society during the process of constructing a modernized socialism at the current stage. 
However, it is undeniable that these “western” ideologies have not touched the core 
of traditional concepts and ideologies of criminal justice in China.9 The role of 
lawyers, the functions of criminal defence for the suspects and the criminal defence 
structure in China are, as all other issues considered in the development, decided and 
continue to be strongly influenced by the traditional values in the criminal justice 
system. The following brief study of the concept of “criminal defence” from the 
viewpoint of historical development will also provide a comparatively clear picture 
of the status and the functions of lawyers in criminal proceedings in China.  
 
2.1 Traditional Concept of Criminal Defence 
The traditional concept of “criminal defence” is viewed in a narrow sense, compared 
with the modern meaning according to international norms.10 The phrase “defence” 
(辩护), in Chinese, has as its original meaning that the utilization of the method of 
“debate” (辩论) is to fulfil the aim of “fending” (守护). From this understanding, in 
criminal proceedings, the implication of defence is usually limited to substantive 
defence and procedural defence is ignored. Therefore the typical “defence” only 
takes place at the trial stage. With regard to the participation of lawyers in the 
pre-trial proceedings, it was mainly for purpose of preparation for the genuine 
“defence” at trial. In addition, the lawyer does not confront his legal opponent face to 
face in the pre-trial stage. Therefore the legal consultations, representation to file 
petitions and complaints, investigations and acquisition of evidence, reference to 
                                                                                                                                                            
Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, 1990), p.35; Guohua Zhang and Xinxian Rao, ed., A History of Chinese 
Legal Thoughts, (Lanzhou: GanSu People Publishing House, 1984), p.75. 
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 See Chap4, 2.1, pp.212-221. 
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files and other activities conducted by lawyers in the pre-trial proceedings do not 
have the nature of a typical “defence”.  
 
In contrast, the English word “defence” can be translated into Chinese as “defence” 
or “defend”. If the function of the prosecution is viewed aggressive, the function of 
the defence is defensive. All the activities of the lawyer in criminal procedures 
including the lawyer’s representation to file petitions and complaints, to arrange 
pre-trial bail, to meet with suspects and witnesses, to carry out presentations on site, 
acquisition of evidence, objections and so on in the pre-trial proceedings can all be 
viewed as a defence against the aggression of the prosecution and for the purpose of 
exercising the defence functions. This is true in trial proceedings and there is no 
exception in the pre-trial proceedings. As discussed in previous Chapters Two and 
Three, it is a universally recognized principle of law that the person on a criminal 
charge also has the right to defence during the pre-trial stage.11 The defence 
principle requires not only legal affirmation of the right to defence, but even more 
importantly to provide necessary conditions for the effective use of this right, as 
required by Article 14(3)(b) of ICCPR.12 
 
To understand the phrase “defence” in its narrow sense in Chinese, it is not difficult 
to understand that the narrow concept, “the right to defence specifically refers to the 
right to rebut and plead against the charge and to obtain the help of a defender in 
criminal procedures”, has commonly existed in China until now.13 This has been the 
fundamental concept of “defence” for the general public and in Chinese legal culture. 
It means the right to defence has only been embodied through the right to make a 
statement, to present evidence, raise questions, debate, acquire the assistance of 
defence lawyers, etc during the stage of criminal trial. From the analysis below, 
compared with the requirement of international standards, the right to defence in 
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China lacks the protection of the legal rights to a full defence of the person on a 
criminal charge incorporating the right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare 
the defence, the right to have a lawyer present in the interrogation, the right to 
petition, etc.14 Therefore, the role of lawyers is not included in the establishment and 
operation of an effective legal framework to prevent arbitrary detention and torture 
of suspects. Under the narrow definition of the right to defence, as Long considered, 
the issue of the lawyer’s status and role in the pre-trial proceedings is confused in 
China.15 A breach of Article 14(3)(b) and (d) of ICCPR is most likely to occur.  
 
The title of this chapter, “the right to defence in the pre-trial proceedings” presents 
the view that the basic definition and the functions of the right to defence and the 
procedural status of the defence lawyers should not be different because of the 
separation between the pre-trial and trial proceedings. To understand the role of the 
lawyers in the pre-trial proceedings based on the operation of defence functions 
under the requirements of international norms, it would not difficult to conclude that 
the status of the lawyers in the pre-trial proceedings is still as a defender, as found in 
Imbrioscia v Switzerland.16  As a defender in the pre-trial proceedings, the role of 
the lawyer is also to protect the legal rights of the suspects.17 Actually in recent and 
modern history, the expansion of the right to defence in Chinese criminal procedure 
is clearly reflected in the constant increase and volume of application for pre-trial 
procedural rights, such as the right for lawyers to meet clients and the right to apply 
for investigation and acquisition of evidence. However, one of the prominent issues 
existing in current criminal procedure in China is that it is more difficult for lawyers 
to defend in pre-trial proceedings than before under the CCPL of 1979, as illustrated 
below. It is necessary to improve the relevant legal cultural environment to tighten up 
the rights of defence lawyers in pre-trial proceedings. The differences in character 
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between the roles of defence lawyers in the pre-trial proceedings and during the trial 
in terms of particulars and methods should be taken into account. Therefore, to 
further confirm and expand the lawyer’s status as a defender status for the lawyer is 
the starting point for better protection of the legal rights of the suspect. 
 
2.2 Traditional Ideologies regarding Criminal Defence 
Not only differences in the actual concept of the right to defence exist across various 
legal systems, but also differences in fundamental legal ideology also exist between 
the western legal system and the Chinese system.18 The right to defence is seen as 
the core of due process rights in the modern western legal system as it protects 
individual rights against the arbitrary powers of the state. In contrast, as mentioned in 
Chapter Four, a high premium on sovereign interest, hierarchical obedience, and 
unanimous consent in a society that has been stamped by Confucian thought for 
centuries is still prevalent in China.19 There was some recognition of the legitimate 
need for legal services, in particular in view of the high rates of illiteracy in Chinese 
society in ancient times. 20  However, dominated by traditional ideologies, the 
traditional criminal procedures in inquisitorial mode，in keeping with Chinese 
traditional legal ideologies, usually pay more attention to the supremacy of authority, 
the prevention of crime and the educative effects of the defendant’s remorse, rather 
than the challenge to the state by the individual through criminal defence.21  
 
Naturally, this lack of ideology in the balance between the power of the state and the 
individual’s rights has a far-reaching influence on the right to defence through 
lawyers in current China, as demonstrated below. In a modern legal system, lawyers 
at the national level, and their professional associations, should have a vital role to 
play in ensuring transparency in institutions and in strengthening the capacity of 
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 For a detailed discussion on the ideological difference, see e.g. Yuxuan Zhang, “Analysis on the Barriers in the 
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national, regional and even international agencies.22 However, from the perspective 
of legal culture, an independent lawyer in China who confronts the state prosecutor is 
alien to the Chinese tradition. Because almost all the dominant ancient Chinese 
philosophies applauded harmony and disdained formal disputes, legal systems in 
imperial China discouraged litigation and restricted the knowledge of law to the 
social and political elite.23 Legal defence in the context of the traditional Chinese 
community reflected badly on an individual as it signified one’s refusal to take 
responsibility for one’s action.24 This has resulted in it being impossible for lawyers 
to be independent of the government in criminal defence and to feel secure in their 
peaceful confrontation with state power. This is because the person on a criminal 
charge is the object of the proceedings and in the feudalistic interrogatory mode of 
criminal justice he had no procedural rights at all.25 As a primitive legal profession, 
not only were lawyers never established as major players in the society, but they 
were often suppressed and divided by the government and were hence afforded very 
low prestige in traditional China.26 For example, lawyers were openly denounced by 
different commentaries and even legal codes in ancient China for entrapping people 
for the sake of profit and deserving of bitter detestation.27  
 
Due to this traditional ideology of non-adversary mode in legal proceedings, the law 
enforcer and the judicial officers have been commonly hostile towards defence 
lawyers until now. The power structure of the Chinese state in the criminal process is 
therefore unbalanced. As indicated in Chapter Five and Six, a just criminal process 
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indeed relies upon a judicial structure with a check and balance system.28 However, 
the three judicial agencies, the MPS, the SPP, and the SPC, are more powerful agents 
in both legislative and administrative affairs than the MOJ, which regulates the legal 
profession, particularly lawyers, in the country. During the legislative process, such 
as in the 1996 CCPL amendment, the three judicial agencies have used the 
opportunity to consolidate and expand the scope of their power. By contrast, the 
rights of defence lawyers are often swept aside as the MOJ has been in a weak 
position compared with the other players. The low status of lawyers in the criminal 
process is further undermined by the fact that all the lawyers, the All China Lawyers 
Association (ACLA) and local lawyers associations are subject to the regulation of 
the MOJ and the local Bureaus of Justice.29 The Secretary General is usually also the 
deputy director of the division in charge of lawyers and notaries public in the MOJ. 
All three current deputy secretaries worked in the MOJ before they became ACLA 
members. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Lawyers of 2007 gives 
authority to the judicial administration departments of the MOJ to “supervise and 
guide lawyers, law firms and lawyers’ associations”.30 Lawyers thus enjoy very 
limited professional autonomy, which will be discussed further below. In addition, 
according to Article 7 of the 1996 CCPL, the police, procuratorate and judicial 
authorities regard themselves as an integrated system fighting crime in China, and 
officials in these three agencies control the state power and make final decisions in 
cases.31 So the law enforcers and the judicial officers often have a strong sense of 
superiority in status regarding lawyers.  
 
In such a situation, lawyers have to be very careful faced with the law enforcers, and 
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there is no system to guarantee their independent defence as discussed below. It 
frequently happens that the judge directly uses the coercive power of the state to 
drive the lawyer out of the courtroom or charge them with crimes. Polices and 
procurators use the state coercive power more directly and frequently, and their tough 
behaviour towards lawyers is sometimes even worse than the behaviour of judges. In 
addition, the traditional criminal policy of leniency to those who confess their crimes 
and severity to those who refuse to, as mentioned in Chapter Six, also declares 
publicly that being obedient is better than mounting a challenge.32 The right to 
silence and the right to refuse to make a statement are rooted in the individualist 
culture that strives to challenge and resist the state’s undue interference with 
individual freedom, something which has not yet been completely accommodated in 
Chinese criminal proceedings.33 Therefore the purpose of the defence lawyer has 
been considered well-served if he could help the court to render a just verdict. The 
suspects and their defence lawyers have generally been obedient to the will of the 
authorities in the stages of investigations and trials. In order to create a harmonious 
atmosphere with the prosecutors, the defending sides often express common grounds 
with the prosecution before rebutting the criminal charges and presenting their 
defence opinions.34 Their defence was often confined to pleading for leniency 
without exercising their rights, such as cross-examining government witnesses and 
calling witnesses of their own, as provided by the law. The confrontation in court 
may be a performance only. This practice reflects an oriental value that seeks the 
obedience of the individual to the state and emphasizes the harmony between the two 
as explained in Chapter Four.35 
 
2.3 The Political Ideologies on Criminal Defence 
The Western type of professional lawyer was first introduced to China at the end of 
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the Qing Dynasty. 36  However, as indicated in Chapter Four, these initiatives 
emanated mostly from the government, and the divisiveness of wars and internal 
conflicts in China never permitted a full flowering of the seeds planted by republican 
reformers.37 The real values of lawyers and criminal defence work as western 
transplants therefore were also not fully appreciated or demanded by the Chinese 
people as other western legal norms.38 Therefore, from its very inception in China, 
rather than serving the interests of the people, the legal profession served mostly as 
an instrument for the government, much like the traditional Chinese view of law as 
an instrument of control for the ruling class.39 After the communist take-over in 
1949, great efforts were made to suppress the practice of former lawyers.40 The 
purpose of the rehabilitation was to eliminate the so-called “litigation tricksters” (讼
棍) from the Nationalist period and to establish a new system of lawyers based on the 
Soviet model.41 As mentioned in Chapter Four, the Marxist theory of antinomy and 
unification has been regarded as the most important theoretical basis for the 
establishment of criminal defence system.42 Under this ideology, prosecution and 
defence are the two opposite sides in complicated criminal procedures, but they exist 
in a contradictory unity. The debating process between prosecution and defence is a 
progression through which the truth of the case gradually comes out, and also a 
course in which people deepen their awareness of the case. Therefore the law stated 
that the accused has the right to retain a defender and the defendant may retain a 
lawyer to conduct his defence.43  
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The law of unity of opposites requires the co-existence and struggle of the 
prosecution and defence in criminal procedure and that they unite with each other on 
the basis of respecting the facts and the law. China has, over an extended period, 
under extremist influences, been inclined to adopt a one-way approach to punishing 
crime: protection of people, and safeguarding social security, as shown in Chapter 
Four.44 With this approach, suspects were the targets of the administration of 
authorities, and their rights had to be restricted or even ignored. Lawyers are hired by 
suspects and are regarded as opponents of the investigating authority. Their early 
involvement is especially detrimental to the work of cracking down on the enemy 
and protecting the people, as Wang Longtian pointed out.45 Therefore the status of 
defence lawyers under Mao continued to be low, due to the view that criminals were 
enemies of the state because of their assistance to mercenary exploiters of the general 
public, a continuation of traditional ideology on criminal defence. Furthermore, the 
hallmark of this socialist legal system is also the educative effect of enemies and 
defendants’ remorse and confession rather than their challenge to the state through 
criminal defence. The profession of lawyer suddenly had no more reason to justify its 
very existence. In the two decades between 1959 and 1980, there was neither lawyer 
nor advocate in criminal proceedings in China, nor did China have any viable laws to 
be practised by lawyers.46 Public trials occur only where officialdom expected them 
to have educational value.47 
 
Along with the introduction of the market economy, a modern legal system has been 
initiated by the Chinese Communist Party. Lawyers, as an essential component of a 
modern legal system, have played an increasingly important role initially in the 
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commercial area and then in all aspects of society.48 Criminal defence was resumed 
in China’s criminal justice system in the early 1980s. That the accused has the right 
to defence was officially stated in the Chinese Constitution of 1982 and this principle 
is also included in Article 26 of the 1979 CCPL, after it had been completely 
suspended in Cultural Revolution.49 According to the law, the defendant not only 
had the right to self-defence, but also to retain a lawyer to defend him.50 In Addition, 
the introduction of the Interim Regulations on Lawyers enacted by the NPC Standing 
Committee on August 26, 1980 began the rehabilitation of the lawyer, his function, 
rights, qualifications and professional status. Under this law, Chinese lawyers were 
characterized as “state legal workers” (国家的法律工作者).51 The definition of state 
legal workers actually attempted to put a lawyer into a place equal to that of the 
prosecutor and the judge who therefore accepted a lawyer as an insider instead of an 
outsider, which gave respect to the rights of the lawyer. This has been a positive step 
in changing the traditional attitude to the profession of lawyers, and assisting a 
lawyer in carrying out his duties and protecting his due rights in the Chinese legal 
system.52 This was because, within the unsound legal system, a lawyer, when 
defined as a legal specialist for the country, was invested with authority.53 
 
However, the ideology that saw a lawyer as a representative of the public interests 
also led the legislators to place the lawyer under the name of state legal worker. A 
lawyer under the definition of state functionary is supposed to safeguard the interests 
of the state and the public when he serves his individual clients. Sometimes the 
lawyers even have to act as instructed by the authorities. The activities of defence 
lawyers in the criminal proceedings are of minor significance. There was in both 
Party and the public a conscious or subconscious suspicion of the legal profession. In 
the absence of incriminating evidence from other sources, confession remained 
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crucial to the strength of the Procuratorate’s case as shown in the analysis in Chapter 
Six.54 Lawyers were still regarded as a profession who would use loopholes to 
destroy the prosecution’s case and hinder the investigating authorities from acquiring 
crucial evidence from the suspects’ confessions.55 Such a concept has not been 
fundamentally changed, as it is deep-rooted, even until now.56 In 1979, when setting 
up the new criminal procedure law, China obviously followed the traditional 
ideology in laying stress on social order and stability, prioritising the interests of the 
country above all.57 There were few procedural requirements within the criminal 
process, and few protective measures to defend the rights of a suspect. So the 
lawyers’ rights during the criminal defence are rather limited. Alongside economic 
development came the increase in crime rates and in the incidence of corruption. In 
practice, it has erroneously implied that defence lawyers have aligned themselves 
with the criminal elements of Chinese society.58 The criminal defence lawyer is still 
a particularly difficult concept for the general public to accept and welcome. 
Obviously the law enforcers have naturally also underplayed the emphasis on 
criminal defence. 
 
In practice, the role of the lawyer is therefore to cooperate or reach a compromise 
with the judges and prosecutors, instead of being an adversary.59 It comes about that 
on the one hand, a lawyer is entrusted with and enters into a commercial agreement 
on a case with the suspect. Therefore lawyers should act on their clients’ behalf and 
guarantee their legal interests. On the other hand, to ensure the implementation of 
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state policies, the loyalty of a lawyer to his client is subject to the remote 
consideration of the interests of the country, which displaces the interests of a citizen 
when they are contradictory.60 It is hard to tell whether or not the participation of a 
lawyer moderates the imbalance between the prosecutor and the suspects, although 
he is supposed to help produce the balance.61 The recognition of the rights of 
suspects may well be incidental in the conflict, negotiation and compromise among 
the powerful institutions in China. Not surprisingly, the great majority of defendants 
have remained non represented by lawyers and, for those who did get legal 
representation, the lawyers’ pleas of innocence were rarely accepted and greatly 
restricted by the government under the CCPL of 1979.62 The 1996 amendment gave 
some indication of procedure designs of justice awareness. But as the detailed 
analysis of the law shows below, substantive changes did not ensue to transform the 
old ideology on criminal defence.  
 
The right to defence is the indispensable requirement for a fair trial and presumption 
of innocence.63  If the principle of presumption of innocence were not firmly 
established, it would be impossible to realize the right to defence.64 As discussed in 
Chapter Four, compared with Article 14(2) of ICCPR, the CCPL of 1996 has not yet 
completely recognized and implemented the principle of presumption of innocence.65 
Therefore, despite the fact that the last 30 years of legal reforms were intended to 
transform China into a country under rule of law and to strengthen the role of 
defence lawyers in the criminal justice process, the effectiveness of defence lawyers 
in China has improved little, as demonstrated below. The gap with international 
standards with regard to lawyers is inevitable, or cannot be avoided at the present 
stage. It is feared that in a system like the Chinese one, where judicial independence 
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and legal professionalism have not been fully established, and the rule of law and the 
principle of presumed innocence have not been fully integrated, the over-emphasis 
on the right to legal representation may not be to the advantage of suspects. It might 
become a liability rather than an asset for the defendant, as the stronger the defence, 
the more severe the punishment that is likely to result.66 It makes it harder for 
defence lawyers to get a public hearing for the important values that they represent. 
 
3. Progress under the 1996 Amendment  
Although there was a right to defence for suspects under the CCPL of 1979 based on 
a small number of regulations, the role of criminal defence lawyers was extremely 
limited under the influence of the traditionally hostile attitude towards criminal 
defence, which led to the poor quality of legal representation for suspects at trial. 
Efforts have also been made by legal scholars, lawyers, and reform-minded officials 
on various occasions to voice their concerns and urge improvements. Information 
emerging from many conferences with regard to criminal defence lawyers provides a 
very positive prospect. While lawyers openly criticized the prosecutors and public 
security personnel for creating obstacles for lawyers to participate in criminal 
defence, the prosecutors attending the conference have frankly admitted such 
difficulties, expressed their sympathies, and vowed to improve, in spite of criticism.67 
There are indeed some detailed initiatives that have been taken by different 
authorities in various areas, such as on-going drafting of the law of evidence by the 
Standing Committee of NPC, which would certainly improve the chance for defence 
lawyers to cross-examine witnesses at trial.68 The substantive changes in the law and 
the symbolic values contained in the reform of 1996 demonstrate China’s efforts to 
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bring the Chinese criminal proceedings closer to internationally recognized standards. 
International society and the human rights watchdogs have warmly welcomed these 
reforms.69  
 
3.1 Timeframe Forward 
One of the most important innovations of the amendments in 1996 was to allow 
earlier and more extensive involvement of defence lawyers in criminal proceedings. 
This revision has attempted to bring China into compliance with the requirement in 
Article 14 (3)(d) of ICCPR regarding the right to a lawyer during the initial stages of 
police investigation.70 It had been commonly recognized that before the 1996 reform, 
in practice, no legal representation for the suspects was permitted until a week before 
the trial. The original CCPL stated that the defendant should be notified of being 
entitled to a lawyer only 7 days before the court decides to open the trial and he shall 
be informed that he may appoint a defender or, when necessary, designate a defender 
for himself.71 In other words, there was no legal basis for a defence lawyer to 
demand to review case files, obtain information or meet and correspond with the 
suspect in the course of investigation before a trial. This practice had obviously 
breached the requirement in Article 14(3)(b) of ICCPR.72 Also the absence of legal 
representation at this stage could in certain circumstances affect the fairness of the 
proceedings as a whole, as Twalib v Greece illustrated, and therefore give rise to a 
violation of the principle of fair trial taken together with the right to defence.73 
 
Moreover, this seven-day rule effectively limited the suspects’ ability to realize his 
right to defence fully at the investigation and prosecution stages of a criminal case. 
Without legal representation during the investigation and prosecution stages, the 
police and procurators might, as happened frequently and as discussed in Chapter 
Five and 6, force or falsify confession, or record only those statements favourable to 
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the prosecution’s case, or illegally detain the suspect. In the vast majority of cases, 
there were only 1 or 2 days available for a lawyer to prepare a defence. In most 
instances, cases were already at trial when the lawyer received the notice. Given so 
little time to prepare, the defence counsel actually played virtually no role in the trial 
proceedings. As established in the Öcalan v. Turkey case, this was inconsistent with 
the requirement of the right to adequate facilities to prepare a defence.74 A Joint 
Notice issued by SPC, SPP, MPS and MOJ in 1981 provided that where a case was 
complicated and there was not sufficient time for preparing a defence, the defence 
lawyer might ask the court to delay the trial, and the court should consider the 
application if the delay would not affect the trial of the case within the limits 
provided by law.75 In practice, however, such extensions were rarely granted. And 
this limited protection was later even abolished for some offences and the right to 
adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence was completely neglected under the 
policy of crime control. According to the 1983 Decisions of the Standing Committee 
of the NPC, the seven-day time limit may be overstepped for defendants who cause 
explosions, commit murder, rape, robbery or other crimes seriously endangering 
public security, and who are liable to the death penalty, where the main facts of the 
crimes are clear, the evidence is conclusive and popular indignation is very great.76  
 
Therefore before the 1996 reform of the CCPL, there had been a consensus among 
academics and many decision makers in China that the right to defence should be 
expanded and defence lawyers should be available to a suspect at an earlier stage.77 
Therefore, significantly, Article 96 of the 1996 CCPL provides that after the suspect 
has been interrogated by an investigation authority for the first time or from the day 
on which compulsory measures are adopted against him, he may appoint a lawyer to 
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provide him with legal advice and to file petitions and complaints on his behalf. This 
change broke the barriers to the completely helpless position of the suspect at the 
stage of investigation, increased his defence ability, and to a great extent prevented 
the police from infringing the legal rights of the suspect. Compared to the old 
provision, it represents a step forward to consistency with Article 14 (d) of ICCPR.78 
The CCPL of 1996 also provides that from the prosecution stage, a defendant has the 
right to entrust a lawyer with his defence at trial.79 The procuratorate shall, within 3 
days from the date of receiving the file record of a case transferred for examination 
before prosecution, inform the suspect and his family that he has the right to entrust a 
person with the task of being his defender. 80 The Court shall, within 3 days from the 
date of accepting a case for private prosecution, inform the defendant that he has the 
right to entrust a person to be his defender.81 Suspects are supposed to be able to 
have a minimum of 10 days to prepare a defence before the beginning of trial.82 
Together with changes in the trial system, by providing a longer time to prepare the 
defence, this amendment is an attempt to strengthen the ability of a lawyer to 
challenge the prosecution’s allegations and to prepare a better defence for suspects in 
the coming trial.83 Also, the distance from the standard in Article 14(3)(b) of ICCPR 
has been narrowed.84 
 
Concerning the investigation of sensitive cases, China has also made some efforts to 
guarantee the right to access to legal advice in pre-trial stage as the Article 14(3)(d) 
of ICCPR requires in judicial interpretations. For example, Regulation 11 of The 
1998 Joint regulation on several Issues in the Implementation of the Criminal 
Procedure Law made by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of National Security, Ministry of 
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Justice, the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (Joint Regulation 1998) 
prescribes that, except for some special circumstances such as state secret 
involvement, the lawyer’s application to meet the suspect should be arranged within 
48 hours, or within 5 days if the lawyer requests for meeting the suspect in a serious 
and complicated case in which two or more individuals have jointly committed 
crimes such as forming, leading or taking part in organizations of the nature of a 
criminal syndicate, or forming, leading or participating in a terrorist organization, or 
smuggling, or drug dealing, or embezzlement and bribery, etc.85 It also confers upon 
the family the right to select a lawyer on behalf of the suspect, so that a lawyer 
chosen by the suspect or his family is recognized as having a right to be involved in 
the case and meet with the suspect.86  
 
3.2 The Function of Lawyers Improved in Pre-trial Proceedings 
The defence position has been extended not only in the timing of the involvement of 
lawyers in criminal proceedings, but also in the legal procedures to ensure that the 
lawyers are on an equal footing with the procuratorate in preparing for the trial with 
the suspects, in harmony with the international standards in Article 14(1) and Article 
14(3)(b) and (d) of ICCPR.87 Furthermore, the more extensive involvement of the 
lawyer may strengthen the legal framework to effectively prevent the investigator 
from disregarding the legitimate rights of suspects by their unique expertise and 
abilities in every stage of the criminal proceedings. This progress has mainly been in 
the following respects. 
 
Firstly, the current phase of the legal reform of the system of lawyers aims at 
professionalizing and formalizing the system of legal representation. Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Lawyers (hereinafter as Law on Lawyers 2007), 
which was amended in 2007 and is currently in force was a historical turning point 
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for the legal profession. Under Article 2 of this law, the status of lawyers is 
dramatically changed to a professional, who provides society with legal services for 
the public and safeguard the lawful rights and interests of parties in order to ensure 
the correct implementation of the law.88 It specifically provides systematic rules on 
the conditions for a lawyer’s practice, the law firm, businesses of the lawyer, the 
rights and obligations of the licensed lawyer, legal aid, the association of lawyers, 
legal liabilities of the lawyer, etc. Therefore the lawyer was an agent of the client 
rather than the representative on behalf of the public interest. The lawyers’ 
association is described as a self-managed, independent social group rather than an 
arm of the justice department as it had been in the past.89 These definitions are more 
rational than that of a legal specialist for the country, the change constituting historic 
progress in terms of the profession of lawyer. These changes are expected to enable 
lawyers to work more independently and to provide legal services more effectively. 
They bring an equal and reasonable opportunity for the suspects to put up a rigorous 
defense in the criminal trials as required in Dowsett v. UK.90 Lawyer’s practice has 
therefore been provided a legal guarantee in a psychological and arguably a material 
sense. The legal profession has been expected to become prosperity. 
 
Secondly, some procedural safeguards for the right to defence through legal 
assistance before trial under ICCPR were introduced. According to Article 10 of the 
1996 CCPL, a suspect may engage a lawyer by himself or may have his relatives 
represent him to arrange such engagement.91 In order to fully protect the right to 
defence for the detainee, the SPP in its departmental rules states that after the suspect 
is interrogated for the first time or from the day on which compulsory measures are 
adopted against him, he should be notified that he has the right to appoint a lawyer to 
provide him with legal advice and to file petitions and complaints on his behalf. And 
this notification should be recorded.92 The MPS also issued a regulation requiring 
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the police to inform suspects of their right to counsel after the completion of the first 
interrogation.93 These provisions are closely linked to Article 9 and Article 14(3)(d) 
of ICCPR regarding the notification of the right to legal counsel for the accused, 
which is an effective mechanism to guarantee the effective execution of criminal 
suspects’ right to defence.94  
 
Moreover, the SPP rules also state that if a suspect in custody wishes to appoint a 
specific lawyer, the custodial organ shall without delay pass the request to the 
investigation organ concerned, which shall then transfer the request to the appointed 
person or the law firm where he works. If the suspect only has a request to have a 
lawyer, but does not name a particular person, the investigating organ shall convey 
promptly the request to the local lawyer’s association or the local judicial 
administrative organization for their recommendation of a lawyer. 95  This 
requirement may be viewed as intended to ensure that Article 14(3)(d) of ICCPR is 
not infringed.96 Furthermore, the SPC in its Judicial Interpretations stated that if the 
accused deserves an appointed defender as mentioned above but has refused the 
court appointed defender and has proper reason for this, this shall be allowed.97 This 
kind of provision shows respect for the accused’s choice of lawyer, as implied in 
Croissant v Germany.98 However, he has to entrust his case to another defender, or 
the court can appoint another defender. In other words, there must be a defender, 
such as a lawyer, for this kind of case so that a trial can take place. It has the utmost 
significance for protecting the rights of the sight-impaired, hearing-impaired and 
speech-impaired, minors, and those who risk being sentenced to death.99 This 
complies with Article 14(3)(d) of ICCPR which requires that suspects have to be 
provided with legal assistance in the interest of justice, as implied in Correia de 
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Matos v. Portugal.100 
 
Thirdly, the CCPL also moved to comply with Article 14(1) and Article 14(3)(b) of 
ICCPR by extending the defence rights of lawyers to a broader degree, particularly in 
the prosecution proceedings. At the stage of investigation, with the exception of a 
case involving state secrets, lawyers need not obtain the approval of the investigation 
organ to carry out legal consultancy. According to Article 96 of the CCPL, the rights 
of lawyers begin with their having the right to be informed by the investigation 
organs about the charges, the right to meet with their clients and maintain 
communication with them in the presence of the investigation organs, in light of the 
necessary situations, at this stage.101 This reform aims at compatibility with the 
requirement ensuring a detainee’s right to communicate and consult with his legal 
counsel from an early stage in criminal proceedings, as emphasized in Murray v 
UK.102 In the investigation stage, communication between the suspect and a lawyer 
can provide the suspect with psychological support and prevent police violence. It is 
a crucial component in safeguarding the effectiveness of complaints procedures and 
the fact that torture will be promptly reported and prosecuted as discussed in Chapter 
Six.103 Significantly, at the stage of examination by the prosecution, according to 
Article 33 of the 1996 CCPL, there are no restrictions on the suspect having recourse 
to a lawyer, and on the lawyer meeting with his client and reading and copying case 
files.104 There is no need for lawyers to obtain approval from the prosecuting agency. 
The quality of legal representation before and during a trial needs to be improved and 
adequate for the suspects by giving them proper access to information regarding the 
case, following Öcalan v. Turkey.105 
 
Noticeably, with cases involving state secrets, the fact is that the suspect still needs 
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the approval of the investigating organ to have access to a lawyer, as mentioned 
above.106 However, China has shown a willingness to make the right to legal counsel 
genuine by trying to minimize the scope of this kind of case. For example, the Joint 
Regulation of 1998 legislatively declares that the so-called state secret-related case is 
one in which its criminal circumstances or its nature are involved with state secrets. 
A case cannot be regarded as a case involving state secrets just because relevant 
materials and opinions on the issues during the investigation process need to be 
confidential.107 According to the regulation, there does not need to be approval for a 
lawyer to meet with the suspect if the case itself does not involve state secrets 
according to the law. The fact that the process of investigation is secret and the case 
therefore is state-secret-related is not reason to prevent the meeting between the 
lawyer and the suspect from being approved. China has begun to take notice of the 
requirement in international norms that the right to see a lawyer in the early stage of 
a police investigation can be restricted only if there is a good reason, as shown in 
Murray v UK and S v Switzerland.108 It is worth mentioning that the Law on 
Lawyers of 2007 also makes an effort to guarantee and to facilitate more effective 
relationships between client and lawyer in criminal cases. Under this new law, the 
previous restrictions on face-to-face meetings with clients have been eased. Lawyers 
will be able to meet their clients after police interrogation without applying for 
permission, and there is no exception for state-secret-cases. Moreover, the state is 
prohibited from conducting surveillance of the defendants meeting their lawyers. 
Presumably, this should represent a turning point in the ability of defence lawyers to 
prepare their cases well. It is a positive signal towards the further amendment of the 
CCPL in full compliance with ICCPR standards, particularly Article 14(1) and 
Article 14(3)(b) of ICCPR, completely. 
 
Also on the way to compliance with Article 14(3)(b) of ICCPR, the right to the 
appropriate information relating to the case is explicitly added into the revised CCPL 
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for suspects and their lawyers. This should help suspects prepare their cases 
adequately, following in Harward v Norway.109 Article 36 of the CCPL specifies that 
at the pre-trial stage, from the date on which the Procuratorate begins to examine a 
case for prosecution, defence lawyers may consult, extract and duplicate the judicial 
documents pertaining to the current case and the technical verification material. 
From the date on which the court accepts a case, defence lawyers may consult, 
extract and duplicate the factual material concerning the crime involved in the 
current case.110 Also Article 37 of the CCPL provides that defence lawyers may, 
with the consent of the witnesses or other relevant units and individuals, collect 
information pertaining to the current case from them and they may also apply to the 
Procuratorate for collection and obtaining of the evidence; with the permission of the 
Procuratorate and with the consent of the victim, his near relatives or the witnesses 
provided by the victim, defence lawyers may collect information from them 
pertaining to the current case.111 Furthermore, under the new provisions of the Law 
on Lawyers of 2007, defence lawyers will also benefit from increased access to court 
documents and case files and more flexibility in gathering and collecting evidence 
independently.112 Also, the Meeting with suspects shall not be monitored.113 From 
the time an investigative case is commenced against a suspect, his lawyer will have 
the right to inspect and make copies of documentation of the proceedings and the 
case files supporting the allegations against the client.114 This significant step signals 
China’s willingness to fully accept the standard set in Article 14(3)(b) of ICCPR into 
its domestic criminal procedures. 
 
Fourthly, the lawyers can now request bail or challenge the legality of the 
compulsory measures for their clients as their role has been extended into the 
pre-trial stage.115 Lawyers can either serve as a guarantor or ask for monetary 
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guarantees for their client, even though the police are under no obligation to approve 
such a request due to imprecise provisions.116 Also when the investigation authority 
adopts compulsory measures exceeding the time limit prescribed by law, the lawyer 
or the other defender instructed by the suspect has a right to demand cancellation of 
the compulsory measures or the adopting of different compulsory measures 
according to the law.117  
 
3.3 The Scope of Legal Aid broadened  
The revised CCPL also broadens the scope of legal aid, which comes closer to the 
requirement of Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR concerning the right to have defence 
lawyers assigned whenever the interests of justice so require.118 In the CCPL of 
1979, Article 27 stated that if a prosecutor appeared in court to conduct a public 
prosecution and the defendant had not instructed anyone to be his defender, the court 
might designate a defender for him. If the defendant was hearing-impaired or 
speech-impaired, or he was a minor, and thus had not entrusted anyone to be his 
defender, the court should designate a defender for him. In practice, this might fail to 
satisfy Article 14(3)(d) of ICCPR, since it was incumbent only on the court to decide 
whether it would designate a lawyer for the defendant.119 In contrast, the Article 34 
of the CCPL in 1996 stated that a defender shall be designated a lawyer in the 
following situations: 120  firstly, in cases of public prosecution with the public 
prosecutor appearing in court where the accused has not instructed a defender due to 
financial difficulties or other reasons. Secondly, when the accused is sight-impaired, 
hearing-impaired or speech-impaired, or is a minor who has not instructed a defender. 
Thirdly, when the accused may be sentenced to death, yet has not instructed any 
defender. With regard to the first situation, the court may designate a lawyer who is 
obliged to provide legal aid and serve as a defender. With regard to the last two 
situations the courts is required to do so. It has been clearly shown that the grounds 
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for the optional appointment of a lawyer in China have extended to physical and 
psychological difficulties by adding “financial difficulties” among these reasons. The 
defender appointed by a court should be a lawyer. The lawyer is obliged to provide 
legal aid and serve entirely as a defender for the interest of justice as required in R. D. 
v Poland.121 The law has emphasized the requirements of full legal aid to be 
provided by a lawyer, representing a major step forward towards compliance the 
general ICCPR approach. 122 
 
China’s first Legal Aid Centre was launched in Guangzhou in 1995. The introduction 
of Rules on Legal Aid, in September 2003, has gone further towards ensuring that 
suspects who cannot afford legal representation have access to legal assistance. In the 
Rules on Legal Aid, the criminal legal aid procedure is not limited to the defendant 
in the trial stage, but extended to criminal suspects in the investigation and 
prosecution stage and to the injured party in a public prosecution.123 Chinese official 
statistics state that about 3% of all cases heard by courts in 2005 involved some 
measure of legal aid.124 Moreover, due to insufficient legal resources in China, 
suspects can be represented by a wide variety of people. The Lawyer’s Law of 2007 
states that a lawyer must undertake the duty of legal aid in accordance with state 
regulations and provides the recipient with legal services in fulfilment of their duty 
and responsibility.125 Their licenses will not be renewed if they do not comply. The 
CCPL stipulates that suspects can be represented by a professional defence lawyer, 
relative, or other specified person.126 These include not only lawyers but often 
relatives, friends and work colleagues of the suspects. It has helped to solve the 
difficulty in finding a defender or lawyer for a suspect, and is conductive to 
protecting the right to defence. It has taken the Chinese practical situation into 
consideration, and solved the problem which has long existed in China, with suspects 
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not having access to legal services due to their financial difficulties or limitation in 
number and power of the lawyers. 
 
4. A New Round of Control 
From the discussion above, it can be seen that the CCPL of 1996 has made a number 
of efforts to comply with international standards in order to greatly strengthen the 
protection of suspects’ right to defence. Given these new developments, it is 
reasonable to assume that the presence of defence lawyers will provide more legal 
services at an earlier stage of criminal proceedings and this will have a positive 
impact on the right to protection of suspects. Nevertheless, due to special historical, 
cultural and political constraints in the Chinese criminal justice system as mentioned 
above, it is also possible that the positive legal changes to allow the early 
involvement of lawyers in theory will not have a transforming effect in practice.127 
According to research from various academics, the number of criminal cases 
represented by a defence lawyer dropped sharply nationwide after the CCPL of 1996 
took effect, a phenomenon that aroused public concern.128  At the same time, 
suspects felt less and less confidence in defence lawyers and the public tended to 
consider the role of criminal defence more and more negligible.129 Therefore the 
purpose of the reform might well be frustrated and the right to defence has even been 
substantially limited and grossly distorted, both because of inconsistencies or 
inadequacies in the laws themselves or obstacles occurring during actual 
implementation which do now allow the exercise of the proper legal rights. Article 
14(3)(b) and (d) of ICCPR could be cited in a variety of contexts. Therefore, despite 
all the progress, there is still a large gap to bridge in respect of the right to defence 
for suspects in criminal proceedings, compared with the ICCPR rules and practices. 
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These main difficulties will be demonstrated below. 
 
4.1 The Deficient Status of the Lawyer in the Pre-trial Proceedings 
Objections could be raised regarding the inadequate right to defence applied in the 
pre-trial stage under Article 14(3)(d) of ICCPR, since the status of the defence 
lawyer in litigation during the period of investigation is not explicitly set out in the 
CCPL of 1996. 130  The 1996 CPL differentiates between the scope of legal 
representation before and after the beginning of the prosecution. When mentioning 
the term lawyer in the pre-trial proceedings, Articles 96 and 33 of the 1996 of CCPL 
use different wording. Article 96 of the CCPL provides that the suspect may appoint 
a “lawyer” to provide him with legal advice and some legal assistance in the 
investigative stage. However, Article 33 of the CCPL provides that a suspect may 
instruct persons as his “defenders” at the examination stage of prosecution.131 Under 
these different definitions, a lawyer appointed by a suspect appears not to have the 
status of a “defender” during the investigation period.132 The function of counsel has 
basically been reduced to a mere advisory role at this stage.133 A lawyer is not 
allowed to carry out investigations, consult the case materials or be present during 
interrogation, according to the aforementioned statutory rights in Article 36 and 
Article 37. In other word, the defence function of a lawyer to prepare the case does 
not start until the lawyer becomes a “defender” at the beginning of the prosecution 
stage. Contrary to the expectation of the revised CCPL, this flaw in the legislation 
means that a lawyer’s capability in the early stage of criminal investigation has been 
generally impaired and restricted in form and substance. It might be argued that such 
an application of the law does not appear to accord with the requirement on the right 
to be given adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, as interpreted in Öcalan 
v. Turkey.134 This application has therefore largely failed to live up to its initial 
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promise to help ensure a proper exercise of the rights of defence for suspects.  
 
These changes in the definition of lawyers in the Law on Lawyers of 1996 also 
brought about a numbers of negative consequences. The implementation of the 
CCPL has indicated that defence lawyers have still not been a major social force in 
affecting case outcomes, as this chapter has demonstrated. The considerable 
resistance to legal reform from the judiciary and law enforcement officers is 
particularly evident regarding certain aspects of the suspect’s and defendant’s rights 
in the process. Since the amendment of 1996, lawyers are no longer “state legal 
workers” as defined in the old law any longer.135 Consequently they have been 
regarded as outsiders and a nuisance in criminal proceedings by the police, 
prosecutor and judges, particularly the first two, of which there are a great number in 
the criminal justice system. A lawyer is an intermediary who is not publicly 
recognized and who is believed by the public to be the same as a private business 
owner.136 Meanwhile, a large proportion of the criminal defendce lawyers are at 
present newly established and inexperienced. 137  It is undoubtedly so that the 
inconsistent quality of criminal lawyers is one of the most significant reasons for the 
current dilemma. Correspondingly, procuratorates and courts have more chance to 
complain about the inferior service of lawyers handling criminal cases, service of the 
designated defenders in particular, especially when lawyers are required to give 
reasonable defence opinions, highlighting key points.  
 
4.2 The Inadequacy of a Defence Lawyer’s Right to Meet a Suspect 
The meeting of lawyers with detainees remains an area of police resistance, often 
with substantial public support under the traditional legal ideology as mentioned 
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above.138 Despite the fact that there has been some progress in the CCPL and 
subsequent regulations, the measures provided by the CCPL are not enough to 
guarantee the right of the defence lawyer to meet the suspect in detention, compared 
with international norms on the right to defence.139 In practice, the individual 
officers regard the performance of their duties having been unduly interfered with by 
retractions of confessions which presented utterly unwarranted complications.140 
Therefore individual officers dealing with investigations have independently denied 
lawyers access to their clients, which surely violates the obligation in Article 14(3)(b) 
and (d) of ICCPR. Since the right of lawyers to meet suspects provided in the 1996 
revision is vague and general, the prevailing rather cynical view is that the lawyer’s 
earlier intervention is more superficial than substantive.141 This is also a reflection of 
the prevalence of police misconduct during the investigation process, along with the 
use of torture, prolonged detention, and other unlawful means of extracting 
confessions as discussed in previous chapters.  
  
4.2.1 No Duty to Inform Suspects of the Right to Counsel 
It is also not clear whether the limited legal counsel service will actually be available 
to these defendants prior to the trial stage, since the vast majority of suspects are still 
detained incommunicado prior to trial, as discussed in Chapter Five and Six.142 
There is basically no stipulation in the CCPL of 1996 on the investigation agency’s 
duty to inform the suspect of the right to counsel on completion of the first police 
interrogation or the adoption of the first compulsory measure according to Article 96. 
Although there are some departmental rules imposing the obligation to notify the 
suspect of the right to legal counsel to remedy the situation mentioned above, in 
practice the obligation in itself is not officially compulsory in the CCPL.143 With the 
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rules on pre-trial detention in Article 64 of CCPL, the obligation is easily ignored by 
the investigators.144 Arguably, these ambiguous rules in the CCPL of 1996 will 
affect the right to defence by a lawyer and appears not to accord with the 
requirements under Article 9 and 14(3) of ICCPR, which implies that every person 
who is arrested, detained or charged must be informed of their right to have the 
assistance of legal counsel at the initial stage of the criminal proceedings.145 Even 
several years after the promulgation of the amended law, few suspects, especially 
those detained in the custody, requested counsel because the right was unknown to 
most of them. Combined with the absence of a right to silence in the CCPL of 1996, 
as analyzed in Chapter Six, there continues to be a significant risk of obtaining 
confessions through Article 7 treatment.146  
 
4.2.2 Lawyers Need Approval to Meet Clients 
While defence lawyers may officially meet their clients in custody, they normally 
need the investigatory authorities’ permission before they can meet with their client 
without legal requirements in practice. Lawyers are frequently and widely denied the 
opportunity of meeting with their clients. For example, in one province, during the 
period from January 1, 1997, the date the CCPL entered into force, to the beginning 
of 1998, the authorities granted only four requests from lawyers who wished to meet 
with their clients.147 A survey carried out by the Committee on Lawyers Rights of 
the Beijing Lawyers Association in 2006, indicates that 90% of the respondents must 
repeatedly apply before getting approval for a visit, and most of the time cannot see 
their client within the 48 hour limit.148 The situation demonstrates a conflict with 
Article 14(3)(b) and (d), or in conjunction with Article 14(1) or other provisions of 
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ICCPR might arise.149 One tactic that the authorities usually used was to broaden the 
exception that exists in the law and regulations concerning “state secrets”. The rules 
issued by public security departments and prosecutors even set up extra restrictions 
on lawyers meeting with their clients. Delay is another tactic, as lawyers’ right to 
meet clients is often restricted instance by instance.  
 
4.2.2.1 Denial of Requests to Meet on “State Secrets” Grounds  
Many lawyers were denied meetings with their clients on the grounds that the case 
involved “state secrets”. Article 96 of CCPL specifies that if a case involves state 
secrets, the suspect must obtain the approval of the investigating agencies to consult 
a lawyer. Where permission is given, the lawyer may not meet or correspond with his 
client without further permission of the investigative body. 150  However, this 
restriction tends to raise issues concerning the restriction of the right of access to a 
lawyer without good reason, as implied in many ECHR cases.151 In practice, the 
concept of state secrets is broadly and arbitrarily applied in China, leaving a wide 
margin of discretion over its interpretation. 
 
Both Article 8 (6) of the Law on the Protection of State Secrets of the People’s 
Republic of China and Article 2(3) to 8 in the 1995 Notice issued by the MPS and the 
National Administration for the Protection of State Secrets, entitled Regulation on 
State Secrets and the Scope of Each Level of Classification in Public Security Work 
consider details of any criminal case currently under investigation with regard to 
state secrets.152 Moreover, Article 11 of the Law on the Protection of State Secrecy 
also empowers the state entities that produce these secrets to classify them 
accordingly.153 Under these provisions, almost all criminal cases under investigation 
could be construed as involving state secrets, and therefore advance approval for 
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meetings between lawyers and their clients in official custody can be required. After 
the 1996 reform, the CCPL itself basically does not define the concept of “state 
secret” in Article 96. Other regulations, even the Joint Regulation of 1998, also fail 
to provide a concrete and clear definition of “state secrets”.154 Interviews with 
Chinese lawyers and scholars reveal a concern that some local police forces have 
tended to follow the old rules and arbitrarily extend the scope of “state secret” to all 
details concerning the investigation of crimes in order to reject the application for the 
lawyer’s meeting with his client during the investigation phase. 155  Everything 
depends on the judgment of the investigation authorities, typically the police, without 
any balancing and supervision mechanism as discussed in Chapter Five.156 On at 
least one occasion, officials admitted that some public security departments were 
denying all requests from lawyers for meetings with their clients on the basis of 
“state secrets”.157 In some cities, the percentage of such cases in which access was 
denied under the “state secrets” clause was close to 90% of all criminal cases.158 As 
a consequence, criminal defence lawyers are vulnerable to accusations of leaking 
state secrets.159  
 
It should be emphasised that the CCPL does not require a lawyer to show the 
detaining authority a copy of the detention notice in order to get access to the case 
and the client. Yet in practice police and prosecutors frequently use their positions to 
make this requirement, and defence lawyers themselves will often reluctantly tell a 
potential client that they cannot, and more often are unwilling, to even accept the 
case, unless a copy of the detention notice is provided for them, especially in a 
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politically sensitive case. The reaction of the lawyers becomes an added incentive for 
the authorities to violate the notification requirement under international standards. 
This has put the suspect into an extremely vulnerable situation, for it even denies the 
family and employer of the detainee their legally-guaranteed access to counsel at the 
initial stage of a case.160 As shown in Magee v UK and Averill v UK, the stage of 
preliminary investigation is a crucial time affecting the fairness of the trial.161 At this 
stage, the ordinary citizen without professional legal knowledge urgently needs the 
help of a criminal lawyer, who has the professional knowledge and ability to enable 
them to locate the detainee, so that the rights conferred by the CCPL upon suspects, 
family and defence counsel can all begin to be implemented. However, the freedom 
of the authorities to handle the practicalities of visits by lawyers was left largely 
unchanged in any judicial interpretation. 
 
As mentioned above, lawyers are able to meet with their client, unsupervised, after 
police interrogation, without applying for permission under the amendment of the 
Law on Lawyers in 2007. Though it opens the way for a later CCPL’s amendment, 
the implementation of the new provisions regarding the meeting between suspect and 
their lawyers might not be so positive. One of the main reasons is that this significant 
change is worded very vaguely and conflicts with the stipulation in the CCPL.162 
Following the reply of the NPC Standing Committee, if there are inconsistencies 
between the Criminal Procedure Law and the Law on Lawyers of 2007, according to 
Lex posterior derogat priori, the latter should prevail.163 However, because of the 
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long-standing imbalance of power in the criminal process, the practice is still biased 
against defence lawyers and in favour of prosecutors.164 Under the current situation, 
the implementation of the new Law on Lawyers is therefore unlikely to be brought 
forward. In practice, the extent to which the excuse of “legislative conflict with the 
CCPL of 1996” is being used on a nationwide basis to refuse requests from lawyers 
for such meetings is unclear.165 Lawyers have still been required to show the 
detaining authority a copy of the approval letter from the investigation agencies for 
the reason that the detaining authority has not received administrative guidance from 
superior agencies concerning the implementation of the new law. The investigation 
agencies also refuse to issue the letter of approval when the lawyers apply for it, as 
the former claim that they now have to follow the stipulations of the new law now. 
The lawyers are thus driven back and forth between the different law enforcement 
authorities. After one year of implementation of the new Law on Lawyers of 2007, 
lawyers complained that they were still denied the opportunity of meeting with their 
clients in custody. 166  Real improvement in the defence ability is severely 
undermined by the structural and legal cultural constraints. The compatibility of 
Article 14(3)(d) of ICCPR apparently continues to be uncertain. 
 
4.2.2.2 Refusal of Meetings for No-Reason at all 
On other occasions, a lawyer’s request to visit his or her client has even been rejected 
for no reason at all as the lawyer has been in a weak position compared with other 
players in criminal proceedings.167 Or the police will delay the meeting using 
different methods such as saying that the meeting should be reported to the superior 
first and his reply should be awaited. In a few situations, lawyers were told that 
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public security departments were “too busy to make any arrangements” for such 
meetings.168 In some cases, lawyers were even informed that suspects did not want 
to see them and were given no chance to speak with the suspects themselves.169 If 
the frustrated criminal lawyer becomes too assertive when reciting the CCPL 
provisions authorising access to his client, the police seldom hesitate to demonstrate 
that they are in charge, especially outside the major cities. This situation definitely 
fails to grant the right to communication with lawyers and it would seem that the 
fairness of the whole process may be affected, following the rule in Imbrioscia v 
Switzerland and Murray v the UK.170 
 
4.2.2.3 Insufficient Legal Aid 
The development of the legal aid system in China is still at an early stage.171 The 
real improvement of defence possibilities is undermined by the absence of actual 
improvement in legal aid. Firstly, the scope of legal aid remains narrow in terms of 
the range of recipients of legal aid and the legal aid process. Therefore the coverage 
of legal aid is still too limited to meet the actual needs. The special groups entitled to 
legal aid listed in the CCPL of 1996 only count for a small proportion of the 
population charged with various offences in the courts. The legal aid provided by the 
CCPL of 1996 is only at the trial stage. In the current situation of arbitrary detention 
in China, when a suspect in prison intends to apply for legal aid, the prison 
authorities can easily refuse to transfer his application to the legal aid institution. The 
provisions on legal aid in the investigation stage under Regulations on Legal Aid of 
2003 exist in name only. 172  Also, there is no provision in the law for the 
investigation agency being obliged to inform suspects of their right to obtain prompt 
legal aid. Many suspects do not even know they have the right to apply for legal aid. 
Obviously there are no other procedures in China to ensure that suspects get effective 
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legal aid in time.173 Therefore many who are unable to appoint lawyers, especially 
during the investigation stage, cannot obtain legal aid when they are in most need of 
a lawyer and therefore they will not benefit from the newly implemented legal rights 
in criminal defence.174 Secondly, the Regulations on Legal aid of 2003 is only an 
administrative law. There is no separate national law to unify and standardise the 
structure, operating procedures and sources of funding for the legal aid centres. The 
operation and quality of legal aid centres varies greatly from place to place. Thirdly, 
the theoretical right to legal aid in China may vanish without a strong commitment 
from the government to finance it. As Shenjian Xu stated, the duty to provide 
effective legal aid is on the government instead of the lawyers.175 The amount of 
money needed for the overwhelming majority of legal aids cases has often not been 
listed in local financial budgets. In most areas, coupled with the lack of personnel, 
not only are the certified lawyers obliged to undertake legal aid cases without 
payment, but they also have to shoulder the cost of the case. So the suspects find it 
rather difficult to get legal aid and a breach of Article 14(3)(d) would have occurred 
read with Article 14(1) of ICCPR.176 
 
4.2.3 Limitation on Number and Duration of Meetings between Lawyers and 
Clients 
In view of the extreme difficulties that lawyers encounter on entering the 
investigation stage and meeting the suspects as discussed above, one might think that 
those who manage to do so might then be allowed to render considerable service. But 
when lawyers are actually allowed to meet with their clients, various restrictions 
under the direct supervision of the authorities still severely limit the legal services 
that lawyers can effectively provide.177 Prior to the CCPL coming into effect, the 
MPS drafted implementation rules stating that meetings between lawyers and 
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suspects, if approved, should ordinarily involve a one-off visit lasting no longer than 
30 minutes.178 The rules further specify that such meetings should not be permitted 
more than twice. The draft MPS Interim rules were widely circulated within the 
public security system. It was reported that most local public security departments 
imposed limits on the number and duration of meetings, either by enacting formal 
detailed rules or through issuing internally circulated notices, even though the formal 
MPS Trial Rules eliminated the time limits when they were formally issued on 
December 20, 1996.179 Although the SPP’s Trial Rules did not spell out any limit on 
the number and duration of lawyers meetings with their clients in custody, most local 
procuratorates in fact followed exactly the same rules as the public security 
departments for the sake of their own interests in practice. A defence lawyer who 
needs to meet with a suspect in detention must first comply with the rules of the local 
detention centre first. Then, if allowed, lawyers generally get only one brief meeting 
during the investigation for a period of no more than 30 minutes.180 This meeting is 
frequently held in areas which make conversation difficult, and is usually monitored 
by investigators according to the provison in Article 96 as discussed in detail below, 
while the investigative process usually lasts for months and sometimes even years 
before it is concluded. 181  This time restriction on the right to communicate 
confidentially with a lawyer appears to limit the accused exercising this right to 
defend himself and therefore deprives him of a fair hearing, as in Öcalan v. 
Turkey.182 One report revealed that in early 1997, the courts themselves imposed the 
same type of restrictions on meetings between lawyers and defendants even after 
cases entered the trial stage, which is in violation of the CCPL.183 These internal 
                                                       
178
 See Zhijun Liu and Yuhong Song, “The Report on the Symposium on Criminal Defense: Indispensable Pillars 
for Building a Judicial Justice System”, (1998) 1 Chinese Lawyer, pp.18-19; Ping Yu, op.cit., fn 26, p.838. 
179
 See, e.g. Ministry of Justice in Jiangsu, “the Report on the Environment of the Lawyer in Performing their 
jobs in Our Province”, [2005], No. 38, 29/04/05, 
http://www.jssf.gov.cn/xxgk/fggw/sftwj/sftwjlvgl/200907/t20090701_31598.html; Cheng Lei, “The lawyer’s 
right to see his client: made impossible by internal bureaucratic directives?” China Youth Daily, 24/03/07, 
http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2007-03/24/content_1710361.htm. 
180
 See Yanyan Wang, “Settlements for the ‘Three Difficulties’ in Criminal Defence from the Perspective of New 
Law on Lawyers”, (2008) 6, Journal of Inner Mongolia Agricultural University(Social Science Edition), p.43. 
181
 See Jerome A. Cohen, “The Plight of China’s Criminal Defence Lawyer”, (2003) 33 Hong Kong Law Journal, 
p.237; The monitor from the police see discussion 4.2.4, pp.442-446. 
182
 See Öcalan v. Turkey, Chap3, 4.6.1, pp.196-197.  
183
 See Zhijun Liu and Yuhong Song, op.cit., fn 178, p.19. 
452 
 
regulations would seem to directly contradict Article 14(3)(b) and would thus also 
appear to be incompatible with Article 14(3)(d) and Article 14(1) of ICCPR.184 
Indeed, the regulatory environment in China renders attorney-client meetings 
virtually meaningless.  
 
4.2.4 Unreasonable Conditions for Meetings with Suspects 
While the amendment clearly authorises lawyers to intervene at an earlier stage, the 
existing CCPL has not provided suspects with the right to the presence of a lawyer in 
the pre-trial investigation.185 However, this is one of the basic safeguards for the 
right to defence, and, as explained in Chapters 2 and 3, both the HRC and the 
European Court have recognized that the right to a fair trial requires access to a 
lawyer during detention, interrogation and the preliminary investigations.186 Song 
Yinghui suggests that the defence lawyer shall be present when competent agencies 
are obtaining evidence.187 The lawyer may be better placed to help the suspect 
exercise his rights and interests. On the one hand, the presence of the defence lawyer 
during the pre-trial questioning and other investigations is in fact to supervise the 
activities carried out by the relevant authorities and effectively prevent Article 7 
treatment and prolonged detention for the suspect, as discussed in previous two 
chapters.188 On the other hand, due to the professional inclination, it is not easy to 
draw the prosecutor’s attention to evidence proving innocence or the minor nature of 
the crimes, as discussed in Chapter Six.189 Under certain circumstances, if a defence 
lawyer is present in the pre-trial questioning and investigation at the request either of 
the accused or the lawyer himself, this prejudicial situation could be avoided and 
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thus ensure the fairness of all the proceedings.190 This is also an opportunity for the 
defence lawyer to learn about the case and collect evidence, as shown in Öçalan v. 
Turkey.191  
 
In fact, however, proper and confidential communication between suspects and 
lawyers is not easy. But all these arrangements make it easy for officials to monitor 
conversation and suppress the right to defence of the suspects. Furthermore, Article 
96 of the 1996 CCPL equally explicitly authorises the law enforcement officials to 
monitor and control the meeting between the lawyers and suspects, depending on the 
circumstances and necessities of the case. 192  The exceptional condition for 
restricting the right to communicate confidentially with a lawyer appears vague and 
far-reaching, and there is no other provision protecting the confidentiality of the 
lawyer-suspect meeting in the CCPL of 1996. Security reasons are arbitrarily 
invoked by the officers to impede confidential discussion and exchange of 
documents between lawyers and their clients, in contrast to Kröcher and Möller 
v. Switzerland. 193  In recent years, in many joint regulations agreed by local 
authorities, the detention centre is required to provide necessary assistance for 
lawyers to interview their clients, including the provision of proper premises.194 
However, while the authorities take every opportunity to limit the effectiveness of 
the assistance which the lawyer could provide, the lawyer cannot obtain any 
assistance from the police except to be informed of the name of the offence the client 
is suspected to have committed.195 Moreover, these regulations only required that 
the normal interview between the lawyers and the detainees shall not be interrupted. 
They do not require the guards to be absent during the interview.  
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However, a more significant question is that during the meeting police officers are 
not only present at the meeting, but also directly intimidate the suspects and of 
course greatly influence the nature of the conversation through their official status. 
The meeting may be seen but not be heard by the tipstaff, as held in Modarca v. 
Moldova.196 However, the suspect, whether in custody or not, should have enough 
opportunity and time to meet or negotiate with a defence lawyer immediately and 
confidentially, and without being wiretapped or inspected. 197  The CCPL and 
relevant interpretations did not prevent the guards from questioning the suspects 
during the interview. Some law enforcement officials and scholars even suggest that 
officials should take advantage of such meetings to crack cases or obtain statements 
from suspects.198 In practice, the investigator who is present at the meeting is usually 
the person in charge of the investigation in question. While Article 96 of the CCPL 
states that the lawyer can interview the detained suspect in order to understand the 
circumstances and details related to the case, as soon as the lawyer begins to do so, in 
practice the investigation officials present at the interview would normally stop it 
immediately.199 Instructions from the police department openly prohibit officials 
from giving any indications that would allow lawyers and suspects to know anything 
regarding that stage of the investigation, because they are afraid it would facilitate 
preparation of defence strategies. 200  Some investigating agencies record and 
videotape the meeting between the defence lawyer and the suspects, even though at 
the same time the officials always claim that there are not enough resources to 
monitor the interrogation between the police and suspects in order to prevent torture 
as discussed in Chapter Six.201 Based on Zagaria v Italy, it is possible that such a 
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stance may also become evident, demonstrating interference with the right to 
confidential meetings with lawyers.202  
 
Lawyers and scholars also complain of the official practice of warning, “educating”, 
and even intimidating suspects in front of their lawyers before the meeting begins. 
Even worse, to ensure that lawyer-suspect meetings do not jeopardize the official 
criminal investigation, some officials required the lawyer to submit a written account 
of what they planned to talk about before holding a conversation with the suspect and 
they attempt to censor the content in advance.203 The officials also require that the 
pre-arranged meeting be carried out exactly according to the written talking points.204 
Until now China has not issued any concrete measures to regulate the behaviour of 
the investigators during their presence in the meeting. Therefore the stipulations of 
the present legislation and its implementation seriously hamper the effectiveness of 
the legal assistance which the lawyer can provide from the meeting, and thus the 
suspects are deprived of a fair hearing, following Modarca v. Moldova and Brennan v 
UK. 205 A serious violation of both Article 14(3)(b) and Article 14(3)(d) read with 
Article 14(1) of ICCPR has thus occurred.206  
 
A further issue arises in respect of adequate facilities to be provided for the 
lawyer-client meeting in Chinese criminal proceedings. While a defence lawyer may 
interview a client in police custody, the police will determine the date, time and place 
of the meeting.207 However, in some detention centers, there is only one visitors 
room for legal consultations in a centre with a population of over a thousand 
detainees.208 Normally the defence lawyer and client are required to talk through a 
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glass partition by means of microphones that broadcast their every word to the 
nearby guards for reasons of security. Such a situation appears to coincide with the 
facts from Modarca v. Moldova and therefore, the relevant arguments and ruling 
based on Modarca would be applicable here.209 In some localities, lawyers met with 
their clients under even more outrageous conditions. Some meetings are even held in 
an outside yard or in a metal cage without any chairs.210 Detention centres generally 
do not provide sufficient space for lawyers to meet with detainees, and sometimes 
this shortage results in lawyers queuing to meet with suspects. Therefore, the legal 
service is delayed. It is common that two meetings are held simultaneously in the 
same room.211 Unreasonable fees can be charged for everything from the purchase 
of application forms to apply for a meeting or for bail, to making photocopies of 
various documents which is be related to the issue concerning the right to collect 
evidence as discussed below.212  
 
4.3 Obstacles in Getting Access to Case Files Collected by the Authorities 
In addition to the meeting constraints, it could be argued that suspects and their 
lawyers encounter more difficulties in accessing prosecutorial evidence since the 
CCPL revision. No exchange of information is required between the defence and the 
procuratorate at the pre-trial stage. The judicial and investigation authorities may 
thus have failed to fulfil their obligation to make sure that defence lawyers can 
access all the relative documents, files or records owned by them as required by 
Article 14(3)(b) read with Article 14(1) of ICCPR.213 Moreover, the situation might 
amount to a breach of Article 14 (3)(d) of ICCPR.214  There were two main 
limitations on lawyers’ review of the files and evidence transferred to the court. First, 
it is common practice for prosecutors to deliberately withhold evidence from 
defendants during the prosecution review stage as well as during the trial stage, as a 
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loophole in the law itself leaves the authorities with great discretion on the disclosure 
of evidence. Similar to the situation concerning approval for meeting with the 
suspects, procuratorates and courts in many regions require lawyers to get approval 
from them if they want to consult judicial documents. The procuratorates and the 
courts will usually reject the application to consult from the lawyers with the excuse 
that the case is involved in “state secrets”.215 An official SPP commentary expressly 
prohibits lawyers from accessing any of the evidence relating to a case on the 
grounds of the public interest.216 However, the grounds of public interest to withhold 
certain relevant evidence may not be satisfied by such unilateral decision-making on 
the part of the prosecution, as shown in Rowe and Davis v UK and Edwards and 
Lewis v UK .217  
 
Even if the lawyer gets permission to consult the documents, Article 36 of the 1996 
CCPL, however, does not clearly define such terms as “judicial documents” or 
“technical verification documents”.218 There is also no requirement for prosecutors 
to provide defence counsel access to all the evidence in their possession, including 
physical evidence, documentary evidence, crime-scene records, the testimony of 
witnesses, or the victim’s statement and other evidential material such as crime-scene 
records and technical records that partially present the case. 219  The ruling in 
Harward v Norway makes it clear that the limits established this interpretation is in 
principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 14(3)(b) of ICCPR.220 
Undoubtedly, the judicial interpretation on what constitutes “judicial documents” has 
further firmly shut out defence lawyers from gaining access to official evidence 
during the prosecution’s review of the case. For example, the SPP has interpreted the 
relevant provisions of the new law to require access only to formal documents in the 
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file, such as copies of the detention and arrest notices.221 Also the minutes of the 
Judicial Committee and the collegial panel could not normally be reviewed. This is a 
serious limitation, given the fact that the Judicial Committee and collegial panel 
normally make a decision as to the offence and punishment prior to a trial.222 An 
SPC document even once classifies these minutes as “state secrets”. Therefore, in 
practice, lawyers can only access the technical documents deposited with the courts 
such as warranties for custody, arrest and search, and the conclusion of the 
assessment or review.  
 
Moreover, without any measures to balance the power of the prosecution, the CCPL 
trial reform of 1996 also prevents suspects and their lawyers from preparing a 
defence at the prosecution review stage and has therefore greatly weakened the 
defendant’s position at the trial stage. Under the old CCPL, prosecutors had to submit 
to the courts all evidence and related materials along with the prosecution, whatever 
evidence supported prosecution of the suspect and defendant. The defence had the 
right to review these files and evidence. If the prosecutors did not do so, they ran the 
risk of the court deciding that the case should be dismissed or returned to the 
procuratorate for supplementary investigation.223 By contrast, Article 150 of the 
1996 CCPL only requires that, after cases are transferred to the court for trial, 
prosecutors should provide courts with a bill of indictment containing clear facts 
concerning the alleged crime, a list of the evidence and of the witnesses as well as 
copies of “important evidence”.224  
 
This revision in the CCPL was part of a larger trial process reform that prohibits 
judges from reviewing the substance of cases before trial, in order to combat a 
long-standing practice of police, procurators, and judges agreeing on the outcome of 
a case before it comes to court.225 Instead, the reform gives judges authority to 
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decide cases based on both sides’ presentations and seeks to make the trial an 
authentic forum. A way of restraining judges from premature decision-making is to 
restrict the evidence they see until the trial takes place. As a result, the law reforms 
have led to a thinning of evidence in the files transferred by the prosecutorate to the 
court. Yet two policy goals in the law partially contradict each other. The duplicates 
of important evidence attached to the case that the procuratorate transfers to the 
courts is not all the evidence for or against the defendants in their possession under 
the equality of arms, as emphasized in Edwards and Lewis v UK.226 Noticeably, 
there is no obligation to disclose the evidence from the judge in the CCPL and the 
interpretations. In practice, judges were also especially reluctant to share evidence 
uncovered through their own investigation. They tended to produce that evidence 
only in court. The barrier set by this reform consciously or unconsciously further 
weakens the attorney’s ability to prepare an effective defence and increases the lack 
of balance between the prosecutor and the prosecuted, as recalled by the ruling in 
Dowsett v. UK.227 It actually places the lawyers in a worse situation than before the 
legislation. 
 
Second, access to case files is also a matter of practicality. After the case is 
transferred to the court, lawyers may review the files in court and the court has an 
obligation to provide the necessary assistance, such as providing a room and 
allowing lawyers to make extracts from the files. However, many courts will not 
voluntarily provide satisfactory facilities for the defence, which again might mean 
violation of Article 14(3)(b) of ICCPR as discussed above.228 The lawyer can be 
denied the right to consultation merely because the duplicating machine in the office 
does not work, or the court charges a high price for copying case files, or the court 
decides not to let lawyers copy case files any more.229 It means lawyers have no 
                                                                                                                                                            
Chinese Criminal Science, p.4; also see Zongzhi Long, “Tentative Views on the Reforming Direction and Way of 
Criminal Adjudication”, (2005) 1 Social Science Research, pp.80-84 
226
 See Edwards and Lewis v UK, Chap3, 4.3, p.165-166.  
227
 See Dowsett v. UK, Chap3, 4.3, pp.161-162. 
228
 Also see 4.2.4 above, pp.456-457. 
229
 See Tonghai Liu, “Confusions and Considerations on the Criminal Defence – with Discussion of Revision of 
Criminal Procedure Law and Law on Lawyers”, (2001) 2, Hebei Law Science, p.104. 
460 
 
choice but to take notes from the files in several volumes, even if they have access to 
them. The result of this situation is that most of the law enforcement officials and 
judges still regard legal representation at trial as a mere formality.230 The report of 
the NPC’s investigation on the implementation of the 1996 CCPL in 2000 indicated 
that despite the stipulation in Article 36(1) of the law, both the time and extent of the 
defence lawyers’ access to case files are greatly restricted in practice.231 
 
It has been reported that in some localities an informal pre-trial disclosure procedure 
has developed in China to increase understanding among the parties. For instance, 
the People’s Procuratorate in Yantai, Taian and Zhuchceng in Shandong Province 
have experimented with this system since 1997 and have allowed defence lawyers to 
access the prosecution’s evidence.232 People’s Procuratorate of Longwan District in 
Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, also issued Rules of Evidence Disclosure on May 
2008.233 As described in previous Chapters, despite enhanced awareness of human 
rights protection in China, the Chinese culture is not yet supportive of robust 
protection for suspects. There were obviously critical of this experiment as the 
disclosure would inevitably eliminate some of the advantage that the procuratorate 
are accustomed to and increase the chance of a successful defence. Also there is 
concern on the possibility of an increased incidence of perjury, as the monitoring and 
disciplinary mechanisms within China’s legal profession are relatively weak.234   
 
However, given the overwhelming power of the procuratorate and the serious 
disadvantages of defence lawyers in China, the advantages of pretrial disclosure of 
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evidence far outweigh the negative impacts that may result.235 In the national 
working conference of public prosecution in Shanghai in August 2000, the SPP had 
firstly proposed that procedures for disclosing evidence before trial in criminal cases 
need to be tried out in places where conditions permit. As one of the main contents of 
the prosecutorial reforms in recent years, it was also required by the SPP that a 
disclosure system in criminal proceedings should be promoted gradually and 
actively.236  But without a clear definition of the legal requirements for disclosure in 
the formal national law, there are only rules set by the local authorities to regulate the 
procedure. Normally these local rules are general and abstract.237 Also there is a lack 
of any legal redress mechanism for the violation of this obligation of disclosure. The 
framework for disclosure to protect the right of the suspect to receive a fair trial is far 
from being set up in China.238 Under these circumstances, the defence mainly 
consists only of questioning and rebutting the evidence presented by prosecutors. 
This generally makes for a weak defence and results in inadequate consideration by 
the courts of the lawyers’ efforts.239 
 
4.4 Inadequate Protection for the Defence Lawyers’ Rights of Person  
The defence lawyers’ security is always challenged in China. If a lawyer’s 
performance of his role can be regarded as being devious or giving rise to criminal 
liability, this will have tremendously adverse effects on the legal profession.240 
Explicitly provided as one of the basic rights in Article 20 of the Basic Principles on 
the Role of Lawyers by the UN, is that the relative speeches made in good faith in 
written or oral pleads or during a lawyer’s professional appearance in court, tribunal 
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or other administrative organs in defence of the accused party shall be exempted 
from civil and criminal charge. The right of expression immunity here serves as a 
privilege for a lawyer, in this way protecting the normal provision of services. But 
Chinese legislation has not clearly identified the right of expression immunity 
ensuring that defence lawyers’ actions and speeches are granted immunity from 
prosecution according to legal stipulations when the lawyers undertake the case.241 
China also completely lacks detail complementary measures that provide safeguards 
for lawyers in the performance of their work in criminal defence. These deficiencies 
can be seen below.  
 
4.4.1 The Hostility of Officials  
The hostility of officials towards lawyers has become a major negative factor 
affecting the full participation of lawyers in the criminal process.242 Judicial officers 
have been unable to adjust from the old concepts to the new ideologies and 
provisions of the CCPL and the Law on lawyers, concerning the promotion of a more 
equitable criminal justice system and better human rights protection through an 
improved defence system. Naturally this is reflected in the actions of the authorities 
seeking to suppress and intimidate lawyers, who are now more likely to come into 
conflict with the authorities because the reform allows them to become involved 
earlier in the legal process and broaden the scope of their work at various stages in 
the proceedings. In addition, the local judicial authorities exercise more covert 
controls. Besides, these prosecutors refuse to think of themselves as being on an 
equal footing with defence lawyers in criminal proceedings, which can bring 
violation of Article 14(1) and Article 14(3) of ICCPR.243 As discussed above, the 
revision of the Law on Lawyers in 1996 somehow contributes to the hostile official 
attitudes to the lawyer, in redefining the role of lawyers as professionals who provide 
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legal service to society.244 It is believed that there is no need to protect lawyers, 
because they are no longer state legal workers. 
 
4.4.2 A Combination of Problematic Provisions in the Law 
Lack of legal protection for the lawyers themselves from arbitrary detention or 
conviction is one of the predominant reasons for the embarrassment and dilemma of 
criminal defence.245  Article 306 of the 1997 CCL, Article 38 of the 1996 CCPL and 
Article 40(6), and Article 49 (4) of Law on Lawyers 2007 all stipulate that lawyers 
shall not intentionally destroy, forge evidence and impede witnesses. The purpose of 
the legislation, to prevent the crime of perjury and fabrication, is reasonable. 
However, both lawyers and academics consider that all these stipulations potentially 
leave defence lawyers in serious professional jeopardy.246 Lawyers may easily be 
falsely arrested or taken into custody by the procuratorate organs on the grounds of 
perjury or false testimony. At the same time, the fact that defence lawyers’ security is 
facing a challenge further impairs the public image and the enthusiasm of lawyers for 
undertaking criminal cases in the light of such accusations. On the one hand, the 
adverse provisions regarding lawyers are overlapping. Article 306 designates as a 
crime the fact that the defender or/and legal agent has destroyed, falsified evidence, 
threatened or lured witnesses to contravene the facts, change their testimony or make 
false testimony.247 The actual crime of perjury or assisting perjury which is covered 
by Article 307 of CCL of 1997 could be committed by anyone involved in the 
criminal process, including prosecutors or even judges according to the law. Some 
scholars considered that the original purpose of the law did not contradict to the 
principle of “equality before the law” due to the special status of the lawyers.248 
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However, critics of Article 306 argue that the stipulations which arbitrarily single out 
defenders and defence lawyers are dangerously open to abuse.249 Undeniably, legal 
practice shows that the lawyers remain hostage to the very powers of the state under 
the influence of the traditional legal culture as observed above and Article 306 has 
become a case of clear discrimination against defence lawyers in legislation. 
 
On the other hand, the phasing and scope of all these stipulations have not been 
clarified. There are no clear and defined legal interpretations of evidentiary standards 
to guide the application of perjury and fabrication provisions in criminal proceedings. 
Article 38 of the CCPL of 1996 is one of the most intimidating provisions against 
lawyers’ personal rights. In Article 38, one clause states that defence lawyers and 
other defenders are prohibited form assisting suspects or defendants by concealing, 
destroying, or forging evidence and from helping defendants collude with each 
other. 250 The other clause states that defence attorneys or other defenders are 
prohibited from threatening or inducing witnesses to change their testimony or 
commit perjury.251 As the terms “collude”, “threaten” and “induce” are not clearly 
defined and standardised, the Article could have the chilling effect of stopping any 
assertive legal practice. For example, in contrast to the word “induce”, the term 
“leading question” is only a tactic need to question a witness or defendant, and could 
by no means be interpreted as “induce”, as many lawyers argued.252 There is 
currently no judicial interpretation that effectively distinguishes “inducement” from a 
“leading question”.  
 
The terms used in Article 306 are also dangerously ambiguous as Article 38 of the 
1996 CCPL. It does not stipulate in detail what constitutes the crime of forging 
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evidence or perjury under Article 306, giving prosecutors ample discretion to 
prosecute lawyers and giving judges enormous opportunity to find them guilty of 
such an offence. As cases have demonstrated, the prosecution needs only a 
discrepancy in evidence or in the testimony of one witness to make the charge.253 
Article 306 makes it possible for defence lawyers to face the risk of both 
imprisonment of up to seven years and the revocation of their licence to practice at 
any moment when defending suspects or defendants. 254  Even though the 
procuratorate knows that the prosecution of such alleged offences might not lead to a 
conviction, Article 306 is often invoked improperly or misused by officials 
attempting to silence defence lawyers, which affects defence lawyers’ ability to 
provide legal advice.255 The threat of Article 306 in the CCL of 1997 directly 
abrogates the rights of lawyers to possess immunity from accusation in criminal 
proceedings and thus exerts a great deal of pressure on lawyers.  
 
In practice, in Chinese criminal proceedings, suspects and witnesses normally give 
statements or testimony first to the police. If a suspect or a witness, particularly the 
witness for the prosecution, changes his testimony after the involvement of the 
defence lawyer, the alleged crime might be proved unfounded and the accused may 
be found not guilty because the prosecution had built its case upon the original 
testimony. Due to the hostile attitude towards lawyers and a lack of challenge in the 
proceedings, the police and the prosecutors usually first allege that the change in 
testimony or statements shows that the lawyer induced the witnesses or suspects to 
lie or present false testimony or statements. 256 The witnesses or the suspects are 
forced by the threat, of the police or prosecutors to retract their in-court statements 
on the grounds that it was the lawyer who induced them to do so. As a result, it 
follows that the lawyer is seen to be obstructing justice. The lawyers may easily be 
detained on the charge of perjury if they present different evidence from that 
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collected by the police and the prosecutors.257 On some occasions, lawyers have 
even been held liable for the perjury of defendants.  
 
Crimes of perjury or fabrication require the necessary mental element in order to 
prove culpability.258 If the defence lawyer offers an honest representation based on 
the information he has obtained, even though his statements may not be objectively 
truthful because of inadequacy of information or flaws in the source of the 
information or the information itself, the lawyer shall not be held liable because he 
does not have the requisite mental element, conscious fabrication. However, this 
distinction is often neglected or purposely ignored when the procuratorate 
investigates a lawyer’s misconduct. China has failed to uphold the guarantee that 
lawyers “shall not suffer, or be threatened with prosecution or administrative or other 
sanctions for any action taken in accordance with their recognized professional 
duties”.259 The opponents of the lawyers, the prosecutors, are the one who have 
unlimited power to determine whether they are behaving appropriately in conducting 
their defence. There is often great tension between defence attorneys and prosecutors, 
but the lawyers lack protection against official abuse.  
 
Dozens of lawyers have been reported as being detained, harassed and prosecuted 
under Article 306 of the 1997 CCL and Article 38 of the 1996 CCPL.260 Therefore 
the criminal defence is not only frustrating but also dangerous for the lawyers. Many 
lawyers are reluctant to continue their criminal law practice for fear of prosecution. 
Also the lawyers are extremely conservative in their work, as they know that the 
authorities are watching them closely and that Article 306 is at their disposal. They 
may decide not to attempt to obtain evidence by themselves if any resulting changes 
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might render them culpable under Article 306, even when they suspect that testimony 
was extracted by illegal means and is false. The chilling effect of this practice is 
particularly troubling in the context of an investigative environment in which coerced 
confession through torture and ill-treatment are all too common as discussed in 
Chapter Six. The capacity of the defence representation is greatly jeopardized when 
it becomes a defence of the lawyer’s own personal safety and the quality of the legal 
defence mechanism will gradually be seriously weakened. This may seriously impair 
an effective defence and therefore, the interest of justice on the whole as required 
under the fair trial clause of human rights instruments.261 
 
While Article 306 of the CCL of 1997 remains effective, Article 37 of the Law on 
Lawyers of 2007 constitutes another trap for lawyers, even though it says that 
lawyers’ personal rights shall not be violated in the course of legal practice. There 
are no detailed and practical regulations on how to protect lawyers’ personal rights. 
Moreover, concerns have been raised about its latter clause, which makes an 
exception for language that endangers state security, maliciously defames another, or 
seriously disrupts the order of the court.262 This Article 37 has been vilified as 
backward.263 In fact, cases of disguised retaliation against lawyers in the name of 
state security are already all too common. As argued above, there are strong reasons 
for considering that a provision worded like this one can be totally manipulated. It 
lacks clear boundaries and practicable standards. For example, how is “state 
security” to be defined in this Article? Under what circumstances would verbal 
statements be considered to endanger state security? What crime should a public 
prosecutor be guilty of if he uses “language that endangers state security, maliciously 
defames another person or seriously disrupts the order of the court”? And which is 
more important, the security of the state, or the security of the people? There is no 
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way to prevent its distortion and abuse by the authorities and officials. There is an 
ever-increasing danger faced by lawyers defending those “sensitive” cases, of being 
charged with subversion of state power, inciting subversion of state power, or with 
disclosure of state secrets or libel.264 Similar to the situation argued above, there is, 
however, no concrete legal standard concerning “state secrets” for a court to bar a 
particular lawyer’s representation in its court. 
 
Tax evasion and corruption are another favourite criminal prosecution initiated 
against lawyers. For example, lawyers who work for state-owned law firms have 
been convicted of embezzlement of public funds. Also, to a large extent, under the 
traditional culture, the judicial system continues to function on a system of a network 
of relationships, as well as party supervision at every level, making the enforcement 
of law vulnerable to a web of corruption and official impunity.265 Judges maintain 
tight control over the courts and the cases that can be heard. In order to carry on their 
work, lawyers reportedly often need to bribe law enforcers, including paying file 
retrieval fees, service fees and fees for referrals from judges. Where bribery is a huge 
problem, lawyers are easy targets for selective prosecution. They have also 
sometimes been convicted of criminal defamation for revealing official misconduct. 
There has often been suspicion that these cases were a form of revenge by legal 
authorities, because the lawyers had criticized the state officers, annoyed the court by 
constantly appealing on their clients’ behalf, or had transferred some defence 
material to the defendant’s family.266 In these cases the lawyers can be deprived of 
the right to represent clients in those particular courts or districts for several years or 
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even sentenced to imprisonment. This fact has further complicated the climate in 
which lawyers are practising criminal law.  
 
4.4.3 Restrictive Administrative Control 
Administrative control over lawyers has been strengthened, particularly during the 
“Strike-Hard” campaigns. The Law on Lawyers continues giving authority to the 
judicial administration departments of the MOJ to “supervise and guide lawyers, law 
firms and lawyers associations”.267 This means that the MOJ has the authority to 
require lawyers associations and lawyers to follow their instructions about how the 
legal profession operates, the range of professional activities lawyers can engage in, 
and at what level lawyers’ fees are set. The judicial administration departments and 
their equivalents at the local level have the power to issue warnings or sanctions, or 
to revoke the licences of lawyers who violate the Law on Lawyers.268 In practice, 
these decisions are almost impossible to challenge. Through the annual renewal of 
lawyers’ licences, the judicial administration departments are able to ensure the 
compliance of lawyers with their directives.269 In some cases, defence lawyers are 
forbidden or informally discouraged from assisting a detainee by the local bureau of 
the MOJ. Justice departments across the country have issued executive documents 
regulating legal services provided by lawyers to exercise control over defence 
lawyers’ conduct in all cases. Most of these documents establish the case reporting 
system and approval practices that require lawyers and their law firms to report 
“major or difficult cases” to the local justice department either for filing or approval 
purposes.  
 
In Beijing, for example, according to rules issued in early 1999, without the advance 
approval of the Leading Group established by the Municipal Justice Ministry, no 
defence lawyer may accept a case that involves state security, foreigners or critical 
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social influences.270 Therefore all cases concerning “state security” as well as those 
involving celebrities or high ranking officials above director level must be reported. 
Lawyers handling such cases at every stage of the case must report to and abide by 
decisions which may concern the substantive outcome of a case brought by the 
Leading Group.271 If a written report causes the Leading Group to believe that a 
meeting is necessary with the lawyer handling the case, it can summon him to report 
relevant circumstances, which include the tactics adopted by the lawyer for handling 
the case as well as the issues that need to be discussed.272 The Leading Group can 
coordinate the work contacts between lawyers and relevant agencies.273  
 
Although the ACLA is the organization for all the lawyers in China which should 
serve to safeguard the rights and interests of lawyers, the efforts of it have been 
compromised in their autonomy from the MOJ and have become powerless and 
ineffective to safeguard the legal rights of lawyers. The ACLA passed Rules on the 
Committee for Safeguarding Lawyer’s legal Rights while Practising Law 
(Safeguarding Rules) to protect the rights of lawyers and ensure that suspects can be 
adequately represented in criminal trials.274 According to these Safeguarding Rules, 
the ACLA and its local subordinates were to formally establish a sub-committee on 
safeguarding lawyers’ rights in 1998 to deal with cases regarding violations of 
lawyers’ legal rights and interests. However, as mentioned above, the ACLA’s 
Secretary-general and three deputy secretaries have strong connections to the 
MOJ.275 Such close connections cast doubts on an association that is supposed to be 
working independently to protect the rights of lawyers. Therefore although the 
sub-committees were expected to take a strong position on protecting lawyers, it 
appears that they only publicize cases and exert influence over the local government 
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in order to rescue lawyers in trouble.276  
 
So there is further cause for concern that the adoption of Guiding Opinions on 
Lawyers Handling Collective Cases in March 2006 (Guiding Opinions of 2006) led 
to further extensive restriction on lawyers’ work and increasing risks to their 
persons. 277  Citing the need to maintain social stability as a reason for their 
promulgation, the Guiding Opinions of 2006 instructs lawyers to seek the 
“supervision and guidance” of the judicial administration when handling sensitive 
cases or cases involving more than ten people.278 The ACLA have the authority to 
look into how a lawyer is handling a case and to put forward suggestions.279 Cases 
involving large numbers of people are generally related to the “class action” 
challenges made to government policies. Over the past few years, China has seen a 
sharp increase in public protests, both in rural and urban areas.280 The ACLA says 
that the Guiding Opinions of 2006 are aimed at enhancing the ability of lawyers to 
resolve disputes between citizens and their respective local governments. In fact, the 
Guiding Opinions of 2006 quash the independence of lawyers significantly and 
sharply curtail their meaningful role in seeking justice and ensuring the effectiveness 
of legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures taken to prevent the abuse of 
state power, for example by police mistreatment.281   
 
According to the Guiding Opinions of 2006, only politically qualified lawyers from 
the Government’s perspective are allowed to deal with collective, major and sensitive 
cases and before accepting those cases, they need the approval of at least three law 
firm partners.282 Section II of the Guiding Opinions of 2006 particularly requires a 
lawyer to communicate promptly and fully with the relevant judicial organs about 
collective cases as well as to actively pass on information about the dispute to the 
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judicial organs, and assist in ascertaining the facts.283 The new rule also warns 
lawyers not to encourage their clients to participate or participate themselves in 
petitions to government offices.284 If lawyers discover problems that may intensify 
the dispute, or discover that the dispute may escalate, they must immediately report it 
to the judicial authorities. Lawyers are also instructed to avoid distortion of the 
details of the case or false testimonies that create a situation where the popular mood 
becomes unstable.285 If this is the case, the lawyer is obliged to report the situation 
promptly to the relevant government departments. These provisions seriously negate 
the principle of confidentiality between lawyers and their clients. Lawyers who act 
for such groups are often those most in need of external assistance, yet the Guidance 
Opinions of 2006 provides that contact with foreign organizations and the media is 
expressly discouraged in such cases. Lawyers who violate the rules will be punished 
by the Association or by judicial departments. The contradiction is particularly acute 
in cases where one of the parties in the case is precisely the authority to which the 
lawyer must report. 
 
Several provinces and municipalities have since adopted similar regulations to the 
Guiding Opinions of 2006, in which lawyers’ involvement in major, difficult and 
sensitive cases is actually even more restricted. For example, in February 2004, the 
Nantong City Bureau of Justice issued an Opinion on Further Strengthening the 
Guidance of Lawyers Handling Major Cases, which was the first document to 
provide a definition of major cases.286 The scope of cases considered “major” was 
widened, including cases involving national politics and social stability, cases that 
have an extensive and sensitive influence in society, cases that attract a high degree 
of attention, cases involving more than ten people, complicated cases and cases 
involving a plea of not guilty, etc.287 Locally issued guidance notes placing similar 
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restrictions on lawyers’ independence were also issued by justice bureaus in 
Guangdong, Shenyang and Shenzhen in 2006.288 These regulations also seriously 
restrict lawyers’ freedom of expression. Failure to follow the instructions of the 
judicial bureau, which regulates the local practice of law, can lead to loss of benefits 
and to administrative sanctions that include suspension of a lawyer’s professional 
licence and even closure of his law firm. Thus, not only the livelihood of the defence 
lawyer is at stake, but also that of his colleagues, which is undoubtedly why some 
judicial bureaus require a would-be defender to discuss whether and how to deal with 
a criminal representation with the other lawyers in his firm before deciding on a 
course of action. For example, the Several Provisions of Anhui Province on Law 
Practice issued by the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of Anhui 
Province states that the decision to defend someone on the basis of a not guilty plea 
should be discussed collectively within the law firm to which the defence lawyer 
belongs.289 
 
Legal restrictions are necessary for the Socialist legal system, but must have a limit. 
Proper control can promote the effective functioning of the legal system. Excessive 
control will cause legal disorder. At the moment in China, things have still gone too 
far, mainly as to the fundamental rights of lawyers. This even causes the basic rights 
that lawyers should enjoy to exist in name only. In addition, because laws in this 
regard are not clear enough, the public security agency, the procuratorate, and the 
court, when enforcing the new CCPL, all introduce some regulations on its 
implementation, in some respects to extend and broaden the limitation provisions. 
This is abnormal interference. In these circumstances, the result is that some suspects 
have been unable to find a lawyer willing to take their case because of the sensitive 
nature of the case, leaving them to either not pursue their grievance or to represent 
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themselves.290 This situation clearly damages the interest of suspects and defendants, 
and also thus the aim of the reformed CCPL to provide more protection of human 
rights guaranteed under ICCPR and relevant human rights instruments. The 
combination of these restrictions and controls over lawyers has had a chilling effect 
on the criminal bar, hindering the number and ability of lawyers handling sensitive 
cases, and undermining the overall independence, legitimacy, and accountability of 
the legal system.  
 
5. Further Improvement  
Earlier analysis in this chapter has revealed that the environment in which lawyers 
work remains highly unsatisfactory according to international norms, although the 
reform of the 1996 CCPL provides for a greater role for lawyers in the criminal 
process. The problems now existing in the criminal defence by lawyers in China are 
complicated and multi-faceted. It is an important issue that is worthy of attention in 
the coming days how to ease the plight of defence lawyers in legislation and practice, 
and how to further enhance the guarantee of the right to defence on a criminal charge 
in China with minimum international standards, taking the stipulations of the ICCPR 
and the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers as standards. The development of 
the criminal defence system is a systematic project which involves legislative 
amendments, a correct understanding and implementation of the law in judicial 
practice and further distillation of the traditional legal culture concerning criminal 
defence. 
 
5.1 Methods of Strengthening the Implementation of the Current Law  
As for the above mentioned problems concerning the poor enforcement of the law in 
practice, the provisions for the criminal defence in current Chinese legislation should 
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be adequately put into effect. No matter how much advice or opinions there are on 
criminal defence in the coming reform, its function in judicial practice still and 
always is affected by the current legislation. On the one hand, the judiciary, the 
police and the institutions of local governments should strictly abide by the 
stipulation of laws in practice. The introduction of an earlier judicial involvement in 
pre-trial procedural issues as recommended in Chapter Five may offer an opportunity 
for the individuals to oppose state authorities effectively and on an equal footing. 
Officials who obstruct the course of justice should be charged appropriately, 
according to certain criteria set out clearly in the law. When the relative supreme 
judicial organs make their own judicial interpretations to the CCPL, the original 
intention of the legislation of the CCPL and the Law on Lawyers 2007 should be 
strictly adhered to in order to keep up with the requirement of the minimum 
standards for the relative international agreements. The local rules and the judicial 
interpretations of every supreme judicial organ should correspond with each other to 
apply the laws faithfully, so as to avoid contradiction among them and thus weaken 
the right to defence of suspects. All the local and administrative rules and regulations 
should abolish those additional limitations imposed on the rights of lawyers beyond 
those defined in the national law or regulations.  
 
Related to the discussion in the previous chapters Five and Six, the lack of 
effectiveness of the defence also derives from the lack of other procedural guarantees 
that are typically associated with legal representation. The fulfilment of the lawyer’s 
defence function is a closely connected with a series of system designs in the 
pre-trial proceedings and the degree of perfection in compulsory measures is one of 
the very important issues. For example, regarding those pre-trial compulsory 
measures, since the adoption of them lacks strict procedural restriction and 
safeguards, the investigation authority enjoys rather too much power of discretion, 
which prevents the suspect from conducting his procedural defence. Without relevant 
procedural guarantees, it is unlikely to expect defence lawyers to single-handedly 
reverse the earlier practices of the police, the prosecution and the court. Along with 
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the contribution of the lawyer, the legal system must also make progress in China. 
 
On the other hand, in the face of the present unfavourable environment in the defence 
process, defence lawyers must overcome the negative ethos, and continuously 
consolidate their legal knowledge and practical skills in criminal defence, including 
investigation of crimes, gathering of evidence and representation and advocacy at 
trial. In order to enhance the overall image of legal professionals, internal demands 
for better ethics and discipline should be encouraged. China should improve related 
systems for managing the legal profession as suggested below, handle ethical 
problems and illegal conduct within the legal profession strictly, and enhance 
professional ethics among lawyers. Professional responsibility guidelines and 
professional disciplines should be set up in detail and comprehensively to channel 
the conduct of lawyers in the right direction.  
 
5.2 Further Reform of the Criminal Defence Legislation based on the Relative 
ICCPR Standards  
As presented in Chapters Two and Three, the principle of safeguarding the equal, 
timely and effective access of the accused to the assistance of legal counsel is the 
guiding ideology observed by the UN and the European Court when formulating 
international standards for criminal defence. This should also be the target in 
improving the criminal defence system in China. In the coming amendment of the 
legislation, some concrete countermeasures should be introduced regarding criminal 
defence in the pre-trial proceedings, including full status of the defender in the early 
stage of the case, an adequate legal aid service, an evidence disclosure procedure, a 
confidential meeting between suspects and lawyers, and a system of immunity for 
lawyers, so as to consolidate the right to defence of criminal defence lawyers and to 
restrict the abuse of power by investigation agencies and the prosecution.  
 
5.2.1 Confirm Action of Early Participation 
The inconsistent position of the criminal defence at the early stage, in the middle, 
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and at the end of the entire Chinese criminal proceedings should be totally changed 
by legislation so as to be compatible with international standards. The law therefore 
should clearly state that all suspects may retain a defender at any time. The status, 
timescale and functions of the criminal defence should be defined in detail to accord 
with the right to a fair trial in Article 14 (3)(b) and 14(3)(d) of ICCPR.291 In 
particular, the status of defender and the functions of lawyers who provide legal 
services in the period of investigation shall be ascertained and strengthened, so that 
the suspects can protect their legal rights by appointing lawyers in time at the 
beginning of the criminal proceedings and receiving help from the lawyers to 
exercise their rights and avoid illegal measures against them such as extortion of 
confessions by torture.292  
 
In order to ensure that the right of access to a lawyer is effective, a rights notification 
system shall be set up. The law should clearly stipulate that the suspect has the right 
to be informed both in written and oral form by police officers that he may retain a 
defence attorney before the first interrogation or when the compulsory measures are 
taken against him.293 The procuratorate should, from the date of receiving the file 
record of a case transferred for examination before the prosecution, inform the 
suspect in written form that he has the right to appoint persons as his defenders. The 
court should, from the date of accepting a case, inform the defendant in written form 
that he has the right to appoint persons as his defenders. The courts, the 
procuratorates and the public security agencies should keep records for a subsidiary 
file on whether the suspects have been informed and on whether the suspects have 
appointed defenders. Where suspects make application for a defender, word should 
be sent to their relatives or other persons appointed by them within 24 hours. If a 
criminal suspect, before the first question from the investigation organ or from the 
date of restraining measures, is financially unable to employ a lawyer, the public 
security organ and the people's prosecutorial office will be obliged to notify him of 
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his rights to apply for criminal legal aid. Any case in which the public security organ 
and the prosecutorial office should notify but do not notify suspects of their right 
shall be defined as a breach of procedural law, and the confessions obtained should 
be excluded from the evidence. In addition to the apparent lack of rules governing 
illegally obtained evidence as discussed in Chapter Six, it is extremely doubtful that 
in practice the Chinese legislature can go so far as to adopt this exclusionary rule for 
the sake of providing further procedural protection for suspects, especially in the 
current social climate which put most emphasis on controlling crime.294 
 
Also, under current conditions with the imbalance in the judicial system, the right of 
a lawyer to be present should be absolutely ensured to the greatest extent to protect 
the cardinal human rights of a citizen. Therefore the coming reform should clearly 
add provisions to guarantee the right to the presence of a lawyer when the competent 
organization is investigating to obtain evidence, especially the right to his presence at 
the time of interrogation of a suspect.295 The law may add the restriction that in 
certain particular circumstances the defence lawyer may not be present.296 But the 
lawyers should still be notified of the time, date, and place of the interrogation of an 
accused person or suspect during the investigation. These particular circumstances 
have to be clearly defined in the law and may include a co-offenders attempt to 
escape, rescuing a hostage or searching for drugs or dangerous items such as firearms, 
ammunition, knives, inflammable objects or materials. The police officer, prosecutor, 
defence attorney, agent of the complainant, or any other person performing his duty 
under law during the investigation shall not disclose information acquired through 
the performance of this duty during the investigation, unless otherwise permitted by 
law, or if it is necessary for the protection of the public interest or any other 
legitimate interest. 
 
5.2.2 The Legal Aid Service 
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Certainly the implementation of the above stipulations needs related systems, 
especially an improved legal aid system to demonstrate the fairness and justice of the 
criminal proceedings. Firstly, the Chinese legal aid system must develop in the 
direction of broadening the scope of eligibility for legal aid, and further its 
application in the investigation proceedings. Generally, the basic criterion in the 
granting of criminal legal aid can be risk of imprisonment or the death penalty, 
especially for a serious crime.297 Anyone who does not have the financial resources 
to hire a lawyer and has no other access to legal assistance can apply for legal aid. As 
to the financial qualification of the potential applicant for legal aid, there should be a 
relatively fixed standard amount in the law based on the current average living 
standard. Legal aid should cover every stage of the criminal proceedings.  
 
Secondly, considering its status and force as well as the potentially large numbers of 
government departments and institutions where legal aid may be involved, it is the 
National People’s Congress or the Standing Committee of National People’s 
Congress that must act soon to establish a law on legal aid. A complete set of 
concrete mechanisms needs to be set up to ensure the timely and successful 
implementation of criminal legal aid for those who may need it.298 Besides the legal 
aid centres supported by the government, more independent legal aid organisations 
staffed with trained advisers and qualified lawyers should be established. The 
organizational structure, operating organization and organization management 
related to legal aid must be clarified. The legal aid institutions in China should focus 
on setting up professional legal aid institutions and undertaking the task of 
encouraging the development of the legal aid system with legal aid case management 
and monitoring. A long-term legal aid programme supported by the government with 
the participation of different social authorities to provide legal advice and 
information, continued training of legal aid centre staff, as well as private lawyers in 
the substantive issues of legal aid and public legal education can help to ensure the 
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quality of legal aid services. 
 
Thirdly, in its financial planning, the government at each level must budget for the 
minimum amount of funds needed for legal aid and the full amount of these funds 
should be provided on time each year. If the local government is financially unable to 
provide the minimum amount of legal aid funding, the central government or local 
government shall implement financial support policies, through which a transfer 
payment or the setting up of legal aid funds shall be arranged to solve the financial 
difficulty based on the minimum funding standard prevailing in the region to be 
supported. With the current situation in mind, the local government should not just 
rely on the funds provided by the central government. The funds provided by the 
central government shall be used primarily to decrease the gap in legal aid funding 
due to the imbalance in economic development in different regions, thus allowing the 
citizens in different regions to enjoy some degree of equal treatment.  
 
5.2.3 Guaranteeing the Right to Meet Suspects in Private 
To improve defence lawyers’ right to meet with suspects, the coming reform of the 
CCPL should bring the legislation into line with the provisions of the Law on 
Lawyers of 2007. As for the right to meeting, this can be seen from two angles. On 
the one hand, the timing of the meeting is a very important issue. In particular, the 
provision stating that a request for meeting can be denied in cases involving state 
secrets should be revoked. The law should clearly state that a defence lawyer may 
interview and correspond with a suspect or an accused person in custody whenever 
he thinks it is necessary, provided that if sufficient facts exist to justify the 
apprehension that such a defender may destroy, fabricate, or alter evidence or form a 
conspiracy with a co-offender or witness, such interviews or correspondence may be 
limited.299 Any other defenders, with permission of the court may also meet and 
correspond with the suspect or defendant in custody. The agencies concerned must 
arrange the meeting within 48 hours.  
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On the other hand, the confidentiality of the meeting is another important human 
rights issue for suspects.300 The law should openly state that defence lawyers and 
other defenders should meet with the suspects without restriction as to duration and 
frequency and without the presence of a third party and not be subject to any 
supervision in accordance with the law. Lawyers should enjoy professional privilege. 
The law should guarantee that lawyers cannot be compelled to disclose what has 
come to their knowledge in the context of the defence. This means defence lawyers 
cannot be forced to disclose confidential information in a witness capacity. If a case 
involves “state secrets”, the defence lawyer and other defenders should have a 
specific duty to maintain confidentiality. Instead of applying of investigative methods 
to the communication between defence lawyers and their clients such as interception 
of telephone conversations, the role of the court and procuratorate, the public 
security organs and the custody organs should only be to provide the best possible 
conditions and convenience for lawyers to meet with suspects.  
 
5.2.4 Ensuring Proper Access to Information 
It is essential that the defence should have all the necessary information available to 
enhance the truth-finding process and ensure a fair trial.301 Effective disclosure also 
contributes to a more effective criminal justice system and to earlier resolution of 
cases. Therefore in the coming reform, China should legislate to strengthen 
procedures for disclosing evidence in criminal cases. A statutory code of practice 
should be provided to detail the appropriate disclosure procedures and 
responsibilities. Firstly, considering that that prosecutors have a disproportionate 
advantage in collecting evidence and that lawyers are given only a short period of 
time to prepare their defence in China, it is suggested that a procedure should be 
established to better protect the right of lawyers to access information. The 
prosecution must accept the obligation of full disclosure of evidence which weakens 
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the prosecution case or strengthens that of the suspects. 302 And the prosecuratorate 
agencies take the lead in respect of evidence disclosure. The law may specifically 
require that the defendant’s duty of disclosure is not triggered until the prosecuting 
agencies comply with the defendant’s disclosure requests. But for the purpose of 
guaranteeing justice and efficiency, the lawyer is also obliged to show his evidence in 
return. The law should be carefully worded as regards the supervision of disclosure 
and should clearly stipulate the penalty for not fulfiling the evidence disclosure 
obligation, including violations by the defence party. The power to impose any 
sanction for failure to comply with a disclosure request should be granted to the court 
only. Potential methods of sanction include the granting of additional time for 
preparation to the party who has been disadvantaged by the non-compliance, or the 
exclusion of a certain type of defence or a certain piece of evidence.  
 
Secondly, there should be legislation to clarify the legal requirements of disclosure, 
including the specific scope and degree of the information. Generally, all the major 
evidence related to the case should be included in the category of judicial documents, 
and therefore be accessible to lawyers. The law should state that defence lawyers 
have the right to find out from the investigation agency about the suspected crime, 
and to consult, extract and duplicate all the records of suspects’ statement, all the 
technical verification materials, and all the judicial documents pertaining to the 
current case. Under the current situation in China, the law should specifically 
emphasise that lawyers may have access to prosecution evidence which has not been 
submitted to the courts.303 As the defendant party only needs to take responsibility 
for the limited disclosure of evidence, the evidence to be shown by the defendant 
party to the procurator should include evidence to prove that the defendant was not 
on the crime scene when the crime was committed, evidence to prove that the 
defendant was acting in self-defence and avoiding danger in emergency; evidence to 
prove that when the defendant committed the alleged crimes, he was not criminally 
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liable or had not reached the age of criminal liability and so on.  
 
Thirdly, a mechanism such as public interest immunity hearings should be introduced 
and established in statute to resolve the conflicts of interest which arise when 
disclosure of sensitive and confidential information might put witnesses or public 
security interests at risk.304 Disputes arising from disclosure should be subject to 
judicial review. The procedure is likely to be fairer if it is a court rather than an 
administrative or executive officer is making the decision, provided the court can 
hear the whole of the evidence and can make a fair decision about whether the 
subject should be informed of the sensitive information. In order to achieve a balance 
between protecting sensitive or confidential information and the requirement to 
disclose, the court may limit the right to access of certain information in some 
situations, such as if the information, materials and documents are irrelevant to the 
case, could seriously hamper law enforcement and prosecution efforts or constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of a third person. Special 
counsel can be arranged to represent interest of individuals under this kind of 
situation.305 Other defenders, with permission from the court, may also consult, 
extract and duplicate the above-mentioned materials. The investigation organs, the 
procuratorates and the Courts should provide adequate facilities and maximum 
convenience for defenders to consult, extract and duplicate the material pertaining to 
the current cases. Meanwhile, an adequate witness and victim protection mechanism 
should be established along with the implementation of the disclosure of evidence 
obligation in order to protect the personal safety of the witnesses and victims, as well 
as that of the members of their family.306 Tremendous resources will be needed to 
adopt these mechanisms in China and it does not seem very practical to implement 
this change under the current social situation and in only a short time. Therefore an 
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alternative solution could be to disclose only the content of witness statements but to 
keep the identities of witnesses secret until trial.307  
 
5.2.5 Better Protection for Personal Security  
To genuinely ensure the right to legal assistance for suspects and to achieve an 
“equity of arms” in criminal proceedings, China needs to tighten up the access right 
of lawyers to the criminal defence by according them an effective guarantee that they 
will be able to carry out their professional duties without intimidation, hindrance, 
harassment or improper interference. Firstly, Article 306 of the 1997 CCL should be 
abolished as soon as possible as many academics have suggested. This would greatly 
help to improve the status of defence lawyers. However, while a repeal of Article 
306 would be a moral victory to show that the problem of lawyer intimidation has 
been officially recognized, the settlement of the issue concerning harassment of 
defence lawyers should not rely solely on it. Given the blanket coverage under 
Article 307 of the 1997 CCL which is a general provision prohibiting evidence 
tampering and perjury, eliminating Article 306 would have no effect on the 
prosecutor’s ability to charge the lawyers with evidence tampering or encouraging 
perjury. Therefore this issue should be considered in the context of a set of broader 
reforms to address the procedural and institutional problems.  
 
For example, to avoid any possible legal trap, some detailed measures to protect 
lawyers can be incorporated in the law. Lawyers may obtain testimony by letter or 
have relevant people present whenever they take evidence from witnesses. The future 
amendment can state that at least two lawyers should be present during the process of 
taking evidence from witnesses, which could prevent the authorities from 
incriminating lawyers later if a witness changes his or her story. The record of the 
meeting must include the details of all the questions posed by the lawyer and the 
                                                       
307
 It is obvious that this scheme still leaves open the possibility of retaliation during or after the trial, but it 
should not become a reason to reject the establishment of pre-trial disclosure because the ultimate solution to 
witness cooperation lies in the implementation of effective measures but not in the rejection of pre-trial 
disclosure.  
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legal advice they provide, and should be signed by the suspects. Also, more precise 
legal standards on evidence should be defined under the law to guide the application 
of Article 307. According to the current practice illustrated above, the law should 
clarify the definition of statutory terms such as “collude”, “threaten” and “induce” to 
prevent manipulation by the prosecutors and to make it clear to lawyers what 
behaviour violates the law. More than one piece of evidence should be required by 
law to demonstrate that a lawyer knowingly engaged or assisted in the perjury or 
fabrication of evidence.  
 
Secondly, the universal principles that exempt a lawyer from prosecution for the 
performance of his professional duties should be genuinely and sincerely established 
in China. In particular, those provisions which make an exception for language that 
endangers state security, maliciously defames another, or seriously disrupts the order 
of the court should be removed. The law should clearly demand that in general 
circumstances, lawyer, who defend the legal rights of suspects, should enjoy 
complete exemption rights regarding the oral or written statements made and 
submitted in court. As mentioned above, defence lawyers in China are often 
threatened by the possibility that if their honest representations are based on faulty 
information, they will also be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or 
fabrication of records. Therefore immunity of lawyers from liability for statement 
information might reduce the incidence of wrongful or revenge prosecution of 
defence lawyers and relieve some fears of potential criminal liability for lawyers in 
criminal defence practice. The law could also contain very detailed provisions to 
require that lawyers appearing in court should act with courtesy towards the court. In 
order to carry out their work independently and effectively, in the event that a lawyer 
uses inappropriate language or behaviour, the presiding judge may issue a warning 
and correct this in court but should not be allowed to discipline or punish a lawyer. 
 
Thirdly, the ACLA should be strengthened in its disciplinary power and be granted 
full independence so that it can adequately represent the interest of lawyers, protect 
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their professional integrity and be responsible for professional discipline. The 
provisions stipulating that the MOJ should exercise supervision and guidance of the 
ACLA should be abolished. The law should firmly ensure that the ACLA carries out 
its functions without external interference. The administrative regulations and similar 
local regulations that interfere with the ability of lawyers to represent the interests of 
their clients should be removed. As opposed to criminal prosecution, internal 
discipline by the ACLA should become the primary means of monitoring lawyers’ 
activities and investigating and punishing conduct which is in violation of 
professional ethics and discipline. Such a mechanism would most likely require an 
amendment to Chapter six of the Law on Lawyers 2007 and Articles 38 and 45 of the 
Criminal Procedure Law 1996, all of which require the MOJ, law enforcement 
organs and judicial authorities to seek criminal liability in cases of evidence 
tampering, perjury and related offences. A disciplinary committee within the ACLA 
should be established for this purpose. There would obviously be concerns about 
professional ethics and the capacity of the ACLA to properly police its own 
profession and handle those disciplinary investigations. In order to address this 
concern, at this stage of the reform, the committee could be composed of members of 
the ACLA as well as officials representative from the courts, the procuratorate, and 
the MOJ.  
 
Then the power to investigate and discipline or punish lawyers for inappropriate 
conducts which does not amount to criminal liability, such as disrespectful behaviour 
in court, should lie exclusively with the disciplinary committee of the ACLA. The 
sanctions could range from a warning to suspension or revocation of the lawyer’s 
licence. In serious cases such as evidence perjury and fabrication, upon the 
recommendation of the relevant procuratorate or public security agencies, the 
disciplinary committee would investigate the case and refer it back to the relevant 
procuratorate with jurisdiction over the lawyer in question for criminal prosecution. 
To avoid conflicts of interest between prosecutors and defence lawyers, such cases 
should be monitored closely by the Court and the MOJ. Given the problems 
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described in this chapter, on the one hand, lawyers would be more effectively 
protected from charges of criminal liability under such a mechanism. On the other 
hand, in order to improve the image of the legal profession and to prevent the 
likelihood of interference from the law enforcement authorities, given such 
responsibility for disciplinary investigation to the law association would create an 
incentive for them to investigate cases carefully and thoroughly. It would be a 
positive development for lawyers’ associations to improve their professionalism and 
ethical status, to strengthen their autonomy and to enhance the capacity of 
self-discipline.  
 
5.3 Removing the Ideological Barriers  
As observed in this chapter, the revised law on criminal defence is already effective, 
but so far real change has been very slow. It has to be enforced by the same police, 
procurators and judges. Despite the increased awareness of procedural fairness and 
conscious efforts to improve procedural safeguards within China’s criminal justice 
system, the equality between officials and citizens, between the individual and the 
state confronting each other in criminal proceedings has not yet taken root in China. 
Criminal defence is still much preoccupied with substantive criminal law. So apart 
from the role transformation of roles and legislative amendment as suggested above, 
the most crucial and deepest problem is how to promote understanding in the whole 
country of the value of the system to protect human rights in criminal defence. The 
whole legal system and legal culture in China need to discard the old attitude to 
criminal defence and treat lawyers fairly. It is necessary to promote and correctly 
understand and position the legal profession in China’s criminal justice system in the 
public mind, including the notion that the involvement of a lawyer is necessary to 
protect the legitimate rights of suspects. In particular, it is vital to raise the legal 
consciousness of the significance of procedural defence, as it is crucial for deterring 
illegal action by the government and enhancing the human rights of suspects. To do 
so, an educational program for the public on the right to defence and the right to have 
a lawyer in criminal proceedings should be established and linked to the legal aid 
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program. Radical and long-standing political and legal restructuring will be 
necessary in order to genuinely improve the right to defence for suspects in China.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, in comparison with the old CCPL, the revised CCPL is notable for the 
introduction of a more active role for lawyers in criminal proceedings in order to 
broaden the right of suspects in the criminal justice system. In particular, the right to 
legal counsel is granted at the police investigation stage which breaks down the 
long-standing barriers to the involvement of defence lawyers in the pre-trial stage of 
the criminal process. The right to have a lawyer and the ability of lawyers to 
represent suspects in China today has advanced considerably, beyond the almost 
complete absence of such protection in China’s long history. There are high 
expectations that this improvement and its symbolic value will provide a most 
significant procedural safeguard for suspects set out by Article 14(3)(b) and (d) of 
ICCPR requiring that all persons facing a criminal charge, including suspects, be 
adequately represented by legal counsel. However, the foregoing presents a stiff 
challenge to lawyers and others concerned with the legal profession and legal 
development in China. The fairness of the pre-trial proceedings and the fairness of 
the criminal trial have not been integrated in a defence lawyer’s representation of the 
suspects. Judicial practice indicates that lawyers continue to experience difficulties in 
preparing a proper defence. Therefore the environment in which lawyers work under 
the CCPL of 1996 remains extremely unsatisfactory according to international 
standards, particularly regarding Article 14 of ICCPR.  
 
From the brief review above, both the legal culture and the social reality have greatly 
undermined this critical reform. As also illustrated in previous chapters, the 
fundamental reason is that during the transition period, reform efforts are being 
confronted with resistance from old ideologies and institutions. The theoretical basis 
for the right to defence is not really recognized in Chinese society. There is a lack of 
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cultural basis for the institution of lawyers and the function of criminal defence but a 
long standing negative attitude toward criminal defence is embedded in Chinese 
culture. The role of lawyers in legal defence envisaged in the revised CCPL has also 
been severely diminished by the deficiency of the law and its implementation 
measures. The continuing imbalance of power in the criminal justice system has put 
the lawyers into an unexpectedly absurd situation and caused both embarrassment 
and difficulties for them. The ability of lawyers in China to represent and participate 
in the criminal trial is subject to many arbitrary restrictions imposed by judicial 
institutions and interference from other state authorities. Furthermore, the 
combination of the adverse provisions for lawyers in the law unfairly discriminates 
against lawyers and greatly increases the risk involved in engaging in criminal 
defence work. Particularly in the pre-trial stage, criminal lawyers face immense 
obstacles in gaining permission to meet suspects in detention confidentially. They are 
unable to review useful information and evidence from the investigation agencies. 
Lawyers largely fail to collect evidence on their own initiative, as when they 
undertake such work they are often harassed and intimidated, and sometimes 
detained or even convicted of crimes, merely for actively defending the interests of 
their clients. All of these difficulties greatly weaken their ability to prepare an 
effective defence for the suspect as required in Article 14(3)(b) of ICCPR and such 
practice does not accord with the fair trial required by Article 14(1) of ICCPR. 
 
Therefore this chapter has sought to provide some suggestions for the coming reform 
in the light of the current situation in order to strengthen the right to defence by the 
lawyer in the pre-trial proceedings. The development and perfecting of the criminal 
defence system is a systematic project which involves legislative amendments, 
correct understanding and implementation of law in judicial practice and a further 
progression in people’s awareness of the criminal defence system. To remove the 
struggles of lawyers in effectively representing suspects as illustrated above and 
genuinely expand the rights of criminal suspects and defendants, China needs to 
improve the implementation of its amended law, enhance the current system and 
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change the perception of the legal profession. To bring to genuine fruition the 
adversarial system, there must be an ideology of equality between officials and 
citizens as well as a system of equal adversarial rights between officials and citizens. 
As regards the transformation of criminal defence and the complications of this 
problem in social life, the criminal defence system in China can only be reformed by 
stages. 
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Chapter Eight  
How Far has China come towards Recognition of ICCPR 
standards in Key Aspects of the Criminal Justice System? 
 
Although some optimists predict that the newly revised CCPL might appear soon, the 
magnitude of the task should not be underestimated. This thesis has shown that 
China has good reason to boast of the tremendous progress made in increasing 
human rights protection for suspects in the criminal justice system in the last 30 
years. On the other hand, compared to international standards, the distance for China 
to cover in order to achieve complete compliance cannot be disregarded. Suspects 
have often continued to be denied access to counsel and to endure lengthy pre-trial 
detention to extract confessions under duress or torture. These difficulties require 
extensive reforms to the Chinese criminal justice system, as well as the establishment 
of legal norms and a legal culture that protects individual and group rights, in the 
light of the international standards. Therefore a multitude of controversial issues 
awaits the NPC, particularly if the revision of the CCPL is to accompany and 
implement China’s long-awaited ratification of the ICCPR. Ratification of the 
ICCPR and implementation in accordance with its terms would have a more 
profound effect on the PRC’s political, legal and social systems than the PRC’s entry 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) has had upon its economy. Also achieving 
a meaningful reconciliation of the conflicting views of the MPS, the MOJ, the SPC, 
the SPP, the ACLA, influential academic experts and relevant Party organizations 
will require enormous legislative skill, time and energy. The challenges have been 
huge, and are likely to become monumental. Specific recommendations have been 
offered regarding different issues in the above chapters. Therefore the focus in this 
conclusion will be to summarise the relevant findings regarding all the research and 
to show the direction of the next CCPL reform movement. 
 
It is essential to study the standards of the international human rights instruments and 
correctly and adequately understand them, then to compare the current conditions in 
China with these and see what can be done to attain these international standards 
completely. In Part Two, the thesis firstly provided an intensive study of the 
international standards concerning human rights protection for suspects in Article 7, 
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9 and 14 of ICCPR in Chapter Two and Article 3, 5 and 6 of ECHR in Chapter Three 
to show the comparative coverage. This part of the study demonstrates that neither 
universal nor regional law for the protection of the individual is static, but that they 
evolve in-step with new human needs that continue to emerge in society. 
Understanding of the international human rights covenants has inevitably changed 
over time. Developments in international rights protection for suspects have 
proceeded at a rapid pace and will most likely continue to do so whilst the 
international community is struggling with increasing crime and terrorism. 1 
Appreciation of that change, as well as of the continued change in understanding, 
illuminates the general evolution of human rights movements as well as changing 
perceptions of international law. It is today clear that the international community 
attributes a very special moral and normative status to the international covenants. 
These international standards and norms represent a collective vision of how a 
criminal justice system should be structured and how criminal policy should be 
further developed to respond to emerging needs.  
 
There are significant challenges in implementing international human rights 
covenants for China, due to the traditional legal culture and complicated social 
situation as illustrated later in Part Three, but the values enshrined in such treaties 
make it well worth the effort. In comparison with European standards and the best 
practices in some jurisdictions, the ICCPR standards are indeed the minimum 
standards and have a great potential for improvement in the future. These standards 
transcend the political and cultural barriers between the various nations in the world. 
There is a much greater recognition now of the centrality of democracy, rule of law, 
and respect for human rights to long-term peace, security, and economic and social 
development. The only way to move forward is if human rights become part of the 
whole framework for a new principled globalisation which affirms that the common 
humanity does not stop at national borders. Actually, China signed the ICCPR in 
1998 and has ever since been seriously considering the issue of ratification. 
Ratification of ICCPR with genuine commitment would further facilitate China to 
make changes in law and practice in the criminal justice area as profound as those 
changes in economic law and practice required by China’s entry into the WTO. Both 
                                               
1
 See e.g. discussions in Chap3 on the cases with terrorism issue in the jurisprudence of ECHR. 
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when considering the ratification and even later at the stage of the actual 
implementation, it is crucial to interpret and understand the ICCPR correctly and 
sufficiently. The research in Part Two on the definitions and interpretations of the 
ICCPR and ECHR clarifies some confusing aspects as to the understanding of the 
specific objectives, purpose of the instruments and the exact scope and meanings of 
the requirements set forth in its provisions. And therefore this particular part is the 
starting point of the whole thesis. It provides a comprehensive, clear and proper 
knowledge of the international standards with relevant attention to the main theme of 
this thesis on the issue of what the remaining differences and current problems in 
Chinese criminal justice are with regard to human rights protection for suspects.  
 
1. Findings 
However, how fast, how deep and how comprehensive is the reform process of the 
criminal justice system in China in meeting with the international standards of 
human rights protection for suspects? These problems in the current system have 
been demonstrated and discussed through several controversial issues in Part Three 
of the thesis. In Part Three, on the one hand the progress China has made in meeting 
international standards has been identified in four specific areas of human rights 
protection for suspects, which in the continuing reform of CCPL, include the guiding 
ideology of the CCPL, pre-trial compulsory measures system, prevention of the use 
of illegal evidence obtained through torture and the right to legal counsel before trial. 
On the other hand, compared to the ICCPR and ECHR standards explained in Part 
Two, a careful analysis of these four key areas of the CCPL reform reveals that the 
current situation of human rights protection for suspects in the Chinese criminal 
justice system remains seriously deficient and there is still a great deal of room for 
improvement with regard to the ICCPR standards, as investigated in Part Three. 
 
1.1 Guiding Ideology for the CCPL  
First of all, the international ideology and principle of human rights protection for 
suspects cannot be applied directly in the real world in China due to its legal tradition 
and national conditions, as discussed in Chapter Four. Just as the HRC has to realize 
the fact that the availability of financial resources is not only relevant for the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, inherent in these procedural 
guarantees of the ICCPR for human rights protection in criminal justice is a far-
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reaching potential for a step-by-step adaptation of the differing national legal systems 
to a common minimum standard of the “rule of law” in the State party. Owing to its 
historical background, cultural environment and ideology, China has drifted far away 
from the concept of the protection of human rights universally accepted by the 
international society. 2  Its legal tradition has the following features, which are 
contrary to the concepts of modern law, and which to a great extent, still have a 
profound influence on the present legal system.3  
 
1.1.1 The Lack of a Cultural Foundation for Human Rights Protection in the 
Criminal Justice System 
In order to ensure the obedience of the people, social harmony and stability, the most 
striking traditional characteristic of Chinese criminal justice was its emphasis on the 
prevention of crime and the reform of the criminal, but its disregard of due process. 
Firstly, the traditional law is of the same nature as criminal law. The judicial system 
of the feudal period in China’s history is commonly characterized by the 
“presumption of guilt”.4 Under this ideology, hardly any thought was given to human 
rights protection for the individual in criminal justice. The criminal justice system 
holds little respect for individual rights. Secondly, procedural law has basically been 
adopted as a tool for effecting substantive law and its own special value has not 
actually been given enough attention. 5  Therefore nobody would view criminal 
proceedings as an adversarial process between man and the state and it was 
impossible for suspects to be secure in the confrontation with the state power. 
Thirdly, the criminal procedure is also viewed as an instrument by which the 
government controls society and fights against its enemies and criminals.6 Therefore 
the emphasis of law is on the protection of government powers and social interests, 
but is not seen as a bulwark for the individual against the state. The cooperation of 
suspects with law enforcement agencies in criminal investigations is automatically 
assumed in China and criminal proceedings are also mainly an educational 
experience for the public.  
 
                                               
2
 See Chap4, 2.2, pp.221-234. 
3
 Ibid., 2.1, pp.212-213. 
4
 Ibid., 2.1.1, p.213. 
5
 Ibid., 2.1.2, p.216. 
6
 Ibid., 2.1.3, p.218. 
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1.1.2 Guiding Principles for the CCPL of 1996 
As discussed in Chapter Four, in order to establish a modern criminal procedural 
system and research harmony with international standards on human rights 
protection, China has indeed over recent years begun to readjust its basic ideological 
approach to criminal justice away from a dominant value based on social control and 
towards a somewhat greater concern for the human rights protection of the suspects.7 
Essential moves have been made in the direction of establishing the fundamental 
principle of presumption of innocence; particularly Article 12 of CCPL in 1996 has 
come close to Article 14 of ICCPR. 8  Along with increasing attention to the 
independent value and impact of procedural justice in China, the law is also moving 
from neglecting procedure to emphasising procedural justness. This approach signals 
a commitment to the requirement of the principle of due process in Article 14(1) of 
ICCPR.9 The CCPL of 1996 contributes to narrowing the gap in ideology between 
the Chinese criminal justice system and international standards and therefore the 
reform of the CCPL is moving in a positive direction to increase protections for 
suspects in the development of the Chinese criminal procedural system. 
 
1.1.3 Existing Problems faced by the Forthcoming Reform on the Guiding 
Principles for the CCPL 
The impact and influence of a certain fundamental traditional legal culture persist in 
the contemporary legal system as to the aspects including how the legal institutions 
operate the law and social attitudes towards law. As a result of the traditional cultural 
influence on law, long-term public opinion emphasises that the interests of society as 
more important than those of the individual. In addition, Chinese society has become 
more complex and crime rates have been rising along with the high-speed economic 
development of recent years. Therefore, firstly, China is facing a huge difficulty in 
balancing the fight against crime and the protection of human rights.10 The CCPL of 
1996 still pays a great deal of attention to the need to fight crime and therefore it has 
not played a significant part in guaranteeing human rights protection for suspects and 
regulating law enforcement powers. It does not appear that it is likely to ensure 
adherence to the principle of presumption of innocence as required in Article 14(2) 
                                               
7
 See Chap4, 3, pp.232-233. 
8
 Ibid., 3.1, p.236. 
9
 Ibid., 3.2, p.242. 
10
 Ibid., 4.1, p.244. 
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of ICCPR as shown in Chapter Four.11 Also the lack of official recognition for the 
presumption of innocence in practice has resulted in continued presumption of guilt 
in the Chinese criminal justice system. Secondly, neglecting procedural justice in 
order to pursue substantive justice is still prevalent not only in judicial practice but 
also in CCPL itself.12 The whole mechanism is still, it is contended, too weak to live 
up to the requirement of fair trial set out the Article 14(1) of ICCPR. Many 
provisions in the CCPL of 1996 are still vague and appropriate measures for 
implementing the new law are lacking as is discussed in the following chapter Five, 
Six and Seven. The requirements of the law cannot be implemented in practice. 
Therefore it does not generate confidence to ensure that the judicial powers act in 
compliance with the law, and the CCPL of 1996 therefore have little impact on 
safeguards for suspects. Violations of individual’s rights often exist to prevent crimes 
and maintain social stability.  
 
1.1.4 Recommendations regarding the Forthcoming Reform on the Guiding 
Ideology for the CCPL 
As suggested in Chapter Four, the guiding ideologies and concepts for the CCPL 
must be kept updated in accordance with the international standards.13 Crime must be 
prevented and fought at national and international level with the firmest 
determination and through the rule of law. At the same time it is the duty of the 
Chinese government to preserve and promote fundamental rights, freedoms and 
liberties as well as the rule of law. In the process of the reform of the criminal justice 
system, with its traditional legal culture and the specific current domestic conditions, 
the Chinese government should take greater account of individual rights when 
developing its law.14 Emphasising the value of human rights protection demands that 
the CCPL should pay full attention to the protection of the position and dignity of a 
citizen. Therefore, primarily the principle of presumption of innocence should be 
firmly established and acknowledged in the next reform of the Chinese criminal 
justice system. In addition, the aim of criminal proceedings should also seek the 
appropriate balance between procedural justice and substantive justice. In view of the 
traditional concept of emphasizing substantive results and despising judicial 
                                               
11
 See Chap4, 4.1.2, pp.249-254. 
12
 ibid., 4.2, pp.254-257. 
13
 ibid., 5, p.257. 
14
 ibid., 5.1, pp.257-262. 
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procedure, which has an unfavorable influence on China’s current criminal justice 
system, the future reform of the CCPL should enhance the value of judicial 
procedure on the premise of a dynamic emphasis on both procedural justice and 
substantive justice.15 
 
1.2 Pre-trial Compulsory Measures 
There is an urgent need for discussions on criminal legislation in China in recent 
years with a focus on how to control compulsory measures before trial to reduce the 
widespread use and even abuse of various forms of pre-trial detention or arrest 
without judicial review and protection of suspects’ human rights, as examined in 
Chapter Five.  
 
1.2.1 Progress regarding Pre-trial Compulsory Measures 
Significant revisions to improve the compulsory measures system in the CCPL of 
1996 have apparently brought China closer to eliminating arbitrary deprived liberty 
as required in Article 9 of ICCPR.16 The removal of the use of the “Shelter and 
Investigation”, a type of indefinite administrative detention, from the practice of 
criminal investigation was one example of a step in the right direction to getting 
close to the “prescribed by law” requirement under Article 9(1) of ICCPR.17 Also, 
the obligation to define precisely the grounds on which deprivation of liberty is 
permissible under Article 9(1) has also been better fulfilled by clarifying certain 
conditions and limits for such detention in the revised CCPL.18 Moreover, a new time 
frame for the compulsory measures has indicated a determination to give real 
efficacy to Article 9(3) of ICCPR.19 The CCPL imposes restrictions on the police 
power to arrest, which aims to establish a judicial supervision system to the arrest as 
required in Article 9(3) and Article 9(4) of ICCPR. This represents a departure from 
the traditional view that arrest and custodial detention are an unconditional outcome 
of the investigation in the criminal process. 20  There are moves to fight against 
illegally prolonged detention, which helps to reduce instances of violation within 
                                               
15
 see Chap4, 5.2, pp.262-268. 
16
 See Chap5, 2, pp.269-283. 
17
 Ibid., 2.1, p.270. 
18
 Ibid., 2.2, p.273. 
19
 Ibid., 2.3, p.274. 
20
 Ibid., 2.4, p.277. 
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Article 9 of ICCPR. 21 It also suggests a willingness to further accept the principle of 
presumption of innocence and due process contained in Article 14(1) and (2) of 
ICCPR.  
 
1.2.2 Absence of Safeguards against Arbitrary Pre-trial Compulsory Measures 
However, the pre-trial compulsory measures system currently prescribed and 
practised in the CCPL still falls far short of recognised international standards.22 
Many factors contribute to the abuse of compulsory measures in China before trial. 
Beyond the significant reason concerning the crime-control orientation of criminal 
procedure as indicated in Chapter Four, the direct cause for the abuse has proved to 
be the prevalence of a misleading understanding and interpretation of the law by the 
law enforcement agencies and the tendency of the officials to mistakenly apply it in a 
harsh manner as analysed in Chapter Five.23 As discussed in Chapter Five, the use of 
arrest and custodial detention remains the primary form of abuse inflicted by law 
enforcement.24 Officials have deliberately detained suspects as punishment without 
satisfying the requirements prescribed by the CCPL. 25  The Chinese government has 
also put forward various justifications for the broad granting of discretion to detain. 
However, compared with the findings of the ECHR, it might have difficulty in 
arguing that the public security issue is sufficient to support the abuse of the 
compulsory measures and the detention for lengthy periods in the absence of 
effective safeguards to guarantee the right to fair trial in China. Non-custodial 
detention such as “posting bail and awaiting trial” remains the exception rather than 
the rule, which is clearly incompatible with Article 14(2) and Article 9(3) of ICCPR. 
The reason for such abuse also lies in problems within the regulations of the system 
of arrest and custodial detention.26 Arrest and custodial detention in Chinese criminal 
justice is an important detection method and its purpose in practice is to facilitate the 
obtaining of confessions by the authorities. The absence of the need to give 
reasonable grounds for arrest clearly raises the possibility that incompatibility with 
Article 9(1) and 14(2) of ICCPR will be found. 
 
                                               
21
 See Chap5, 2.5, pp.278-283. 
22
 Ibid., 3, pp.283-317. 
23
 Ibid., 3.1, p.284. 
24
 Ibid.,  3.1.1, pp.285-286. 
25
 Ibid.,  3.1.2 Chapter 5, p.289. 
26
 Ibid.,  3.1.2 Chapter 5, p.287-289. 
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One of the most heavily criticised aspects of the Chinese criminal justice system that 
hampers efforts to improve human rights for suspects is that the time limits under the 
CCPL of 1996 with regard to detention before trial are still uncertain.27 Its weakness 
mainly lies in the often vague provisions and use of undefined terms containing a 
great deal of flexibility and providing broad authority to the Chinese law 
enforcement authorities in criminal proceedings. Firstly, the CCPL of 1996 does not 
specifically prohibit authorities from using administrative detention and the pre-trial 
compulsory measures consecutively or in succession, as discussed in Chapter Five, 
which might undermine the safeguards they are intended to offer, taking Article 9(3) 
of ICCPR into account.28 This leads to the practical application of non-custodial 
detention not being standard and the total period of non-custodial detention can be a 
severe measure to restrict personal liberty for a long period. A breach of Article 9(3) 
of ICCPR might be found here. The system of non-custodial detention has changed 
from a guarantee measure in litigation activity to a measure taken to avoid risks to 
public security organs and to punish suspects on behalf of victims and the public, as 
well as to relieve the general public’s fear of crime.  
 
Secondly, the new time frame in the CCPL of 1996 has flaws in respect of the 
custodial detention. 29  Article 9(3) calls into question those provisions, which 
obviously invest officials with huge discretion to decide when to extend detention in 
the absence of judicial supervision. Due to ambiguous drafting, the conditions for 
continued detention may be interpreted many ways. The rules for warrantless 
detention in China can legally last up to 37 days and so is much longer than the 
universally-accepted standard.30 The duration of detention after arrest, which may 
extend to more than 7 months, is unacceptably long.31 Thirdly, besides the already 
uncertain long periods of compulsory measures allowed under the law, detention 
may, and frequently is, prolonged beyond legal time limits.32 The quality of Chinese 
law enforcement officers does not meet the requirement of the new reform, which 
has drawn sharp criticism. There is still the tendency for law enforcement officers to 
disregard the law and to follow their own traditional style of working for the 
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convenience of law enforcement under the influence of traditional legal ideologies, 
particularly for obtaining evidence through interrogation of detained suspects as 
discussed in Chapter Six. This phenomenon severely underscores the difficulty 
involved in implementing a comprehensive criminal legal system to protect human 
rights for suspects in China. The extensive loopholes and ambiguities in the law have 
been further exploited to the full by law enforcement authorities in this situation. 
Regulations or notices issued by the law enforcement authorities have tried to 
provide some additional details and to address this long-term concern, but they too 
were silent or ambiguous on many key issues. Clearly, a conflict with Article 14(2) 
read with 9(1) and Article 9(3) of ICCPR might arise.  
 
As suggested in Chapter Five, another significant factor to be considered in the 
arbitrary nature of compulsory measures lies in the checks and balances system 
within the criminal justice system, which comes directly into conflict with Article 
9(3) and Article 9(4) of ICCPR.33 No other compulsory measure in the CCPL of 
1996 except arrest is to be examined and approved by an institution other than the 
police.34 The right to notification guaranteed in Article 9(2) of ICCPR might not be 
satisfied at the time of the possible incommunicado detention.35 The police may still 
dispense with the requirement to inform the suspect’s family or work unit of his 
detention if it would interfere with the investigation or if there is no way to give 
notice. The only apparent check on police discretion in determining if such 
circumstances exist is the general oversight role of the procuratorate, though 
expanded access to counsel may help to improve the situation to some degree as 
discussed in Chapter Seven. As far as all the consequences arising from it, Article 7 
and Article 14 of ICCPR are also concerned here, as discussed in Article 6. At the 
same time, the power of examining and deciding an arrest is in fact in the hands of 
procuratorates by the prosecutor in Chinese criminal proceedings, while arrests 
decided by the courts rarely occur.36 But the procuratorate will usually approve an 
arrest because of its simultaneous task of crime control.37 Arguably, the procuratorate 
in the Chinese current judicial system is not authorised by law to exercise judicial 
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power as required in Article 9(3) of ICCPR, but its review of arrests is normally far 
from “prompt” which also fails to fulfil Article 9(3) of the ICCPR obligation.38  
 
Furthermore, a person subject to detention under the revised CCPL is likewise denied 
the internationally recognized right to bring a habeas corpus proceeding whereby a 
court can determine the lawfulness of the detention.39 The detainee only has the right 
to challenge his detention once the time limit for detention prescribed by law expires. 
However, the revised CCPL is conspicuously vague on the question of to whom the 
suspect should direct his or her demand for release, and there is no provision for any 
judicial role in reviewing the response. Detailed rules on implementing the CCPL 
issued by the SPC and the SPP contain no procedure for reviewing the legality of 
time limit extensions either before or after they have been initiated. Such a 
supervision system might not satisfy the aim of achieving compliance with Article 
9(4) of ICCPR, despite the involvement of the procuratorate as a monitoring figure 
during the entire criminal proceedings. Also, there are virtually no legal or other 
consequences for law enforcement officials who ignore or misuse the laws regarding 
pre-trial compulsory measures. The result is that the police continue to have 
enormous power to detain the suspect for extended periods of time. The extensive 
loopholes contained in the law itself and in its interpretation used by legal 
implementation agencies, allow the authorities enormous latitude to detain people for 
as long as they see fit. The pre-trial legal personal liberty of the suspect cannot be 
guaranteed at all. Article 9(5) of ICCPR would also be involved where the failure to 
provide an effective mechanism for the detainee to test the lawfulness of the 
detention might easily affect his or her enforceable right to compensation.40 
 
1.2.3 Recommendations regarding Pre-trial Compulsory Measures 
Recognizing some of the current problems affecting pre-trial compulsory measures 
in Chinese criminal justice with a view to bringing them into line with international 
human rights standards, Chapter Five discussed the likelihood of the coming CCPL 
reform. The grounds for various forms of pre-trial compulsory measures under the 
CCPL should be clearly identified and specified to avoid their arbitrary use, in order 
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to fulfil the requirement of Article 9(1) of ICCPR.41  In particular, a formal bail 
system should be set up and pre-trial detention should remain exceptional to ensure 
that Article 9(3) of ICCPR is not infringed.42 It is necessary to prohibit all forms of 
compulsory measures without prompt examination and approval. In this respect the 
role of the procuratorate needs to be reconsidered to meet the criteria of 
independence and impartiality set forth in Article 9(3) of ICCPR in the current stage 
of reform. China should also consider a more formalized system of information in 
order to fully respect Article 9(2) of ICCPR. 43  In particular, legally-binding 
provisions in the law should be established. Moreover, the CCPL should be urged to 
guarantee that the duration of the various forms of detention meets internationally 
accepted time limits, including Article 9(3) and Article (4) of ICCPR.44 Bearing in 
mind the safeguard in Article 9(4) of ICCPR, there is an impelling need for the 
CCPL to accept the effective right of the suspect to challenge before a court the 
lawfulness of every kind of detention or arrest.45 The legal duties and liabilities of the 
judicial officers should be evaluated and identified in the law.46  It is considered 
desirable that the reconstruction of the procedures concerning detention and arrest 
before trial is the direction that should be taken in the coming legal reform, including 
the authority and the method of implementing the judicial review in the course of 
investigation.47 Individuals detained in contravention of their legal rights should be 
offered compensation by the state as required in Article 9(5) of ICCPR.48 
 
1.3 The Prevention of Torture and Illegally-Obtained Evidence 
Apart from the abuse of pre-trial compulsory measures, an equally salient problem in 
China’s criminal justice system is that acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in breach of Article 7 of ICCPR and Article 3 of 
ECHR, mainly in the form of extorting a confession through torture, have existed for 
so long in China as discussed in Chapter Six. The struggle against all kinds of torture 
and ill-treatment in Chinese criminal justice continues. It has long been recognized 
that the frequent occurrence of such phenomena as the use of torture to obtain 
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evidence must also be influenced by the prevailing legal culture and structure in a 
Chinese society under transformation. 
 
1.3.1 Factors Contributing to the Continuing Use of Evidence Obtained through 
Torture or Ill-treatment 
The first factor related to this is the traditional legal culture regarding confession.49 
Confession with sincere remorse, rather than insistence on one’s rights, is an 
important aspect of the legal culture of confession in China. 50 Moreover, another 
aspect of the legal culture of confession, the belief that legal authorities will show 
greater leniency towards those who confess, greatly encourages the cooperation of 
the suspects. The general attitude which is unfavorable to silence and challenge from 
the suspects to the state may be due to this legal culture of confession. Also 
confession is regarded as the most valuable source of information in solving and 
prosecuting crimes and torture has been relied upon over centuries in China as a 
convenient tool for obtaining confession.51 
 
Another factor leading to the widespread use of torture and other inhumane treatment 
against suspects in China is that the criminal legal system fails to adequately protect 
critical procedural rights for suspects.52 Firstly, the concept of torture defined and 
understood in China is rather more general and narrow under the Chinese criminal 
justice system than the definitions in Article 7 of ICCPR or Article 1 of CAT.53 A 
necessary precondition for torture is the involvement of the regular judicial process. 
The authorities in China might therefore fail to fulfil their responsibilities in Article 7 
of the ICCPR obligation to prosecute all perpetrators of torture, regardless of whether 
they are acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private 
capacity. 54  Also, many aspects of Article 7 related to torture and ill-treatment have 
never existed in Chinese domestic law. 55   Secondly, illegally-obtained evidence 
generally continues to be admissible during the trial under the CCPL of 1996.56 This 
is primarily because there is no specific mechanism for barring the use of illegally-
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obtained evidence in the Chinese criminal justice system. 57  Also lack of the 
obligation to investigate alleged torture in police custody also fails to make CCPL 
compatible with Article 7 of ICCPR. 58  These flaws directly encourage the 
continuation of the use of torture as a means to extract evidence in crime 
investigation, especially through confession. 
 
Thirdly, the CCPL of 1996 does not recognize the right to silence, which is regarded 
as contributing to the risks of a confession obtained in breach of Article 7.59  The 
question of whether the right to silence should be granted to suspects in China has 
long been a controversial issue. Opposition to the right to silence is more concerned 
with the effectiveness of crime control.60 On the other hand, proponents of this right 
have argued that the right to silence is internationally recognised as an important 
aspect inherent in the presumption of innocence and a primary safeguard for 
vulnerable suspects against police misconduct and wrongful conviction. 61  The 
burden of proof will be affected and Article 14(2) of ICCPR will not appear to be 
satisfied, if suspects are obliged to make confessions in order to assist the 
prosecution in any way to establish their guilt. Fourthly, last but not least, lack of 
valid supervision mechanisms to investigate police activity also adds to the relative 
limitation of criminal justice systems that contributes to the torture and ill-treatment 
of suspects.62  There is no independent complaint body and effective avenue for 
people to make complaints about their treatment against Article 7 while being 
investigated.63 The procuratorates are in a relatively weak position to supervise the 
practice of the police during interrogations.64 The internal check has also failed to 
address the issue.65 Moreover, supervision of the implementation of the legislation by 
the public and the media is not strong enough.66 Neither is the current administrative 
supervision system efficient enough and sufficient to handle the allegations of torture 
and ill-treatment. 67  China therefore has not complied with the obligation under 
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Article 7 of ICCPR to provide effective and adequate methods for the victims to seek 
redress from the perpetrators. 
 
1.3.2 Major Efforts to Prevent Extorting Confessions by Torture 
Acknowledging the extent of torture in China, the Chinese government and the 
judicial organs have made great efforts in this regard.68 One of the efforts made was 
to increase cooperation with international society and the issue of human rights 
protection has been considered in the anti-torture campaign.69 Efforts have also been 
made in the area of legislation.70 A series of concrete measures have been initiated to 
ban torture and protect the human rights of the suspects.71 There has been an effort to 
reform the standards regarding criminal evidence to exclude confessions extorted by 
torture and the principle of presumption of innocence is now more widely 
practised.72 The so-called “zero statement rule” is being put into practice in the local 
jurisdictions and signifies a growing recognition of the right of silence in China. 73 
Additionally, many new and detailed regulations have been published mainly by SPC, 
SPP and MPS in order to correctly and efficiently implement existing loosely defined 
laws against extracting confessions through torture. 74  Governments, courts and 
procuratorates in their work and law enforcement are all aiming to have wider 
ranging supervision by the general public and the media in order to better combat 
Article 7 treatments in criminal proceedings.75 Due to the measures mentioned above, 
China has made great progress in legislation and implementation with regards to 
prohibition against torture. 
 
1.3.3 Recommendations regarding the Prohibition of Torture in Criminal 
Justice 
However, interrogation by torture is still one of the most important causes of 
injustice nowadays in China. To ensure that Article 7 of ICCPR is respected, the 
Chinese criminal justice system, CCPL in particular, must be further revised to 
provide an effective judicial and social mechanism in order to thoroughly eradicate 
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torture during criminal investigations.76 Firstly, the prevention of Article 7 treatment 
lies in better implementation of the law and greater professionalism on the part of 
law enforcement personnel. Therefore China should continue to intensify efforts to 
increase strict enforcement of the law. The professional quality and responsibility of 
different levels of authority among officials in China should be continuously 
improved by providing different levels of specialized education or systematic 
training in scientific investigation skills, legal theories and international human rights 
standards.77  
 
Secondly, greater efforts should also be made in China to set in place building up a 
series of standards and measures in line with the necessary international human 
rights standards in the domestic legislative and judicial fields to reduce the chance of 
suspects being tortured during investigations.78 First, the definition of torture and 
other ill-treatment should be based on the definition given in Article 1 of CAT and 
Article 7 of ICCPR. 79  Second, evidence gathered as a result of torture and ill-
treatments should be strictly inadmissible as evidence. 80 Concerning the burden of 
proof in cases of extortion of confessions by torture, the prosecution and the public 
security organs should be required to produce evidence compatible with Article 7 
and Article 14 of ICCPR. Third, the right to silence should be added to the law. 
Suspects should not be compelled to make a statement against their will and the 
obligation to give truthful answers prescribed in Article 93 of the CCPL of 1996 
should be cancelled.81 Fourth, an independent complaints system against torture and 
ill-treatment should be established. 82  The mechanisms of independent judicial 
supervision should be established. Also comprehensive procedural protection for 
suspects to prevent torture should be set up and strengthened, such as establishing the 
system of synchronise sound and videotape recording during interrogations, 
improving the conditions and procedures of detention and increasing public 
participation.  
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Thirdly, to achieve the goal of fulfilling international obligations under Article 7 of 
ICCPR and CAT, construction of a legal culture for the suppression of torture in 
China must be supported and enhanced through all kinds of public education, 
academic research, and a series of social policies, so as to raise awareness of the 
prohibition and prevention of torture in the whole country.83 
 
1.4 The Right to Legal Counsel before Trial 
From the discussion on arbitrary pre-trial compulsory measures and the use of torture 
in criminal proceedings, a further significant fact is that Article 14(3)(b) and Article 
14(3)(d) of ICCPR might be breached where persons have been detained 
incommunicado for a long time. The role of the defence team in the criminal 
procedure is still rather weak, so that they may not adequately serve the interests of 
suspects, as discussed in Chapter Seven.  
 
1.4.1 Major Changes in the Right to Counsel Introduced by the CCPL of 1996 
Compared with the CCPL of 1979, the CCPL of 1996 further emphasizes the 
protection for the rights of suspects to defend and there has been significant progress 
in expanding the nature and role of legal representation in criminal proceedings, 
especially at the pre-trial stage.84 Firstly, a suspect may seek legal assistance during 
the investigation stage.85 Secondly, procedural improvements have also been made to 
introduce more functions for lawyers in order to better implement their proper role in 
protecting the human rights of the suspects at all stages of criminal proceedings.86  
The lawyer can check with the authorities regarding the criminal charges on which 
their clients are being held in custody or for questioning. They may also meet with 
suspects in custody. If a criminal suspect is arrested, the lawyer may apply for a bail 
pending trial for the suspect. In the prosecution stage, the defence lawyer can go to 
the prosecuting authority and read part of the case material. Thirdly, the revised law 
has broadened the grounds for the optional grant of legal aid.87  
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1.4.2 Major Obstacles to the Implementation of the Right to Counsel under the 
CCPL of 1996 
The problems may undeniably lead to strong resistance from those upholding the 
traditional legal culture as to the criminal defence and the role of defence lawyers in 
China. 88  The function of criminal defence in the modern concept would be 
contradictory to the culture and tradition of ancient China, in which the criminal 
defence was limited to the procedural activities at the criminal trial stage.89 The legal 
cultural difference is also embedded in the Chinese attitude towards criminal defence 
and the role of lawyers, which lacks the ideology of the individual versus the state in 
criminal proceedings and the lawyers have no right to mount an independent 
defence. 90  Moreover, the limited criminal defence and the unequal position of 
Chinese defence lawyers are the result of political interference from the Communist 
Party and government.91 
 
Therefore, while there has been a great deal of progress from the old laws in 
allowing earlier access to counsel, the revised CCPL does not actually provide a 
better environment for criminal defence.92 In contrast to the rules of international 
standards on the right to defence, a fair gap still exists and seems to be widening. 
Lawyers still lack independence and necessary rights and protection in Chinese 
criminal justice. The deficiency of the criminal defence position has both legislative 
and judicial aspects. Also, these restrictions effectively deprive suspects of 
meaningful legal representation. Some of the main limitations of the reform can be 
found in the following regards. Firstly, it is generally considered that the 
participation of the lawyers in pre-trial proceedings does not grant them the complete 
status of defenders, compared with the requirement in Article 14(3)(b) and Article 
14(3)(d).93 Secondly, police concern over security hinders frank meetings between 
lawyers and their clients, and therefore the right to legal counsel in Article 14(3) of 
ICCPR and the right to a fair trial on the whole in Article 14(1) of ICCPR for 
suspects cannot be safeguarded. 94  The CCPL is silent on the obligation to give 
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suspects immediate notice of their right to counsel in the investigation stage.95 The 
police are also granted great arbitrary power to deny requests for lawyer-suspect 
meetings.96 The police block suspects’ access to counsel most often by using the 
expansive definition of “state secret” as justification.97 No reason will be given to 
explain the rejection of the application for such meetings. 98 The legal aid service is 
still far from meeting the demand.99 Moreover, the duration and the times of the 
meetings in custody have been greatly limited by the local authorities. 100 
Furthermore, while the defence lawyer can not be present at the interrogation, the 
authorities are permitted to monitor the meeting between the lawyers and suspects. 
Lawyers have great difficulty in holding private meetings with suspects and learning 
the details of the whole case.101 
 
Thirdly, compared with international standards on what lawyers are allowed to 
access for criminal defence, the files disclosed to lawyers in China are generally 
limited during the prosecution review stage as well as during the trial stage.102 In 
addition, there are no adequate measures or systems for monitoring the decision as to 
whether the disclosure of evidence is inappropriate. Fourthly, the lack of 
independence and effectiveness of defence lawyers also derives from the lack of 
immunity for criminal defence work.103 As lawyers have faced hostile attitudes over 
many years in China, the reform to expand the role of the lawyer in the criminal 
process in terms of safeguarding suspects’ rights has provided more incentives for 
the investigative organs to use their superior power to thwart such advances by the 
defence.104 There are several easily manipulated provisions in the whole criminal 
justice law which is both too broad by virtue of its vagueness and too narrow by 
virtue of its application only to lawyers.105 The combination of all these adverse 
provisions for lawyers has created an environment that endangers towards the 
provision of legal counsel or defence services. Lawyers continue to be vulnerable to 
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huge interference from judicial and other state institutions. 106  The disciplinary 
mechanism within China’s legal profession is relatively new and ineffective. The 
impact of the 1996 reform on the right to defence is mixed and lawyers are thus still 
left in the dark in their defence preparation during the pre-trial stage in a system 
where the state traditionally has enormous power, and where law enforcement 
agencies dominate the judicial process. 
 
1.4.3 Recommendations regarding the Right to Counsel 
An analysis of the difficulties for defence lawyers at the pre-trial stage evidently calls 
for appropriate measures with the aim of bringing China’s criminal defence system 
into conformity with international standards, particularly the requirement in Article 
14(3)(b) and (d) of ICCPR in conjunction with Article 14(1) of ICCPR. 107  Firstly, 
adequate and effective enforcement of the existing law should be carried out to 
ensure that lawyers can work more independently and to provide legal services more 
effectively, particularly in the pre-trial stage. 108 Some steps can be taken during 
further legislative amendment to alleviate the crisis in China’s criminal defence 
system and to improve lawyers’ ability to plead for suspects’ rights. 109  It is 
recommended that the defence lawyer at the investigation stage should enjoy equal 
status and be given the same roles as those at the prosecution or trial stage.110 To 
ensure that people under investigation or accused of crimes have access to legal 
advice and representation, it is necessary to expand the coverage of legal aid and to 
standardise an immediate and effective legal aid service in the criminal justice 
system. 111  The legislation on the right to confidential communication with the 
accused must be guaranteed by unrestricted access.112 One method of solving the 
difficulty for lawyers in gaining access to appropriate and useful information is to 
establish an evidence disclosure system through legislation.113 China should ensure 
the effective protection of lawyers carrying out their duties and functions. It is 
necessary to consider defining the right to complete immunity from prosecution for 
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words written or spoken during legal representation. 114  In addition to the steps 
outlined above, full resolution of the problems faced by defence lawyers in China 
will in the long-term require education and a change in prevailing attitudes toward 
criminal defence. 115 
 
2. Looking forward 
By accounting for both the positive and the negative aspects of the current CCPL and 
its practice regarding human rights protection of suspects in the pre-trial stage, earlier 
analysis in this thesis has revealed that the 1996 revisions failed to bring the CCPL 
into conformity with the standards of ICCPR. It should be aware that solely 
amending the CCPL will not make rights for suspects happen. It is fair to observe 
from Part Three that inconsistencies or inadequacies in the laws themselves and poor 
enforcement of the laws render the new procedural protection immaterial and 
frustrate the original intention and the ultimate purpose of the reform. This 
phenomenon demonstrates that the whole criminal justice system in China is still 
haunted by the spirits of traditional legal culture and some of the traditional values 
are the fundamental problem, causing embarrassment and obstacles in the criminal 
justice system. Social harmony has to be achieved within the state and the public 
interest outweighs individual rights in China. This conventional value may help 
justify the belief that legally guaranteed individual rights can be disregarded and 
sacrificed in the interests of society, particularly in terms of crime control and 
prevention. In the criminal justice system, as shown in Part Three, a crime-control 
approach to criminal procedure still prevails in both legislative and legal practice. 
Even though the Chinese people have been quite deft at adopting the Western style 
market economy and life style, their concept of law, their lack of tolerance of crimes 
and criminals and their self-contradictory attitudes towards government bureaucracy 
have proved to make them rather immune to Western influences. Actions of the court, 
the procuratorate and police are ultimately motivated by the desire to find the person 
responsible for the crime and convict the one they believe is the criminal. The 
significance of procedural safeguards in the ultimate fairness of the trial and human 
rights protection has not been fully appreciated in China.  
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Since the reforms are intended to change ingrained patterns of behaviour by law 
enforcement officials, it seems that the gaps between the law and the practice of 
criminal justice, and the domestic law and the international norms will actually grow 
wider, at least in the short term.116 China faces a more serious challenge in bridging 
the gap under the current cultural preference. Therefore, while much could 
potentially be done to improve the current situation as suggested in the thesis, the 
reform will be limited in its effectiveness unless accompanied by a change in attitude 
toward crimes and suspects among the public and those working within the legal 
system, and by an increase in the political will among state leaders to take human 
rights seriously. In order to work against arbitrariness and improve the overall 
environment for greater protection for suspects, an underlying recommendation 
applying to all aspects evaluated in this thesis is the further development of Chinese 
legal culture. However, legal cultural changes take an extremely long time to develop. 
The adoption of many of the modern concepts of criminal justice, e.g. the 
presumption of innocence, early participation by lawyers, elements of the adversarial 
system, etc., requires a change in the approach and thinking of the public, judicial 
personnel and the Chinese leadership.  
 
The sincerity and commitment to reform on the part of the authorities will be 
particularly called into question. If they continue in the same manner as before, then 
additional and welcome safeguards for suspects introduced in the coming legal 
reforms still have little chance of being implemented in practice. The leading 
institutions need to be conscious of human rights in their operations. Also, the 
strengthening of the role of defence in criminal proceedings, the limitation of the 
powers of investigatory organs, and the introduction of the more adversarial trial 
process demand higher judicial and professional standards. This can be achieved 
through strengthening the efforts to educate and train the judicial authorities, 
including the police, prosecutors and judges about the importance of observing the 
law and the principle of due process, so that they are aware of human rights 
standards and what is expected of them. Training programs should be a permanent 
feature and be implemented throughout the system, reflected in long-term and 
different training plans and resource allocation, from the highest to the lowest 
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authorities. Such training should emphasize the role of the law enforcement officials 
as protectors of human rights and raise awareness of the fact that human rights 
protection and effective crime control are mutually inclusive goals. And also 
information regarding the knowledge and understanding of the ICCPR must be 
included in the training, as well as information about China’s obligations under the 
ICCPR. Moreover, China should reform the old selection system of judges and 
prosecutors, under which law graduates who pass the uniform judicial qualification 
examination but who have no prior experience in legal practice are selected to serve 
as judges and prosecutors. Instead, China should open the channels for lawyers, 
judges, and prosecutors to change their careers and build a system in which 
prosecutors and judges are selected from a pool of outstanding lawyers who have a 
rich and varied experience of litigation.   
 
In order to nurture and popularize a culture respecting the human rights of the most 
vulnerable groups such as criminal suspects, a national plan for human rights 
education should be established taking account of the rich cultural heritage and the 
present social conditions in China. Many Chinese people recognize the problems 
concerning governmental arbitrariness and lack of protection for individual rights 
and they also express their desire to change the situation. However, human rights 
education and public awareness has been a rather abstract issue, given the low 
educational level of large groups of the population. Accordingly, there should be 
human rights education targeted at the general public, not only to raise and deepen 
their awareness but also to improve their understanding of the issues at stake. It 
should reflect international human rights standards and emphasis the rights provided 
in the CCPL. The promotion of human rights education should be incorporated in the 
school curriculum at different levels of education, the training program in different 
state agencies and in the publicity among broader communities.  In order to train 
professionals in the field of human rights with an international vision, the 
government should encourage and support the study and research into human rights 
in institutions of higher learning and social science academies and institutes. It is also 
important to have constant dialogues, international exchange and cooperation on 
human rights issues with other countries and international communities through 
various channels on the basis of equality and mutual respect. The aim of these 
communications is to establish a genuine platform for open and frank discussion and 
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therefore enhance mutual understanding on the human rights issue.   
 
In order to reach the widest possible audience, in addition to publishing and 
distributing books, leaflets and brochures, China should make good use of the media, 
including radio, television, newspapers, magazines and the Internet, to spread and 
popularise knowledge of the law and human rights in various forms. As a free media 
is critical to providing Chinese people with a realistic understanding of the 
international standards on human rights protection and the challenges facing the 
rapidly transforming society, the government should lift its strict control of the media. 
In particular, as the internet records extraordinary growth in services as well as users, 
the government must try to end all limits on access to any contents that are related to 
“human rights” issues, such as a number of human rights organizations, but allow its 
citizens to access the comprehensive and updated information that keeps them 
informed of their human rights and broadens their understanding of and respect for 
human rights. As a minimum, the public should be given the basic information about 
such matters as the legal time limits on compulsory measures, the right to appeal 
against torture and the right to get help from a lawyer in criminal procedures. It is 
crucial to ensure that suspects should not only be informed of their rights, but that 
they have also understood them. Increased publicity about criminal trials could also 
have positive effects, as a pervasive presumption of guilt is widespread among the 
public, who are more concerned about fighting crime than about violations of human 
rights.  
 
It is unrealistic to expect that a revision of the law could bring about the desired 
changes overnight. Legal reform is certainly an expensive and arduous task, but 
China has to take steps to meet its international obligations with which it has agreed 
to comply by ratifying major international human rights instruments. The underlying 
principles of the international instruments should become embedded in an effective 
human rights culture and in time reflect how people treat each other in their everyday 
lives in China. The nearly three decades of reform are only an instant in history and 
China is undergoing a dramatic transition period. The frustration and confusion 
connected with the current criminal procedure reform are characteristic of a 
transition period, during which reform efforts are confronted by resistance from old 
ideologies and institutions. China presents and will continue to present an unruly and 
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continuing mix of western concepts of legality with Chinese values and institutions 
that are sometimes hostile to them.117 It remains the Chinese government’s obligation 
to address such issues honestly while improving the systematic protection of the 
criminal justice system and upholding the letter and spirit of the revised CCPL. A 
greater awareness and appreciation of the important cultural and historical 
differences between China and the western approach concerning human rights 
problems may suggest a commitment for China and the world to work together to 
promote human rights protection rather than to concentrate dangerously on an 
ideological conflict over the question of respect for basic human rights.  
 
However, the dangers involved with indulging in the emphasis on specific Chinese 
characteristics limit China’s understandings of the genuine concepts and values of 
human rights and of the worldwide-acquired experience and expertise for effective 
protection of human rights. Also the increasing relevance of human rights dialogues 
and cooperation will not be fruitful where there is no willingness to acknowledge 
common ground. To become further integrated into the world, China must no longer 
use its particularity and its unique position in the world as a pretext for rejecting 
criticism and preventing debates from going into the core issues of human rights 
protection. China should not only integrate its economy into the world economy, but 
also adopt universally accepted human rights values. In order to achieve a better 
balance between crime control and human rights protection, the modern concepts of 
human rights protection in the light of international norms must gradually take root 
in the field of criminal justice in the country. In this case, the burden will be heavy 
and time-consuming before the new principles and concepts are integrated into the 
minds of Chinese citizens and the structures of Chinese society. In this transitional 
period, the Chinese government and people need to make more effort and have the 
courage to change the balance of power between the individual and the state. 
Legislation and amendments need to be based on the demands of modern Chinese 
society, to actively sublimate its traditional legal culture, and to objectively absorb 
and transplant international principles on human rights protection to a gradual 
improvement of the criminal justice system. “We need to safeguard the lawful rights 
and interests of our people according to law,” Wen Jiabao suggested. “We also need 
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to educate and properly guide the general public so that they can realize more that 
their legitimate concerns need to be expressed through lawful and legal channels and 
in lawful formats.”118 After all, the aim of this tough reform is not just to make the 
establishment of the legal system more compatible with well-recognized 
international standards, but also to transform the lives of the people in China. 
 
 
                                               
118
 see Wen Jiabao, Press Conference at the Conclusion of the Fourth Session of the 10th National People's 
Congress, 14/03/06, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200603/15/eng20060315_250735.html.  
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